Merged Pearl Harbor: "Revisionists" vs. "Traditionalists"

Windows in aircraft? what will the think of next? Maybe not transmitting their position when sneaking up to do a surprise attack?
 
Well, you know, a signal that can be detected at 20 miles is much more dangerous than one that can tracked from Washington State. :p

But they didn't think those transmissions could be tracked from Washington state. They didn't think those transmissions could be received by any listening post in the Pacific. They didn't know that those transmissions could "skip" so far as to be heard back in Japan, in Hawaii, etc., etc. They didn't know that. They thought they were safe from detection if they used low-power transmissions. The Germans made the exact same mistake in WW I, as Farago pointed out.

Now, regarding my point that KB ships weren't supposed to signal at night, I have to chuckle at the sarcastic response that "well, they weren't supposed to transmit either!" Yeah, ok. Hey, I'm perfectly willing to believe that on a few occasions some of the ships violated the nighttime-signal ban. But, umm, are any of you willing to allow that on a few occasions some of the ships also violated the radio silence order? Ahhhhh. . . . Oooops. . . . Uh-oh, are you going to be consistent in your logic? No, I didn't think so.

So, according to you, they never once broke radio silence, but they may have signaled a few times at night. Uh-huh. Whatever it takes to see the emperor's new clothes, hey?

And how about when they needed to communicate on the days/nights when they encountered horrific, fierce storms--as we know they did? Signals would have been useless. Utterly useless. Then what? Obviously, they would use the radio and would do so in a way that they thought involved very little or no risk of detection. And that's exactly what they did. They made the same mistake that the Germans made in WW I.
 
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BTF, are you going to acknowledge the significance of this point? Even if we grant your argument that I-72 was operationally a part of Kido Butai (which I would dispute, but still, just for the sake of argument), the fact of the matter is that the transmission could not have materially affected the security of the striking force because the attack was already underway. Not to mention the fact that the sub was not present with the striking force at the time the transmission was made. Put more simply, Kido Butai did not transmit.

But the attack was not already underway when the sub transmitted. As for the sub's relationship with the KB, the sub was part of the "Hawaii Operation" force, which included the KB. Not only that, the sub was operating in direct support of the KB and was under its command. It is grasping at straws and making up a distinction without a difference to pretend that that sub force was not a part of the KB in every meaningful, operational way.

Perhaps you're thinking of Admiral Nagumo's transmission? But even that transmission was highly risky and shows, as other scholars have pointed out, that even Nagumo did not treat the radio silence order very rigidly. He transmitted shortly after the planes left the carriers and well before they arrived at their target, and he did so to pass along rather trivial info that could have waited until much later.
 
"Point-by-point" doesn't mean factual.

Oh, well, then you should easily be able to shows us some factual errors in these articles, hey? Why not start with Lt. Cmdr. Pettinger's article--just show us one or two of his supposed factual errors. Surely you can easily do this, siince anyone who disagrees with you is ignorant, backward, and guilty of peddling "idiocy." So, please, come down from Mt. Denial and just show us mortals one or two specific factual errors contained in Pettinger's thesis.
 
But they didn't think those transmissions could be tracked from Washington state. They didn't think those transmissions could be received by any listening post in the Pacific. They didn't know that those transmissions could "skip" so far as to be heard back in Japan, in Hawaii, etc., etc. They didn't know that. They thought they were safe from detection if they used low-power transmissions. The Germans made the exact same mistake in WW I, as Farago pointed out.

Except we have the Japanese documents about how exactly the keys were disabled, and how they had problems reactivating them when they arrived at their destination. You, on the other hand, have nothing.

And how about when they needed to communicate on the days/nights when they encountered horrific, fierce storms--as we know they did? Signals would have been useless. Utterly useless. Then what? Obviously, they would use the radio and would do so in a way that they thought involved very little or no risk of detection. And that's exactly what they did. They made the same mistake that the Germans made in WW I.

You need to show the storm was as bad as all that.
If it was so bad for signalling then it was too bad for refuelling, so why did they need to contact anyone? What was the purpose?
You have failed to show any reason for maintaining contact during these "horrific, fierce storms".

And why do you think the Japanese navy would be unaware of what the Germans had discovered 25 years earlier?
 
But the attack was not already underway when the sub transmitted.

I'm sorry, what? Did you miss the whole discussion on the timestamp on the intercepted transmission on purpose so as to selectively quote my post, or are you just dense? Go back to the page prior to that post, page 35. It's clearly spelled out that the transmission occurred after the attack occurred.
 
I'm sorry, what? Did you miss the whole discussion on the timestamp on the intercepted transmission on purpose so as to selectively quote my post, or are you just dense? Go back to the page prior to that post, page 35. It's clearly spelled out that the transmission occurred after the attack occurred.
It's funny how Bob seems to have missed that.

It's also funny how he seems to have missed the fact that the message wasn't even decoded and translated until 1945.

So Bob, still no credible evidence the KB transmitted huh?
 
The biggest problem with CTers is that each one thinks they have THE gotcha. No matter that it's not a gotcha but just bad scholarship on their part. No matter that it has been debunked endless times. No matter that it's irrelevant to any serious discussion of the events.
 
The biggest problem with CTers is that each one thinks they have THE gotcha. No matter that it's not a gotcha but just bad scholarship on their part. No matter that it has been debunked endless times. No matter that it's irrelevant to any serious discussion of the events.

This "gotcha" is the source of the fringe reset. Once enough time has passed, they decide it's time to bring back their smoking gun, assuming people have forgotten how well it was debunked the last 300 times it was discussed.
 
This "gotcha" is the source of the fringe reset. Once enough time has passed, they decide it's time to bring back their smoking gun, assuming people have forgotten how well it was debunked the last 300 times it was discussed.

It's the basis of every CT book sold to these morons. I acquire CT books through any channel that doesn't give any of my money to the authors.
 
Uh-oh, are you going to be consistent in your logic?


Wow! That took a complete lack of a sense of shame to write that.

According to you the Kido Butai would never dare to use signal lamps at night that have a range of 20 miles for fear of counter-detection but according to you they are banging away left and right on their radios. Someone pointed out your inconsistent logic, you admitted they might have signaled at night, but you ingenuously admitted that solely for the purpose of being able to accuse him of inconsistent logic. Wow!


Signals would have been useless. Utterly useless.

The flaws in this claim are numerous:

1. You are assuming they would need to transmit. They were following a plan and the plan eliminated the need for any ship in the carrier task force to transmit on their radios.
2. Your claim that signal lamps are useless in bad weather is an argument from personal incredulity and it is based on your sources' ignorance of fleet operations. I have experience in fleet operations and I have seen ships use their signal lamps in sea state 7.
3. There are other methods of visual signalling, namely signal flags and semaphore, but most importantly, yardarm blinkers. No matter how bad the weather may be, a ship's yardarm blinkers wil always be above the waves. If the visibility is poor and a ship needs to communicate with another ship they can do this radical maneuver called the "move closer to the ship I am trying to communicate with" maneuver.
 
Begging the question of whether there was a "campaign" to blame them, and the question of whether any such campaign, if it existed, was orchestrated by FDR.

As you'd know if you'd ever dared yourself to read a non-traditionalist book, FDR was "furious" over the NCI and APHB reports and did everything he could to keep them suppressed for as long as possible. FDR was the one who ordered that those reports be reviewed (read: refuted) (that was Clausen's pathetic "review"). FDR sat back and said nothing to correct the record as Kimmel and Short were smeared in the press and by members of his own administration. He appointed the Roberts Commission to smear Kimmel and Short (and forbade it from even considering wrongdoing/mistakes by members of his administration, much less by himself). And on and on we could go.

Sorry, you don't get to attempt to disqualify your critics on the grounds of not having read certain books or papers. The facts speak for themselves.

In other words, only books that support your position contain "the facts." So, therefore, you don't need to bother yourself with reading both sides. Great. Just great. That's beyond sophomoric.

Kimmel and Short were explicitly warned that war was imminent, and that hostile Japanese action was possible "in any direction."

Oh, just hogwash. What "warnings" they were given were deliberately vague and contradictory. And not one of those "warnings" said there was even the slightest chance that Hawaii would be attacked, even after the bomb plot messages started rolling in, even after allied intel services started telling American high officials that Pearl Harbor could/would be attacked, and even after an ONI report noted that Hawaii was among the top three targets of Japanese intelligence efforts for info that could be used by the Japanese Navy during war.

Tell us, BTF, how many interceptors did Short have on combat air patrol on the morning of December 7, 1941? And what sort of use did Short make of the radar sets his command had received?

Sheesh. . . . As Marshall and other Army brass knew, Short believed that the 11/27 "warning" directed him to guard against sabotage and therefore he had his planes bunched up on the runway. Not once did Marshall contact Short to correct this supposed "misunderstanding" or "misinterpretation" of the 11/27 warning, even though it was his absolute duty to do so. Nor did any other high Army official, such as General Grew. As many scholars and military experts have noted, the fact that nobody from Washington told Short that he had "misinterpreted" the 11/27 warning was a clear indication to Short that his interpretation was correct and that he was acting as his superiors wanted him to act.

Furthermore, Short and Kimmel had jointly decided, for very sound, reasonable reasons, that extensive air patrols simply weren't feasible. John Keegan:

Logan Ramsey, Operations Officer on the staff of Rear Admiral P.N.L. Bellinger, testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that there were not a sufficient number of patrol planes, spare parts, or pilots to have conducted continuous distant reconnaissance to 700-800 miles that encompassed a radius of 360 degrees. Eighteen planes would have been required to conduct daily 700-mile reconnaissance operations, covering 144 degrees and leaving 216 degrees of that sector uncovered.132 360 degree reconnaissance could be conducted in an emergency, but it could only be maintained for one or two days and only if necessary spare parts were available.133 Spare parts were not available.

Thus, it was decided jointly by the Army and Navy in Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan A-1-41, Addendum I March 31, 1941 (Martin-Bellinger report), that running daily patrols as far as possible from Oahu in a 360 degree radius were desirable but could not be maintained due to a lack of personnel and equipment. As a result, it could only be initiated when intelligence indicated that a surface raid was possible within “rather narrow time limits.”134 (For the Good of the Service: Husband E. Kimmel and the Aftermath of Pearl Harbor, MA thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 2010, p. 36)​

And, by the way, Kimmel did conduct some aerial reconnaissance, but it was necessarily limited (although it did extend out to 400 miles). But the "experts" who peddle the traditionalist mythology continue to repeat the false claim that Kimmel did no aerial reconnaissance, and they also repeat the myth that Kimmel had enough planes to do 360-degree aerial reconnaissance. Keegan:

Forrestal concluded that Kimmel‟s most “grievous failure was his failure to conduct long-range air reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors from Oahu during the week preceding the attack.”139 King also concluded that Kimmel could have used the patrol aircraft that were available.140 According to Kimmel's memorandum of his December 7, 1944 meeting with King, King “said he had not read the testimony given before” the Naval Court of Inquiry.141 It is equally possible that Forrestal did not read the testimony given before the Naval Court of Inquiry before drawing his conclusion. Forrestal‟s conclusion, aside from ignoring the lack of patrol planes, pilots, and spare parts, assumed twenty-five mile visibility for long-range reconnaissance of 700-800 miles around Oahu. Weather did restrict the effectiveness of aerial reconnaissance. . . .

Regardless of Forrestal‟s oversights, Prange, or more likely his co-authors, Katherine Dillon and Donald Goldstein, agreed with Forrestal‟s conclusion that there were sufficient planes for Kimmel to have conducted long-range air reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors from Oahu. 143 Dillon and Goldstein also seemed to have been unaware of Ramsey‟s testimony, for they, like the Dorn report, Borch, and Martinez, implied that Kimmel conducted no aerial reconnaissance. Additionally, Dillon and Goldstein focus on Forrestal‟s phrase “the more dangerous sectors from Oahu,” arguing that 360 degree reconnaissance was not necessary and that Navy aircraft should have been deployed based on the “carefully reasoned estimates” of the Martin-Bellinger report.144 Dillon and Goldstein implied that the Martin-Bellinger report identified more dangerous sectors. It did not. Nowhere in the pages of the report did it indicate any sector as more dangerous or the likely sector from which a Japanese air attack would come from.145 (For the Good of the Service, p. 39)​

Further, Short failed to read the extensive briefing materials prepared for him by his predecessor, appointed an officer with no intelligence training as his intelligence chief (apparently because he didn't want an unwashed reservist as part of his inner circle), and grossly overestimated the threat of sabotage from Hawaii's ethnic Japanese population. See Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement, by Henry Clausen and Bruce Lee, and the testimony of General Charles D. Herron before the joint Congressional investigation.

A downright silly argument. Short could have appointed the greatest intel officer in the world, but he would have been nearly helpless without the intel that Washington possessed. Kimmel had a very good intel officer, Edwin Layton. Layton later proved his skills beyond any question. Yet, Layton himself later said that he was clueless about Pearl Harbor because of all the vital intel that Washington withheld from the Hawaiian commands.

By the way, I've read Clausen and Lee's book. It's loaded with just the kinds of silly arguments that you just made. You might read Dr. Michael Gannon's book Pearl Harbor Betrayed. After reading Gannon's research, CNO Admiral Trost reversed his negative view of the Kimmel family's request. Trost, after being fed a bunch of traditionalist "scholarship," initially recommended against the Kimmel family's request. But, when he read Professor Gannon's research, which dismantled the traditionalist nonsense he'd been fed, he changed his mind.

As for Kimmel, as Gawdzilla pointed out up-thread, he kept the fleet on a predictable schedule, which allowed the Japanese to know that they had an excellent chance of finding most of the Pacific Fleet's capital ships at anchor on a Sunday morning in Hawaii. He also failed to share intelligence or otherwise develop any sort of a coordinated defense plan with Short, as he'd been directed.

Oh, please, spare me appeals to Gawdzilla. He's no "expert"--except on traditionalist talking points. Short and Kimmel did in fact work quite closely together, and, among other things, they jointly decided that 360 air patrols simply were not feasible.

As just one more of innumerable examples of Gawdzilla's poor "scholarship," he says he can't understand the Kimmel family's request to have Admiral Kimmel restored to his CIC Pacific Fleet rank, since it was normal for CICs to revert back to their previous admirality rank when they were no longer CIC. But, as Gawdzilla would know if he'd bother to read anything that disagrees with his views with any care, Congress long ago passed a law--the Officer Personnel Act of 1947--that made it possible for senior commanders to be retired at their highest command rank, and Kimmel and Short were the only two high-level WW II commanders who were not submitted for this honor.

In 2001 Congress voted overwhelmingly to recommend that Kimmel and Short be restored to their CIC ranks posthumously. A veritable boat load of former senior officers, former CNOs, and veterans groups voiced their support, by the way.

As the Dorn Report states (paraphrasing), Kimmel and Short were relieved because they had demonstrated a clear lack of the "superior judgement" required for high command. The evidence of this lack of superior judgement is incontrovertible, whether you, their families, or their other apologists like it or not.

LOL! You're citing the Dorn Report?!!!! FYI, a boat load of former admirals, including some CNOs, and the vast majority of the members of Congress disagreed with the Dorn Report's rejection of advancing Kimmel and Short to their CIC ranks. Have you read Admiral Richardson's point-by-point rebuttal to the Dorn Report? How about Professor Gannon's dismantling of it--read that? Have you read ANYTHING that questions the Dorn Report? Or did you just take Gawdzilla's lead in his appeal to the authority of the Dorn Report?

The fact that others may have escaped blame for their failures is irrelevant (though you fail to note that Admiral Harold Stark was relieved as Chief of Naval Operations for his errors in judgement).

Oh, gosh, more abject silliness. If anyone truly deserved to be relieved, it was MacArthur, not Kimmel or Short. MacArthur's incredible blundering cost the loss of tens of thousands of troops, not to mention a devastating surprise air raid on his bomber force 24 hours after Pearl Harbor happened! And, yes, I'm aware that Stark was relieved. Do you know why he was relieved? Have you ever read the NCI report? It was rather scathing in its criticism of Stark's failures, such as his failure to pass along crucial intelligence to Kimmel.
 
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Oh, please, spare me appeals to Gawdzilla. He's no "expert"--except on traditionalist talking points. Short and Kimmel did in fact work quite closely together, and, among other things, they jointly decided that 360 air patrols simply were not feasible.
Do you know where Short was when Kimmel went to the harbor that morning?

Bob, anybody who has read two book knows more than you about this topic.
As just one more of innumerable examples of Gawdzilla's poor "scholarship," he says he can't understand the Kimmel family's request to have Admiral Kimmel restored to his CIC Pacific Fleet rank, since it was normal for CICs to revert back to their previous admirality rank when they were no longer CIC. But, as Gawdzilla would know if he'd bother to read anything that disagrees with his views with any care, Congress long ago passed a law--the Officer Personnel Act of 1947--that made it possible for senior commanders to be retired at their highest command rank, and Kimmel and Short were the only two high-level WW II commanders who were not submitted for this honor.

In 2001 Congress voted overwhelmingly to recommend that Kimmel and Short be restored to their CIC ranks posthumously. A veritable boat load of former senior officers, former CNOs, and veterans groups voiced their support, by the way.
So what? Does that mean Kimmel did an extremely good job at Pearl? Did those Congresscritters even know what the issues were? Or did they just vote the popular route? You'll never know.
 
Wow! That took a complete lack of a sense of shame to write that.

According to you the Kido Butai would never dare to use signal lamps at night that have a range of 20 miles for fear of counter-detection but according to you they are banging away left and right on their radios. Someone pointed out your inconsistent logic, you admitted they might have signaled at night, but you ingenuously admitted that solely for the purpose of being able to accuse him of inconsistent logic. Wow!

LOL!!! Holy cow! You have it backward. I cited the ban on nighttime signaling because according to you guys the Japanese slavishly adhered to the radio silence order (never mind that that order did allow for some communications).

I said I was perfectly willing to allow that some KB ships violated the nighttime signal ban, and then I asked if any of you would allow that some KB ships violated the radio silence order. Yeah, uh-huh. . . .

The flaws in this claim are numerous:

1. You are assuming they would need to transmit. They were following a plan and the plan eliminated the need for any ship in the carrier task force to transmit on their radios.

There are all kinds of holes in this argument. You might read Villa and Wilford's detailed 2006 study "Signals Intelligence and Pearl Harbor: The State of the Question," Intelligence and National Security, 21:4, available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520600885665?journalCode=fint20#preview.

2. Your claim that signal lamps are useless in bad weather is an argument from personal incredulity and it is based on your sources' ignorance of fleet operations. I have experience in fleet operations and I have seen ships use their signal lamps in sea state 7.

You should ease off on the pejorative rhetoric until you've done a bit more research. We're talking about weather that was considerably worse than Sea State 7. One of the KB sailors said he'd never seen waves so high. We know the KB sailed right into some horrific storms, which included extremely limited visibility, which were not uncommon for the North Pacific for that time of year.

3. There are other methods of visual signalling, namely signal flags and semaphore, but most importantly, yardarm blinkers. No matter how bad the weather may be, a ship's yardarm blinkers wil always be above the waves. If the visibility is poor and a ship needs to communicate with another ship they can do this radical maneuver called the "move closer to the ship I am trying to communicate with" maneuver.

Umm, what about when they encountered extremely bad weather at night??? Hey? Then what? This denialism is just silly.

And during extreme weather during the day, such as the storms that KB encountered, we're not just talking about seeing above waves. Sheesh, think about it.

Again, I suggest you read the other side, starting with Villa and Wilford's 2006 study.
 
LOL!!! Holy cow! You have it backward. I cited the ban on nighttime signaling because according to you guys the Japanese slavishly adhered to the radio silence order (never mind that that order did allow for some communications).

I said I was perfectly willing to allow that some KB ships violated the nighttime signal ban, and then I asked if any of you would allow that some KB ships violated the radio silence order. Yeah, uh-huh. . . .


Fringe resets are a real time saver.


There are all kinds of holes in this argument. You might read Villa and Wilford's detailed 2006 study "Signals Intelligence and Pearl Harbor: The State of the Question," Intelligence and National Security, 21:4, available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520600885665?journalCode=fint20#preview.


If recommending I waste money on long debunked nonsense is all you have to defend your claim then you don't have a claim.


You should ease off on the pejorative rhetoric until you've done a bit more research. We're talking about weather that was considerably worse than Sea State 7. One of the KB sailors said he'd never seen waves so high. We know the KB sailed right into some horrific storms, which included extremely limited visibility, which were not uncommon for the North Pacific for that time of year.


"more research" isn't necessary after performing naval operations for 20 years. Did you bother to look up sea state heights before posting that nonsense? Even if the waves were higher than sea state 7, so what? So visual communications would be more difficult but so what? You are desperately trying to cling to your claim that they had to use radio to communicate when every sailor with experience in naval operations knows visual communication works in the worst weather and communication is not required to have a fleet rendezvous when they have a predetermined track.

Umm, what about when they encountered extremely bad weather at night??? Hey? Then what? This denialism is just silly.


Then they perform the even more radical maneuver called the "move closer to the ship I am trying to communicate with at night" maneuver. C'mon man. It's not rocket science.


And during extreme weather during the day, such as the storms that KB encountered, we're not just talking about seeing above waves. Sheesh, think about it.


You obviously have thought about it but you lack the necessary naval experience to know your claims are not valid. Do you have a valid reason for ignoring my expertise in this field?
 

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