Merged Pearl Harbor: "Revisionists" vs. "Traditionalists"

Regarding the weather that the KB encountered, Lt. Cmdr. Minoru Genda, who planned much of the Hawaii Operation, said the weather was "rough" and "severe," that at times the weather was bad enough that it prevented supply operations, that the weather and poor visibility caused navigation to be "full of hardships," and that the bad weather served to help conceal the task force:

Throughout, navigation was full of hardships owing to poor visibility (dense mist) and rough weather. But we thanked heaven for them, because they reduced the chances of being discovered by the enemy. As for the supply, it was done almost every if weather permitted [which logically means there were times when weather did not permit]. . . . During the voyage, stress was laid on the economy of fuel; heaving was not done in spite of severe winter and electric lights were reduced to the minimum necessary. (Goldstein and Dillon, The Pearl Harbor Papers, p. 38)​

Genda provided another interesting bit of information about the weather: He said the visibility was so bad that the submarines were ordered to travel within sight of the other ships instead of traveling 40 to 60 miles ahead of "the fleets" as originally planned:

Originally it was scheduled that the submarines were to be kept 40 to 60 miles ahead of the fleets, but poor visibility made them move around within their sight all the way. (The Pearl Harbor Papers, p. 38)​
 
Genda provided another interesting bit of information about the weather: He said the visibility was so bad that the submarines were ordered to travel within sight of the other ships instead of traveling 40 to 60 miles ahead of "the fleets" as originally planned:

"Within sight", hmm?

What else can be done within sight, I wonder...
 
BTF, why are you now quoting the Japanese? I thought you said they lied? Or do they only lie when they don't say what you want?
 
Regarding the weather that the KB encountered, Lt. Cmdr. Minoru Genda, who planned much of the Hawaii Operation, said the weather was "rough" and "severe," that at times the weather was bad enough that it prevented supply operations, that the weather and poor visibility caused navigation to be "full of hardships," and that the bad weather served to help conceal the task force:

Throughout, navigation was full of hardships owing to poor visibility (dense mist) and rough weather. But we thanked heaven for them, because they reduced the chances of being discovered by the enemy. As for the supply, it was done almost every if weather permitted [which logically means there were times when weather did not permit]. . . . During the voyage, stress was laid on the economy of fuel; heaving was not done in spite of severe winter and electric lights were reduced to the minimum necessary. (Goldstein and Dillon, The Pearl Harbor Papers, p. 38)​

Genda provided another interesting bit of information about the weather: He said the visibility was so bad that the submarines were ordered to travel within sight of the other ships instead of traveling 40 to 60 miles ahead of "the fleets" as originally planned:

Originally it was scheduled that the submarines were to be kept 40 to 60 miles ahead of the fleets, but poor visibility made them move around within their sight all the way. (The Pearl Harbor Papers, p. 38)​

Odd that they would worry about visibility when they had radios. Oh that's right KB did not transmit.
 
Odd that they would worry about visibility when they had radios.

So instead of allowing that the extremely poor visibility may have led some ships to use low-powered comms because they couldn't always use signals, you make the illogical, strawman argument that they wouldn't have cared about visibility if they were using radios. For one thing, bad visibility affects more than just a convoy's ability to use signals.

And if, as Jacobsen suggests, Grogan was nearly hearing transmissions from Yokohoma to Japanese commercial ships, why didn't Grogan hear more of those transmissions during the SS Lurline's return voyage to San Francisco?

Traditionalists have bounced from one theory to another to explain Grogan's DF bearings: they were from Russian ships; they were signals that had bounced from Japan all the way to Grogan's position and somehow they consistently returned bearings that were NW of Hawaii; they were ABD ships; they were stray Japanese fishing boats; or, well, maybe Grogan just made up the whole story--and never you mind that he was known as a credible, honest man (Farago reached this same judgment about him when he interviewed him).
 
So instead of allowing that the extremely poor visibility may have led some ships to use low-powered comms because they couldn't always use signals, you make the illogical, strawman argument that they wouldn't have cared about visibility if they were using radios. For one thing, bad visibility affects more than just a convoy's ability to use signals.

And if, as Jacobsen suggests, Grogan was nearly hearing transmissions from Yokohoma to Japanese commercial ships, why didn't Grogan hear more of those transmissions during the SS Lurline's return voyage to San Francisco?

Traditionalists have bounced from one theory to another to explain Grogan's DF bearings: they were from Russian ships; they were signals that had bounced from Japan all the way to Grogan's position and somehow they consistently returned bearings that were NW of Hawaii; they were ABD ships; they were stray Japanese fishing boats; or, well, maybe Grogan just made up the whole story--and never you mind that he was known as a credible, honest man (Farago reached this same judgment about him when he interviewed him).
You exaggerate the low level of visibility, and continue to tout that ******** about them transmitting.
 
You exaggerate the low level of visibility, and continue to tout that ******** about them transmitting.

I think the descriptions of the poor visibility speak for themselves. It must have been pretty bad to compel the KB to make the subs travel within sight instead of 40 to 60 miles ahead as originally scheduled.

And you continue to repeat your implausible explanation that the intercepted transmissions between the Akagi and tankers on a tactical circuit were part of the radio deception effort. If anything would have been "stupid," that would have been utterly "stupid." Carriers normally did not talk directly with tankers, and routine home-waters operations would not have been done on tactical circuits. But that's the kind of nonsense you must peddle because otherwise your "KB did not transmit" line would collapse.
 
I think the descriptions of the poor visibility speak for themselves. It must have been pretty bad to compel the KB to make the subs travel within sight instead of 40 to 60 miles ahead as originally scheduled.
Yes, they speak for themselves, despite your efforts to make them seem like something they're not.
And you continue to repeat your implausible explanation that the intercepted transmissions between the Akagi and tankers on a tactical circuit were part of the radio deception effort. If anything would have been "stupid," that would have been utterly "stupid." Carriers normally did not talk directly with tankers, and routine home-waters operations would not have been done on tactical circuits. But that's the kind of nonsense you must peddle because otherwise your "KB did not transmit" line would collapse.
Again with the lame ********. Your claims are deader than Tutankhamen.
 
And it's interesting to see how Jacobsen tries to explain the fact that one way that Grogan determined that the ships he was hearing were in the North Pacific was that he heard their signals best under darkness. Jacobsen acts as though Grogan said he heard them only under darkness, and then he notes that Grogan also heard the signals after sunrise. But, as Jacobsen knew full well, Grogan never said he heard the signals only under darkness. Rather, Grogan said he heard them best/strongest under darkness (before sunrise), which would make perfect sense if he were hearing low-powered transmissions.

If Grogan had been hearing Japanese commercial traffic, it's unlikely that that traffic would have gone silent from 5-7 December. On the Lurline's return voyage to SF, which started on 5 December, Grogan checked for the signals he'd been hearing, but they weren't there anymore.
 
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Geez. Grogan has KB yakking like a teenage girl on a cell phone! Daytime? Dusk! ITs all talk talk talk!

And what proof beyond Grogan's nonsense does Bobby bring as proof that KB transmitted? An unattached submarine broadcast a two letter code.

Yeah, no.
 
So instead of allowing that the extremely poor visibility may have led some ships to use low-powered comms because they couldn't always use signals, you make the illogical, strawman argument that they wouldn't have cared about visibility if they were using radios. For one thing, bad visibility affects more than just a convoy's ability to use signals.

And if, as Jacobsen suggests, Grogan was nearly hearing transmissions from Yokohoma to Japanese commercial ships, why didn't Grogan hear more of those transmissions during the SS Lurline's return voyage to San Francisco?

Traditionalists have bounced from one theory to another to explain Grogan's DF bearings: they were from Russian ships; they were signals that had bounced from Japan all the way to Grogan's position and somehow they consistently returned bearings that were NW of Hawaii; they were ABD ships; they were stray Japanese fishing boats; or, well, maybe Grogan just made up the whole story--and never you mind that he was known as a credible, honest man (Farago reached this same judgment about him when he interviewed him).

And the Japanese are not credible, honest men?
 
Submarines being so low in the water have poor visibility anyway. They would be useless as lookouts in any kind of seaway while on the surface and using the periscope they would have been hard pressed to see more than a few yards. They wouldn't risk surface operation in daylight in case they were spotted..

As for re-supply, it only happens in calm weather anyway. I have done some scarey re supply in marginal weather. People get injured or killed.

Carriers normally did not talk directly with tankers

So how do they arrange for a transfer? How do they arrange the tonnage of fuel and other stores?
 
Regarding Captain Ranneft's attempt to ask Admiral Stark in 1960 about what ONI told him about Japanese carriers near Hawaii and why Pearl Harbor was caught off guard, someone asked the silly question, gee, why didn't Ranneft try to talk to Stark after the attack?

Uh, maybe because Rannneft knew that that would be a raw, sore subject at that moment? Maybe because he knew that Stark and the rest of the Navy were a bit busy dealing with the aftermath of Pearl Harbor and with the war that they now found themselves fighting in the Pacific? As a foreigner, Ranneft had the good sense and decorum not to raise the subject with his American counterparts at that time.

If anything, the fact that Ranneft wanted to meet with Stark in 1960 to discuss ONI's foreknowledge and Pearl Harbor's lack of preparedness is further evidence of Ranneft's account and of his sincerity. If he had just made it all up, he would hardly have wanted to discuss it with Stark, of all people, 19 years later.
 

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