Here is an excerpt from Edward Barkin and Michael Meyer's discussion on the myth of radio silence in their article "COMINT and Pearl Harbor: FDR's Mistake,"
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence:
But evidence indicates that the Japanese flotilla did, in fact, engage in radio activity. The Japanese Naval General Staff in Tokyo sent a coded message every odd-numbered hour for the duration of the journey. Although all ships in the task force were instructed to receive the coded messages, the Hiei, one of the two ships in the task force that had very powerful receiving gear, relayed its copy to the flagship Akagi for double-checking.8 Even Gordon Prange, whose monumental work At Dawn We Slept documents this retransmission, failed to perceive its potential significance. Prange apparently assumes that the messages from Tokyo were transmitted from the Hiei to the Akagi by means of some non-radio form of communication — either flag or light signals.
But when the hypothesis that the Hiei communicated by radio is juxtaposed with Grogan's account, all the pieces fall uncannily into place. In his journal, which should be emphasized was written at the time of the crucial events related, radio operator Grogan recorded: "We noted that signals were being repeated back, possibly for copying by crafts with smaller antennas;" he noted, too, that the signals being picked up were (1) "all in Japanese code" and (2) "on the Lower Marine Radio frequency."9 In addition, his DF bearings, like Ogg's, showed clearly that the source of the signals was moving toward Hawaii from the northwest. This description of the transmissions exactly parallels the rebroadcasting hypothesis, simultaneously corroborating the known factual details previously presented.
First, if the Hiei had been rebroadcasting the messages from Japan for the Akagi's benefit, signals were obviously being repeated back for copying by a craft with a smaller antenna. Second, if this inter-ship transmission occurred, the transmitted messages would certainly have been in Japanese code. Indeed, Grogan's log strongly suggests that the intercepted signals were of a military nature: "If anyone should ask me, I would say it's the Jap's Mobilization Battle Order." Grogan, a radio operator with thirty years of experience in the Pacific, would have been well acquainted with the various types of radio communications prevalent on the high seas in that part of the world.
With regard to the next point, if the Japanese chose to transmit by radio, they would undoubtedly have used a low frequency to achieve maximum security. Signals sent on high frequencies are more likely to rebound off the Earth's ionosphere; and when radio waves are reflected in this way by the ionosphere, they can travel a greater nautical distance than unreflected waves, which, because of the Earth's curvature, propagate directly into space. Clearly, the greater the nautical distance covered by a radio transmission, the greater the chances are of an enemy receiver's picking it up. So, to minimize the risk of interception, the Japanese would have utilized the lower frequency range if at all possible. Because the intership distance was small, the Hiei could easily have employed a low frequency, not needing to take advantage of the "skip-distance" phenomenon to ensure reception of the transmissions by the Akagi. The use of low frequency communications by the Japanese Navy was, though not prevalent, definitely standard practice when secrecy was imperative. . . .
Finally, the fact that both sets of direction finder (DF) bearings, taken from widely separated points, showed that the source of the signals was moving toward Hawaii from the northwest is extremely important. In fact, it is the crucial point of agreement between the two scenarios. Regardless of how inaccurate the crude bearings taken by Ogg and Grogan may have been, their consistent agreement with each other over a period of days is a powerful argument favoring their validity. . . .
The Lurline scenario, which fits the facts perfectly, parallels Ogg's account in two major ways. First of all, Grogan, like Ogg, clearly states that the intercepted signals were in Japanese code. (Ogg knew this because Hosmer informed him of it; and Grogan, as has been stated, recognized this because of his extensive experience as a radio operator in the Pacific.) Second, Grogan, like Ogg, states that the transmissions were on a low frequency. If both were using the low frequency (LF) band, as opposed to, say, the lower range of the HF band, then this is a very compelling coincidence, because the Japanese rarely used LF radio signals. Typical Japanese naval communications were between fleet and Japan, necessitating the use of HF transmissions, which are better suited for a long=distance communication. But LF signals would have been the most logical ones for the Japanese to use in this instance, so as to lessen the chance of detection by the enemy. Ogg would not have known about the Lurline episode, since his testimony predates the publication of John Toland's Infamy. . . .
Another minor point in Ogg's favor is his statement that one of the commercial wire services such a Press Wireless, Globe Wireless, or RCA actually intercepted the Japanese transmissions and so informed the 12th Naval District intelligence office. Wire services commonly pass intelligence such as intercepted communications on to ONI. To facilitate the passage of information, in the case of RCA, there existed a special agreement between David Sarnoff, the president of RCA, and Captain Mayfield, head of the District Intelligence Office.11 ("COMINT and Pearl Harbor," International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, pp. 517-519)
The whole article is a great read. Especially interesting is Barkin and Meyer's debunking of the claim that Ogg recanted or backed away from his story when interviewed by Navy Intelligence after his identify had been revealed.