Merged Pearl Harbor: "Revisionists" vs. "Traditionalists"

There was no need to talk to the tankers on the radio, they were in visual signalling range on the outbound trip until they split off to wait in safety for the return trip. So, once again you're lame assertions don't stand up when one has done the reading.

But, but, but, bad weather! Grogan's RDF! Some submarine out in the Pacific somewhere!
 
Do you even know what a "tactical circuit" is used for?

Well, I certainly know it doesn't include the Naval War College or the Army War College. Those are on the Strategic Circuit.

Maybe it includes Surface Warfare Officers School, the ASW school, the Army Manuever School, and Quantico. And whatever the Air Force uses when they're not golfing.
 
In addition, we have record of radio transmissions between a Kido Butai carrier and some tankers on a tactical circuit. The traditionalists can only respond with the implausible claim that those transmissions were part of the IJN's radio deception effort. This is absurdly silly. Why on earth would the Japanese send out "fake" radio transmissions in which carriers conversed with tankers on a tactical circuit if they were trying to fool us into thinking that those carriers were in home waters?
Maybe, you know, cuz' it's what they did routinely when actually training in home waters?

Bob, did you also know those home waters are much bigger than your bathtub?
 
You're kinda late on this, we've been over this stuff before. You really should look at more than the first link when you're Googlefishing.

And you really should stop pretending to be some kind of authority when you again blunder and make it clear that your research has been rather one-sided and incomplete.

But please, do tell me something: Yamamoto based his guarantee of a "big bag" on the fact that the US Fleet was routinely in port on the weekend. This violates one the basic tenet of operational security, "don't be predictable!" Now, the person responsble for insuring that the US Fleet was not predictable was...

Nope. sorry, wrong again. The Go-No Go decision was made after they reviewed the latest reports on the ships in the harbor, and those reports were follow-up bomb plot messages (which were also commonly called the "ships-in-harbor messages"). This is mentioned in The Pearl Harbor Papers, among other sources.

How can you not know this stuff?
 
There was no need to talk to the tankers on the radio, they were in visual signalling range on the outbound trip until they split off to wait in safety for the return trip. So, once again you're lame assertions don't stand up when one has done the reading.

Nope, but you once again prove that you're no expert.

One, the ships were not supposed to signal at night. How can you not know that?

Two, when they encountered horrific weather, as we know they did, signals would have been useless.

Three, they thought that low-powered transmissions were safe because they mistakenly believed that they had a very limited reception range. The Germans made the exact same mistake in WW I, as Farago pointed out.

Also, someone floated the odd argument that carriers conversing with tankers on a tactical circuit would have been included with other fake transmissions since this would supposedly reflect routine training activity. Wrong. Villa and Wilford:

The significance of the term, ‘tactical circuit’ is that the vessel itself, that is, the AKAGI, was using its own radio to call up and work directly the other vessels rather than work them through shore stations via the broadcast method which was the common practice in Japanese communications. The working of the AKAGI with the Marus indicated that she was making arrangements for fuel or some administrative function, since a carrier would rarely address a Maru."87

The intercepted Akagi traffic is perhaps the most important indication that the Strike Force may have made a few necessary transmissions during a period of nominal radio silence. In the case of the Akagi, ‘tactical’ traffic with its Marus seemed to reflect operations far away from home, rather than stationary anchorage in homeports as Japanese deception was trying to convey using routine call signs.88 As the Congressional Hearings suggest, oil tankers were the type of Marus supporting an aircraft carrier like the Akagi. The Japanese would not be likely to have sent a false message indicating that the Akagi was conversing on a ‘tactical circuit’ with Marus when previous false messages were trying to convince Allied naval intelligence that the carriers were in home waters. ("Signals Intelligence and
Pearl Harbor: The State of the Question," Intelligence and National Security, 21:4, pp. 534-535, 545, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/1...84520600885665)​
 
And you really should stop pretending to be some kind of authority when you again blunder and make it clear that your research has been rather one-sided and incomplete.
Yeah, I don't know nuthin' from nuthin'.
Nope. sorry, wrong again. The Go-No Go decision was made after they reviewed the latest reports on the ships in the harbor, and those reports were follow-up bomb plot messages (which were also commonly called the "ships-in-harbor messages"). This is mentioned in The Pearl Harbor Papers, among other sources.

How can you not know this stuff?
You replied to a statement I didn't make.

BTW, The Pearl Harbor Papers messages were taken from the PHA Hearings. Ever read them? Only forty volumes. I'd loan you may set but you'd just use them to make a fort in your room.
 
Nope, but you once again prove that you're no expert.

One, the ships were not supposed to signal at night. How can you not know that?

Two, when they encountered horrific weather, as we know they did, signals would have been useless.

Three, they thought that low-powered transmissions were safe because they mistakenly believed that they had a very limited reception range. The Germans made the exact same mistake in WW I, as Farago pointed out.

Also, someone floated the odd argument that carriers conversing with tankers on a tactical circuit would have been included with other fake transmissions since this would supposedly reflect routine training activity. Wrong. Villa and Wilford:

The significance of the term, ‘tactical circuit’ is that the vessel itself, that is, the AKAGI, was using its own radio to call up and work directly the other vessels rather than work them through shore stations via the broadcast method which was the common practice in Japanese communications. The working of the AKAGI with the Marus indicated that she was making arrangements for fuel or some administrative function, since a carrier would rarely address a Maru."87

The intercepted Akagi traffic is perhaps the most important indication that the Strike Force may have made a few necessary transmissions during a period of nominal radio silence. In the case of the Akagi, ‘tactical’ traffic with its Marus seemed to reflect operations far away from home, rather than stationary anchorage in homeports as Japanese deception was trying to convey using routine call signs.88 As the Congressional Hearings suggest, oil tankers were the type of Marus supporting an aircraft carrier like the Akagi. The Japanese would not be likely to have sent a false message indicating that the Akagi was conversing on a ‘tactical circuit’ with Marus when previous false messages were trying to convince Allied naval intelligence that the carriers were in home waters. ("Signals Intelligence and
Pearl Harbor: The State of the Question," Intelligence and National Security, 21:4, pp. 534-535, 545, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/1...84520600885665)​
Kido Butai did not transmit.
 
picture.php
 
Nope, but you once again prove that you're no expert.

One, the ships were not supposed to signal at night. How can you not know that?

Two, when they encountered horrific weather, as we know they did, signals would have been useless.

Three, they thought that low-powered transmissions were safe because they mistakenly believed that they had a very limited reception range. The Germans made the exact same mistake in WW I, as Farago pointed out.

You have yet to prove that this so-called "horrific" weather was an obstacle that required radio transmission.

Also, someone floated the odd argument that carriers conversing with tankers on a tactical circuit would have been included with other fake transmissions since this would supposedly reflect routine training activity. Wrong. Villa and Wilford:

The significance of the term, ‘tactical circuit’ is that the vessel itself, that is, the AKAGI, was using its own radio to call up and work directly the other vessels rather than work them through shore stations via the broadcast method which was the common practice in Japanese communications. The working of the AKAGI with the Marus indicated that she was making arrangements for fuel or some administrative function, since a carrier would rarely address a Maru."87

The intercepted Akagi traffic is perhaps the most important indication that the Strike Force may have made a few necessary transmissions during a period of nominal radio silence. In the case of the Akagi, ‘tactical’ traffic with its Marus seemed to reflect operations far away from home, rather than stationary anchorage in homeports as Japanese deception was trying to convey using routine call signs.88 As the Congressional Hearings suggest, oil tankers were the type of Marus supporting an aircraft carrier like the Akagi. The Japanese would not be likely to have sent a false message indicating that the Akagi was conversing on a ‘tactical circuit’ with Marus when previous false messages were trying to convince Allied naval intelligence that the carriers were in home waters. ("Signals Intelligence and
Pearl Harbor: The State of the Question," Intelligence and National Security, 21:4, pp. 534-535, 545, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/1...84520600885665)​

"Home waters" != "stationary anchorage in homeports". The Japanese weren't trying to deceive the Americans into thinking their ships were at anchor, because why would they be transmitting if they were sitting in the harbor? For the rest, I hold that Kido Butai did not transmit.
 
You have yet to prove that this so-called "horrific" weather was an obstacle that required radio transmission.
Bob cited The Pearl Harbor Papers, so he should be able to give the page numbers where the deck logs recorded this "horrific" weather. We'll be waiting, Bob. My copy is on the deck here.

"Home waters" != "stationary anchorage in homeports". The Japanese weren't trying to deceive the Americans into thinking their ships were at anchor, because why would they be transmitting if they were sitting in the harbor? For the rest, I hold that Kido Butai did not transmit.
Bob is again victim of peripheral reading of third-hand sources. He's conflated the fact that the "easily recognizable fists" were left behind in Japan to spoof US trackers. He then concludes the IJN was stupid enough to think that the USN was stupid enough not to notice that the "ships" being tracked by RDF WEREN'T MOVING.
 
Bob is again victim of peripheral reading of third-hand sources. He's conflated the fact that the "easily recognizable fists" were left behind in Japan to spoof US trackers. He then concludes the IJN was stupid enough to think that the USN was stupid enough not to notice that the "ships" being tracked by RDF WEREN'T MOVING.

Heh, and once again, I learned something. I'd never really processed the implications of leaving the telegraphers behind as a deception effort. Naturally, they would be left on ships that were actually maneuvering in the water, because it would be incredibly dense to risk someone tracking them to a concrete bomb shelter in downtown Tokyo... :D
 
Heh, and once again, I learned something. I'd never really processed the implications of leaving the telegraphers behind as a deception effort. Naturally, they would be left on ships that were actually maneuvering in the water, because it would be incredibly dense to risk someone tracking them to a concrete bomb shelter in downtown Tokyo... :D

There was discussion of sending some south with the Kra Peninsula invasion force, but some bright soul pointed out they didn't want to alarm the British by making them think heavy carriers were heading for Malaya.

"One more great idea like that and we'll all be dead."
 
There was discussion of sending some south with the Kra Peninsula invasion force, but some bright soul pointed out they didn't want to alarm the British by making them think heavy carriers were heading for Malaya.

"One more great idea like that and we'll all be dead."

Besides alarming the British, what might have happened if the Brits sent a reconnaissance flight and discovered that the carriers weren't with the invasion force? "Hey, uhh, USN, just thought you might want to know that the Japanese heavies are MIA and their telegraphers are on some dinky destroyers playing around out thisaway."
 
Besides alarming the British, what might have happened if the Brits sent a reconnaissance flight and discovered that the carriers weren't with the invasion force? "Hey, uhh, USN, just thought you might want to know that the Japanese heavies are MIA and their telegraphers are on some dinky destroyers playing around out thisaway."

Could have happened, but you'd have to figure out what the spoof was for. As PI was the "obvious" target of such a diversion of interest, MacArthur would have been alerted, I do believe.
 

ISF - Join now!

Every member here is approved by hand. No bots, no spam, just people who care about evidence and honest debate.

Membership is free!

Create your free account

Back
Top Bottom