Merged Pearl Harbor: "Revisionists" vs. "Traditionalists"

Oh, come now. You know that's hair splitting. They were under his command.

No, they were not under his command, they were part of a separate force that at a pre-determined time were to send a brief message on a predetermined frequency to indicate what their results of their recce were. This is the equivalent of the divisional recce squadron conducting a spot recce, and sending out a message to the battle group HQ of the results.

Doesn't mean that I-72 was part of the Kido Butai, as their orders came from a separate organization, and the head of the Kido Butai was not in a position to issue orders to them.

Do you have any military experience? I spent 21 years in the Army and did deployments where we had units attached to ours, under our command, and working ahead of or behind us. We considered them part of our unit for that operation.

27 years Canadian Forces Primary Reserves, Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery (still serving). Presently a Master Warrant Officer (E-8 equivalent) and serving as Battery Sergeant Major.

And if a unit or group is attached or placed under the tactical control of of another unit or formation it is listed in the formal "Atts and Dets" for that formation. I-72 is not listed as part of Kido Butai in the Japanese records for the operation, therefore it was NOT part of the Kido Butai. It was part of a separate formation with orders from a separate chain of command.

I've said that Japanese believed, as did we, that low-powered transmissions were safe from intercept because they thought, as did we, that they had a limited reception range.

And you've never been able to back up this assertion - I take it you now have relevant exerpts from US and Japanese radio-telecom manuals that indicate that low-powered transmissions were safe from intercept due to limited reception range, or was it low frequency transmissions, as you first posited in Post #270? Big difference between low POWER and low FREQUENCY in radio wave.

Now, as for the I-72 transmission, now that we've debunked your adamant-but-erroneous claim that it was sent after the attack, the issue is not how long it lasted or whether it was coded. The point is that it was a transmission by a KB-attached submarine, a submarine that was part of the Hawaii Operation force attacked Pearl Harbor.

The sheet with this message has a date/time stamp of "12/072046 G " on it. That would mean to most of us who have spent any time as a radio operator that was the time when the message was received by the US operator. Now, I may be wrong, but if I read the history books correctly, the attack on Pearl Harbor started at 0748 7 December, 1941 (local time), putting the I-72 message well after the attack.

Huh??? How does my point that I-72 was part of KB for all intents and purposes contradict, much less "refute," my point A that the transmission in question was "made by a Hawaii Operation submarine that was under the command of Nagumo and operationally attached to the KB"? Huh? How?

the I-72 was not part of the KB orbat, it was not under Nagumo's command, nor was it operationally attached to the Kido Butai. The only correct part of the above is "Hawaii Operation submariine".
 
The Senken Butai had missions for Dai Ichi Dan and Dai Ni Dan. First Phase mission was to scout Lahaina and intercept any ships exciting Pearl Harbor. (They failed in the second part of that mission.)

Second Phase mission was to attack shipping between Hawaii and the US West Coast.

So, Senken Butai and Kido Butai not only traveled to the target area by different paths, they were only in the same area for a day or two. Then they went in opposite directions.
 
The exact date of I-72's blip transmit is irrelevant, because we didn't notice it, it wouldn't have told us anything if we did, and the sub wasn't part of Kido Butai. Bob, you have to come up with something new or live with that red herring being ignored.
 
"...nit picking on the face of it."

Thanks a lot, Bob. Now I have this mental image of Robert A. Taft (of Taft-Hartley fame; yeah, that one) leaning in close to his bathroom mirror and squeezing things off his ugly mug.

But let's get to the point: if That Man Roosevelt really did connive at the Pearl Harbor attack -- and you obviously believe that he did -- then what are you going to do about it? Will you get him impeached? Or will you have him dug up like Cromwell and posthumously beheaded? Will you publish your own paradigm-smashing book?

As one dehydrated Frenchman said to another, "What do we do now, Pierre?"
 
Do you have any military experience? I spent 21 years in the Army and did deployments where we had units attached to ours, under our command, and working ahead of or behind us. We considered them part of our unit for that operation.

Leading Seaman Royal Navy. I spent my time on AS Frigates and faught a war at sea in the South Atlantic. We worked with Subs on exercise, they were never part of our command even when working with them. They got their orders through their own chain.
 
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Leading Seaman Royal Navy. I spent my time on AS Frigates and faught a war at sea in the South Atlantic. We worked with Subs on exercise, they were never part of our command even when working with them. They got their orders through their own chain.

I have no doubt of your years of service. BTF? Not so much. I think he is simply making it up.
 
I have no doubt of your years of service. BTF? Not so much. I think he is simply making it up.
I'd have to agree; if I'm wrong so be it, and I'll apologize and applaud Bob's service. I did one three year enlistment in the U.S. Army, as a 31v tactical commo systems mechanic; I was, eventually, the battalion tactical operations center commo tech when we did CPX/FTXes. Granted, I had little to do with long range commo, and absolutely nothing to do with RDF; yet the things I learned in the basic radio/electronics segment are things I'm almost certain any commo MOS would learn, and probably learn more of it in a more specialized field such as RDF. Bob has shown he doesn't understand these things. He doesn't seem to understand OPSEC, he doesn't seem to understand radio propagation etc. Or maybe he does and would rather parrot his favorite CTish authors instead.

In any case, Bob, if you want to convince me of this stuff, you're gonna need more than the same old crap we've been seeing for decades.
 
The sheet with this message has a date/time stamp of "12/072046 G " on it. That would mean to most of us who have spent any time as a radio operator that was the time when the message was received by the US operator. Now, I may be wrong, but if I read the history books correctly, the attack on Pearl Harbor started at 0748 7 December, 1941 (local time), putting the I-72 message well after the attack.


Time zone G is 7 hours later than Z time (a letter at the end of a naval date-time-group indicates the time zone). So the message was received at 07 Dec 1346 Z.

Hawaii is time zone W (10 hours earlier than Z time). So the message was received at 07 Dec 0346 W.

The message was received 4 hours before the attack.

What is the significance of this again?
 
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Time zone G is 7 hours later than Z time (a letter at the end of a naval date-time-group indicates the time zone). So the message was received at 07 Dec 1346 Z.

Hawaii is time zone W (10 hours earlier than Z time). So the message was received at 07 Dec 0346 W.

The message was received 4 hours before the attack.

What is the significance of this again?
This was my take on it as well. Except why the G timezone? I can't find any reference to an intercept station that far west (that's like central China and a good part of modern Indonesia today, all west of Australia).

But, in the end, it's all timezones shimezomes, as the intercept wasn't decrypted and translated until 11/45.
 
Time zone G is 7 hours later than Z time (a letter at the end of a naval date-time-group indicates the time zone). So the message was received at 07 Dec 1346 Z.

Hawaii is time zone W (10 hours earlier than Z time). So the message was received at 07 Dec 0346 W.

The message was received 4 hours before the attack.

What is the significance of this again?

It's very simple, really.

A submarine, whose orders including making a radio transmission, made a single, very brief radio transmission. From this we may safely conclude that a carrier group, whose orders included strict radio silence, made many long radio transmissions.

(there may be a subtle flaw in that logic somewhere)
 
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It's all smoke and mirrors.
It's been pointed out to BTF months ago that the sub transmitting when it did has no bearing whatsoever on whether or not KB transmitted. But he's convinced himself it's some sort of smoking gun, so he clings to it.
 
Getting back to the issue of dereliction of duty for a minute, it is well known that on the morning of December 7, after the receipt of the 14-part message and its two accompanying messages (especially the time-of-delivery instruction), Admiral Wilkinson, the Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence, urged Admiral Stark to "pick up the phone" and call Kimmel, and that Stark inexplicably refused.

What is not so well known is that a short time later Admiral Noyes, the Director of Naval Communications, urged Stark to send a warning to Hawaii via the Navy radio system and advised him that they could get the message to Hawaii in "less than twenty minutes," and that Stark again refused (Arthur McCollum, "Unheeded Warnings," in Paul Stillwell, editor, Air Raid: Pearl Harbor!, Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1981, p. 87).

Mind you, this is the same Admiral Stark who falsely promised Kimmel that he would send Kimmel any relevant intelligence from Japanese intercepts. This is also the same Admiral Stark who later claimed that he thought Kimmel was getting MAGIC intelligence, a claim that Stark knew was a lie. What is especially revealing about this episode is that at a certain point in time before the attack, the issue of whether or not Kimmel was getting sufficient intelligence, including MAGIC, became a hot topic in the Navy Department. As mentioned, Stark later claimed that he thought Kimmel was getting MAGIC and other intel. Yet, incredibly, and quite suspiciously, Stark never bothered to simply ask Kimmel if this was the case, not even when he had a meeting with Kimmel after the controversy had arisen.

Now, either Stark was the dumbest, most clueless person ever born or he deliberately made sure that Kimmel did not get MAGIC and other intelligence and then later lied about it to Congress and to Navy investigators.

So it's no wonder that on the morning of December 7, with a clear indication that war would commence at 1:00 p.m., Eastern Time (7:30 a.m., Hawaii Time), Stark refused to send a timely warning to the commander of the Pacific Fleet. In fact, Stark initially tried to talk Marshall out of sending his belated, deliberately stalled warning.
 
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So it's no wonder that on the morning of December 7, with a clear indication that war would commence at 1:00 p.m., Eastern Time (7:30 a.m., Hawaii Time), Stark refused to send a timely warning to the commander of the Pacific Fleet. In fact, Stark initially tried to talk Marshall out of sending his belated, deliberately stalled warning.

So, tell us exactly what Stark did do, Bob. What were his actions, in detail, that morning? You know what he did wrong based on your exhaustive research. (Or is it "exhausted"? Have you reached the end of the footnotes?)
 
It's very simple, really.

A submarine, whose orders including making a radio transmission, made a single, very brief radio transmission. From this we may safely conclude that a carrier group, whose orders included strict radio silence, made many long radio transmissions. (there may be a subtle flaw in that logic somewhere)

Not if you understand that the Japanese believed that low-powered transmissions were safe from detection. Not if you understand that Nagumo modified the radio silence order to allow for some radio communication. Not if you understand that the KB encountered some extreme weather, weather that was so bad that one admiral said that it caused his ship to roll to a degree that he'd never experienced before then. (In fact, even if the task force had not encountered harsh weather, they still may very well have communicated via low-powered radio transmissions since they thought it was safe to do so.) And not if you understand that we have numerous credible witnesses that American and Allied intelligence services knew from intercepts and other intelligence that a Japanese flotilla was approaching Pearl Harbor.

Furthermore, I did not say that I-72's transmission automatically means that other Hawaii Operation ships transmitted. I never made that claim.

By the way, Admiral Fukudome claimed that the submarine force maintained "the strictest radio silence . . . all the way" ("Hawaii Operation," in Stillwell, editor, Air Raid: Pearl Harbor, p. 68, emphasis added). But we know for a fact that that is not true, because we know that submarine I-72 sent a radio transmission on 6 December. So that right there tells us that claims about "strict radio silence" should be taken with a sizable grain of salt.
 
By the way, Admiral Fukudome claimed that the submarine force maintained "the strictest radio silence . . . all the way" ("Hawaii Operation," in Stillwell, editor, Air Raid: Pearl Harbor, p. 68, emphasis added). But we know for a fact that that is not true, because we know that submarine I-72 sent a radio transmission on 6 December. So that right there tells us that claims about "strict radio silence" should be taken with a sizable grain of salt.

Strange that a scout would report the findings of its mission by anything other than carrier pigeon, right Bob?
 

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