Border Reiver
Philosopher
- Joined
- Sep 6, 2011
- Messages
- 6,726
The Japanese didn't need to know where they was, they needed to know where they is. That's why Buddha put windows on warplanes.
I thought that was Hiro at the Mitsubishi plant.
The Japanese didn't need to know where they was, they needed to know where they is. That's why Buddha put windows on warplanes.
I thought that was Hiro at the Mitsubishi plant.
One, the ships were not supposed to signal at night. How can you not know that?
They were also not supposed to transmit by radio. How can you not know that?
Well, you know, a signal that can be detected at 20 miles is much more dangerous than one that can tracked from Washington State.![]()
BTF, are you going to acknowledge the significance of this point? Even if we grant your argument that I-72 was operationally a part of Kido Butai (which I would dispute, but still, just for the sake of argument), the fact of the matter is that the transmission could not have materially affected the security of the striking force because the attack was already underway. Not to mention the fact that the sub was not present with the striking force at the time the transmission was made. Put more simply, Kido Butai did not transmit.
"Point-by-point" doesn't mean factual.
But they didn't think those transmissions could be tracked from Washington state. They didn't think those transmissions could be received by any listening post in the Pacific. They didn't know that those transmissions could "skip" so far as to be heard back in Japan, in Hawaii, etc., etc. They didn't know that. They thought they were safe from detection if they used low-power transmissions. The Germans made the exact same mistake in WW I, as Farago pointed out.
And how about when they needed to communicate on the days/nights when they encountered horrific, fierce storms--as we know they did? Signals would have been useless. Utterly useless. Then what? Obviously, they would use the radio and would do so in a way that they thought involved very little or no risk of detection. And that's exactly what they did. They made the same mistake that the Germans made in WW I.
But they didn't think those transmissions could be tracked from Washington state.
But the attack was not already underway when the sub transmitted.
It's funny how Bob seems to have missed that.I'm sorry, what? Did you miss the whole discussion on the timestamp on the intercepted transmission on purpose so as to selectively quote my post, or are you just dense? Go back to the page prior to that post, page 35. It's clearly spelled out that the transmission occurred after the attack occurred.
The biggest problem with CTers is that each one thinks they have THE gotcha. No matter that it's not a gotcha but just bad scholarship on their part. No matter that it has been debunked endless times. No matter that it's irrelevant to any serious discussion of the events.
This "gotcha" is the source of the fringe reset. Once enough time has passed, they decide it's time to bring back their smoking gun, assuming people have forgotten how well it was debunked the last 300 times it was discussed.
Uh-oh, are you going to be consistent in your logic?
Signals would have been useless. Utterly useless.
Begging the question of whether there was a "campaign" to blame them, and the question of whether any such campaign, if it existed, was orchestrated by FDR.
Sorry, you don't get to attempt to disqualify your critics on the grounds of not having read certain books or papers. The facts speak for themselves.
Kimmel and Short were explicitly warned that war was imminent, and that hostile Japanese action was possible "in any direction."
Tell us, BTF, how many interceptors did Short have on combat air patrol on the morning of December 7, 1941? And what sort of use did Short make of the radar sets his command had received?
Further, Short failed to read the extensive briefing materials prepared for him by his predecessor, appointed an officer with no intelligence training as his intelligence chief (apparently because he didn't want an unwashed reservist as part of his inner circle), and grossly overestimated the threat of sabotage from Hawaii's ethnic Japanese population. See Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement, by Henry Clausen and Bruce Lee, and the testimony of General Charles D. Herron before the joint Congressional investigation.
As for Kimmel, as Gawdzilla pointed out up-thread, he kept the fleet on a predictable schedule, which allowed the Japanese to know that they had an excellent chance of finding most of the Pacific Fleet's capital ships at anchor on a Sunday morning in Hawaii. He also failed to share intelligence or otherwise develop any sort of a coordinated defense plan with Short, as he'd been directed.
As the Dorn Report states (paraphrasing), Kimmel and Short were relieved because they had demonstrated a clear lack of the "superior judgement" required for high command. The evidence of this lack of superior judgement is incontrovertible, whether you, their families, or their other apologists like it or not.
The fact that others may have escaped blame for their failures is irrelevant (though you fail to note that Admiral Harold Stark was relieved as Chief of Naval Operations for his errors in judgement).
Do you know where Short was when Kimmel went to the harbor that morning?Oh, please, spare me appeals to Gawdzilla. He's no "expert"--except on traditionalist talking points. Short and Kimmel did in fact work quite closely together, and, among other things, they jointly decided that 360 air patrols simply were not feasible.
So what? Does that mean Kimmel did an extremely good job at Pearl? Did those Congresscritters even know what the issues were? Or did they just vote the popular route? You'll never know.As just one more of innumerable examples of Gawdzilla's poor "scholarship," he says he can't understand the Kimmel family's request to have Admiral Kimmel restored to his CIC Pacific Fleet rank, since it was normal for CICs to revert back to their previous admirality rank when they were no longer CIC. But, as Gawdzilla would know if he'd bother to read anything that disagrees with his views with any care, Congress long ago passed a law--the Officer Personnel Act of 1947--that made it possible for senior commanders to be retired at their highest command rank, and Kimmel and Short were the only two high-level WW II commanders who were not submitted for this honor.
In 2001 Congress voted overwhelmingly to recommend that Kimmel and Short be restored to their CIC ranks posthumously. A veritable boat load of former senior officers, former CNOs, and veterans groups voiced their support, by the way.
Wow! That took a complete lack of a sense of shame to write that.
According to you the Kido Butai would never dare to use signal lamps at night that have a range of 20 miles for fear of counter-detection but according to you they are banging away left and right on their radios. Someone pointed out your inconsistent logic, you admitted they might have signaled at night, but you ingenuously admitted that solely for the purpose of being able to accuse him of inconsistent logic. Wow!
The flaws in this claim are numerous:
1. You are assuming they would need to transmit. They were following a plan and the plan eliminated the need for any ship in the carrier task force to transmit on their radios.
2. Your claim that signal lamps are useless in bad weather is an argument from personal incredulity and it is based on your sources' ignorance of fleet operations. I have experience in fleet operations and I have seen ships use their signal lamps in sea state 7.
3. There are other methods of visual signalling, namely signal flags and semaphore, but most importantly, yardarm blinkers. No matter how bad the weather may be, a ship's yardarm blinkers wil always be above the waves. If the visibility is poor and a ship needs to communicate with another ship they can do this radical maneuver called the "move closer to the ship I am trying to communicate with" maneuver.
LOL!!! Holy cow! You have it backward. I cited the ban on nighttime signaling because according to you guys the Japanese slavishly adhered to the radio silence order (never mind that that order did allow for some communications).
I said I was perfectly willing to allow that some KB ships violated the nighttime signal ban, and then I asked if any of you would allow that some KB ships violated the radio silence order. Yeah, uh-huh. . . .
There are all kinds of holes in this argument. You might read Villa and Wilford's detailed 2006 study "Signals Intelligence and Pearl Harbor: The State of the Question," Intelligence and National Security, 21:4, available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520600885665?journalCode=fint20#preview.
You should ease off on the pejorative rhetoric until you've done a bit more research. We're talking about weather that was considerably worse than Sea State 7. One of the KB sailors said he'd never seen waves so high. We know the KB sailed right into some horrific storms, which included extremely limited visibility, which were not uncommon for the North Pacific for that time of year.
Umm, what about when they encountered extremely bad weather at night??? Hey? Then what? This denialism is just silly.
And during extreme weather during the day, such as the storms that KB encountered, we're not just talking about seeing above waves. Sheesh, think about it.