Merged Pearl Harbor: "Revisionists" vs. "Traditionalists"

At night a hand lamp can be used if the other ship is just a mile or two away, it won't be seen at 20 miles.
When we headed south for the Falklands we were under radio silence for some of the time, we signalled with good old fashioned lamps and flags, that was in the 1980s.
As for visibility in storms, I have stood watch in terrible Atlantic storms, and we could see other ships we were in company with enough not to run into them and keep station on them.
 
At night a hand lamp can be used if the other ship is just a mile or two away, it won't be seen at 20 miles.
When we headed south for the Falklands we were under radio silence for some of the time, we signalled with good old fashioned lamps and flags, that was in the 1980s.
As for visibility in storms, I have stood watch in terrible Atlantic storms, and we could see other ships we were in company with enough not to run into them and keep station on them.

I doubt anybody who has never been on anything bigger than a rowboat would understand station-keeping in a full gale. But it takes real hardened stupid to refuse to admit that the Kido Butai didn't run into weather that bad.
 
I doubt anybody who has never been on anything bigger than a rowboat would understand station-keeping in a full gale. But it takes real hardened stupid to refuse to admit that the Kido Butai didn't run into weather that bad.

It's central to his theory, of course. I'm still uncertain as to where he got the idea. I'm not exactly the most familiar with the details of that fateful voyage, but all the historians I've read have led me to understand that the conditions were nothing out of the ordinary (and no, BTF, that does not necessarily mean I believe they had smooth sailing the whole way). To my mind, any storm that would require a fleet member to break an order of strict radio silence would have to be very out of the ordinary. Am I wrong in this assumption? Just how ordinary or non-ordinary was this supposed storm they ran into?
 
It's central to his theory, of course. I'm still uncertain as to where he got the idea. I'm not exactly the most familiar with the details of that fateful voyage, but all the historians I've read have led me to understand that the conditions were nothing out of the ordinary (and no, BTF, that does not necessarily mean I believe they had smooth sailing the whole way). To my mind, any storm that would require a fleet member to break an order of strict radio silence would have to be very out of the ordinary. Am I wrong in this assumption? Just how ordinary or non-ordinary was this supposed storm they ran into?

It would have to be mythical to get the results he wants.

This is another "grasping at straws" idea that comes from the fact that there was a front generating clouds over the Kido Butai's route. Lazy thinkers conclude that clouds mean storms and that storms mean radio is the only way to communicate. The fact that they had rally points in case they were separated precisely so that they wouldn't have to use radio is ignored, of course.

And Bob, you're right, I'm not an "expert", but I'll do until one comes along. (Paging Mr. Prange's ghost!)
 
Bob, where is the evidence that the KB encountered conditions worse than Sea State 7?

For those who don't want to click the link - that would mean waves greater than 9m according to the Douglas Sea Scale.
 
It would have to be mythical to get the results he wants.

This is another "grasping at straws" idea that comes from the fact that there was a front generating clouds over the Kido Butai's route. Lazy thinkers conclude that clouds mean storms and that storms mean radio is the only way to communicate. The fact that they had rally points in case they were separated precisely so that they wouldn't have to use radio is ignored, of course.

And Bob, you're right, I'm not an "expert", but I'll do until one comes along. (Paging Mr. Prange's ghost!)

I'd think the IJN would be prepared to lose a ship rather than breaking radio silence.
 
It would have to be mythical to get the results he wants.

This is another "grasping at straws" idea that comes from the fact that there was a front generating clouds over the Kido Butai's route. Lazy thinkers conclude that clouds mean storms and that storms mean radio is the only way to communicate. The fact that they had rally points in case they were separated precisely so that they wouldn't have to use radio is ignored, of course.

And Bob, you're right, I'm not an "expert", but I'll do until one comes along. (Paging Mr. Prange's ghost!)

So in other words, he read some conspiracy theorist author who said that Kido Butai ran into a storm and had to break radio silence, and it resonated so deeply that he decided to adopt it as his fundamental "gotcha" upon which the whole house of cards of conventional history was upended, without doing any real research into reality.
 
I'd think the IJN would be prepared to lose a ship rather than breaking radio silence.

And the lost lamb would have sucked it up. They knew for certain where they could find the KB on the return route, so they would have laid low and waited if they were unable to continue due to, say, a mechanical breakdown.

Or they could have just waited on a line between Hawaii and Midway and the Midway Bombardment Force would be along to collect them shortly.

Anything but stupidly broadcast their presence to the world. They weren't as dumb as the people who put forward that idea.
 
And the lost lamb would have sucked it up. They knew for certain where they could find the KB on the return route, so they would have laid low and waited if they were unable to continue due to, say, a mechanical breakdown.

Or they could have just waited on a line between Hawaii and Midway and the Midway Bombardment Force would be along to collect them shortly.

Anything but stupidly broadcast their presence to the world. They weren't as dumb as the people who put forward that idea.

You keep ignoring the point that it was commonly believed back then that it was safe to transmit low-powered radio messages, just as the Germans thought it was safe in WW I. So in the minds of the KB ships that made those broadcasts, they were not taking a risk, because they thought those transmissions had a short range and didn't think they could be received by enemy listening stations.

You also keep ignoring the point that the radio silence order contained some exceptions.

And your only answer to the considerable anecdotal evidence that KB radio transmissions were heard by some American and Allied listening stations is to simply wave it all aside as lies.

Your only answer to Grogan's account of hearing KB transmissions is to cite Jacobsen's now-shredded nonsense, and of course you ignore the fact that Jacobsen's theory (actually, theories) contradicts the earlier "scholarly" theory that Grogan heard Russian signals.

Your only answer to the documented reception of a KB carrier communicating directly with tankers on a tactical circuit is to float the silly explanation that this, too, was just part of the IJN's radio deception effort, and never you mind that such communication would have been highly unusual for ships in home waters.

You asked if I am saying that Kimmel did a good job. Yes, that is exactly what I am saying: that given what he knew, and what he did not know, he did a very good job. He improved the training and significantly improved the combat skills of his sailors. Others noted how much Kimmel had done to improve the fleet's readiness and efficiency. Kimmel also did a great deal to improve morale. He even leaned on his orders and ordered that Japanese subs be fired at on sight. So, yes, I'm saying he did an outstanding job under the circumstances, and a whole slew of his peers and many admirals who served later said the same thing.

As for another poster's argument about using signal lights in bad weather, one could also raise the objection that the thick fog that occurs in the North Pacific at that time of year would have rendered those signals useless as well, not to mention the horrific storm weather that the KB encountered for a few days. We're not just talking about any old "bad weather" but a severe North Pacific storm.
 
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What Fog and Storms?

As for radio silence, in WW2 entire huge Convoys of Merchant ships crossed the Atlantic in terrible weather in complete radio silence.
 
You keep ignoring the point that it was commonly believed back then that it was safe to transmit low-powered radio messages, just as the Germans thought it was safe in WW I. So in the minds of the KB ships that made those broadcasts, they were not taking a risk, because they thought those transmissions had a short range and didn't think they could be received by enemy listening stations.

You also keep ignoring the point that the radio silence order contained some exceptions.

And your only answer to the considerable anecdotal evidence that KB radio transmissions were heard by some American and Allied listening stations is to simply wave it all aside as lies.

Your only answer to Grogan's account of hearing KB transmissions is to cite Jacobsen's now-shredded nonsense, and of course you ignore the fact that Jacobsen's theory (actually, theories) contradicts the earlier "scholarly" theory that Grogan heard Russian signals.

Your only answer to the documented reception of a KB carrier communicating directly with tankers on a tactical circuit is to float the silly explanation that this, too, was just part of the IJN's radio deception effort, and never you mind that such communication would have been highly unusual for ships in home waters.

You asked if I am saying that Kimmel did a good job. Yes, that is exactly what I am saying: that given what he knew, and what he did not know, he did a very good job. He improved the training and significantly improved the combat skills of his sailors. Others noted how much Kimmel had done to improve the fleet's readiness and efficiency. Kimmel also did a great deal to improve morale. He even leaned on his orders and ordered that Japanese subs be fired at on sight. So, yes, I'm saying he did an outstanding job under the circumstances, and a whole slew of his peers and many admirals who served later said the same thing.

As for another poster's argument about using signal lights in bad weather, one could also raise the objection that the thick fog that occurs in the North Pacific at that time of year would have rendered those signals useless as well, not to mention the horrific storm weather that the KB encountered for a few days. We're not just talking about any old "bad weather" but a severe North Pacific storm.
So in other words, still no credible evidence that the Kido Butai transmitted.

No evidence that Japanese did not understand how radio transmissions can propagate long distances.

No evidence anyone heard anything but the deception broadcasts.

No evidence of this nasty nasty storm.

And no evidence Kimmel did anything beyond a mediocre job (and that's being kind).
 
GAWD, being unable to read Japanese, can you point me at a translation of any of the Kido Butai's deck logs to take a look at the sea state in the approach to PH?
 
Bob, one simple question: Why use signal lights or radios at all when using waypoint navigation? Each individual ship knows where it is, when it is, and where and when the fleet will be. Using that information, it can regroup with the fleet perfectly well on its own, no external communication required. Exactly why was it so important that the fleet break strict radio silence to communicate?
 
Bob, one simple question: Why use signal lights or radios at all when using waypoint navigation? Each individual ship knows where it is, when it is, and where and when the fleet will be. Using that information, it can regroup with the fleet perfectly well on its own, no external communication required. Exactly why was it so important that the fleet break strict radio silence to communicate?

It really wouldn't have been hard to catch up anyway, given the "complex" course as they headed for T.H.
 

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Except we have the Japanese documents about how exactly the keys were disabled, and how they had problems reactivating them when they arrived at their destination. You, on the other hand, have nothing.

Oh, oh, ok. So the Japanese documents are absolutely reliable, and all the American and Allied military personnel who reported that the KB was heard and tracked were all lying! Yeah, ok.

I guess when you say I have "nothing" you're saying that all those accounts of the KB being heard and tracked are, again, just a pack of lies that were independently cooked up by military personnel (from different nations no less)--all of whom, by the way, went on to have successful careers in the military and after they left the military. But, yeah, they were all a pack of liars and those Japanese documents are beyond question.

Your arguments are a joke.
 
Oh, oh, ok. So the Japanese documents are absolutely reliable, and all the American and Allied military personnel who reported that the KB was heard and tracked were all lying! Yeah, ok.
Kido Butai didn't transmit. And "all the" is an absurdly small number, without supporting evidence. You fail.
I guess when you say I have "nothing" you're saying that all those accounts of the KB being heard and tracked are, again, just a pack of lies that were independently cooked up by military personnel (from different nations no less)--all of whom, by the way, went on to have successful careers in the military and after they left the military. But, yeah, they were all a pack of liars and those Japanese documents are beyond question.

Your arguments are a joke.
You should just give up, you'll never have a coherent argument, you don't have it in you.
 
It really wouldn't have been hard to catch up anyway, given the "complex" course as they headed for T.H.

I almost think the plane pilots would've had a harder time than the ships in the task force, given the range at launch. It hadn't really sunk in how far the flight had to fly (and the need for Kido Butai to come in closer for recovery) to press home the attack. They really didn't have time to do more than shoot and scoot.
 
Bob, one simple question: Why use signal lights or radios at all when using waypoint navigation? Each individual ship knows where it is, when it is, and where and when the fleet will be. Using that information, it can regroup with the fleet perfectly well on its own, no external communication required. Exactly why was it so important that the fleet break strict radio silence to communicate?

The laundry ship was was putting too much starch in the admiral's skivies.
 

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