This might be a good time to quote some of what Villa and Wilford say about Jacobsen's use of primary sources relating to the issue of radio silence and his argument regarding the transmissions between the Akagi and some tankers in their 2006 reply to Jacobsen:
Jacobsen treats primary sources capriciously in his article ‘Radio Silence and Radio Deception: Secrecy Insurance for the Pearl Harbor Strike Force’. He claims to review ‘well-known Japanese and US records’, but ignores primary sources that conflict with his views, including the Hewitt Inquiry, several USN call sign reports and Ranneft’s 1941 war diary, all of which will be discussed later in this article.44 He cites Japanese sources regarding radio silence and transmitter key/fuse removals, upholding their relevance to the debate, but avoids mentioning that Wilford cites similar sources and also notes that the Japanese practised radio silence and radio deception.45 He extrapolates great meaning from certain phrases in primary sources in a laboured attempt to defend his position. For example, he seizes upon the expression ‘extreme emergency’ in a Japanese radio silence order and then proceeds to divine what specific emergencies are being referred to in the document, even though none are specified.46 In making a case that a certain Japanese radio frequency was ‘old’ and therefore used for deception, he inserts the frequency into a Japanese quote concerning false transmissions from Kyushu, as though this will prove his point.47 Jacobsen criticizes Wilford for stating that high-power dual-frequency broadcasts from Japan in early December 1941 indicated a long-distance movement of ships, but fails to point out that it is not Wilford making such a claim, but rather USN intelligence staff in a document dated 5 December 1941 that Wilford has cited.48. . . .
Wilford . . . notes that some USN intercepts suggest that the Kido Butai and associated support vessels may have transmitted some radio messages during the voyage to Hawaii.85 Arguably, the most important intercept concerned the flagship carrier Akagi. On 30 November 1941, Station Hypo, a USN communications intelligence centre in Hawaii, reported that the Akagi conversed with its Marus (support vessels): ‘The only tactical circuit heard today was one with AKAGI and several MARUS’.86 In the Hewitt Inquiry, the USN, with full access to all the records still presumably in their pristine and complete form, that is to say possessing the signal logs from the five different listening stations of the Mid Pacific Net, had ample and complete means of sorting the true from the false and yet conceded the authenticity of that particular report:
"The significance of the term, ‘tactical circuit’ is that the vessel itself, that is, the AKAGI, was using its own radio to call up and work directly the other vessels rather than work them through shore stations via the broadcast method which was the common practice in Japanese communications. The working of the AKAGI with the Marus indicated that she was making arrangements for fuel or some administrative function, since a carrier would rarely address a Maru."87
The intercepted Akagi traffic is perhaps the most important indication that the Strike Force may have made a few necessary transmissions during a period of nominal radio silence. In the case of the Akagi, ‘tactical’ traffic with its Marus seemed to reflect operations far away from home, rather than stationary anchorage in homeports as Japanese deception was trying to convey using routine call signs.88 As the Congressional Hearings suggest, oil tankers were the type of Marus supporting an aircraft carrier like the Akagi. The Japanese would not be likely to have sent a false message indicating that the Akagi was conversing on a ‘tactical circuit’ with Marus when previous false messages were trying to convince Allied naval intelligence that the carriers were in home waters. ("Signals Intelligence and
Pearl Harbor: The State of the Question,"
Intelligence and National Security, 21:4, pp. 534-535, 545,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520600885665)