Merged Pearl Harbor: "Revisionists" vs. "Traditionalists"

Not if you understand that the Japanese believed that low-powered transmissions were safe from detection.

An assertion is not evidence. You have failed to show the Japanese thought this was the case. Indeed, the orders covering radio transmission for KB is quite clear.

Not if you understand that Nagumo modified the radio silence order to allow for some radio communication.

Show, exactly, what that modification was. Not your interpretation. We want the actual order.

Not if you understand that the KB encountered some extreme weather, weather that was so bad that one admiral said that it caused his ship to roll to a degree that he'd never experienced before then.

You have failed to show that. The list of weather you gave earlier showed nothing of the sort.

Furthermore, I did not say that I-72's transmission automatically means that other Hawaii Operation ships transmitted. I never made that claim.

So why bring it up? It's been explained to you why the message was sent and why it is irrelevant to KB.

By the way, Admiral Fukudome claimed that the submarine force maintained "the strictest radio silence . . . all the way" ("Hawaii Operation," in Stillwell, editor, Air Raid: Pearl Harbor, p. 68, emphasis added). But we know for a fact that that is not true, because we know that submarine I-72 sent a radio transmission on 6 December. So that right there tells us that claims about "strict radio silence" should be taken with a sizable grain of salt.

Except, as noted just a few posts up there, that was its bloody mission!
 
Strange that a scout would report the findings of its mission by anything other than carrier pigeon, right Bob?

Humm, well now, so are you saying that mission necessity overruled "strict radio silence"?

Anyway, the point is that we have a prime example of the claim of "strict radio silence" being demonstrably false. The subs did not maintain the "strictest radio silence" because we know that one sub sent a report on the Lahaina Anchorage.

But, let me guess, you will refuse to see the implications of this for the claim of "strict radio silence" for the rest of the Hawaii Operation attack force, right?
 
Humm, well now, so are you saying that mission necessity overruled "strict radio silence"?

Anyway, the point is that we have a prime example of the claim of "strict radio silence" being demonstrably false. The subs did not maintain the "strictest radio silence" because we know that one sub sent a report on the Lahaina Anchorage.

But, let me guess, you will refuse to see the implications of this for the claim of "strict radio silence" for the rest of the Hawaii Operation attack force, right?

Bob, that's obfuscation to the extreme. Scouts report, that's their job. And you keep ignoring the fact that the Senken Butai and the Kido Butai are separate entities. Go Google "butai" and see if you can figure something out.
 
An assertion is not evidence. You have failed to show the Japanese thought this was the case. Indeed, the orders covering radio transmission for KB is quite clear.

This has been documented in numerous scholarly works on Pearl Harbor. Apparently you haven't read a single one of them. Here is one such source:

http://www.thestormunleashed.com/files/docs/warning_at_ph.pdf

Show, exactly, what that modification was. Not your interpretation. We want the actual order.

You would have read the "actual order" several times by now if your research had been balanced. The modification order has been discussed in many revisionist works. See, for example, chapter 3 of Dr. George Victor's book The Pearl Harbor Myth (that's one of the chapters available online via Google Books, in case you can't imagine yourself ever buying a "revisionist" book).

You have failed to show that. The list of weather you gave earlier showed nothing of the sort.

Uh, I quoted a KB admiral who said they encountered weather that was so bad that it made his ship tilt more than he'd ever seen before.

So why bring it up? It's been explained to you why the message was sent and why it is irrelevant to KB.

Why bring it up??? Huh??? Because it was sent by a ship (a sub, in this case) that was part of the Hawaii Operation attack force, and yet Admiral Fukudome assured us that that force maintained the "strictest radio silence . . . all the way."

And that sub was operationally attacked to the KB and was under the ultimate command of the KB's commander, Nagumo.

Except, as noted just a few posts up there, that was its bloody mission!

Then how could Admiral Fukudome claim that the submarine force maintained the "strictest radio silence"? How? Answer: He was wrong. The sub force did not maintain "strict radio silence."

We have two problems here: One, your minds are so closed, and you are so immune to persuasion, that you simply can't bring yourselves to analyze the evidence objectively. Two, it is increasingly clear that you folks have only read one side of the story, that you have not read any of the major scholarly works that challenge the traditional story.

Some very good scholarly revisionist works are available, in whole or in large part, online:

Dr. Brian Villa and Dr. Tim Wilford, "Signals Intelligence and Pearl Harbor: The State of the Question," Intelligence and National Security, 21:4, August 2006, pp. 520-556. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520600885665#preview

Dr. Steve Sniegoski, "The Case for Pearl Harbor Revisionism," The Occidental Quarterly, Winter 2001, pp. 5-48. http://home.comcast.net/~transparentcabal/pearlharbor.pdf

Dr. George Victor, The Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable (Potomac Books, 2008). Available via Google Books.

Dr. Harry Barnes, Pearl Harbor After a Quarter of a Century (1980). http://tmh.floonet.net/articles/pearl25.html or http://mises.org/journals/lar/pdfs/4_1/4_1_3.pdf.

Dr. Charles Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of War (Transaction Publishers, 2003, reprint of 1948 edition). By the way, Beard was one of the most influential historians of the first half of the 20th century and served a term as president of the American Historical Association. Available via Google Books.
 
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And that sub was operationally attacked to the KB and was under the ultimate command of the KB's commander, Nagumo.
No, it wasn't. Nagumo had his own force to worry about.

Then how could Admiral Fukudome claim that the submarine force maintained the "strictest radio silence"? How? Answer: He was wrong. The sub force did not maintain "strict radio silence."
Bob, how was this scout supposed to report? Type up the message, put it in a capsule, shove it where the Army wouldn't think of looking, and waddle across the ocean to the Kido Butai?
 
Ranneft enabled the U.S. Navy to obtain the Bofors 40-mm AA gun, in technical violation of the Swedish patent no less, and the Navy was very grateful, and as a result afforded Ranneft exceptional access. British scholar Colonel John Hughes-Wilson:
The US Navy was delighted with their new AA gun and afforded Ranneft all the easy, informal access that valued attaches strive so hard to achieve but rarely obtain. For Ranneft was not only a valued friend, he was also, in the eyes of the US naval officers based in Washington, a colleague, a senior officer, a friend to US interests, and overall a "regular guy." (Military Intelligence Blunders and Cover-Ups, p. 90)​
Nope. This simply isn't true. The US Navy had evaluated the 40mm Bofors before 1939 and BuOrd had purchased an example (twin barrel, air cooled) from Bofors in 1940, before the Dutch sloop van Kinsbergen arrived in New York. The Dutch demonstrated the Hazemeyer gun mounting to the US Navy but didn't supply blueprint; the plans for the gun came from Britain (where they'd already dealt with a number of the problems the US encountered in their earlier evaluation).
The US Navy signed a license contract with Bofors in JUN1941.

If this is a sample of Hughes-Wilson's level of research he's not really worth using as a source.
 
Nope. This simply isn't true. The US Navy had evaluated the 40mm Bofors before 1939 and BuOrd had purchased an example (twin barrel, air cooled) from Bofors in 1940, before the Dutch sloop van Kinsbergen arrived in New York. The Dutch demonstrated the Hazemeyer gun mounting to the US Navy but didn't supply blueprint; the plans for the gun came from Britain (where they'd already dealt with a number of the problems the US encountered in their earlier evaluation).
The US Navy signed a license contract with Bofors in JUN1941.

If this is a sample of Hughes-Wilson's level of research he's not really worth using as a source.
For simple-minded souls the added panache of the Bofors story is enough to make them believe the rest of it must be true. It's rather like saying "Lindbergh was right about the Jews, after all, he did fly the Atlantic solo."
 
For simple-minded souls the added panache of the Bofors story is enough to make them believe the rest of it must be true. It's rather like saying "Lindbergh was right about the Jews, after all, he did fly the Atlantic solo."
Yeah. The ease with which a little research exposes the inaccuracy demonstrates the superficiality, credulousness or bias of Hughes-Wilson's research and bobtaftfan's ignorant parroting of anything that seemingly supports his views.
 
Yeah. The ease with which a little research exposes the inaccuracy demonstrates the superficiality, credulousness or bias of Hughes-Wilson's research and bobtaftfan's ignorant parroting of anything that seemingly supports his views.

Superficial research is all that keeps CTs going. They find something they like and they don't check it. Faster that way. And, of course, there's the problem that things they like don't check out. Rather awkward for their theories.
 
This has been documented in numerous scholarly works on Pearl Harbor. Apparently you haven't read a single one of them. Here is one such source:

http://www.thestormunleashed.com/files/docs/warning_at_ph.pdf

That says nothing of the sort.
There is no reference in your "scholarly work" to Japanese documents showing either that they thought they were safe from interception using low frequencies, or that the orders allowed for that.
None.
If you think there are then please post it.

You would have read the "actual order" several times by now if your research had been balanced. The modification order has been discussed in many revisionist works. See, for example, chapter 3 of Dr. George Victor's book The Pearl Harbor Myth (that's one of the chapters available online via Google Books, in case you can't imagine yourself ever buying a "revisionist" book).

Come on...surely you are capable of referencing it yourself.


Uh, I quoted a KB admiral who said they encountered weather that was so bad that it made his ship tilt more than he'd ever seen before.

That's wind and waves.
They don't interfere with flags.

Why bring it up??? Huh??? Because it was sent by a ship (a sub, in this case) that was part of the Hawaii Operation attack force, and yet Admiral Fukudome assured us that that force maintained the "strictest radio silence . . . all the way."

And they did. All the way to Hawaii, where they had a job to do.
That "all the way" is the important bit.

And that sub was operationally attacked to the KB and was under the ultimate command of the KB's commander, Nagumo.

This has been explained to you.

Then how could Admiral Fukudome claim that the submarine force maintained the "strictest radio silence"? How? Answer: He was wrong. The sub force did not maintain "strict radio silence."

"all the way".
Remember that.
It's important.

We have two problems here: One, your minds are so closed, and you are so immune to persuasion, that you simply can't bring yourselves to analyze the evidence objectively. Two, it is increasingly clear that you folks have only read one side of the story, that you have not read any of the major scholarly works that challenge the traditional story.

Some very good scholarly revisionist works are available, in whole or in large part, online:

Dr. Brian Villa and Dr. Tim Wilford, "Signals Intelligence and Pearl Harbor: The State of the Question," Intelligence and National Security, 21:4, August 2006, pp. 520-556. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520600885665#preview

Dr. Steve Sniegoski, "The Case for Pearl Harbor Revisionism," The Occidental Quarterly, Winter 2001, pp. 5-48. http://home.comcast.net/~transparentcabal/pearlharbor.pdf

Dr. George Victor, The Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable (Potomac Books, 2008). Available via Google Books.

Dr. Harry Barnes, Pearl Harbor After a Quarter of a Century (1980). http://tmh.floonet.net/articles/pearl25.html or http://mises.org/journals/lar/pdfs/4_1/4_1_3.pdf.

Dr. Charles Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of War (Transaction Publishers, 2003, reprint of 1948 edition). By the way, Beard was one of the most influential historians of the first half of the 20th century and served a term as president of the American Historical Association. Available via Google Books.

Hey, I don't read creationist books either...
 
For those of you who are astute enough to do more research than can be contained in one trashy novelized version of the events:

Vice Admiral Shimizu Mitsumi, Commander, Sixth Fleet (Submarines) was the overall commander of the Senken Butai. Senken Butai did not report to Vice Admiral Nagumo.
 
Humm, well now, so are you saying that mission necessity overruled "strict radio silence"?

Anyway, the point is that we have a prime example of the claim of "strict radio silence" being demonstrably false. The subs did not maintain the "strictest radio silence" because we know that one sub sent a report on the Lahaina Anchorage.

But, let me guess, you will refuse to see the implications of this for the claim of "strict radio silence" for the rest of the Hawaii Operation attack force, right?

The scouting force, having carried out their mission were to report. This would make this an "authorized transmission", and something that was in the sub's orders to do.

Now, how about you carry on with your thoughts on the implications of a warship carrying out the orders given to it in a time of war?

Also, your assertion that the Japanese "knew" they could make low-powered radio calls wiht minimal risk so they did - you of course have the relevant manuals that would back this up? And originally, you said it was "low-frequency" radio transmissions that the Japanese thought wouldn't be detected - which is it? Again that manual might clear that right up.
 
I know I've mentioned it before, but this "Low frequency doesn't propagate" claim is silly.
When the Radio Act of 1912 passed (less than 30 years before PH), it relegated amateurs to those useless HF frequencies with wavelengths shorter than 200 meters (about 1500 kHz, roughly everything above the current AM radio band), and kept the useful LF and MF frequencies for commercial and military purposes.
Granted, quite a little bit more was learned about HF in the intervening 30 years, but it's really hard to believe the Japanese had forgotten technology from just 30 years previous.
 
I know I've mentioned it before, but this "Low frequency doesn't propagate" claim is silly.
When the Radio Act of 1912 passed (less than 30 years before PH), it relegated amateurs to those useless HF frequencies with wavelengths shorter than 200 meters (about 1500 kHz, roughly everything above the current AM radio band), and kept the useful LF and MF frequencies for commercial and military purposes.
Granted, quite a little bit more was learned about HF in the intervening 30 years, but it's really hard to believe the Japanese had forgotten technology from just 30 years previous.

The thing is, even BTF has been pointing out that the German UBoats discovered this problem in WW1...it wasn't new by 1941 even in his world.
 
Getting back to the issue of dereliction of duty for a minute, it is well known that on the morning of December 7, after the receipt of the 14-part message and its two accompanying messages (especially the time-of-delivery instruction), Admiral Wilkinson, the Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence, urged Admiral Stark to "pick up the phone" and call Kimmel, and that Stark inexplicably refused.

What is not so well known is that a short time later Admiral Noyes, the Director of Naval Communications, urged Stark to send a warning to Hawaii via the Navy radio system and advised him that they could get the message to Hawaii in "less than twenty minutes," and that Stark again refused (Arthur McCollum, "Unheeded Warnings," in Paul Stillwell, editor, Air Raid: Pearl Harbor!, Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1981, p. 87).

Mind you, this is the same Admiral Stark who falsely promised Kimmel that he would send Kimmel any relevant intelligence from Japanese intercepts. This is also the same Admiral Stark who later claimed that he thought Kimmel was getting MAGIC intelligence, a claim that Stark knew was a lie. What is especially revealing about this episode is that at a certain point in time before the attack, the issue of whether or not Kimmel was getting sufficient intelligence, including MAGIC, became a hot topic in the Navy Department. As mentioned, Stark later claimed that he thought Kimmel was getting MAGIC and other intel. Yet, incredibly, and quite suspiciously, Stark never bothered to simply ask Kimmel if this was the case, not even when he had a meeting with Kimmel after the controversy had arisen.

Now, either Stark was the dumbest, most clueless person ever born or he deliberately made sure that Kimmel did not get MAGIC and other intelligence and then later lied about it to Congress and to Navy investigators.

So it's no wonder that on the morning of December 7, with a clear indication that war would commence at 1:00 p.m., Eastern Time (7:30 a.m., Hawaii Time), Stark refused to send a timely warning to the commander of the Pacific Fleet. In fact, Stark initially tried to talk Marshall out of sending his belated, deliberately stalled warning.

So the whole point of this conspiracy was to keep Kimmel in the dark?
 
Not if you understand that the Japanese believed that low-powered transmissions were safe from detection. Not if you understand that Nagumo modified the radio silence order to allow for some radio communication. Not if you understand that the KB encountered some extreme weather, weather that was so bad that one admiral said that it caused his ship to roll to a degree that he'd never experienced before then. (In fact, even if the task force had not encountered harsh weather, they still may very well have communicated via low-powered radio transmissions since they thought it was safe to do so.) And not if you understand that we have numerous credible witnesses that American and Allied intelligence services knew from intercepts and other intelligence that a Japanese flotilla was approaching Pearl Harbor.

Furthermore, I did not say that I-72's transmission automatically means that other Hawaii Operation ships transmitted. I never made that claim.

By the way, Admiral Fukudome claimed that the submarine force maintained "the strictest radio silence . . . all the way" ("Hawaii Operation," in Stillwell, editor, Air Raid: Pearl Harbor, p. 68, emphasis added). But we know for a fact that that is not true, because we know that submarine I-72 sent a radio transmission on 6 December. So that right there tells us that claims about "strict radio silence" should be taken with a sizable grain of salt.

You seem able to understand things that never happened.
 
As I began to read about Pearl Harbor, it took me a while to appreciate just how mind-boggling and inexplicable--and suspicious and inexcusable--Stark's failure to phone Kimmel was. Stark arrived at his office at 9:00 a.m., EST. Wilkinson and McCollum were already there waiting for him, with the 14-part message, the code destruction message, and the time-of-delivery message in their hands. They urged him to call Kimmel and Hart, but he refused. So nearly 4 hours before the attack, Stark had the chance to warn Kimmel--and he had the Director of ONI, the Director of ONI's Far East Asia branch, and (a bit later) the Director of Naval Communications urging him to do so. Yet he refused to make the call.

In his book The Eagle and the Rising Sun: The Japanese-American War, 1941-1943: Pearl Harbor through Guadalcanal (W. W. Norton, 2004), even traditionalist historian Arthur Schom has some surprisingly critical things to say about Stark's conduct. He stops short of accusing Stark of deliberate wrongdoing, opining instead that Stark was "paralyzed" and "overwhelmed" by "the immensity of the event." But Schom also says this:

He never did clarify his astonishing inaction, except once, when he explained that everything he did "was in accordance with orders from higher authority," but he was not able to elaborate further on that rather hollow-sounding remark. (The Eagle and the Rising Sun, p. 132)​
 

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