Gawdzilla Sama
TImeToSweepTheLeg
More footnote mining or have you gone to Googlefishing? My question still stands, Bob. What exactly did Stark do that day? And yes, this is a trap.
Genda provided another interesting bit of information about the weather: He said the visibility was so bad that the submarines were ordered to travel within sight of the other ships instead of traveling 40 to 60 miles ahead of "the fleets" as originally planned:
Uh, high powered radio transmission that can be heard thousands of miles away?"Within sight", hmm?
What else can be done within sight, I wonder...
Regarding the weather that the KB encountered, Lt. Cmdr. Minoru Genda, who planned much of the Hawaii Operation, said the weather was "rough" and "severe," that at times the weather was bad enough that it prevented supply operations, that the weather and poor visibility caused navigation to be "full of hardships," and that the bad weather served to help conceal the task force:
Throughout, navigation was full of hardships owing to poor visibility (dense mist) and rough weather. But we thanked heaven for them, because they reduced the chances of being discovered by the enemy. As for the supply, it was done almost every if weather permitted [which logically means there were times when weather did not permit]. . . . During the voyage, stress was laid on the economy of fuel; heaving was not done in spite of severe winter and electric lights were reduced to the minimum necessary. (Goldstein and Dillon, The Pearl Harbor Papers, p. 38)
Genda provided another interesting bit of information about the weather: He said the visibility was so bad that the submarines were ordered to travel within sight of the other ships instead of traveling 40 to 60 miles ahead of "the fleets" as originally planned:
Originally it was scheduled that the submarines were to be kept 40 to 60 miles ahead of the fleets, but poor visibility made them move around within their sight all the way. (The Pearl Harbor Papers, p. 38)
Odd that they would worry about visibility when they had radios. Oh that's right KB did not transmit.
Odd that they would worry about visibility when they had radios.
You exaggerate the low level of visibility, and continue to tout that ******** about them transmitting.So instead of allowing that the extremely poor visibility may have led some ships to use low-powered comms because they couldn't always use signals, you make the illogical, strawman argument that they wouldn't have cared about visibility if they were using radios. For one thing, bad visibility affects more than just a convoy's ability to use signals.
And if, as Jacobsen suggests, Grogan was nearly hearing transmissions from Yokohoma to Japanese commercial ships, why didn't Grogan hear more of those transmissions during the SS Lurline's return voyage to San Francisco?
Traditionalists have bounced from one theory to another to explain Grogan's DF bearings: they were from Russian ships; they were signals that had bounced from Japan all the way to Grogan's position and somehow they consistently returned bearings that were NW of Hawaii; they were ABD ships; they were stray Japanese fishing boats; or, well, maybe Grogan just made up the whole story--and never you mind that he was known as a credible, honest man (Farago reached this same judgment about him when he interviewed him).
You exaggerate the low level of visibility, and continue to tout that ******** about them transmitting.
Yes, they speak for themselves, despite your efforts to make them seem like something they're not.I think the descriptions of the poor visibility speak for themselves. It must have been pretty bad to compel the KB to make the subs travel within sight instead of 40 to 60 miles ahead as originally scheduled.
Again with the lame ********. Your claims are deader than Tutankhamen.And you continue to repeat your implausible explanation that the intercepted transmissions between the Akagi and tankers on a tactical circuit were part of the radio deception effort. If anything would have been "stupid," that would have been utterly "stupid." Carriers normally did not talk directly with tankers, and routine home-waters operations would not have been done on tactical circuits. But that's the kind of nonsense you must peddle because otherwise your "KB did not transmit" line would collapse.
So instead of allowing that the extremely poor visibility may have led some ships to use low-powered comms because they couldn't always use signals, you make the illogical, strawman argument that they wouldn't have cared about visibility if they were using radios. For one thing, bad visibility affects more than just a convoy's ability to use signals.
And if, as Jacobsen suggests, Grogan was nearly hearing transmissions from Yokohoma to Japanese commercial ships, why didn't Grogan hear more of those transmissions during the SS Lurline's return voyage to San Francisco?
Traditionalists have bounced from one theory to another to explain Grogan's DF bearings: they were from Russian ships; they were signals that had bounced from Japan all the way to Grogan's position and somehow they consistently returned bearings that were NW of Hawaii; they were ABD ships; they were stray Japanese fishing boats; or, well, maybe Grogan just made up the whole story--and never you mind that he was known as a credible, honest man (Farago reached this same judgment about him when he interviewed him).
Carriers normally did not talk directly with tankers
So how do they arrange for a transfer?