Define what you mean by that, and I will answer the question.
What do I mean by 'what is mathematics?' We all know what the term means academically. So what am I asking? I am asking what you surely have asked yourself, before, I would presume. I think Einstein said 'the old one is a mathematician'. There is immense order to the physical world and this faculty we have with modeling via the 'language' of math is maybe what we could say is 'fortunate'. But I am asking the question, beyond that we have this faculty of mathematics, this language, does it have an existence of its own? I would predict that you would say that it has no existence on its own. Perhaps you would say, as I have, that it only has existence in a 'mind'. Define 'mind'? For now, I'll say it is the thing we have where we do math. Do other things have 'minds'? If I will take ID seriously, which I have come to entertain, then the ID will have to be done in something similar to this thing we possess, called 'mind'. So what I am asking you, and I also ask you to interpret my question in a context of your own paradigm if you cannot make literal sense of it, 'besides its definition as a branch in academics, or as a formal system extrapolated upon basic logic, or as a 'language', is there a more fundamental existence for 'mathematics'? ...not a trick question - just a curious question.
Why do you think minds are formal systems?
Actually, that was John Lucas' argument - his premise. I will have to read the essay again (after many years) and see the whole argument again. Perhaps that is the counter-argument? ... and here I believe the system incompasses more than the mind but the whole reality - the argument would be that the physical universe (nor a human mind within the physical universe) is not a formal system?
Ah, that. Penrose doesn't know what he is talking about.
..seems a rather global condemnation, to me. What is it mainly about ENM about which you find he "doesn't know"?
It's not a question of "old school", it's a question of relevance. The Incompleteness Theorem points out a fundamental and inescapable limitation of formal systems. If minds were formal systems, then they are subject to the same limit. But they aren't.
A neural network model running on a digital computer is a formal system. I have come to understand that it is not uncommonly believed by Strong-AI-ers that a conscious mind may emerge from a sufficiently complex neural network synthesized in an digital computer. So where am I incorrect: that such synthesis would not be a formal system; or, that a conscious mind could never emerge from such a synthesis?
They're virtual photons. In a mathematical model.
I can understand that the virtual photons are so-called for the reason that they convey intra-particle information, but are not directly detected with humanly devised instruments (did I say that to your satisfaction?).
I need to read up on virtual photons. Are information-packets labeled virtual only when they are non-relativistic? Otherwise, they are labeled "photons"?
Quantum computation can produce approximations to extremely difficult combinatorial problems very quickly, but (a) they are approximations, and (b) the accuracy of the approximation is dependent on the processing time. So you may have a problem that would take a million years on a conventional supercomputer that could be calculated in a second on a small quantum computer... But the answer might be wrong.
What kind of problems could be solved with this? Could QC at least give us some ideas and then we could use more conventional ways to verify/falsify?
They most certainly cannot process anything instantaneously.
"Instantaneously" is an extreme boundary... OK, what if we say that the speed ratio K= 1MY/1s (from your preceding paragraph). That approximates to 10^14 times as fast as a supercomputer. Not instantaneous but a hell of an improvement. Maybe the computation time is infinitesmal but the transport time is finite (I/O bound)
