Here is some of what Dr. Villa and Dr. Wilford have to say about the radio silence claim:
A dispatch of 25 November confirmed that emergency communications were possible during radio silence: "From 26 November, ships of Combined Fleet will observe radio communications procedure as follows...Except in extreme emergency the Main Force and its attached force will cease communicating."" It is thus clear that the Japanese navy admitted the possibility that it might be necessary in particular circumstances to use radio.
The Kido Butai, sailing under difficult conditions in winter seas, faced a number of circumstances that seemed to compel the use of radio for its secret operation. As Rear Admiral Kusaka of the 1st Air Fleet later explained that "It was needless to say that the strictest radio silence was ordered to be maintained in every ship of the Task Force. To keep radio silence was easy to say, but not so easy to maintain."31 How could the Kido Butai, spread out over 360 square miles of ocean by day and ninety square miles by night, cope with fog, storms and a ban on night illumination without recourse to radio communications?32 Under these circumstances, the ships certainly needed low-power radio to assemble at a common point in the north Pacific for refuelling.
Little noticed USN intercepts suggest that the Kido Butai was forced to transmit radio messages before and during the voyage to Hawaii.33 On 25 November, Carrier Division 5 of the Strike Force broke radio silence by transmitting on 4.963 MHz under call sign NAO 0, as recorded in the Station H Chronology.34 On 26 November Station H reported that "the Carriers were heard using secret calls on 4963M [4.963 MHz] during the evening watch."35 These HF transmissions on a common frequency of 4.963 MHz were most likely from the Kido Butai, since six of Japan's eight carriers were part of the force. Vessels such as the aircraft carrier Akagi, the oil tanker Shiriya and the battleship Hiei were also reported as making transmissions. On 28 November Station H recorded call signs and code movement reports transmitted from two of these vessels, RU SI 8, using Akagi 's transmitter, and HA NI 1 on Shiriya.36 The next day Station Hypo, a USN communications intelligence unit in Pearl Harbor, reported that Hiei sent a message to the Chief of Staff, 3rd Fleet. Station Hypo's report for 30 November explained that Japanese oil tankers, or marus, conversed with Akagi: "The only tactical circuit heard today was one with Akagi and several marus."37 On 1 December, the USN intercepted a position report transmitted by Shiriya.38 Moreover, Station H intercepted a radio transmission from a Kido Butai submarine using call sign WA HI 8 on 6 December at 0552 hours, Tokyo time."
It is unlikely that these USN intercepts all represented Japanese radio deception. Secret call signs intercepted by American monitoring stations suggested clandestine operations. Code movement reports, as well as traffic between carriers and their oil tankers, reflected operations far away from home, rather than stationary anchorage in home ports, as Japanese deception was trying to convey using routine call signs. The Japanese would not have sent a false message indicating that Akagi was conversing on a " tactical circuit" with oil tankers when previous false messages were trying to convince American naval intelligence that the carriers were in home waters. The oil tanker traffic with the carriers clearly meant long voyages, not anchorage in Kyushu. ("Warning at Pearl Harbor: Leslie Grogan and the Tracking of the Kido Butai,"
The Northern Mariner, 11:2, April 2001, pp. 1-17,
http://www.thestormunleashed.com/files/docs/warning_at_ph.pdf, emphasis added)
The last point is one for which traditionalists have no good answer. If you're trying to trick your enemy into thinking that your carriers are in home waters, the last thing in the world you're going to do is send out fake messages that have one of your carriers conversing with oil tankers. Even a rookie analyst would understand that oil tankers talking with carriers indicates long voyages, not anchorage in home waters.
By the way, before anyone cites Jacobsen's rebuttal article on Grogan, Drs. Villa and Wilford have responded in detail to Jacobsen's rebuttal. Here is their response:
“Signals Intelligence and Pearl Harbor,”
Intelligence and National Security, 21:4, 2006, pp. 520-556.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520600885665#preview
I have yet to see a traditionalist reply to Villa and Wilford's response.
Edward Barkin and Michael Meyer likewise reject the radio silence claim in their article "COMINT and Pearl Harbor: FDR's Mistake,"
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 2:4, 1988, pp. 513-531.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08850608808435079
Barkin and Meyer also debunk the traditionalist claim that Robert Ogg essentially denied his story when he was interviewed by a Navy investigator. They show that in fact Ogg, a successful businessman after the war, reaffirmed his account.