Merged Pearl Harbor: "Revisionists" vs. "Traditionalists"

I'll stick with these two.




What made John Toland bad was that he just got caught too many times telling falsehoods about his sources and creating false information that his own sources didn't support. His most famous example was the diary of Rear Admiral J. E. Meijer Ranneft of the Dutch Navy. During the subsequent printings of his book (softcover) he later removed the section showing the pictures of the diary since what he claimed about the diary was not true. I believe John Zimmerman, and a couple of others also wrote an article on this. I myself also have a copy of the diary pages.

The 2006 article hardly refutes anything, I didn't think much of it in 2006 when I got the early copy from Jacobsen.

If you look around hard enough you will see Jacobsen wrote in fact numerous letters and an article after the 2006 publication. See for example his 2007 article (Radio Silence of the Pearl Harbor Strike Force Confirmed Again: The Saga of Secret Message Serial (SMS) Numbers). (posthumous)
After talking with these guys like Wiley, Stinnett, and Villa, (Wilford never seems to talk) I've long considered the ball in their court and have been waiting to see something new.

Villa and Wilford never put out the book they were claiming to write that would in fact refute Jacobsen.

Have they written anything since 2006? If they have please point me to it.
Otherwise frankly I'm not too interested.


John Toland was a good Historian, who, sadly, caught the Woo Train in his later years. Just about everything he wrote after his Hitler biography is a little suspect.
In his later years, Toland became pretty much an apologist for Japan in the World War 2 years. Sad to see the decline from the Rising Sun, where, although sympathetic to the Japanese common man he condemns the Militarists, to Infamy where he tries to whitewash the Militarists.
 
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Gawdzilla: The I-72 was not part of the Kido Butai. The force disposition, as shown in (Goldstein and Dillon, The Pearl Harbor Papers, p. 243) clearly shows that.

Wrong. I've already refuted this, weeks ago. Vice Admiral Shigeru Fukudome, in an article titled “Hawaii Operation,” said that submarine I-72 was part of the task force’s submarine forces (in Paul Stillwell, editor, Air Raid, Pearl Harbor!: Recollections of Day of Infamy, Annapolis, Maryland: U.S. Naval Institute, 1981, pp. 66-67).

I-72 was part of the task force's recon force. That's why it reported back that there were no U.S. Navy ships at the Lahaina anchorage. The Japanese were hoping that some American naval vessels would be there because they believed that the anchorage was so deep that any ships sunk there would be impossible to recover. This is a matter of readily verifiable history.

And I-72 sent a radio message to report that there were no American naval vessels at Lahaina.

So a submarine assigned to the task force sent a radio message. So the Kido Butai DID transmit.
 
As for FDR's Japan policy being motivated by a desire to save the Soviet Union, you might want to check out Dr. Waldo Heinrichs' long treatment of this in his highly acclaimed book Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry Into World War II (Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 92-163. Among many other things, Heinrichs summarizes FDR's policy as follows:

Even some risk would be worthwhile if a Japanese attack on the Soviet Union would be prevented. Any security Japan might find in the resumption of oil shipments, or in fact any improvement in its relations with the United States, might encourage it to move with Germany against Russia. . . . (p. 142)​

By the way, Dr. Heinrichs was a professor of history at Temple University, and his abovementioned book was praised by such historians as Robert Dallek and Akira Iriye. His book also received high marks from such journals as The Atlantic, Diplomatic History, and the International History Review.
 
Wrong. I've already refuted this, weeks ago. Vice Admiral Shigeru Fukudome, in an article titled “Hawaii Operation,” said that submarine I-72 was part of the task force’s submarine forces (in Paul Stillwell, editor, Air Raid, Pearl Harbor!: Recollections of Day of Infamy, Annapolis, Maryland: U.S. Naval Institute, 1981, pp. 66-67).

I-72 was part of the task force's recon force. That's why it reported back that there were no U.S. Navy ships at the Lahaina anchorage. The Japanese were hoping that some American naval vessels would be there because they believed that the anchorage was so deep that any ships sunk there would be impossible to recover. This is a matter of readily verifiable history.

And I-72 sent a radio message to report that there were no American naval vessels at Lahaina.

So a submarine assigned to the task force sent a radio message. So the Kido Butai DID transmit.

It was part of the IJN. It was not part of the Kido Butai. Unless the IGHQ lied about the task force disposition.

And you still don't know where Lahaina Anchorage is, do you?
 
As for FDR's Japan policy being motivated by a desire to save the Soviet Union, you might want to check out Dr. Waldo Heinrichs' long treatment of this in his highly acclaimed book Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry Into World War II (Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 92-163. Among many other things, Heinrichs summarizes FDR's policy as follows:

Even some risk would be worthwhile if a Japanese attack on the Soviet Union would be prevented. Any security Japan might find in the resumption of oil shipments, or in fact any improvement in its relations with the United States, might encourage it to move with Germany against Russia. . . . (p. 142)​

By the way, Dr. Heinrichs was a professor of history at Temple University, and his abovementioned book was praised by such historians as Robert Dallek and Akira Iriye. His book also received high marks from such journals as The Atlantic, Diplomatic History, and the International History Review.
And what does what he says have to do with your claims about FDR? Other than the fact that he mentions both FDR and the Soviet Union in the same book, that is.
 
As for FDR's Japan policy being motivated by a desire to save the Soviet Union, you might want to check out Dr. Waldo Heinrichs' long treatment of this in his highly acclaimed book Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry Into World War II (Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 92-163. Among many other things, Heinrichs summarizes FDR's policy as follows:

Even some risk would be worthwhile if a Japanese attack on the Soviet Union would be prevented. Any security Japan might find in the resumption of oil shipments, or in fact any improvement in its relations with the United States, might encourage it to move with Germany against Russia. . . . (p. 142)​

By the way, Dr. Heinrichs was a professor of history at Temple University, and his abovementioned book was praised by such historians as Robert Dallek and Akira Iriye. His book also received high marks from such journals as The Atlantic, Diplomatic History, and the International History Review.

So, when was this policy articulated? Before, or after the Neutrality Pact between the Soviet Union and Japan was entered into? Before or after Barbarossa commenced?
 
Wrong. I've already refuted this, weeks ago. Vice Admiral Shigeru Fukudome, in an article titled “Hawaii Operation,” said that submarine I-72 was part of the task force’s submarine forces (in Paul Stillwell, editor, Air Raid, Pearl Harbor!: Recollections of Day of Infamy, Annapolis, Maryland: U.S. Naval Institute, 1981, pp. 66-67).

I-72 was part of the task force's recon force. That's why it reported back that there were no U.S. Navy ships at the Lahaina anchorage. The Japanese were hoping that some American naval vessels would be there because they believed that the anchorage was so deep that any ships sunk there would be impossible to recover. This is a matter of readily verifiable history.

And I-72 sent a radio message to report that there were no American naval vessels at Lahaina.

So a submarine assigned to the task force sent a radio message. So the Kido Butai DID transmit.
At some point, when Kido Butai reached it's intended destination, and wanted to launch it's attack, then it must, surely break radio silence at some point? No? And the I-72 transmission was merely the first time that happened? No? And that the I-72 transmission was required for Kido Butai to correctly direct it's attack aircraft? No? And that it was made early enough to allow I-72 to reach its secondary station at the entrance to pearl harbour? No?
 
At some point, when Kido Butai reached it's intended destination, and wanted to launch it's attack, then it must, surely break radio silence at some point? No? And the I-72 transmission was merely the first time that happened? No? And that the I-72 transmission was required for Kido Butai to correctly direct it's attack aircraft? No? And that it was made early enough to allow I-72 to reach its secondary station at the entrance to pearl harbour? No?

Aircraft launched from subs scouted the anchorage and Pearl. They broadcast messages as to what they found. For example, say "AF" meant "No major ships at Pearl." They could send this three times in one minute, using a band the IJN didn't normal use so it mostly likely wouldn't be monitored. "FA" would mean "no major ships at Lahaina".

Brevity, non-standard wavelengths, both would make the detection unlikely. The planes made it in and out undetected, proving they weren't spotted.
 
Admiral Fukudome said the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Submarine Squadrons were part of the "Hawaii Operation" attack force. He lists submarine I-72's squadron (3rd Squadron) as being among the "operational units employed in the Hawaii Operation." After noting that the attack force was divided into two groups, he goes on to point out that Admiral Nagumo was in command of both groups ("Hawaii Operation," in Stillwell, editor, Air Raid: Pearl Harbor!, pp. 66-67).

On 5 December, I-72 reconnoitered the Kaholi Channel between Molokai and Lanai.

On 6 December, I-72's commanding officer radioed the attack force that Lahaina anchorage is empty.

On 7 December, I-72 was stationed at the entrance to Pearl Harbor.

So at a minimum, we can say that a submarine that was part of Admiral Nagumo's attack force and that was under his operational command transmitted a radio message to advise the force that there were no enemy ships at Lahaina anchorage.

Now, of course, it would not have taken a genius to figure out that the message was a bit suspicious--a Japanese sub reporting on the absence of U.S. Navy ships at the alternate port to Pearl Harbor.

Of course, then there is the fact that Nagumo himself broke radio silence before the attack occurred. At 0700 on 7 December, just 10 minutes after the first wave of planes left the carriers, he radioed Yamamoto to tell him, "I will return back via 1st route. But point 'L' is shifted to the point 35-00 north, 160-00 east." Barkin and Meyer:

Implausible as it may seem for the Japanese to blunder in this way, at least one documented instance exists where the Japanese broke radio silence during the voyage. According to Prange, after the initial attack, but during a period of time when the Air Fleet was still concerned with keeping its position secret, Admiral Nagumo, the task force commander, radioed Admiral Yamamoto in Tokyo to communicate his intention to retire upon the convoy's return. The fact that Nagumo broke radio silence in this way emphasizes several points. First of all, the Japanese claim that many radio transmitters were physically rendered inoperative is at best a generalization that has no bearing on the capacity of an individual set to
transmit, and, moreover, could be altogether false. But, even more importantly, the fact that Admiral Nagumo broke radio silence for a rather trivial personal purpose at a time when the task force was still vulnerable indicates quite clearly that the Japanese were not as conscientious about communications security as either they or most mainstream historians would like us to believe. ("COMINT and Pearl Harbor," International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 2:4, p. 521, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08850608808435079)​
 
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So the fact that the Japanese fleet might have broken radio silence after the attack was already under way is part of your proof that they broke radio silence before the attack?

And you could at least thank me for providing the link you just used.
 
Admiral Fukudome said the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Submarine Squadrons were part of the "Hawaii Operation" attack force. He lists submarine I-72's squadron (3rd Squadron) as being among the "operational units employed in the Hawaii Operation." After noting that the attack force was divided into two groups, he goes on to point out that Admiral Nagumo was in command of both groups ("Hawaii Operation," in Stillwell, editor, Air Raid: Pearl Harbor!, pp. 66-67).
Nice try, but they were not part of the Kido Butai, they traveled from completely different locations, never in company of the Striking Force
On 5 December, I-72 reconnoitered the Kaholi Channel between Molokai and Lanai.

On 6 December, I-72's commanding officer radioed the attack force that Lahaina anchorage is empty.

On 7 December, I-72 was stationed at the entrance to Pearl Harbor.

So at a minimum, we can say that a submarine that was part of Admiral Nagumo's attack force and that was under his operational command transmitted a radio message to advise the force that there were no enemy ships at Lahaina anchorage.


Now, of course, it would not have taken a genius to figure out that the message was a bit suspicious--a Japanese sub reporting on the absence of U.S. Navy ships at the alternate port to Pearl Harbor.
Show me how a two letter message screams "Japanese submarine scouting Lahaina, please.
Of course, then there is the fact that Nagumo himself broke radio silence before the attack occurred. At 0200 on 7 December, just 10 minutes after the first wave of planes left the carriers, he radioed Yamamoto to tell him, "I will return back via 1st route. But point 'L' is shifted to the point 35-00 north, 160-00 east." Barkin and Meyer:

Implausible as it may seem for the Japanese to blunder in this way, at least one documented instance exists where the Japanese broke radio silence during the voyage. According to Prange, after the initial attack, but during a period of time when the Air Fleet was still concerned with keeping its position secret, Admiral Nagumo, the task force commander, radioed Admiral Yamamoto in Tokyo to communicate his intention to retire upon the convoy's return. The fact that Nagumo broke radio silence in this way emphasizes several points. First of all, the Japanese claim that many radio transmitters were physically rendered inoperative is at best a generalization that has no bearing on the capacity of an individual set to
transmit, and, moreover, could be altogether false. But, even more importantly, the fact that Admiral Nagumo broke radio silence for a rather trivial personal purpose at a time when the task force was still vulnerable indicates quite clearly that the Japanese were not as conscientious about communications security as either they or most mainstream historians would like us to believe. ("COMINT and Pearl Harbor," International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 2:4, p. 521, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08850608808435079)​

Sorry, chum, but the planes didn't leave until Dec. 8th, his time.

Is there anything else you want to get wrong?
 
So the fact that the Japanese fleet might have broken radio silence after the attack was already under way is part of your proof that they broke radio silence before the attack?

And you could at least thank me for providing the link you just used.

The attack had not begun yet. The first wave had just taken off. The attack didn't begin until almost an hour later. The fleet was still vulnerable--in fact, very vulnerable if there were U.S. carriers in the area.

Also, I-72 was part of the attack force, and it transmitted a message to both groups of the attack force on 6 December that "the enemy is not in the Lahaina anchorage."

And I was not aware that you had provided a link. Whatever links I've used I have found on my own or already had.
 
The attack had not begun yet. The first wave had just taken off. The attack didn't begin until almost an hour later. The fleet was still vulnerable--in fact, very vulnerable if there were U.S. carriers in the area.
And they had orders to press home the attack even if discovered by strong USN forces within 24 hours of the planned attack time/date.
Also, I-72 was part of the attack force, and it transmitted a message to both groups of the attack force on 6 December that "the enemy is not in the Lahaina anchorage."
Again you win at being wrong.
 
The attack had not begun yet. The first wave had just taken off. The attack didn't begin until almost an hour later. The fleet was still vulnerable--in fact, very vulnerable if there were U.S. carriers in the area.

Also, I-72 was part of the attack force, and it transmitted a message to both groups of the attack force on 6 December that "the enemy is not in the Lahaina anchorage."

And I was not aware that you had provided a link. Whatever links I've used I have found on my own or already had.

Even revisionist Timothy Wilford states "WAHI8" (I-72) was not a Kido Butai sub. Maybe you should discuss this with him also.

There were 3 Kido Butai Subs. WAHI8 wasn't one of them.

Captain Kijiro was in charge of the 3 subs and stated that nothing of interest occurred during the transit to Hawaiian waters.
 
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Even assuming that I-72 was part of Kido Butai (which, it has been adequately established that it was not, but this is just for the sake of argument), the main body of ships had no need to respond. All I-72 was doing was broadcasting an intelligence report, which needs no acknowledgement. Kido Butai did not transmit.
 
Even assuming that I-72 was part of Kido Butai (which, it has been adequately established that it was not, but this is just for the sake of argument), the main body of ships had no need to respond. All I-72 was doing was broadcasting an intelligence report, which needs no acknowledgement. Kido Butai did not transmit.

And if it was transmitting near enough to Lahaina (does anyone know?), it wasn't colocated with Kido Butai anyway.
 
And if it was transmitting near enough to Lahaina (does anyone know?), it wasn't colocated with Kido Butai anyway.

That was part of my point, that perhaps I should've made more explicit. The sub would have had no need to transmit if it was actually with the main body of the force, as the ships to whom it was transmitting could've seen with their own eyes.
 

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