matt.tansy
Muse
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- Feb 23, 2007
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NW by W [sic]
sic? What is this sic crap? "NW by W" was not a typo.
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NW by W [sic]
I just knew that, someday, I'd finally have to use this...sic? What is this sic crap? "NW by W" was not a typo.
sic? What is this sic crap? "NW by W" was not a typo.
I see a man sitting at the end of the bar, wearing a postal worker uniform. He is expounding to the ignorant folks, illuminating their ignorance with his brilliant insights, fueled by decades of scholarly research and just plain genius.
"And this here, my friends, is what you call your 'compass'. Notice all the little points all around it? Each one has a name. But I don't know what they are."
Really, Bob?
That just gave me the mental image of Cliff Claven rattling off a story at Cheers.
Sorry, Bob, but the date on the message form was put there by the S.I.S. when they decrypted it. You just don't read very well, do you?
Nope. The transmission date was 6 December, Hawaii Time--7 December, Tokyo Time. You didn't bother to check Goldstein and Dillon, did you?
If you want to continue to embarrass yourself, then perhaps you can explain how I-72's transmission could have been sent after the attack when it was sent the day before Nagumo's risky, careless 7 December message, given that we know that Nagumo's message was sent just 10 minutes after the first wave of planes had left the carriers, and given that we're pretty doggone sure that those planes attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December.
Or, try this: Just go the pages I cited from The Pearl Harbor Papers and backtrack from I-72's message day by day back to the KB's departure date. And, uh-oh, you're gonna see that the dates are all in Tokyo time because we know the day on which the task force started its journey: 26 November, Tokyo Time, which was 25 November our time. Our histories have the KB leaving on 25 November, but Japanese histories have it leaving on 26 November, just as Goldstein and Dillon do, since, as they note, the dates are in Tokyo Time.
Bob, that copy is written in English. Ever wonder how that happened?Nope. The transmission date was 6 December, Hawaii Time--7 December, Tokyo Time. You didn't bother to check Goldstein and Dillon, did you?
If you want to continue to embarrass yourself, then perhaps you can explain how I-72's transmission could have been sent after the attack when it was sent the day before Nagumo's risky, careless 7 December message, given that we know that Nagumo's message was sent just 10 minutes after the first wave of planes had left the carriers, and given that we're pretty doggone sure that those planes attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December.
Or, try this: Just go the pages I cited from The Pearl Harbor Papers and backtrack from I-72's message day by day back to the KB's departure date. And, uh-oh, you're gonna see that the dates are all in Tokyo time because we know the day on which the task force started its journey: 26 November, Tokyo Time, which was 25 November our time. Our histories have the KB leaving on 25 November, but Japanese histories have it leaving on 26 November, just as Goldstein and Dillon do, since, as they note, the dates are in Tokyo Time.
Bob, what was the exact text of the message? Not the translation, what was the text? I'll be waiting for your reply.
Oh, and Kido Butai did not transmit.
BTW, do you know how many Kido Butais existed on that day? Total number?
According to Prange, after the initial attack, but during a period of time when the Air Fleet was still concerned with keeping its position secret, Admiral Nagumo, the task force commander
British scholar Colonel John Hughes-Wilson provides a useful review of Captain Ranneft's account in chapter 4 of his book Military Intelligence Blunders and Cover-Ups (London: Constable and Robinson, 2004). Wilson notes that when Ranneft returned to visit Washington in 1960, he arranged to meet with Admiral Stark because he wanted to discuss why the Navy did not act on ONI's intelligence regarding Japanese carriers being a few hundred miles from Pearl Harbor the day before the attack. However, "when Stark realized why Ranneft wanted to see him, he abruptly cancelled the meeting and refused to see the Dutch officer."
Bob, that's a decryption, not the original message. And the date was local, put there by the decoders. I've told you this before.
The ONI didn't say there were carriers 300-400 miles from Hawaii. If you're referring to Johnston Island, that was call-sign intercept of a DD that usually was a plane guard. One ship, nobody else, and no further intercepts. And that ship wasn't assigned to the Kido Butai either.
There you go. After the attack started. You gotta read this stuff. Seriously, why don't you read what you post? Is it boring for you too?
Bob, what was the actual text of that transmission? Not the decoded version, that just says what it means. What was the text of the transmission.
Wilson notes that when Ranneft returned to visit Washington in 1960, he arranged to meet with Admiral Stark because he wanted to discuss why the Navy did not act on ONI's intelligence regarding Japanese carriers being a few hundred miles from Pearl Harbor the day before the attack.