Kimmel's decision not to use his relatively few available aircraft for surveillance was not even remotely dereliction of duty; rather, it was a perfectly rational, logical decision based on the information and orders he had at the time, as the Navy Court of Inquiry pointed out and as many scholars and naval experts have pointed out.
As for Kimmel's alleged "failure" to take swift action on the report of the sighting of a Japanese sub, Kimmel did take immediate action: he ordered that the sighting be confirmed, since there had been a number of false sub-sighting reports in recent months. As Kimmel explained, given that there had been several sub sightings that turned out to be false, he wanted to get confirmation of this most recent one before he took further action. Again, a perfectly rational, logical decision, based on the circumstances and on the information he had at the time--not even remotely dereliction of duty.
I'm reminded that many admirals, including Admiral Nimitz, said later that they would have done the same things that Kimmel did, given the circumstances and the information that he had at the time.
You want dereliction of duty? How about Admiral Stark's refusal to follow Admiral Wilkinson's urgent recommendation that he "pick up the phone and call Kimmel" after he received the Japanese 14-part reply and its two accompanying messages? THAT was dereliction of duty. Here he had the head of ONI telling him what he obviously already could see--that the Japanese intercepts in his hand clearly, obviously indicated war was imminent--and urging him to "pick up the phone" and call Kimmel. Instead, Stark tried to call FDR, and when he couldn't reach him, he did . . . NOTHING. He sat there and did NOTHING, even though as CNO he had the absolute right and authority to call Kimmel. THAT is what you call dereliction of duty.
Another clear case of dereliction of duty was General Marshall's downright criminal stalling after he was given the 6-7-December Japanese intercepts. He had the head of Army G-2 and another senior Army intel officer urging him to read the crucial time-of-delivery message first, but he refused to read it until he had read--slowly and out loud--the entire 14-part main message. Even Captain Beach said it looked like Marshall was stalling. THAT was dereliction of duty.
Then, after Marshall finally got around to reading the time-of-delivery and code-destruction messages, he stalled further by calling Admiral Stark to get his opinion on what should be done! After this pointless chit-chat, Marshall finally, finally wrote out--in messy handwriting--a rather vague 'warning" message and dispatched Bratton to send it. Yet, incredibly, Marshall did not direct that this crucial message be marked as urgent or that it be sent as a priority transmission. Even after he learned that the message would have to be sent via Western Union wire and that it might take 40 minutes just to get to Hawaii, he took no further action. He knew he could simply pick up the scrambler phone on his desk and order Short to go to full alert, and he could have done this without mentioning intercepts at all. But he did nothing. THAT was dereliction of duty.