Merged Pearl Harbor: "Revisionists" vs. "Traditionalists"

Operationally, sub I-72 was certainly "part of the Kido Butai." To cling to the fact that I-72 was not officially one of the vessels that was formally listed as being part of the task force is to cling to a distinction without a difference. I-72's sub squadron was part of the Kido Butai's recon force, was part of the overall attack force, fell under Admiral Nagumo's command, and participated in the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Perhaps that's why Admiral Fukudome included I-72's sub squadron in the "units employed in the Hawaii Operation." Perhaps that's also why he said the three sub squadrons were part of the task force's "advance force."

When I was in the Army, when we were deployed we considered our advance/recon forces to be part of our unit. If they were operationally attached to us, i.e., they fell under our commander's command and performed a function for us (as in recon), then we viewed them as being one of us and expected them to follow the same rules we had to follow.
 
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Operationally, sub I-72 was certainly "part of the Kido Butai." To cling to the fact that I-72 was not officially one of the vessels that was formally listed as being part of the task force is to cling to a distinction without a difference. I-72's sub squadron was part of the Kido Butai's recon force, was part of the overall attack force, fell under Admiral Nagumo's command, and participated in the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Perhaps that's why Admiral Fukudome included I-72's sub squadron in the "units employed in the Hawaii Operation." Perhaps that's also why he said the three sub squadrons were part of the task force's "advance force."

When I was in the Army, when we were deployed we considered our advance/recon forces to be part of our unit. If they were operationally attached to us, i.e., they fell under our commander's command and performed a function for us (as in recon), then we viewed them as being one of us and expected them to follow the same rules we had to follow.

Nice war story but I don't see what it has to do with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
 
Operationally, sub I-72 was certainly "part of the Kido Butai." To cling to the fact that I-72 was not officially one of the vessels that was formally listed as being part of the task force is to cling to a distinction without a difference. I-72's sub squadron was part of the Kido Butai's recon force, was part of the overall attack force, fell under Admiral Nagumo's command, and participated in the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Perhaps that's why Admiral Fukudome included I-72's sub squadron in the "units employed in the Hawaii Operation." Perhaps that's also why he said the three sub squadrons were part of the task force's "advance force."

When I was in the Army, when we were deployed we considered our advance/recon forces to be part of our unit. If they were operationally attached to us, i.e., they fell under our commander's command and performed a function for us (as in recon), then we viewed them as being one of us and expected them to follow the same rules we had to follow.

"Operationally" so was the Setsu. :rolleyes:
 
That's your argument? Really? Yeah, roll your eyes indeed. The problem is that you are such a partisan ideologue on this issue that you are incapable of being objective.

And you weasel the definitions of words to make them mean anything that will support your failed proposition. You're scrabbling to salvage something from the current debacle you've hitched your star to, and it just ain't working.
 
This might be a good time to quote some of what Villa and Wilford say about Jacobsen's use of primary sources relating to the issue of radio silence and his argument regarding the transmissions between the Akagi and some tankers in their 2006 reply to Jacobsen:

Jacobsen treats primary sources capriciously in his article ‘Radio Silence and Radio Deception: Secrecy Insurance for the Pearl Harbor Strike Force’. He claims to review ‘well-known Japanese and US records’, but ignores primary sources that conflict with his views, including the Hewitt Inquiry, several USN call sign reports and Ranneft’s 1941 war diary, all of which will be discussed later in this article.44 He cites Japanese sources regarding radio silence and transmitter key/fuse removals, upholding their relevance to the debate, but avoids mentioning that Wilford cites similar sources and also notes that the Japanese practised radio silence and radio deception.45 He extrapolates great meaning from certain phrases in primary sources in a laboured attempt to defend his position. For example, he seizes upon the expression ‘extreme emergency’ in a Japanese radio silence order and then proceeds to divine what specific emergencies are being referred to in the document, even though none are specified.46 In making a case that a certain Japanese radio frequency was ‘old’ and therefore used for deception, he inserts the frequency into a Japanese quote concerning false transmissions from Kyushu, as though this will prove his point.47 Jacobsen criticizes Wilford for stating that high-power dual-frequency broadcasts from Japan in early December 1941 indicated a long-distance movement of ships, but fails to point out that it is not Wilford making such a claim, but rather USN intelligence staff in a document dated 5 December 1941 that Wilford has cited.48. . . .

Wilford . . . notes that some USN intercepts suggest that the Kido Butai and associated support vessels may have transmitted some radio messages during the voyage to Hawaii.85 Arguably, the most important intercept concerned the flagship carrier Akagi. On 30 November 1941, Station Hypo, a USN communications intelligence centre in Hawaii, reported that the Akagi conversed with its Marus (support vessels): ‘The only tactical circuit heard today was one with AKAGI and several MARUS’.86 In the Hewitt Inquiry, the USN, with full access to all the records still presumably in their pristine and complete form, that is to say possessing the signal logs from the five different listening stations of the Mid Pacific Net, had ample and complete means of sorting the true from the false and yet conceded the authenticity of that particular report:

"The significance of the term, ‘tactical circuit’ is that the vessel itself, that is, the AKAGI, was using its own radio to call up and work directly the other vessels rather than work them through shore stations via the broadcast method which was the common practice in Japanese communications. The working of the AKAGI with the Marus indicated that she was making arrangements for fuel or some administrative function, since a carrier would rarely address a Maru."87

The intercepted Akagi traffic is perhaps the most important indication that the Strike Force may have made a few necessary transmissions during a period of nominal radio silence. In the case of the Akagi, ‘tactical’ traffic with its Marus seemed to reflect operations far away from home, rather than stationary anchorage in homeports as Japanese deception was trying to convey using routine call signs.88 As the Congressional Hearings suggest, oil tankers were the type of Marus supporting an aircraft carrier like the Akagi. The Japanese would not be likely to have sent a false message indicating that the Akagi was conversing on a ‘tactical circuit’ with Marus when previous false messages were trying to convince Allied naval intelligence that the carriers were in home waters. ("Signals Intelligence and
Pearl Harbor: The State of the Question," Intelligence and National Security, 21:4, pp. 534-535, 545, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520600885665)​
 
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Operationally, sub I-72 was certainly "part of the Kido Butai." To cling to the fact that I-72 was not officially one of the vessels that was formally listed as being part of the task force is to cling to a distinction without a difference. I-72's sub squadron was part of the Kido Butai's recon force, was part of the overall attack force, fell under Admiral Nagumo's command, and participated in the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Perhaps that's why Admiral Fukudome included I-72's sub squadron in the "units employed in the Hawaii Operation." Perhaps that's also why he said the three sub squadrons were part of the task force's "advance force."

When I was in the Army, when we were deployed we considered our advance/recon forces to be part of our unit. If they were operationally attached to us, i.e., they fell under our commander's command and performed a function for us (as in recon), then we viewed them as being one of us and expected them to follow the same rules we had to follow.

Given that the transmission was made AFTER the attack began it is rather moot to your argument.

With respect to your last point, recon units, if not formally attached to a formation by being placed either TACCOM (tactical command) or OPCOM (operational command) have their own set of orders given by their actual commanders. Not being part of Kido Butai, I-72 would recieved orders to do what it did from its own commander, that it sent a message to the afterwards is irrelevant to whom exercises command and control.
 
This might be a good time to quote some of what Villa and Wilford say about Jacobsen's use of primary sources relating to the issue of radio silence and his argument regarding the transmissions between the Akagi and some tankers in their 2006 reply to Jacobsen:

Jacobsen treats primary sources capriciously in his article ‘Radio Silence and Radio Deception: Secrecy Insurance for the Pearl Harbor Strike Force’. He claims to review ‘well-known Japanese and US records’, but ignores primary sources that conflict with his views, including the Hewitt Inquiry, several USN call sign reports and Ranneft’s 1941 war diary, all of which will be discussed later in this article.44 He cites Japanese sources regarding radio silence and transmitter key/fuse removals, upholding their relevance to the debate, but avoids mentioning that Wilford cites similar sources and also notes that the Japanese practised radio silence and radio deception.45 He extrapolates great meaning from certain phrases in primary sources in a laboured attempt to defend his position. For example, he seizes upon the expression ‘extreme emergency’ in a Japanese radio silence order and then proceeds to divine what specific emergencies are being referred to in the document, even though none are specified.46 In making a case that a certain Japanese radio frequency was ‘old’ and therefore used for deception, he inserts the frequency into a Japanese quote concerning false transmissions from Kyushu, as though this will prove his point.47 Jacobsen criticizes Wilford for stating that high-power dual-frequency broadcasts from Japan in early December 1941 indicated a long-distance movement of ships, but fails to point out that it is not Wilford making such a claim, but rather USN intelligence staff in a document dated 5 December 1941 that Wilford has cited.48. . . .

Wilford . . . notes that some USN intercepts suggest that the Kido Butai and associated support vessels may have transmitted some radio messages during the voyage to Hawaii.85 Arguably, the most important intercept concerned the flagship carrier Akagi. On 30 November 1941, Station Hypo, a USN communications intelligence centre in Hawaii, reported that the Akagi conversed with its Marus (support vessels): ‘The only tactical circuit heard today was one with AKAGI and several MARUS’.86 In the Hewitt Inquiry, the USN, with full access to all the records still presumably in their pristine and complete form, that is to say possessing the signal logs from the five different listening stations of the Mid Pacific Net, had ample and complete means of sorting the true from the false and yet conceded the authenticity of that particular report:

"The significance of the term, ‘tactical circuit’ is that the vessel itself, that is, the AKAGI, was using its own radio to call up and work directly the other vessels rather than work them through shore stations via the broadcast method which was the common practice in Japanese communications. The working of the AKAGI with the Marus indicated that she was making arrangements for fuel or some administrative function, since a carrier would rarely address a Maru."87

The intercepted Akagi traffic is perhaps the most important indication that the Strike Force may have made a few necessary transmissions during a period of nominal radio silence. In the case of the Akagi, ‘tactical’ traffic with its Marus seemed to reflect operations far away from home, rather than stationary anchorage in homeports as Japanese deception was trying to convey using routine call signs.88 As the Congressional Hearings suggest, oil tankers were the type of Marus supporting an aircraft carrier like the Akagi. The Japanese would not be likely to have sent a false message indicating that the Akagi was conversing on a ‘tactical circuit’ with Marus when previous false messages were trying to convince Allied naval intelligence that the carriers were in home waters. ("Signals Intelligence and
Pearl Harbor: The State of the Question," Intelligence and National Security, 21:4, pp. 534-535, 545, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520600885665)​

Amazing that the deceptive Japanese radio signals are still working.
 
Given that the transmission was made AFTER the attack began it is rather moot to your argument.

BTF, are you going to acknowledge the significance of this point? Even if we grant your argument that I-72 was operationally a part of Kido Butai (which I would dispute, but still, just for the sake of argument), the fact of the matter is that the transmission could not have materially affected the security of the striking force because the attack was already underway. Not to mention the fact that the sub was not present with the striking force at the time the transmission was made. Put more simply, Kido Butai did not transmit.
 
BTF, are you going to acknowledge the significance of this point? Even if we grant your argument that I-72 was operationally a part of Kido Butai (which I would dispute, but still, just for the sake of argument), the fact of the matter is that the transmission could not have materially affected the security of the striking force because the attack was already underway. Not to mention the fact that the sub was not present with the striking force at the time the transmission was made. Put more simply, Kido Butai did not transmit.

I can see the reply.

1. I-72 transmitted.
2. I-72 transmitted after the attack.
3. Therefore Kido Butai transmitted like KTU Honolulu all the way from Hittokapu Bay.
 
I can see the reply.

There is an upside to all of this. I now know an awful lot more about Kido Butai right up to it's ultimate demise. It was a whole lot of interesting reading. That's what the "E" is for in JREF. Thanks to all who pointed in all sorts of intresting reading directions.

I still have a lingering question. When, exactly, does BTF think radio silence should have been broken? By whom? Why?
 
This is a great thread and one I've been enjoying reading. I also have a question or two if some one has the time to answer.

What would be the timeline for the US to realise that an intercepted radio message meant that Pearl Harbour was about to be attacked? Presumably it would have to be decoded and then understood and so there would be a period of being in limbo as to what was going on. Unless the message said, 'Remember to attack Pearl Harbour.' They might realise that the Japanese were within a certain distance and take precautions but would that automatically mean there would be an attack? Would it have made a big difference to pick up even an uninterpreted Japanese message?
 
Okay, the intercept was dated 12/071450/I, TOI (time of interecept, I think) 12/072046. Navy Trans(lation) date was 11/15/45. I'm good with that as they ID the sub, I-72, which would only be known from post-war interrogations. So it was nearly 4 years before they sorted it out, and then only with help.
Wow, almost 4 years.

How's this piece of evidence working for you now Bob?;)
 
This is a great thread and one I've been enjoying reading. I also have a question or two if some one has the time to answer.

What would be the timeline for the US to realise that an intercepted radio message meant that Pearl Harbour was about to be attacked? Presumably it would have to be decoded and then understood and so there would be a period of being in limbo as to what was going on. Unless the message said, 'Remember to attack Pearl Harbour.' They might realise that the Japanese were within a certain distance and take precautions but would that automatically mean there would be an attack? Would it have made a big difference to pick up even an uninterpreted Japanese message?

Hmmm, "Niitaka nobore, 8/12", wasn't even intercepted. We found out about it from a Japanese POW. (The man recreated the entire 80 pages of orders for the first stage of attacks, including Pearl Harbor, from memory. :eek: (95% accuracy.)

Five minutes would have meant a lot to the USN ships. The Army would have needed a bit longer, but the airplanes could have been in the air with 30 minutes warning easy.
 
Oh right. I was assuming the messages would be along the lines of 'The geese are flying low over the Volga tonight.' , sending the codebreakers into a frenzy of activity! Obviously not how these things work at all!
 
Oh right. I was assuming the messages would be along the lines of 'The geese are flying low over the Volga tonight.' , sending the codebreakers into a frenzy of activity! Obviously not how these things work at all!


It is how it works! That translates as "Climb Mount Niitaka", the code word to proceed with the attack.
 

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