Merged Pearl Harbor: "Revisionists" vs. "Traditionalists"

sic? What is this sic crap? "NW by W" was not a typo.
I just knew that, someday, I'd finally have to use this...
picture.php
(thanks Bob)
 
sic? What is this sic crap? "NW by W" was not a typo.

I see a man sitting at the end of the bar, wearing a postal worker uniform. He is expounding to the ignorant folks, illuminating their ignorance with his brilliant insights, fueled by decades of scholarly research and just plain genius.

"And this here, my friends, is what you call your 'compass'. Notice all the little points all around it? Each one has a name. But I don't know what they are."

Really, Bob?
 
Several folks have adamantly declared that sub I-72's transmission about no enemy ships being in the Lahaina Anchorage was transmitted on 7 December and after the attack.

Wrong. I suspect those folks forgot to take into account the International Dateline. 7 December Tokyo time was 6 December Hawaii time. If you consult Goldstein and Dillon's The Pearl Harbor Papers, you'll find that Nagumo's risky, careless transmission to CIC Combined Fleet was made the day after I-72's transmission (pp. 243-244). Note that Goldstein and Dillon don't adjust for the time difference, so they have Nagumo's transmission dated 8 December, since that was the date on the message, just as they have 7 December as the date for the I-72 transmission because that was the date on the message. But they explain early in the book that the dates are in Tokyo time and that Tokyo time was a day ahead of Hawaii time.

One person cited the copy of the I-72 transmission in Robert Hanyok's PowerPoint presentation on IJN radio deception, overlooking the fact that the date on the transmission was Tokyo time, not Hawaii time. But, if someone wants to argue that Nagumo sent his message on 8 December Hawaii time, be my guest, but that'll be a tough case to make since Nagumo's transmission indisputably was made the day after I-72's transmission.

It should have occurred to some of you folks that by 1255 (1755 Hawaii time) on 7 December, there would have been no reason for I-72 to inform the KB that the enemy was not in Lahaina Anchorage. It would have been a bit late for that bit of intelligence.

By the way, Goldstein and Dillon try to explain away Nagumo's transmission by theorizing that it was sent about 17 hours later. Why? Because they acknowledge that "it is incredible that Nagumo would have broken radio silence a mere 10 minutes after his first wave set course for Hawaii" (p. 244). Indeed, it was incredibly careless and risky and shows, as other scholars have noted, a rather casual attitude about radio security. Of course, few scholars accept Goldstein and Dillon's delayed-broadcast theory; most acknowledge that the transmission time is accurate. Barkin and Meyer discuss Nagumo's astonishingly careless transmission in "COMINT and Pearl Harbor," International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 2:4, pp. 521-522.
 
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I see a man sitting at the end of the bar, wearing a postal worker uniform. He is expounding to the ignorant folks, illuminating their ignorance with his brilliant insights, fueled by decades of scholarly research and just plain genius.

"And this here, my friends, is what you call your 'compass'. Notice all the little points all around it? Each one has a name. But I don't know what they are."

Really, Bob?

That just gave me the mental image of Cliff Claven rattling off a story at Cheers.

"Yeaaah, Nahm, ya know the ancient Floridians, there, they invented that radio direction finding." :D
 
Sorry, Bob, but the date on the message form was put there by the S.I.S. when they decrypted it. You just don't read very well, do you?

Nope. The transmission date was 6 December, Hawaii Time--7 December, Tokyo Time. You didn't bother to check Goldstein and Dillon, did you?

If you want to continue to embarrass yourself, then perhaps you can explain how I-72's transmission could have been sent after the attack when it was sent the day before Nagumo's risky, careless 7 December message, given that we know that Nagumo's message was sent just 10 minutes after the first wave of planes had left the carriers, and given that we're pretty doggone sure that those planes attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December.

Or, try this: Just go the pages I cited from The Pearl Harbor Papers and backtrack from I-72's message day by day back to the KB's departure date. And, uh-oh, you're gonna see that the dates are all in Tokyo time because we know the day on which the task force started its journey: 26 November, Tokyo Time, which was 25 November our time. Our histories have the KB leaving on 25 November, but Japanese histories have it leaving on 26 November, just as Goldstein and Dillon do, since, as they note, the dates are in Tokyo Time.
 
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Nope. The transmission date was 6 December, Hawaii Time--7 December, Tokyo Time. You didn't bother to check Goldstein and Dillon, did you?

If you want to continue to embarrass yourself, then perhaps you can explain how I-72's transmission could have been sent after the attack when it was sent the day before Nagumo's risky, careless 7 December message, given that we know that Nagumo's message was sent just 10 minutes after the first wave of planes had left the carriers, and given that we're pretty doggone sure that those planes attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December.

Or, try this: Just go the pages I cited from The Pearl Harbor Papers and backtrack from I-72's message day by day back to the KB's departure date. And, uh-oh, you're gonna see that the dates are all in Tokyo time because we know the day on which the task force started its journey: 26 November, Tokyo Time, which was 25 November our time. Our histories have the KB leaving on 25 November, but Japanese histories have it leaving on 26 November, just as Goldstein and Dillon do, since, as they note, the dates are in Tokyo Time.

Bob, what was the exact text of the message? Not the translation, what was the text? I'll be waiting for your reply.

Oh, and Kido Butai did not transmit.

BTW, do you know how many Kido Butais existed on that day? Total number?
 
Nope. The transmission date was 6 December, Hawaii Time--7 December, Tokyo Time. You didn't bother to check Goldstein and Dillon, did you?

If you want to continue to embarrass yourself, then perhaps you can explain how I-72's transmission could have been sent after the attack when it was sent the day before Nagumo's risky, careless 7 December message, given that we know that Nagumo's message was sent just 10 minutes after the first wave of planes had left the carriers, and given that we're pretty doggone sure that those planes attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December.

Or, try this: Just go the pages I cited from The Pearl Harbor Papers and backtrack from I-72's message day by day back to the KB's departure date. And, uh-oh, you're gonna see that the dates are all in Tokyo time because we know the day on which the task force started its journey: 26 November, Tokyo Time, which was 25 November our time. Our histories have the KB leaving on 25 November, but Japanese histories have it leaving on 26 November, just as Goldstein and Dillon do, since, as they note, the dates are in Tokyo Time.
Bob, that copy is written in English. Ever wonder how that happened?
 
Bob, what was the exact text of the message? Not the translation, what was the text? I'll be waiting for your reply.

Oh, and Kido Butai did not transmit.

BTW, do you know how many Kido Butais existed on that day? Total number?

Do you just not have a copy of Goldstein and Dillon's The Pearl Harbor Papers? Is that the problem? Or do you just not want to bother to check the messages? This is not rocket science. We know the date and time of Nagumo's transmission: As even Prange acknowledged, it was sent 10 minutes after the first wave took off. I-72's transmission was sent the day before.

And let's revisit Barkin and Meyer's point about what Nagumo's risky transmission indicates about the strictness of adherence to radio silence (not to mention the fact that Nagumo had already modified the radio silence order to allow for some communications, as other scholars have observed):

According to Prange, after the initial attack, but during a period of time when the Air Fleet was still concerned with keeping its position secret, Admiral Nagumo, the task force commander, radioed Admiral Yamamoto in Tokyo to communicate his intention to retire upon the convoy's return. The fact that Nagumo broke radio silence in this way emphasizes several points. First of all, the Japanese claim that many radio transmitters were physically rendered inoperative is at best a generalization that has no bearing on the capacity of an individual set to transmit, and, moreover, could be altogether false. But, even more importantly, the fact that Admiral Nagumo broke radio silence for a rather trivial personal purpose at a time when the task force was still vulnerable indicates quite clearly that the Japanese were not as conscientious about communications security as either they or most mainstream historians would like us to believe. ("COMINT and Pearl Harbor," International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 2:4, p. 521, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08850608808435079)​

And if your circular argument that "KB did not transmit" is correct, then how was ONI able to tell Captain Ranneft that there were Japanese carriers 300-400 miles from Hawaii? No matter how you want to spin and strain over Ranneft's diary entries, at the very, very least they tell us that ONI told Ranneft that there Japanese carriers in the area of Hawaii. Even Alvin Coox, straining to find every possible way to minimize the impact of Ranneft's information, is forced to admit that Ranneft said this (see Coox, "Repulsing the Pearl Harbor Revisionists," in Hilary Conroy and Henry Wray, editors, Pearl Harbor Reexamined, University of Hawaii Press, 1990, p. 122). (Also, if by chance you're inclined to repeat the standard traditionalist myths about Toland's treatment of Ranneft's account, you might break down and read Dr. George Victor's discussion on the Ranneft evidence in The Pearl Harbor Myth, pp. 45-47.)

And, by the way, KB did transmit before Pearl Harbor was attacked. Nagumo's transmission was made 10 minutes after the first wave left, nearly 2 hours before they would arrive at their target. By any rational measurement, this was a careless, risky transmission, and it was made before the attack occurred. So KB did in fact transmit.
 
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Bob, that's a decryption, not the original message. And the date was local, put there by the decoders. I've told you this before.

The ONI didn't say there were carriers 300-400 miles from Hawaii. If you're referring to Johnston Island, that was call-sign intercept of a DD that usually was a plane guard. One ship, nobody else, and no further intercepts. And that ship wasn't assigned to the Kido Butai either.

According to Prange, after the initial attack, but during a period of time when the Air Fleet was still concerned with keeping its position secret, Admiral Nagumo, the task force commander

There you go. After the attack started. You gotta read this stuff. Seriously, why don't you read what you post? Is it boring for you too?
 
British scholar Colonel John Hughes-Wilson provides a useful review of Captain Ranneft's account in chapter 4 of his book Military Intelligence Blunders and Cover-Ups (London: Constable and Robinson, 2004). Wilson notes that when Ranneft returned to visit Washington in 1960, he arranged to meet with Admiral Stark because he wanted to discuss why the Navy did not act on ONI's intelligence regarding Japanese carriers being a few hundred miles from Pearl Harbor the day before the attack. However, "when Stark realized why Ranneft wanted to see him, he abruptly cancelled the meeting and refused to see the Dutch officer."
 
British scholar Colonel John Hughes-Wilson provides a useful review of Captain Ranneft's account in chapter 4 of his book Military Intelligence Blunders and Cover-Ups (London: Constable and Robinson, 2004). Wilson notes that when Ranneft returned to visit Washington in 1960, he arranged to meet with Admiral Stark because he wanted to discuss why the Navy did not act on ONI's intelligence regarding Japanese carriers being a few hundred miles from Pearl Harbor the day before the attack. However, "when Stark realized why Ranneft wanted to see him, he abruptly cancelled the meeting and refused to see the Dutch officer."

Yep, I don't let kooks in my office either.
 
Bob, that's a decryption, not the original message. And the date was local, put there by the decoders. I've told you this before.

The ONI didn't say there were carriers 300-400 miles from Hawaii. If you're referring to Johnston Island, that was call-sign intercept of a DD that usually was a plane guard. One ship, nobody else, and no further intercepts. And that ship wasn't assigned to the Kido Butai either.

There you go. After the attack started. You gotta read this stuff. Seriously, why don't you read what you post? Is it boring for you too?

The time stamp has Nagumo's message being transmitted 10 minutes after the first wave left the decks, according to Goldstein and Dillon. Again, do you just not have a copy of The Pearl Harbor Papers? Is that the problem? But even Prange's slightly later time still shows a casual, risky attitude about radio silence by Nagumo, as Barkin and Meyer note.

You can say the Earth's flat a thousand times, but it'll still be round, and according to Ranneft, ONI told him that there were carriers 300-400 miles from Hawaii. Your only option is to simply call Ranneft a liar. And, ah, I see in your next reply you label Ranneft as a "kook." Really? A "kook"? The U.S. Navy certainly didn't regard him as a "kook." And, FYI, Ranneft later achieved the rank of Admiral and won the following awards during the course of his distinguished career:

Dutch:

Officer in the Order of Orange Nassau (ON.4)
Knight in the Order of the Dutch Lion (NL)
Honorary Sign for important undertakings: Sunda islands 1905-1909 (E.17)
War Remembrance Cross (OHK)
Mobilization Cross 1914-1918 (Mk)
Service cross for naval officers, for 40 years' of service (XL)

Foreign:

Commander, Legion of Merit (LM.2) (United States of America)
Great Officer in the "Orde del Marito of Juan Pablo Duarte of Dominica" (Dominican Republic)[2]
Knight 3rd class in the Order of Saint Anna of Russia (Russia)
Commander in the Order of the Crown of Italy (Italy)
Commander in the Order of the Black Star of France (France)

But, of course, in your world this distinguished Dutch naval officer must be a "kook" because he provided information that shatters your emperor's-new-clothes myths about Pearl Harbor.

Finally, in order for I-72's transmission to have been sent after the attack, we'd have to believe that Goldstein and Dillon totally screwed up the chronology for the messages sent on 6 and 7 December. Is that what you're saying? That Goldstein and Dillon royally blundered and mistakenly put I-72's message as being sent the day before Nagumo's?
 
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Bob, what was the actual text of that transmission? Not the decoded version, that just says what it means. What was the text of the transmission.

Your dance is getting a bit old. Now, yes or no--do you have a copy of Goldstein and Dillon's The Pearl Harbor Papers? Every pre-attack 6-7 December Hawaii Operation message of which we have a record is reprinted on pages 242-244 therein (and, of course, the dates therein for those days are 7-8 December, since they're all in Tokyo Time).

Now, if I-72's transmission was sent after the attack, then that means Goldstein and Dillon royally screwed up the chronology for those messages, because they have I-72's message as being sent the day before Nagumo's message.

Is that what you're saying, or do you not have a copy of The Pearl Harbor Papers? Just answer the question.
 
Wilson notes that when Ranneft returned to visit Washington in 1960, he arranged to meet with Admiral Stark because he wanted to discuss why the Navy did not act on ONI's intelligence regarding Japanese carriers being a few hundred miles from Pearl Harbor the day before the attack.

Why did he wait until 1960 to do that? Why didn't he do that, say, the day after the attack?
 

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