Merged Pearl Harbor: "Revisionists" vs. "Traditionalists"

Based on the research I've done so far, there is very little if any weather information for the western part of the North Pacific for November-December 1941, and of course that's where the KB traveled. Available weather data for the eastern North Pacific inform us that there were several severe storms and other weather issues in the November-to-December timeframe.

Anyway, in addition to the evidence that I cited earlier of bad weather for the KB, we also have Admiral Sadao Chigusa's account of the KB's voyage. He noted the following--I'm going to work backwards from 5 December (and I'll change Japanese time to Hawaii time):

* On 5 December in the morning there was "a southwest wind blowing over 10 m (20 kts)," and the wind "increased strongly in the evening to about 15 m or 16 m (30 kts or 32 kts) bringing us very high waves." (Goldstein and Dillon, The Pearl Harbor Papers, p. 189) 20 kts equals 23 mph, and 32 kts equals 37 mph. And the waves were "very high."

* On 4 December "after a long interval, the sea became calm," which of course means that it was not calm during that long interval. (The Pearl Harbor Papers, p. 189)

* On 3 December at dusk the wind "fell below 10 m (20 kts) and the sea became fairly calm." (The Pearl Harbor Papers, p. 189) So the wind had been above 20 kts (23 mph) before dusk, and at dusk it became "fairly" calm, which tells us that before dusk the sea was not even "fairly" calm.

* On 2 December there was "a strong south wind at 18 m (35 kts)" and visibility was "short owing to heavy drizzle" (The Pearl Harbor Papers, p. 188) 35 kts is 40 mph, and visibility was "short." But that's not all. Chigusa goes on to tell us that his ship reached a 47-degree of roll to one side and that he'd never experienced anything like that before: "[the roll] was the largest roll since leaving Hitokappu Bay, and of course I hadn't experienced anything like it ever before." (The Pearl Harbor Papers, p. 188)

So an admiral had never seen a ship roll the way his ship did in that weather, and this was the same day that Grogan discerned that the ships he was monitoring were "bunched up." My, my, what a coincidence.

* On 1 December "the roll of our ship was severe" and winds were at 26-28 kts, or 30-32 mph. (The Pearl Harbor Papers, p. 188)
 
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Based on the research I've done so far, there is very little if any weather information for the western part of the North Pacific for November-December 1941, and of course that's where the KB traveled. Available weather data for the eastern North Pacific inform us that there were several severe storms and other weather issues in the November-to-December timeframe.

It's in the records you've never read.
 
In the RN an aircraft is Recovered, not landed on a ship :)

I was aware of that, actually. I was merely relating the laws as they apply to civilian aircraft. I don't know what rules and regulations apply to military aircraft though. If you could link me those I would be happy to look through them as I hope to work for (not in) the military when I get my A&P license.
 
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Bob, meteorology was in it's infancy back during WWII, so missing weather reports should hardly be surprising even if it were true that they were missing.
 
Based on the research I've done so far, there is very little if any weather information for the western part of the North Pacific for November-December 1941, and of course that's where the KB traveled. Available weather data for the eastern North Pacific inform us that there were several severe storms and other weather issues in the November-to-December timeframe.

Anyway, in addition to the evidence that I cited earlier of bad weather for the KB, we also have Admiral Sadao Chigusa's account of the KB's voyage. He noted the following--I'm going to work backwards from 5 December (and I'll change Japanese time to Hawaii time):

* On 5 December in the morning there was "a southwest wind blowing over 10 m (20 kts)," and the wind "increased strongly in the evening to about 15 m or 16 m (30 kts or 32 kts) bringing us very high waves." (Goldstein and Dillon, The Pearl Harbor Papers, p. 189) 20 kts equals 23 mph, and 32 kts equals 37 mph. And the waves were "very high."

* On 4 December "after a long interval, the sea became calm," which of course means that it was not calm during that long interval. (The Pearl Harbor Papers, p. 189)

* On 3 December at dusk the wind "fell below 10 m (20 kts) and the sea became fairly calm." (The Pearl Harbor Papers, p. 189) So the wind had been above 20 kts (23 mph) before dusk, and at dusk it became "fairly" calm, which tells us that before dusk the sea was not even "fairly" calm.

* On 2 December there was "a strong south wind at 18 m (35 kts)" and visibility was "short owing to heavy drizzle" (The Pearl Harbor Papers, p. 188) 35 kts is 40 mph, and visibility was "short." But that's not all. Chigusa goes on to tell us that his ship reached a 47-degree of roll to one side and that he'd never experienced anything like that before: "[the roll] was the largest roll since leaving Hitokappu Bay, and of course I hadn't experienced anything like it ever before." (The Pearl Harbor Papers, p. 188)

So an admiral had never seen a ship roll the way his ship did in that weather, and this was the same day that Grogan discerned that the ships he was monitoring were "bunched up." My, my, what a coincidence.

* On 1 December "the roll of our ship was severe" and winds were at 26-28 kts, or 30-32 mph. (The Pearl Harbor Papers, p. 188)

When, in your opinion, would the wheather be too bad for flying to be possible, if you look at the waves in the link?

http://www.delta-s.org/weer/wind-at-sea.jpg

And if we look at this photo of Kaga. Which sea state would this about correspond to?
http://padresteve.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/h75483.jpg
 
It was part of the IJN. It was not part of the Kido Butai. Unless the IGHQ lied about the task force disposition.

I-72 was part of the "Hawaii Operation" attack force, was operationally attached to the KB, and was under the command of the KB. Perhaps you have no military experience, but if your unit is deployed and another unit is attached to yours and is under your command, that unit is considered part of your unit in every sense except in minor administrative matters--and orders that apply to you also apply to the attached unit unless the orders specify otherwise.

And you still don't know where Lahaina Anchorage is, do you?

Oh, boy. . . . Really? Uh, so are you saying that I-72 was not talking about the same Lahaina anchorage that was the alternate port for Pearl Harbor?

I've already discussed the fact that the Japanese were hoping to catch some U.S. Navy ships at the Lahaina anchorage because the anchorage was so deep that it would be impossible to salvage the ships.
 
You need to account for the fact that the first of the Soviet-Japanese border wars started in 1932, BEFORE Rooseveldt took office.

What on earth are you talking about? Nobody is disputing the historical fact that the Soviet-Japanese border wars started before FDR was president. What does this have to do with FDR's apparent obsession with saving the Soviet Union? How does this affect the fact that FDR's Japan policy hardened considerably when he became aware via intercepts that the Japanese were seriously considering attacking Russia?
 
snip stuff about lots of wind

You do realise that your contention was for bad storms, such that visibility was a problem. All you have given us is that it was windy, resulting in high waves, and one day of drizzle.

And not a terribly subtle fringe reset, going back over 2 months to reply to posts...
 
I-72 was part of the "Hawaii Operation" attack force, was operationally attached to the KB, and was under the command of the KB. Perhaps you have no military experience, but if your unit is deployed and another unit is attached to yours and is under your command, that unit is considered part of your unit in every sense except in minor administrative matters--and orders that apply to you also apply to the attached unit unless the orders specify otherwise.



Oh, boy. . . . Really? Uh, so are you saying that I-72 was not talking about the same Lahaina anchorage that was the alternate port for Pearl Harbor?

I've already discussed the fact that the Japanese were hoping to catch some U.S. Navy ships at the Lahaina anchorage because the anchorage was so deep that it would be impossible to salvage the ships.
Then, Bob, you'd know that it was south of Pearl, and that any broadcast from that area, if it were detected, would draw attention AWAY from the incoming planes.

And I-72 was not assigned to the Kido Butai, that's been settled 10-12 pages back, I think.
 
They were also not supposed to transmit by radio. How can you not know that?

Actually, the radio silence order was not absolute; there were exceptions to it. And I'm guessing that you don't know this because you've only read one side of the story. As several scholars have noted, the comms orders to the fleet allowed for some exceptions to the radio silence directive.

See, for example, Villa and Wilford, "Warning at Pearl Harbor," pp. 6-9, at http://www.thestormunleashed.com/files/docs/warning_at_ph.pdf.
 
Seems the transmissions from Akagi about oil tankers are what would be expected as part of the deception or have you forgotten that the radio operators were sat in Japan pretending to be sending routine messages?

But carriers talking directly to tankers on tactical circuits was not "routine" and not the norm for ships in home waters. That's the last thing that fake transmissions would have said.
 
I liked his defense of Grogan being basically "well, he was using really vague and imprecise terms when describing the direction he heard the signals from, which is why it's obvious he knew the precise location and bearing of Kido Butai".


Edited by LashL: 
Edited for civility.


Ok, now, who in the world has ever said that Grogan knew "the precise location and bearing" of the KB? Got a name for that person, cuz I'd like to hear it. The claim has always been that Grogan determined the general location and general heading of the task force, not that he had precise data. Grogan was close, but no one has ever said he had the KB's precise location.

When I've said something like "and that was exactly where the KB was located," that was referring to the part of the huge Pacific Ocean where the KB traveling. Grogan determined that the ships he was hearing were northwest of Hawaii and moving east. That was "exactly" the part of the Pacific where the KB was. It's not a precise, exact location reference in the technical sense of having the actual bearings of the KB's location and direction. Grogan was close, but not exact.

Second, to use the term "northwest by west" in a layman's sense of saying "northwest of Hawaii" or "north and west of Hawaii" is not, in context, not all that "vague," especially when Grogan twice noted that he was using "northwest by west" in this manner. Grogan plainly and clearly placed the signals, i.e., the task force, NW of Hawaii. Here's Grogan's full statement on the November 30 bearings:
"The main body of signals came from a Northwest by West area, which from our second night out from Los Angeles bound for Honolulu -- would be North and West of Honolulu." (RFP, p. 3)
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Note: "which . . . would be North and West of Honolulu." Which was "exactly" where the task force was at this time. It was northwest of Hawaii. Grogan was "exactly" right in this regard. That's not the same as saying he knew the exact, precise location of the KB.

Here's what Grogan said about the bearings they took on December 2:
"We got good Radio Direction Finder bearings, mostly coming from a Northwesterly direction from our position. . . . and tonight's Radio Detection signals have come from a NW by W [sic] from Honolulu, and from the signals the Japs must be bunched up, biding time." (RFP, p. 4)
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Again, note how he uses "northwesterly direction" as a synonym for "NW by W." Now, clearly, Grogan wasn't saying that the task force was moving "NW by W" but that the signals were coming from an area that was "NW by W" from Honolulu, and just a few words earlier he said the bearings were "coming from a northwesterly direction" from his position. Furthermore, Grogan had already made it clear on page 3 that the phrase "NW by W area" meant north and west of Honolulu ("which . . . would be North and West of Honolulu").

Now, if you want to continue to wear blinders and ignore Grogan's clear, plain explanation of how he was using "NW by W," that's up to you. But it was simply dishonest of Jacobsen to use Grogan's "NW by W" reference without telling his readers that Grogan made it clear that he was using it in a general, layman's sense to say "north and west of Hawaii" or "northwest of Hawaii." Of course, if Jacobsen had done this, he wouldn't have been able to make the false claim that Grogan's bearings were off by 18 and 44 degrees.
 
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Actually, the radio silence order was not absolute; there were exceptions to it. And I'm guessing that you don't know this because you've only read one side of the story. As several scholars have noted, the comms orders to the fleet allowed for some exceptions to the radio silence directive.

See, for example, Villa and Wilford, "Warning at Pearl Harbor," pp. 6-9, at http://www.thestormunleashed.com/files/docs/warning_at_ph.pdf.

Circular references to mythical events do not count as evidence.
 

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