Merged Pearl Harbor: "Revisionists" vs. "Traditionalists"

An individual ship isn't 90 miles long, it is a few hundred feet. Or, are you claiming that the entire fleet was transmitting at the same time?

How are you using the 90 miles? Is it 90 square miles? That would put the fleet in a square of about 9.5 miles a side. Or do you mean they were strung out over a track of 90 miles?
 
An individual ship isn't 90 miles long, it is a few hundred feet. Or, are you claiming that the entire fleet was transmitting at the same time?

How are you using the 90 miles? Is it 90 square miles? That would put the fleet in a square of about 9.5 miles a side. Or do you mean they were strung out over a track of 90 miles?

They were using "Calliope Stealth", that's why they were so easy to track.
 
They were using "Calliope Stealth", that's why they were so easy to track.

Yes when you get orders to maintain radio silence you instead toot out radio signals like a Calliope does tunes.
 
How did he track a fleet that didn't transmit? You still haven't gotten over that hurdle.

You can repeat a myth a thousand times and it will still be a myth. The fleet did transmit. We have records of some of its transmissions. Sub I-72, one of the subs assigned to the task force, transmitted a radio message that there were no U.S. Navy ships at the Lahaina anchorage (Goldstein and Dillon, The Pearl Harbor Papers, p. 243). And we have record of traffic between the carrier Akagi and several oil tankers, and the traffic log notes that this traffic was on a tactical circuit. "The Japanese," notes Dr. Wilford, "would never have sent a false message indicating that the Akagi was conversing with oil tankers on a tactical circuit when previous false messages showed the carrier in home water" (Pearl Harbor Redefined: USN Radio Intelligence in 1941, University Press of America, 2001, pp. 72-73).

And then there is the mass of anecdotal evidence (some of it firsthand) on the interception and tracking of signals from the task force: Ogg, Hosmer, Raneft, Bentick, Burnett, Mortimer, Leib, Helfrich, and others. Your "scholarly, expert" answer is that they were lying or mistaken. Really, all of them?

I know others here regard you as a great expert, but your knowledge and logic have come across as rather deficient in several cases:

* You scoffed at the bomb plot messages and said the info was unnecessary because the bombers could just find the ships when they got there. What an amazingly silly thing to say, especially for someone who's supposed to be an expert. As you should know, the Japanese used the information on the disposition of ships and Pearl Harbor's defenses to prepare mock-ups of the harbor to train the air raid commanders. Air forces routinely seek information on a target to prepare attacks. No commander in his right mind would just assume that "oh, you'll see the ships when you get there."

* You referred to John Toland as one of the "Roosevelt haters." Now, obviously, you've never read his book Infamy, even though you've attacked it. If you'd read the book, you'd know that Toland was a huge fan of FDR's. Toland makes this clear in several places in the book. He's very critical of FDR's handling of relations with Japan, but he heaps praise on FDR on other issues and expresses his overall high regard for the man. You'd know that if you'd read the book.

* You trumpeted Jacobsen's article on Grogan's bearings as the definitive, final word on the matter, yet you apparently weren't even aware that Drs. Hill and Wilford shredded Jacobsen's article in a detailed 2006 reply. And it's clear from your polemics on Hill and Wilford's response that you have no credible answer for their arguments and documentation.

* You keep using the silly circular argument that the task force did not transmit as your reply to all evidence that it did transmit, and your main justification is that, oh, gosh, the Japanese swore up and down that they never transmitted--never mind that the Japanese were caught lying about all kinds of things relating to the Pearl Harbor attack. Perhaps you've never taken a college-level logic or critical thinking course, but the assertion that "Kido Butai did not transmit" is an assertion of a negative, and negatives are usually very hard to prove anyway. Not only is your "evidence" that the task force did not transmit weak, but your denials of all the evidence that it did transmit are clearly strained.
 
An individual ship isn't 90 miles long, it is a few hundred feet. Or, are you claiming that the entire fleet was transmitting at the same time?

How are you using the 90 miles? Is it 90 square miles? That would put the fleet in a square of about 9.5 miles a side. Or do you mean they were strung out over a track of 90 miles?

Gosh, are you serious? Some of you folks are so biased that you end up making the most absurd arguments. Uh, yes, of course I was saying that the fleet extended for at least 90 miles. I thought that was already crystal clear. What was it about the wording that could have confused you? And how in the world could even a third grader have inferred that I was even hinting that an individual ship is "90 miles long"?

Sheesh, folks, are your minds locked shut or what?

And to answer another argument, someone said that I hurriedly got off my argument that FDR saved Russia from Japan. No, not at all. It's just that I don't waste a whole lot of time arguing with people whose minds are obviously slammed shut to persuasion and who clearly have no interest in doing any serious research that might disturb their preexisting views.

Yes, FDR absolutely saved Russia from a Japanese invasion and from collapse. Have a single one of you bothered to read Dr. Victor's treatment of this issue in The Pearl Harbor Myth? Why don't you check out his documentation on this issue? Are you aware that non-revisionist scholars have pointed out that FDR's policy toward Japan became much harsher once he learned from intercepts that Japan was considering invading Russia? Are you aware that a zillion scholars have documented the fact that Stalin halted the German advance because he was freed up to transfer huge amounts of troops from his eastern front? And, humm, why was he able to do that? He would not have been able to do that if FDR had not rejected Japan's reasonable peace offers and had not provoked Japan to war against America.
 
Last edited:
If a ship transmits it transmits from one point not a 90 mile long line.
What ships were at what point of the 90 mile line?

As for the transmissions from the Sub, as has already been posted it was not part of the task force, it was on a specific mission and transmitted a 2 letter code. That was it's job.
Seems the transmissions from Akagi about oil tankers are what would be expected as part of the deception or have you forgotten that the radio operators were sat in Japan pretending to be sending routine messages?
 
Yes, FDR absolutely saved Russia from a Japanese invasion and from collapse. Have a single one of you bothered to read Dr. Victor's treatment of this issue in The Pearl Harbor Myth? Why don't you check out his documentation on this issue? Are you aware that non-revisionist scholars have pointed out that FDR's policy toward Japan became much harsher once he learned from intercepts that Japan was considering invading Russia? Are you aware that a zillion scholars have documented the fact that Stalin halted the German advance because he was freed up to transfer huge amounts of troops from his eastern front? And, humm, why was he able to do that? He would not have been able to do that if FDR had not rejected Japan's reasonable peace offers and had not provoked Japan to war against America.

Pure fantasy. Hyperfocusing does not prove cause-and-effect, btf.

For anyone interested in the actual messages: http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/magic/
 
Bob, FDR had nothing to do with Japan deciding not to go after the USSR (you should at least call the country by its proper name). Japan and Russia were very hostile to one another, Japan seeing Siberia as a rich source of raw materials. There being remarkably little role for the navy in this campaign, the army championed and during their period of ascendency were able to direct the bulk of Japan's military effort there.

The border wars between Japan and the USSR started in 1932 and came to a head in August 1939. In August 1939 a large force of several divisions were badly mauled by Soviet forces under the command of Zhukov. This lead to talks between the two countries, culminating in a Neutrality Pact being signed in April 1941. The inability of the Army to decisively make headway, lead to their loss of prestige and the Navy's ascendency. This lead to a shift of focus to the pacific islands and southern Asia.

After June 1941 until the defeat of Germany in April 1945, as the Soviets had a greater threat there. The reason the Soviets were able to shift divisions west starting in September comes froma recognition that the Tri-Partite Agreement did not require military intervention in support of the other signatories, and the shift of Japanese focus away from Siberia.

FDR did not become President until 1933, after hostilities commenced between Japan and the USSR.

The embargo of sales of fuel and scrap steel to Japan did not come into effect until after 1939, indeed after the August battles at Khalkin Gol.

The USSR did not start receiving materiel under Lend-Lease until October 1941.

The Japanese decision to attack PH was made in early November 1941.

Now, unless you have someway showing that FDR engineered the disgrace of the Japanese Army after 1939 to force the shift in strategic focus of Japan south and East, while simultaneously ensuring that the Tri-Partite agreement did not have military assistance clauses, I think the "argument" that FDR saved the USSR can be put to rest.
 
You can repeat a myth a thousand times and it will still be a myth. The fleet did transmit. We have records of some of its transmissions. Sub I-72, one of the subs assigned to the task force, transmitted a radio message that there were no U.S. Navy ships at the Lahaina anchorage (Goldstein and Dillon, The Pearl Harbor Papers, p. 243).

The I-72 was not part of the Kido Butai. The force disposition, as shown in (Goldstein and Dillon, The Pearl Harbor Papers, p. 243) clearly shows that.

CHART: Chart 1, Disposition of Forces.

Task Force
Classification: Air Attack Force

Commander: 1st Air Fleet Commander

Strength: 1st Air Fleet
1st Carrier Division
CV Akagi
CV Kaga
2nd Carrier Division
CV Hiryu
CV Soryu
3rd Carrier Division
CV Zuikaku
CV Shokaku

Duties: Air Attacks

Classification: Screening Unit

Commander: 1st Destroyer Squadron Commander

Strength: 17th Destroyer Division
(Nagara Flagship)
18th Destroyer Division
(Akigumo Flagship)

Duties: Screening and escort

Classification: Support Force

Commander: 3rd Battleship Division Commander

Strength: 3rd Battleship Division
(less the 2nd section)
8th Cruiser Division

Duties: Screen and support

Classification: Patrol Unit

Commander: 2nd Submarine Division Commander

Strength: I-19 (Flagship)
I-21
I-23

Duties: Patrol

Classification: Midway Bombardment Unit

Commander: 7th Destroyer Division Commander

Strength: 7th Destroyer Division
(less the 2nd section)

Duties: Midway air base attack

Classification: Supply Force

Overall Commander: Kyokuto Maru Commander

Classification: Supply Force (1st Supply Unit)

Commander: Kyokuto Maru Commander

Strength: Kenyo Maru
Kyokuto Maru
Kokuyo Maru
Shinkoku Maru
Akebono Maru

Duties: Supply

Classification: Supply Force (2nd Supply Unit)

Commander: Toho Maru Inspector

Strength: Toho Maru
Toei Maru
Nippon Maru

Duties: Supply
 
The I-72 was not part of the Kido Butai. The force disposition, as shown in (Goldstein and Dillon, The Pearl Harbor Papers, p. 243) clearly shows that.

CHART: Chart 1, Disposition of Forces.

Task Force
Classification: Air Attack Force

Commander: 1st Air Fleet Commander

Strength: 1st Air Fleet
1st Carrier Division
CV Akagi
CV Kaga
2nd Carrier Division
CV Hiryu
CV Soryu
3rd Carrier Division
CV Zuikaku
CV Shokaku

Duties: Air Attacks

Classification: Screening Unit

Commander: 1st Destroyer Squadron Commander

Strength: 17th Destroyer Division
(Nagara Flagship)
18th Destroyer Division
(Akigumo Flagship)

Duties: Screening and escort

Classification: Support Force

Commander: 3rd Battleship Division Commander

Strength: 3rd Battleship Division
(less the 2nd section)
8th Cruiser Division

Duties: Screen and support

Classification: Patrol Unit

Commander: 2nd Submarine Division Commander

Strength: I-19 (Flagship)
I-21
I-23

Duties: Patrol

Classification: Midway Bombardment Unit

Commander: 7th Destroyer Division Commander

Strength: 7th Destroyer Division
(less the 2nd section)

Duties: Midway air base attack

Classification: Supply Force

Overall Commander: Kyokuto Maru Commander

Classification: Supply Force (1st Supply Unit)

Commander: Kyokuto Maru Commander

Strength: Kenyo Maru
Kyokuto Maru
Kokuyo Maru
Shinkoku Maru
Akebono Maru

Duties: Supply

Classification: Supply Force (2nd Supply Unit)

Commander: Toho Maru Inspector

Strength: Toho Maru
Toei Maru
Nippon Maru

Duties: Supply

Not to mention that Lahaina is a totally different direction than where the Kido Butai was, if that's where he was transmitting from. One sub with one RF line isn't gonna locate a fleet for you.
 
Sheesh, folks, are your minds locked shut or what?

They are open to reasoned argument supported by solid evidence from primary sources.

What you have offered are quotes from books describing accounts that have been offered long after the even and are by and large unverifiable. You've also demonstrated a lack of knowledge about technical matters and your only refutation of counter arguments is to claim that records have been falsified and people lied, while refusing to consider the possibility it is you own sources that are engaged in deception.

In summary you are big on claims and short on evidence. Unless you can address that deficiency you will convince no one.
 
Bob, FDR had nothing to do with Japan deciding not to go after the USSR (you should at least call the country by its proper name). Japan and Russia were very hostile to one another, Japan seeing Siberia as a rich source of raw materials. There being remarkably little role for the navy in this campaign, the army championed and during their period of ascendency were able to direct the bulk of Japan's military effort there.

The border wars between Japan and the USSR started in 1932 and came to a head in August 1939. In August 1939 a large force of several divisions were badly mauled by Soviet forces under the command of Zhukov. This lead to talks between the two countries, culminating in a Neutrality Pact being signed in April 1941. The inability of the Army to decisively make headway, lead to their loss of prestige and the Navy's ascendency. This lead to a shift of focus to the pacific islands and southern Asia.

After June 1941 until the defeat of Germany in April 1945, as the Soviets had a greater threat there. The reason the Soviets were able to shift divisions west starting in September comes froma recognition that the Tri-Partite Agreement did not require military intervention in support of the other signatories, and the shift of Japanese focus away from Siberia.

FDR did not become President until 1933, after hostilities commenced between Japan and the USSR.

The embargo of sales of fuel and scrap steel to Japan did not come into effect until after 1939, indeed after the August battles at Khalkin Gol.

The USSR did not start receiving materiel under Lend-Lease until October 1941.

The Japanese decision to attack PH was made in early November 1941.

Now, unless you have someway showing that FDR engineered the disgrace of the Japanese Army after 1939 to force the shift in strategic focus of Japan south and East, while simultaneously ensuring that the Tri-Partite agreement did not have military assistance clauses, I think the "argument" that FDR saved the USSR can be put to rest.

These points are either irrelevant or incomplete or problematic, mostly the first. Nothing you say here refutes the revisionist case on this point. I'll tell you what: Why don't you dare yourself to read the evidence on this matter presented by Dr. George Victor in The Pearl Harbor Myth and by Percy Greaves in Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy? Surely if that case is so weak, you should have nothing to fear from reading it.
 
These points are either irrelevant or incomplete or problematic, mostly the first. Nothing you say here refutes the revisionist case on this point. I'll tell you what: Why don't you dare yourself to read the evidence on this matter presented by Dr. George Victor in The Pearl Harbor Myth and by Percy Greaves in Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy? Surely if that case is so weak, you should have nothing to fear from reading it.

When reality refutes your sources there's little reason to waste the time. You've convinced me they're not worth a look.
 
Here is an excerpt from Edward Barkin and Michael Meyer's discussion on the myth of radio silence in their article "COMINT and Pearl Harbor: FDR's Mistake," International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence:

But evidence indicates that the Japanese flotilla did, in fact, engage in radio activity. The Japanese Naval General Staff in Tokyo sent a coded message every odd-numbered hour for the duration of the journey. Although all ships in the task force were instructed to receive the coded messages, the Hiei, one of the two ships in the task force that had very powerful receiving gear, relayed its copy to the flagship Akagi for double-checking.8 Even Gordon Prange, whose monumental work At Dawn We Slept documents this retransmission, failed to perceive its potential significance. Prange apparently assumes that the messages from Tokyo
were transmitted from the Hiei to the Akagi by means of some non-radio form of communication — either flag or light signals.

But when the hypothesis that the Hiei communicated by radio is juxtaposed with Grogan's account, all the pieces fall uncannily into place. In his journal, which should be emphasized was written at the time of the crucial events related, radio operator Grogan recorded: "We noted that signals were being repeated back, possibly for copying by crafts with smaller antennas;" he noted, too, that the signals being picked up were (1) "all in Japanese code" and (2) "on the Lower Marine Radio frequency."9 In addition, his DF bearings, like Ogg's, showed clearly that the source of the signals was moving toward Hawaii from the northwest. This description of the transmissions exactly parallels the rebroadcasting hypothesis, simultaneously corroborating the known factual details previously presented.

First, if the Hiei had been rebroadcasting the messages from Japan for the
Akagi's benefit, signals were obviously being repeated back for copying by a craft with a smaller antenna. Second, if this inter-ship transmission occurred, the transmitted messages would certainly have been in Japanese code. Indeed, Grogan's log strongly suggests that the intercepted signals were of a military nature: "If anyone should ask me, I would say it's the Jap's Mobilization Battle Order." Grogan, a radio operator with thirty years of experience in the Pacific, would have been well acquainted with the various types of radio communications prevalent on the high seas in that part of the world.

With regard to the next point, if the Japanese chose to transmit by radio, they would undoubtedly have used a low frequency to achieve maximum security. Signals sent on high frequencies are more likely to rebound off the Earth's ionosphere; and when radio waves are reflected in this way by the ionosphere, they can travel a greater nautical distance than unreflected waves, which, because of the Earth's curvature, propagate directly into space. Clearly, the greater the nautical distance covered by a radio transmission, the greater the chances are of an enemy receiver's picking it up. So, to minimize the risk of interception, the Japanese would have utilized the lower frequency range if at all possible. Because the intership
distance was small, the Hiei could easily have employed a low frequency, not
needing to take advantage of the "skip-distance" phenomenon to ensure reception of the transmissions by the Akagi. The use of low frequency communications by the Japanese Navy was, though not prevalent, definitely standard practice when secrecy was imperative. . . .

Finally, the fact that both sets of direction finder (DF) bearings, taken from
widely separated points, showed that the source of the signals was moving toward Hawaii from the northwest is extremely important. In fact, it is the crucial point of agreement between the two scenarios. Regardless of how inaccurate the crude bearings taken by Ogg and Grogan may have been, their consistent agreement with each other over a period of days is a powerful argument favoring their validity. . . .

The Lurline scenario, which fits the facts perfectly, parallels Ogg's account in two major ways. First of all, Grogan, like Ogg, clearly states that the intercepted signals were in Japanese code. (Ogg knew this because Hosmer
informed him of it; and Grogan, as has been stated, recognized this because of his extensive experience as a radio operator in the Pacific.) Second, Grogan, like Ogg, states that the transmissions were on a low frequency. If both were using the low frequency (LF) band, as opposed to, say, the lower range of the HF band, then this is a very compelling coincidence, because the Japanese rarely used LF radio signals. Typical Japanese naval communications were between fleet and Japan, necessitating the use of HF transmissions, which are better suited for a long=distance communication. But LF signals would have been the most logical ones for the Japanese to use in this instance, so as to lessen the chance of detection by the
enemy. Ogg would not have known about the Lurline episode, since his testimony predates the publication of John Toland's Infamy. . . .

Another minor point in Ogg's favor is his statement that one of the commercial wire services such a Press Wireless, Globe Wireless, or RCA actually intercepted the Japanese transmissions and so informed the 12th Naval District intelligence office. Wire services commonly pass intelligence such as intercepted communications on to ONI. To facilitate the passage of information, in the case of RCA, there existed a special agreement between David Sarnoff, the president of RCA, and Captain Mayfield, head of the District Intelligence Office.11 ("COMINT and Pearl Harbor," International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, pp. 517-519)​
 
Here is an excerpt from Edward Barkin and Michael Meyer's discussion on the myth of radio silence in their article "COMINT and Pearl Harbor: FDR's Mistake," International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence:

But evidence indicates that the Japanese flotilla did, in fact, engage in radio activity. The Japanese Naval General Staff in Tokyo sent a coded message every odd-numbered hour for the duration of the journey. Although all ships in the task force were instructed to receive the coded messages, the Hiei, one of the two ships in the task force that had very powerful receiving gear, relayed its copy to the flagship Akagi for double-checking.8 Even Gordon Prange, whose monumental work At Dawn We Slept documents this retransmission, failed to perceive its potential significance. Prange apparently assumes that the messages from Tokyo were transmitted from the Hiei to the Akagi by means of some non-radio form of communication — either flag or light signals.

But when the hypothesis that the Hiei communicated by radio is juxtaposed with Grogan's account, all the pieces fall uncannily into place. In his journal, which should be emphasized was written at the time of the crucial events related, radio operator Grogan recorded: "We noted that signals were being repeated back, possibly for copying by crafts with smaller antennas;" he noted, too, that the signals being picked up were (1) "all in Japanese code" and (2) "on the Lower Marine Radio frequency."9 In addition, his DF bearings, like Ogg's, showed clearly that the source of the signals was moving toward Hawaii from the northwest. This description of the transmissions exactly parallels the rebroadcasting hypothesis, simultaneously corroborating the known factual details previously presented.

First, if the Hiei had been rebroadcasting the messages from Japan for the Akagi's benefit, signals were obviously being repeated back for copying by a craft with a smaller antenna. Second, if this inter-ship transmission occurred, the transmitted messages would certainly have been in Japanese code. Indeed, Grogan's log strongly suggests that the intercepted signals were of a military nature: "If anyone should ask me, I would say it's the Jap's Mobilization Battle Order." Grogan, a radio operator with thirty years of experience in the Pacific, would have been well acquainted with the various types of radio communications prevalent on the high seas in that part of the world.

With regard to the next point, if the Japanese chose to transmit by radio, they would undoubtedly have used a low frequency to achieve maximum security. Signals sent on high frequencies are more likely to rebound off the Earth's ionosphere; and when radio waves are reflected in this way by the ionosphere, they can travel a greater nautical distance than unreflected waves, which, because of the Earth's curvature, propagate directly into space. Clearly, the greater the nautical distance covered by a radio transmission, the greater the chances are of an enemy receiver's picking it up. So, to minimize the risk of interception, the Japanese would have utilized the lower frequency range if at all possible. Because the intership distance was small, the Hiei could easily have employed a low frequency, not needing to take advantage of the "skip-distance" phenomenon to ensure reception of the transmissions by the Akagi. The use of low frequency communications by the Japanese Navy was, though not prevalent, definitely standard practice when secrecy was imperative. . . .

Finally, the fact that both sets of direction finder (DF) bearings, taken from widely separated points, showed that the source of the signals was moving toward Hawaii from the northwest is extremely important. In fact, it is the crucial point of agreement between the two scenarios. Regardless of how inaccurate the crude bearings taken by Ogg and Grogan may have been, their consistent agreement with each other over a period of days is a powerful argument favoring their validity. . . .

The Lurline scenario, which fits the facts perfectly, parallels Ogg's account in two major ways. First of all, Grogan, like Ogg, clearly states that the intercepted signals were in Japanese code. (Ogg knew this because Hosmer informed him of it; and Grogan, as has been stated, recognized this because of his extensive experience as a radio operator in the Pacific.) Second, Grogan, like Ogg, states that the transmissions were on a low frequency. If both were using the low frequency (LF) band, as opposed to, say, the lower range of the HF band, then this is a very compelling coincidence, because the Japanese rarely used LF radio signals. Typical Japanese naval communications were between fleet and Japan, necessitating the use of HF transmissions, which are better suited for a long=distance communication. But LF signals would have been the most logical ones for the Japanese to use in this instance, so as to lessen the chance of detection by the enemy. Ogg would not have known about the Lurline episode, since his testimony predates the publication of John Toland's Infamy. . . .

Another minor point in Ogg's favor is his statement that one of the commercial wire services such a Press Wireless, Globe Wireless, or RCA actually intercepted the Japanese transmissions and so informed the 12th Naval District intelligence office. Wire services commonly pass intelligence such as intercepted communications on to ONI. To facilitate the passage of information, in the case of RCA, there existed a special agreement between David Sarnoff, the president of RCA, and Captain Mayfield, head of the District Intelligence Office.11 ("COMINT and Pearl Harbor," International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, pp. 517-519)​

The whole article is a great read. Especially interesting is Barkin and Meyer's debunking of the claim that Ogg recanted or backed away from his story when interviewed by Navy Intelligence after his identify had been revealed.
 
Last edited:
I take it that's a peer-reviewed journal?

As for your two books on the this subject, I have trouble believing you've read them. Why? Because reading CTer books is like reading the Bible. If you actually read it and understand what they're saying you lose your faith in them quickly.
 
And, humm, why was he able to do that? He would not have been able to do that if FDR had not rejected Japan's reasonable peace offers and had not provoked Japan to war against America.


Please note that bobtaftfan is now opening siding with the Japanese in their little effort to create the Greater East Asia Co Prosperity Sphere........
 

ISF - Join now!

Every member here is approved by hand. No bots, no spam, just people who care about evidence and honest debate.

Membership is free!

Create your free account

Back
Top Bottom