Merged Pearl Harbor: "Revisionists" vs. "Traditionalists"

Here's an alternative question for the many smart military historians here.

What would have happened if the Japanese hadn't attacked the US and instead concentrated their endeavours on destroying the British and Dutch?

What would have been the US position or action in response?

Would you like to see the pre-war planning for that eventuality?

Joint Committee Exhibit No. 49, United States-British Staff Conversations (ABC-1 talks on division of military responsibility in case of US entry into the war.)

Joint Committee Exhibit No. 50, American-Dutch-British Conversations, discussing military cooperation in the Far East, April, 1941.

Joint Committee Exhibit No. 51, Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plan No. 2 (Short Title-ABC-22), discussing military cooperation between Canada and the United States.

Navy Basic War Plan-Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46)
 
The fact that FDR prevented Japan from launching an invasion of the Soviet Union is too well documented to warrant debate.

I'm sorry? What Earth are you living on because it sure isn't this one. Japan getting their butt kicked by the Soviets was the answer there.

Let's see, who were your sources? Percy Greaves? A paleo-con of the worst order and George Victor, who seems very much in the Stinnett camp. Not shining examples. Why not find some real historians to back you, m'kay?
 
Would you like to see the pre-war planning for that eventuality?

Joint Committee Exhibit No. 49, United States-British Staff Conversations (ABC-1 talks on division of military responsibility in case of US entry into the war.)

Joint Committee Exhibit No. 50, American-Dutch-British Conversations, discussing military cooperation in the Far East, April, 1941.

Joint Committee Exhibit No. 51, Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plan No. 2 (Short Title-ABC-22), discussing military cooperation between Canada and the United States.

Navy Basic War Plan-Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46)

Thanks Gawdzilla

I'm familar with these but as far I recall they don't address the particular circumstance I put out there as an alternative. What would have happened if only the British and Dutch had been attacked? If in there I apology !
 
Thanks Gawdzilla

I'm familar with these but as far I recall they don't address the particular circumstance I put out there as an alternative. What would have happened if only the British and Dutch had been attacked? If in there I apology !

The ABC talks cover that IIRC. Basically, the US, while not committed at the Presidential level, was making plans to aid the British and Dutch if their colonies were attacked. The what-if gets fuzzy because the Japanese could not leave the PI on their flank. They presumed the US would attack and they were probably right. In any case, the PI is in perfect position to block traffic from the NEI to Japan by sea, so the US was going to get involved, voluntarily or otherwise.
 
Here is some of what Dr. Villa and Dr. Wilford have to say about the radio silence claim:

A dispatch of 25 November confirmed that emergency communications were possible during radio silence: "From 26 November, ships of Combined Fleet will observe radio communications procedure as follows...Except in extreme emergency the Main Force and its attached force will cease communicating."" It is thus clear that the Japanese navy admitted the possibility that it might be necessary in particular circumstances to use radio.

The Kido Butai, sailing under difficult conditions in winter seas, faced a number of circumstances that seemed to compel the use of radio for its secret operation. As Rear Admiral Kusaka of the 1st Air Fleet later explained that "It was needless to say that the strictest radio silence was ordered to be maintained in every ship of the Task Force. To keep radio silence was easy to say, but not so easy to maintain."31 How could the Kido Butai, spread out over 360 square miles of ocean by day and ninety square miles by night, cope with fog, storms and a ban on night illumination without recourse to radio communications?32 Under these circumstances, the ships certainly needed low-power radio to assemble at a common point in the north Pacific for refuelling.

Little noticed USN intercepts suggest that the Kido Butai was forced to transmit radio messages before and during the voyage to Hawaii.33 On 25 November, Carrier Division 5 of the Strike Force broke radio silence by transmitting on 4.963 MHz under call sign NAO 0, as recorded in the Station H Chronology.34 On 26 November Station H reported that "the Carriers were heard using secret calls on 4963M [4.963 MHz] during the evening watch."35 These HF transmissions on a common frequency of 4.963 MHz were most likely from the Kido Butai, since six of Japan's eight carriers were part of the force. Vessels such as the aircraft carrier Akagi, the oil tanker Shiriya and the battleship Hiei were also reported as making transmissions. On 28 November Station H recorded call signs and code movement reports transmitted from two of these vessels, RU SI 8, using Akagi 's transmitter, and HA NI 1 on Shiriya.36 The next day Station Hypo, a USN communications intelligence unit in Pearl Harbor, reported that Hiei sent a message to the Chief of Staff, 3rd Fleet. Station Hypo's report for 30 November explained that Japanese oil tankers, or marus, conversed with Akagi: "The only tactical circuit heard today was one with Akagi and several marus."37 On 1 December, the USN intercepted a position report transmitted by Shiriya.38 Moreover, Station H intercepted a radio transmission from a Kido Butai submarine using call sign WA HI 8 on 6 December at 0552 hours, Tokyo time."

It is unlikely that these USN intercepts all represented Japanese radio deception. Secret call signs intercepted by American monitoring stations suggested clandestine operations. Code movement reports, as well as traffic between carriers and their oil tankers, reflected operations far away from home, rather than stationary anchorage in home ports, as Japanese deception was trying to convey using routine call signs. The Japanese would not have sent a false message indicating that Akagi was conversing on a " tactical circuit" with oil tankers when previous false messages were trying to convince American naval intelligence that the carriers were in home waters. The oil tanker traffic with the carriers clearly meant long voyages, not anchorage in Kyushu. ("Warning at Pearl Harbor: Leslie Grogan and the Tracking of the Kido Butai," The Northern Mariner, 11:2, April 2001, pp. 1-17, http://www.thestormunleashed.com/files/docs/warning_at_ph.pdf, emphasis added)​

The last point is one for which traditionalists have no good answer. If you're trying to trick your enemy into thinking that your carriers are in home waters, the last thing in the world you're going to do is send out fake messages that have one of your carriers conversing with oil tankers. Even a rookie analyst would understand that oil tankers talking with carriers indicates long voyages, not anchorage in home waters.

By the way, before anyone cites Jacobsen's rebuttal article on Grogan, Drs. Villa and Wilford have responded in detail to Jacobsen's rebuttal. Here is their response:

“Signals Intelligence and Pearl Harbor,” Intelligence and National Security, 21:4, 2006, pp. 520-556.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520600885665#preview

I have yet to see a traditionalist reply to Villa and Wilford's response.

Edward Barkin and Michael Meyer likewise reject the radio silence claim in their article "COMINT and Pearl Harbor: FDR's Mistake," International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 2:4, 1988, pp. 513-531.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08850608808435079

Barkin and Meyer also debunk the traditionalist claim that Robert Ogg essentially denied his story when he was interviewed by a Navy investigator. They show that in fact Ogg, a successful businessman after the war, reaffirmed his account.
 
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The reason you haven't seen a reply is because personal incredulity is not a response, it is a fallacy.
 
If you're trying to trick your enemy into thinking that your carriers are in home waters, the last thing in the world you're going to do is send out fake messages that have one of your carriers conversing with oil tankers.
Why wouldn't they talk to the tankers? Are you trying to tell us the IJN never did any tanker refueling training?
 
We also seem to have switched away from "Evil FDR made the Japanese stop fighting the Russians so they could fight us!" and back to the radio transmissions again.

I predict that after a few more debunkings of the radio we'll be due for another reset.
 
I was hoping for a bit more fun from that fringe reset, though.
The transmission thing has been beaten to death and is currently residing in Findus Lasagne.
 
I was hoping for a bit more fun from that fringe reset, though.
The transmission thing has been beaten to death and is currently residing in Findus Lasagne.

Yeah, but he doesn't have anything else. Despite his protestations of "abundance of evidence", he's got some iffy (at best) RDF claptrap from Grogan, a few half-remembered anecdotes whose accuracy cannot be verified from non-CT sources, and a pile of personal incredulity (and/or an axe to grind against FDR). Hard to go any sort of distance on that amount of bupkis, so looks like periodic fringe resets are in order.
 
How could the Kido Butai, spread out over 360 square miles of ocean by day and ninety square miles by night,


ZOMG!!1! 90 square miles?!?!?! 90!!! 90 is so huge!!!!

Until you divide by pi and take the square root and get a radius of 4.7 nautical miles.

C'mon man, did you really fall for that guy's low ball tactic? You need to turn your BS detector way up.

cope with fog, storms and a ban on night illumination without recourse to radio communications?32 Under these circumstances, the ships certainly needed low-power radio to assemble at a common point in the north Pacific for refuelling.


Again another revisionist fancies himself an expert in naval operations and falls flat on his face. These guys must think the fleet's orders read "get underway and head to Hawaii". In reality, and as I've told you numerous times, each ship would have been given a detailed track, including latitude, longitude, and the time they were expected to arrive at each point. The common point to assemble for refueling was predetermined. Do you think it's like a bunch of guys driving down the highway, occasionally glancing down at their fuel gauges, and as soon as one guy starts to run low he calls the other guys on his cell phone and says he needs to stop and get gas?

Even a rookie analyst would understand that oil tankers talking with carriers indicates long voyages, not anchorage in home waters.


On the contrary, only a rookie analyst would think an aircraft carrier sends a message to a tanker only when it is already running low on fuel.

Did you think the radiomen left behind to send deceptive messages were not told what to do? Or do you think they given a stack of messages and told to transmit them at certain times? Surely most of those fake messages would be routine boring day-to-day stuff like logistics.

Every ship plans its fuel requirements out for the year and sends this information up the chain of command. Ships inform tankers when and how much fuel they will need weeks in advance. The tanker needs to know all its customers needs weeks in advance so it can plan its operations to ensure it can refuel its customers. Or did you think tankers magically refill their empty tanks?

There is a famous quote about warfare that is apt here: "armchair generals talk about tactics, real generals talk about logistics."
 
The tankers and the carriers had no problem finding each other. The carriers had these things called "airplanes" that they sent out far and wide to look for problems. And tankers. They could report the location of the tankers when they returned. I suspect that they would also indicate the course for the tankers by flying low over them in the right direction while wagging their wings. But that information is from a lying Japanese (as Bob would put it) so it can't be trusted.
 
I would also suspect that the Japanese issued an order to the effect of: "The fleet will RV with supply ships at (latitude, longitude) for resupply at (date time group)" in the written instructions given the ship's captains before they even left port.

Prepositioning supplies on an approach route isn't just for armies anymore.
 
I would also suspect that the Japanese issued an order to the effect of: "The fleet will RV with supply ships at (latitude, longitude) for resupply at (date time group)" in the written instructions given the ship's captains before they even left port.

Prepositioning supplies on an approach route isn't just for armies anymore.

The tankers went with them. No need to rendezvous.

a. General

While exercising strict antiaircraft and antisubmarine measures and making every effort to conceal its position and movements, the entire force (except the Midway Bombardment Unit) in accordance with special orders will depart as a group from Hitokappu Bay at a speed of 12-14 knots. The force refueling en route whenever possible will arrive at the standby point (42 N, 165 W). In the event bad weather prevents refueling en route to the standby point, the screening unit will be ordered to return to the home base. Subsequent to the issuance of the order designating X Day (the day of the outbreak of hostilities), the force will proceed to the approaching point (32 N, 157 W).

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/myths/jm-097.html (starts on page 8.)
 

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