Border Reiver
Philosopher
- Joined
- Sep 6, 2011
- Messages
- 6,726
Oh, come now. You know that's hair splitting. They were under his command.
No, they were not under his command, they were part of a separate force that at a pre-determined time were to send a brief message on a predetermined frequency to indicate what their results of their recce were. This is the equivalent of the divisional recce squadron conducting a spot recce, and sending out a message to the battle group HQ of the results.
Doesn't mean that I-72 was part of the Kido Butai, as their orders came from a separate organization, and the head of the Kido Butai was not in a position to issue orders to them.
Do you have any military experience? I spent 21 years in the Army and did deployments where we had units attached to ours, under our command, and working ahead of or behind us. We considered them part of our unit for that operation.
27 years Canadian Forces Primary Reserves, Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery (still serving). Presently a Master Warrant Officer (E-8 equivalent) and serving as Battery Sergeant Major.
And if a unit or group is attached or placed under the tactical control of of another unit or formation it is listed in the formal "Atts and Dets" for that formation. I-72 is not listed as part of Kido Butai in the Japanese records for the operation, therefore it was NOT part of the Kido Butai. It was part of a separate formation with orders from a separate chain of command.
I've said that Japanese believed, as did we, that low-powered transmissions were safe from intercept because they thought, as did we, that they had a limited reception range.
And you've never been able to back up this assertion - I take it you now have relevant exerpts from US and Japanese radio-telecom manuals that indicate that low-powered transmissions were safe from intercept due to limited reception range, or was it low frequency transmissions, as you first posited in Post #270? Big difference between low POWER and low FREQUENCY in radio wave.
Now, as for the I-72 transmission, now that we've debunked your adamant-but-erroneous claim that it was sent after the attack, the issue is not how long it lasted or whether it was coded. The point is that it was a transmission by a KB-attached submarine, a submarine that was part of the Hawaii Operation force attacked Pearl Harbor.
The sheet with this message has a date/time stamp of "12/072046 G " on it. That would mean to most of us who have spent any time as a radio operator that was the time when the message was received by the US operator. Now, I may be wrong, but if I read the history books correctly, the attack on Pearl Harbor started at 0748 7 December, 1941 (local time), putting the I-72 message well after the attack.
Huh??? How does my point that I-72 was part of KB for all intents and purposes contradict, much less "refute," my point A that the transmission in question was "made by a Hawaii Operation submarine that was under the command of Nagumo and operationally attached to the KB"? Huh? How?
the I-72 was not part of the KB orbat, it was not under Nagumo's command, nor was it operationally attached to the Kido Butai. The only correct part of the above is "Hawaii Operation submariine".