Merged Pearl Harbor: "Revisionists" vs. "Traditionalists"

For crying out loud.
We've done all this.
The task force was never NWbW from Honolulu prior to the 7th. Grogan was therefore not picking up KB.

I can only assume by this gallop back to February that you concede that the weather was in fact not so horrendous as to cause significant problems for KB such that they had to transmit.

Glad we have that cleared up.
 
In #1241, he very carefully does not claim they were lying about transmitting. He said the Japanese were not trustworthy. He said there is evidence of them transmitting and that they did transmit. But he does not make the next logical step and say "they lied about whether they transmitted", despite that being the obvious implication.

One possibility is that he's trying to keep some backpedal room, so he can also suggest the Americans altered the records and forced the Japanese to go along with the lie, as he has already suggested elsewhere in the thread, IIRC.

Holy cow, how can you say this stuff with a straight face? I have repeatedly said, over and over, that the Japanese lied when they said the KB never transmitted before the attack. I can't fathom how anyone with even a modicum of education could infer from my #1241 reply that I was not accusing them of lying about this.

The Japanese, like the Americans and the Germans, thought it was safe to send low-power radio transmissions because they believed those transmissions had limited reception range, and therefore they did not think they were risking radio detection when they transmitted in that mode.

I haven't seen anyone answer the points that Villa and Wilford make about the various reasons that the KB would have needed to transmit. Your resident "expert" simply waves aside their research, but he hasn't stepped up to the plate to give us any specifics to refute their arguments and observations.

Nor have I seen anyone answer Barkin and Meyer's point that Nagumo's transmission was not only risky but showed a casual attitude about radio silence. If he'd get on the radio and send a regular radio message so soon after the planes had taken off, and a good hour before they would reach their target, it's entirely plausible that other KB members sent low-power transmissions a few days earlier, since they believed such transmissions were safe from detection due to their presumably limited reception range.

And I repeat the point that there was nothing "routine" about carriers talking directly with tankers on tactical circuits. Such traffic would indicate operations far removed from home waters. So the argument that the documented transmissions between the Akagi and tankers were all fakes seems forced, not to mention spurious. But that's what you have to do to maintain the "Kido Butai did not transmit" line.

And isn't it interesting that Station H records can't be used to confirm the Kido Butai's radio activities from 1 to 3 December, "the period when the force sailed through mid-Pacific storm conditions," because "pages 43 to 48 of the Station H intercept log, which cover this period, have not been released" (Villa and Wilford, "Warning at Pearl Harbor," p. 9). It's been over 70 years since Pearl Harbor, but for some reason we can't be allowed to study the Station H intercept log for 1-3 December 1941. Does anyone else find that a bit strange? What possible reason could there be for not releasing those records?
 
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I haven't seen anyone answer the points that Villa and Wilford make about the various reasons that the KB would have needed to transmit.
They had no need to transmit that would have caused them to violate their orders. They didn't violate their orders because they had no need to transmit. No transmissions were made in violation of their orders because the need never arose. The events that would have triggered transmission were never encountered, so they didn't violate their order. They were given orders to not transmit and they followed them.
 
What on earth are you talking about? Nobody is disputing the historical fact that the Soviet-Japanese border wars started before FDR was president. What does this have to do with FDR's apparent obsession with saving the Soviet Union? How does this affect the fact that FDR's Japan policy hardened considerably when he became aware via intercepts that the Japanese were seriously considering attacking Russia?


I was talking about your contention that FDR was provoking Japan to save the USSR is greatly mistaken.

Ie. pointing out that the hostilities between Imperial Japan and the USSR preceeded FDR's assupumtion of the Presidency, and reached their peak in 1939 prior to the emabargos of 1940/41, and that a ceasefire was in place from August 1939 until the Soviet-Japanese Non-Agression Pact was signed in April 1941. Hostilties did not commence again until after the defeat of Nazi Germany, because Japan's strategic vision was looking to the south, not to Siberia after Nohomen/Khalkin Ghol.

FDR's attitude towards Japan started to harden after the Rape of Nanking in '37, but nothing was carried out until the first embargos started in 1940 and was as a result of Japan's actions in China - a US trading partner.
 
BTF, here's the deal: You have offered nothing really concrete in the way of demonstrating that Kido Butai transmitted. What you have so far is:

1) An unsupported assertion that the weather was so foul as to require radio transmission;
2) An argument from incredulity that tanker traffic would be included in radio deception efforts;
3) A flat-out lie concerning the transmission from I-72;
4) Grogan's RDF, which has been demonstrated not to be plausible;
5) A veritable Gish gallop of garbage cribbed from other sources that you regurgitate without elaboration.

Explain to me how any of this is supposed to convince us that Kido Butai transmitted, in the face of the known facts (including the Japanese records, which you admit you have not touched).
 
FDR's attitude towards Japan started to harden after the Rape of Nanking in '37, but nothing was carried out until the first embargos started in 1940 and was as a result of Japan's actions in China - a US trading partner.

Additionally, Cordell Hull, SecState, warned FDR that embargoes might lead to war with Japan. However, the military was taking more and more of those resources and the isolationists were demanding that we stop supplying the Japanese with war materials. FDR traded embargoes for passage of bills intended to increase US readiness.
 
They didn't talk to the tankers on the radios. They did not transmit.

But we have records of a KB carrier talking directly to tankers, so they did transmit. To avoid this, you float the implausible theory that the IJN fake transmissions included transmissions between carriers and tankers on tactical circuits, even though this would have been abnormal for home-waters comms and even though such transmissions would indicate activity far away from port.

It is ironic that in your previous reply you refer to circular arguments. Your "KB did not transmit" is itself a rather egregious circular argument.

In your world, the documented transmissions between the Akagi and tankers had to be part of the IJN's deception because "KB did not transmit," never mind the fact that such transmissions would be abnormal for ships sitting in home waters.

In your world, the numerous military and civilian personnel who said they heard or saw intel from Japanese intercepts that indicated an attack on Pearl Harbor and/or who said they were informed of such intel from people who heard or saw it--they were all lying or "mistaken" because "KB did not transmit." And never you mind that most of these people didn't know each other and yet told the same basic account. "Mistaken"? What exactly would there be to have gotten confused about? "I've seen Japanese intel that says Pearl Harbor will be attacked." Or, "the intel I've seen from Japanese intercepts leads me to believe that Pearl Harbor could be attacked." One could think of dozens of variants, all of which would be easy to understand and rather hard to be "mistaken" about.

In your world, Grogan's signals were--well, let's go through the list: They were Russian ships. Yes, that's the scholarly consensus. Err, uh-oh, wait, they weren't Russian ships after all. Uh, they were some stray Japanese fishing ships--that's gotta be it. But, uh, hold on--no, they were signals that bounced all the way from a Japanese port to Grogan's RDF antennas, and somehow those signals gave him numerous bearings that indicated they came from an area northwest of Hawaii! Yeah! Of course, makes perfect sense! Or, hey, maybe they were actually American, British, or Dutch signals! Oh, rats, all ABD ships were in the southwestern quadrant of the Pacific at the time. Ah-hah . . . wait . . . we got it: Maybe Grogan just made up the whole story and he never heard any signals! Really, take any one of those, but you just can't believe that Grogan heard the KB because "KB did not transmit."
 
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But, uh, hold on--no, they were signals that bounced all the way from a Japanese port to Grogan's RDF antennas, and somehow those signals gave him numerous bearings that indicated they came from an area northwest of Hawaii! "

Actually NWbW...ie not from the direction KB were at the time.
 
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Edited for civility.
Bob, this is one of the most classic cases of projection I've seen in some time.

Your arguments and supposed evidence have all, so far, been shown to be lacking. Simply repeating them without bringing any new credible evidence isn't helping your case.
 
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But we have records of a KB carrier talking directly to tankers, so they did transmit. To avoid this, you float the implausible theory that the IJN fake transmissions included transmissions between carriers and tankers on tactical circuits, even though this would have been abnormal for home-waters comms and even though such transmissions would indicate activity far away from port.
You keep saying these sort of transmissions in home waters would be exceptionally abnormal. That's your opinion (or at least the opinion of whomever you're cribbing from this time), and I disagree with that opinion. Any competent professional navy, such as the IJN, trains as they would fight; this sort of training AFAIK almost always includes all of the logistical and support elements needed to support the fleet in combat. Hence I don't find it particularly surprising that transmissions feigning carrier-to-tanker communications were used in the deception operation.

ETA-Bob, you do realize the term "Japanese Home Waters" covers a rather large patch of the Pacific, don't you?
 
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But we have records of a KB carrier talking directly to tankers, so they did transmit. To avoid this, you float the implausible theory that the IJN fake transmissions included transmissions between carriers and tankers on tactical circuits, even though this would have been abnormal for home-waters comms and even though such transmissions would indicate activity far away from port.

It is ironic that in your previous reply you refer to circular arguments. Your "KB did not transmit" is itself a rather egregious circular argument.

In your world, the documented transmissions between the Akagi and tankers had to be part of the IJN's deception because "KB did not transmit," never mind the fact that such transmissions would be abnormal for ships sitting in home waters.

In your world, the numerous military and civilian personnel who said they heard or saw intel from Japanese intercepts that indicated an attack on Pearl Harbor and/or who said they were informed of such intel from people who heard or saw it--they were all lying or "mistaken" because "KB did not transmit." And never you mind that most of these people didn't know each other and yet told the same basic account. "Mistaken"? What exactly would there be to have gotten confused about? "I've seen Japanese intel that says Pearl Harbor will be attacked." Or, "the intel I've seen from Japanese intercepts leads me to believe that Pearl Harbor could be attacked." One could think of dozens of variants, all of which would be easy to understand and rather hard to be "mistaken" about.

In your world, Grogan's signals were--well, let's go through the list: They were Russian ships. Yes, that's the scholarly consensus. Err, uh-oh, wait, they weren't Russian ships after all. Uh, they were some stray Japanese fishing ships--that's gotta be it. But, uh, hold on--no, they were signals that bounced all the way from a Japanese port to Grogan's RDF antennas, and somehow those signals gave him numerous bearings that indicated they came from an area northwest of Hawaii! Yeah! Of course, makes perfect sense! Or, hey, maybe they were actually American, British, or Dutch signals! Oh, rats, all ABD ships were in the southwestern quadrant of the Pacific at the time. Ah-hah . . . wait . . . we got it: Maybe Grogan just made up the whole story and he never heard any signals! Really, take any one of those, but you just can't believe that Grogan heard the KB because "KB did not transmit."

Bob, we know that KB did not transmit because we have the ships logs from the KB and they do not have records of transmissions made by KB ships.

We know that many of the usual signallers from the KB were deployed on other vessels kept in home waters to execute a deception plan by simulating radio traffic between KB vessels, including the Akagi making a transmission to the effect of "Ship needs fuel, send tanker." Grogan likely picked up on those transmissions, and as we've shown you, his RDF capability would ahve been limited to direction only - which given the mobility of his receiving station, and the movement of the KB would make any information that he received of marginal value, and even less when you start plotting those backbearings on a map and see that oddly the lines all head back towards Japan....

As to those people claiming to have heard/received intel that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor - all of the people that you have cited made their claims years after the fact, and often after the person who might have been able to cooroborate the story is dead. Also there are a number of people in your list that had nothing to fear from disclosing that they had seen documents or information that the attack was coming - Sorge and the KGB is a prime example.

If the Soviets had wanted to truly embarass the US Government with a major (in fact I would say nearly crippling) scandal would have been to reveal to the world that, "In October of 1941 on of our top agents uncovered the following information about the attack on Pearl Harbor, which we passed onto the American government. Here are copies of what we passed on, a signature on the receipt line showing who received it, and we'll leave you folks to figure out what happens next. Pass the popcorn Sergei, this'll be fun to watch."
 
Not carrying out a replenishment at sea just because you are in home waters would be the equivalent of bringing a military unit in from a local exercise for meals and gassing up because the training area is right next to the base. As opposed to carrying out a DP.
 
[167] Communication Intelligence Summary, 27 November 1941

General.-Traffic volume a little below normal due to poor signals on the
frequencies above 7000 kcs. Tokyo-Takao circuit unreadable on mid-watch.
Some tactical traffic intercepted from carriers. Bako, Sama, and Saigon
active as originators, addressing traffic to each other and to the
Chiefs of Staff of Second, Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. Bako
addressed the Chief of Staff Third Fleet information Destroyer Squadrons
Four and Five and Chief of Staff Second Fleet. The main Tokyo originator
today was the Intelligence activity who sent five dispatches to the
major commanders. The Direction Finder activity was very high with all
stations sending in bearings including the Marshall Islands Stations
which has been silent for the past four days.

COMBINED FLEET.-No further information as to whether or not Destroyer
Squadron Three is in Hainan area but is believed to be still with
Cruiser Division Seven in that area. There is still no evidence of any
further movement from the Kure-Sasebo area. The Chief of Staff Combined
Fleet originated several messages of general address. He has been fairly
inactive as an originator lately. CinC. Second Fleet originated many
messages to Third Fleet, Combined Air Force and Bako.

THIRD FLEET.-Still holding extensive communication with Baka, Sama South
China Fleet and French Indo China Force. The use of WE addresses is
increasing, those occurring today were:

"DAIHATIFUTABUTAISANBOTEU" (in Taihoku)
"KOROKUKITISIKI"
"KIZUKEYAMASITABUTAI" (in care of RYUJO)
"HEIZEUKAIGUNDAIGONREUSEU"

There is nothing to indicate any movement of the Third Fleet as yet.

FOURTH FLEET.-CinC. Fourth Fleet frequently addressed dispatches to the
defense forces in the Mandates. Jaluit addressed messages to the
Commander Submarine Force and several submarine units. The Saipan Air
Corps held communication with Jaluit and CinC. Fourth Fleet. The Civil
Engineering Units at IMIEJI and ENIWETOK were heard from after being
silent for weeks. Chitose Air Corps is in Saipan and Air Squadron
Twenty-four is still operating in the Marshalls. No further information
on the presence of Carrier Division Five in the Mandates.

AIR.-An air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYU and
SHOKAKU. Carriers are still located in home waters. No information of
further movement of any Combined Air Force units to Hainan.

SUBMARINES.-Commander Submarine Force still in Chichijima Area

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/misc/int_summ.html
 
From The Code Breakers (abridged), the Pearl Harbor task force departed on November 26.

On December 1, the IJN reassigned all 20,000 call signs. This was actually unexpectedly early, the previous reassignment was on schedule and this was earlier than expected (one might infer that war was drawing near, a clue after all). Therefore the USN had to rebuild their table of what call signs related to what ships, commands, commanders, etc. At that point one of the ways, other than by observing who talked to whom and keeping track of that, of relating a call sign to a ship or base or command, would be to identify the radio operator's fist.

Since the embargo prevented all visual observations of Japan waters, the USN had to depend on radio RDF and traffic analysis to try and keep track of IJN vessels.

Therefore, the USN had no way of knowing what call sign was associated with any of the First Air Fleet carriers especially if, as apparently the IJN practiced, a more intense form of radio silence (nothing to the carriers, nothing from the carriers). Since the IJN had done this before, not being able to specifically locate the carriers would be worrisome but not completely unexpected.

Point of all this in this context?

Grogan would only be able to report he heard such and such a call sign on such and such a bearing. He would not have known that it was a carrier (since call signs do change) and given the mobile nature of his platform, even if he went to the navigator and tried to get as precise the location as possible (and you know that the ship's navigator is going to make a special effort to get a location because a radio operator asked him to), and the lack of precision of his station and lack of cross bearings, his reports would not have much value in and of themselves. If it got to the CIU at all, it probably would have passed down through channels to them.

So even considering this in the most favorable light, there would be no reason for anyone to have acted on Grogran's report in any significant way.
 
A few points. How does 20 to 30 kt winds become a huge storm? Sounds like everyday weather in winter.

Second We talked to tankers and other RFA ships all the time. We would routinely do a RAS even in 'home waters'.
As someone points out you don't go all the way back to port to top up. Plus while taking fuel other stores would be transfered.
 
Not carrying out a replenishment at sea just because you are in home waters would be the equivalent of bringing a military unit in from a local exercise for meals and gassing up because the training area is right next to the base. As opposed to carrying out a DP.

I'd imagine they did some training on refueling at sea.
 

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