Nope, but you once again prove that you're no expert.
One, the ships were not supposed to signal at night. How can you not know that?
Two, when they encountered horrific weather, as we know they did, signals would have been useless.
Three, they thought that low-powered transmissions were safe because they mistakenly believed that they had a very limited reception range. The Germans made the exact same mistake in WW I, as Farago pointed out.
Also, someone floated the odd argument that carriers conversing with tankers on a tactical circuit would have been included with other fake transmissions since this would supposedly reflect routine training activity. Wrong. Villa and Wilford:
The significance of the term, ‘tactical circuit’ is that the vessel itself, that is, the AKAGI, was using its own radio to call up and work directly the other vessels rather than work them through shore stations via the broadcast method which was the common practice in Japanese communications. The working of the AKAGI with the Marus indicated that she was making arrangements for fuel or some administrative function, since a carrier would rarely address a Maru."87
The intercepted Akagi traffic is perhaps the most important indication that the Strike Force may have made a few necessary transmissions during a period of nominal radio silence. In the case of the Akagi, ‘tactical’ traffic with its Marus seemed to reflect operations far away from home, rather than stationary anchorage in homeports as Japanese deception was trying to convey using routine call signs.88 As the Congressional Hearings suggest, oil tankers were the type of Marus supporting an aircraft carrier like the Akagi. The Japanese would not be likely to have sent a false message indicating that the Akagi was conversing on a ‘tactical circuit’ with Marus when previous false messages were trying to convince Allied naval intelligence that the carriers were in home waters. ("Signals Intelligence and
Pearl Harbor: The State of the Question," Intelligence and National Security, 21:4, pp. 534-535, 545,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/1...84520600885665)