Merged Pearl Harbor: "Revisionists" vs. "Traditionalists"

Pearl Harbour Traditionalists, here is a "what if" for you to ponder.

Prior to 1924, US cryptographers (the Cipher Bureau, headed by Herbert Yardley) were easily reading the diplomatic traffic of a number of countries including Japan.

Then after budget cuts in 1924, the Cipher Bureau was eventually shut down in 1929 by US secretary of state Henry Stimpson. A somewhat disgruntled Yardley, now out of a job, then wrote a book about the Cipher Bureau's decryption efforts called "The American Black Chamber". This book was translated into the Japanese language, and it was only then, that the Japanese government discovered the extent to which their codes had been compromised. This led to them extensively tightening the strength and security of their codes.

What if Stimpson hadn't put the Cipher Bureau out of business? Yardley doesn't write his book, and the Japanese don't find out about their codes being compromised.

Could the Japanese Navy have still been using weaker less secure codes 10 years later, instead of the much stronger JN25

If the Americans had been able to read whatever they were using instead of JN25, could they have realised Pearl Harbor was in imminent danger of being attacked?
 
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If the Americans had been able to read whatever they were using instead of JN25, could they have realised Pearl Harbor was in imminent danger of being attacked?


From Battle of Wits, by Stephen Budiansky, pp. 8-9:

Five years later, with the war safely won, a few of OP-20-G's cryptanalysts were tidying up loose ends and decided to go back and try to crack the unread AN-1 traffic that had piled up in the months just before Pearl Harbor. What they found was enough to break an intelligence officer's heart. Over and over, the orders to the Japanese fleet during October and November 1941 repeated a single theme: Complete all preparations and be on a total war footing by November 20. Several messages referred to exercises in "ambushing" the "U.S. enemy." And one signal, dispatched November 4, ordered a destroyer to pick up torpedoes that Carrier Divisions 1 and 2 "are to fire against anchored capital ships on the morning in question." None specifically mentioned Pearl Harbor, and indeed many other intelligence indications in those critical months pointed to the Philippines, or even the Panama Canal, as possible targets of Japanese naval action if war broke out. Yet the pre*Pearl Harbor AN traffic, had it been broken at the time, would certainly have conveyed heavy hints of what was to come. [bolding mine]
 
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The US wasn't the only country trying to crack cyphers. Stimson may have put us out of the game, but the rest of the world generally had fewer compunctions about "reading other people's mail."

Stimson was supposed to have said, "a gentleman does not read another gentleman's mail", but I always thought that quote was apocryphal?

No-one else was reading JN-25 in 1941 were they?
 
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From Battle of Wits, by Stephen Budiansky, pp. 8-9:

Spitfire, I disagree with the authors conclusions. The "Great All-out Battle" was the dream of the IJN, and of the USN to some extent before the Rainbow plans faced reality. And the quote you bolded could have applied to Singapore, where the British fleet was to muster, insofar as the crypies were aware of. The quote gives neither date nor location.
 
Spitfire, I disagree with the authors conclusions. The "Great All-out Battle" was the dream of the IJN, and of the USN to some extent before the Rainbow plans faced reality. And the quote you bolded could have applied to Singapore, where the British fleet was to muster, insofar as the crypies were aware of. The quote gives neither date nor location.

That's another thing that I think most CT'ers are unaware of: The Japanese weren't completely stupid. They didn't just broadcast dates and places in the clear (or even in ciphertext) where anyone with a radio set could pick them up and anyone with a determined will and plenty of time could decrypt them. There were other potential targets besides Pearl, most of them considered much more likely targets by the planners of the day. Even if the collective intelligence community had "connected the dots", the most it could've done would be to put the USN on a war footing. Nobody could have known when or where.
 
That's another thing that I think most CT'ers are unaware of: The Japanese weren't completely stupid. They didn't just broadcast dates and places in the clear (or even in ciphertext) where anyone with a radio set could pick them up and anyone with a determined will and plenty of time could decrypt them. There were other potential targets besides Pearl, most of them considered much more likely targets by the planners of the day. Even if the collective intelligence community had "connected the dots", the most it could've done would be to put the USN on a war footing. Nobody could have known when or where.

I find the message to be extremely curious. There was no need to tell the pick-up team what the torpedoes were going to be used for. Additionally, the torpedoes were modified onboard the carriers, they weren't "special" before the mods were done.
 
Stimson was supposed to have said, "a gentleman does not read another gentleman's mail", but I always thought that quote was apocryphal?

No-one else was reading JN-25 in 1941 were they?

Yeah but budget cuts are a fact of life for the military when there is no war going on (usually, the Cold War being an exception).

You'd be hard pressed to really make a case for cracking Japanese codes as an essential activity in the 1920's.
 
Stimson was supposed to have said, "a gentleman does not read another gentleman's mail", but I always thought that quote was apocryphal?
Nope. Stimson was an "old-fashioned gentleman". He was also a avid documentarian, his personal records are quite detailed.
No-one else was reading JN-25 in 1941 were they?
If you ask BTF everybody was read it. Apparently the messages were published in the Sunday Supplement of the Chicago Tribune. :rolleyes:
 
And of course doesn't preclude strikes against the Dutch fleet in Indonesia, the Soviet fleet at Vladivostok, or even the Phillipines. You'd need additional info to make a determination of the target
 
And of course doesn't preclude strikes against the Dutch fleet in Indonesia, the Soviet fleet at Vladivostok, or even the Phillipines. You'd need additional info to make a determination of the target

I think it's another case of hyper-focusing. Instructive post, however, in that it brought out all this good info. Cheers.
 
Stimson was supposed to have said, "a gentleman does not read another gentleman's mail", but I always thought that quote was apocryphal?

No-one else was reading JN-25 in 1941 were they?
The actual quote is "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail" it appears in Stimson's memoirs, On Active Service in Peace and War.
 
Just curious: Given all that we now know, are any of you traditionalists willing to acknowledge that FDR's campaign to blame Kimmel and Short was unjustified and disgraceful?

Admiral David Richardson's point-by-point rebuttal to the Dorn Report and Richardson's letter to Dorn
http://www.kimmelfamily.net/ERK02.htm

Lt. Cmdr. Pettinger, Held to a Higher Standard: The Downfall of Admiral Kimmel, Master's thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA416925

Edward Kimmel's letters to President Bush
http://www.kimmelfamily.net/ERK03.htm

And I trust that anyone who wants to be viewed as an informed student on this issue has read Captain Ed Beach's Scapegoats: A Defense of Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor, Dr. Michael Gannon's Pearl Harbor Betrayed, John Costello's Days of Infamy, and Admiral Edwin Layton's And I Was There. All of these books soundly debunk the Roosevelt administration's smearing of Kimmel and Short. (I also trust that it's common knowledge that each of these authors rejects the conspiracy theory that FDR and other high officials deliberately allowed PH to be attacked; rather, they take the view that FDR, Stark, Marshall, etc., carried out a cover-up and scapegoated Kimmel and Short to try to conceal their own horrendous blunders.)

If by chance there is anyone here who still buys the claim that Kimmel and Short were mostly/totally to blame, please specify which if any of the above books and articles you've read.
 
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You're kinda late on this, we've been over this stuff before. You really should look at more than the first link when you're Googlefishing.

But please, do tell me something: Yamamoto based his guarantee of a "big bag" on the fact that the US Fleet was routinely in port on the weekend. This violates one the basic tenet of operational security, "don't be predictable!" Now, the person responsble for insuring that the US Fleet was not predictable was...
 
Just curious: Given all that we now know, are any of you traditionalists willing to acknowledge that FDR's campaign to blame Kimmel and Short was unjustified and disgraceful?

Admiral David Richardson's point-by-point rebuttal to the Dorn Report and Richardson's letter to Dorn
http://www.kimmelfamily.net/ERK02.htm

Lt. Cmdr. Pettinger, Held to a Higher Standard: The Downfall of Admiral Kimmel, Master's thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA416925

Edward Kimmel's letters to President Bush
http://www.kimmelfamily.net/ERK03.htm

And I trust that anyone who wants to be viewed as an informed student on this issue has read Captain Ed Beach's Scapegoats: A Defense of Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor, Dr. Michael Gannon's Pearl Harbor Betrayed, John Costello's Days of Infamy, and Admiral Edwin Layton's And I Was There. All of these books soundly debunk the Roosevelt administration's smearing of Kimmel and Short. (I also trust that it's common knowledge that each of these authors rejects the conspiracy theory that FDR and other high officials deliberately allowed PH to be attacked; rather, they take the view that FDR, Stark, Marshall, etc., carried out a cover-up and scapegoated Kimmel and Short to try to conceal their own horrendous blunders.)

If by chance there is anyone here who still buys the claim that Kimmel and Short were mostly/totally to blame, please specify which if any of the above books and articles you've read.
Well, that's a problem. If you claim that Pearl Harbour was a LIHOP or MIHOP operation, then those accusations of blame are meaningless, as they would be simply fabricated by TPTB. Kimmel, Short, et. al. must all be complicit in your conspiracy fantasy. They must perforce, be co-conspirators, willing to go along with the conspiracy.

OTOH, if you want to accept those as true, then you must accept the traditional narrative, which clearly, you do not.

I would suggest that you are simply attempting to build a logical trap.
 

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