Merged Pearl Harbor: "Revisionists" vs. "Traditionalists"

No. You've got it all wrong. Earlier in the thread it was asserted that FDR didn't want the Japanese to destroy the fleet; he thought that the attack would barely hurt the fleet. So, actually....

well...

OK, the not-so-bright fifth grader theory is becoming more viable.

Once again a CT falls afoul of an unstated Goldilocks condition.

Catching the fleet at sea before they launched would have been too little to drag the US into war.

What actually happened at Pearl was too much; they entered behind and damn near lost a couple major engagements early on.

Only what the CT imagines FDR expected is just right.
 
You do realize FDR wanted the US in a war with Germany. The US did everything it could to provoke Germany. It didn’t work, so they provoked Japan and got their desired result.


Because fighting a two-front war is a sound military idea, right? How did that work out for Shicklegruber again?
 
Stinnett was a drooling idiot with ALZ who was obsessed with the alternate reality that was FDR let it happen on purpose (LIHOP).

The dialog is difficult when conspiracy theorists don't read the material. For example, Stinnett didn't read the Hearings, so he though those "JN-25" messages in his book were intercepts. They were, in fact taken from the Hearings by Homer Wallin. The funny part is Stinnett cites Wallin, but didn't take the next logical step.

The Japanese confirmed they never transmitted. Go to Japan and call them liars if you wish.

And it's called the "bomb plot" by Americans. The Japanese pilots didn't need such things. They had a reconnaissance break-through in their planes called "glass". They could look through this "glass" and see the ships in the harbor. Some of the pilots were so good they could tell a battleship from a destroyer using this "glass".


The 14-part message didn't declare war, it didn't break off diplomatic negotiations, it was not an ultimatum. If one is appalling ignorant of diplomatic forms one might miss these things.

As for the timing, what does that prove?


And then the intell fairy came in and stamped "Pearl Harbor will be attacked at 1 pm" on their foreheads?


I offer you forty volumes of information Pearl Harbor. If you read it all you and I can have a conversation. http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/


Well, I'm impressed with the fact that you have read one book, a very badly written and highly inaccurate book, and you can make a serious decision like that. Reading Harry Potter and the Philosopher's Stone would make you a magician by those standards.

I love you! :lovestruck:
 
The claim that the Japanese task force maintained radio silence is demonstrably false. The fact that some scholars continue to insist on its validity says something about the nature of the Pearl Harbor debate. We have records--and in at least two cases copies--of messages that were sent by ships of the task force en route to Hawaii (Victor, The Pearl Harbor Myth, pp. 37-38; Timothy Wilford, "Watching the North Pacific: British and Commonwealth intelligence before Pearl Harbor," Intelligence and National Security, volume 17, number 4, pp. 147-153).[
The Kido Butai did not transmit. The ships' radio keys were locked in the safes. The scout planes had keys, so in case of emergency they could report enemy forces. Other than that, no transmission. None.
QUOTE]
Furthermore, the task force's orders allowed for some communication among the ships. Yamamoto issued follow-up orders that allowed for a certain amount of radio traffic between ships of the task force (Victor, The Pearl Harbor Myth, pp. 37-38; Victor quotes the orders). The severe weather that the task force encountered would have mandated inter-fleet communication, as A. J. Barker pointed out (Pearl Harbor, p. 81).[/QUOTE]
They didn't need to transmit, they used blinker lights and pre-arranged rendezvous points if they got separated. They didn't, so they didn't need to do anything special. (One destroyer lagged well behind the force for nearly a day, but caught up that night.)
Also, just because Kido Butai veterans later claimed that the task force maintained radio silence does not prove this was the case. Those same veterans made other claims that were proven false, such as their claims that the Japanese consulate in Hawaii provided no intelligence for the task force and that no written records survived. So it's curious that traditionalists put such stock in these men's claim of radio silence. Additionally, one admiral of the task force hinted that radio silence was not maintained after all, saying "To keep radio silence was easy to say, but not so easy to maintain."
As noted above, if you can't transmit, you don't. You can go call the survivors liars if you wish, and you have the balls. And the quote does not say they broke radio silence, only they took extraordinary measures to maintain silence.
Furthermore, the DF bearings obtained by the SS Lurline are additional proof that radio silence was not maintained. The bearings were taken by Leslie Grogan, an experienced radio operator on the ship. He took the bearings over the course of several days, which means they had a very reasonable degree of accuracy at the very least. One of the things that caught Grogan's attention was that the flotilla he was monitoring was using automatic rebroadcasts (aka "repeat-backs") at certain times. The only ships that would have repeatedly used repeat-backs in the North Pacific at that time were the vessels of the Kido Butai. Grogan discerned that the ships were trying to conceal their movements, and he concluded they intended to sneak up on Hawaii. Moreover, Grogan noted that the ships halted on 12/2, which is powerful evidence that he was tracking the Kido Butai--because we know that the task force stopped on 12/2 to refuel and to await final confirmation of orders.

Picking up Japanese language messages coming from the direction of Japan proves what? That Japan lies in that direction? I'm impressed.
Traditionalists have strained to explain the Lurline DF bearings. Wilford and Villa destroy the theories that Grogan heard Russian fishing ships or that he heard radio deception signals broadcast from Tokyo (Brian Villa and Timothy Wilford, “Warning at Pearl Harbor: Leslie Grogan and the Tracking of the Kido Butai,” The Northern Mariner, volume 11, number 2, pp. 1-17). No Russian fishing vessels would have been using automatic repeat-backs, and there is no way that signals broadcast from Tokyo would have yielded DF bearings that far east in the North Pacific.

As a former signals intelligence linguist who did direction finding in the field, I can add that the radio-deception explanation is wholly implausible, and anyone who knows anything about DFing knows this. Grogan took his bearings over the course of several days, which, given the size and speed of the task force, would have enabled him to essentially "triangulate" the location of the ships, which in turn would have ensured a degree of accuracy definitely within a reasonable margin of error. So it's not surprising that, as Wilford and Villa point out, Grogan's bearings substantially match the route that the task force traveled. This is further evidence that Grogan was tracking the task force. Needless to say, the Lurline DF bearings destroy the radio-silence claim.

Thanks for proving that even a "former signals intelligence linguist" can get things absurdly wrong. Where did you do this work and for whom. :pop:
 
These arguments have been answered in detail. I'd link to some material, but I'm not allowed to link yet. So, a few points:

1. Marshall led FDR to believe that the damage from an air attack on Pearl Harbor would be minimal. So FDR thought he could allow a surprise attack to occur at very little cost. He was stunned when he heard how much damage had been done.

"So, Franklin, we just let the fleet sit there like morons and we'll probably only lose a few hundred sailor and soldiers. Your aid there, his son's at Pearl, he won't mind if the boy gets killed, will he?"

2. FDR could not risk trying to meet the oncoming Japanese task force because Japanese spies on Oahu would have noticed and reported the deployment preparations, which in turn would have led the Japanese to call off the attack. We know that the Japanese were going to call off the attack if they lost the element of surprise. FDR would have logically assumed this to be the case, which provides a logical explanation for the "vacant sea" order that Washington issued for the North Pacific (this cleared a path for the Japanese task force).
You need to have your logic checked, you're about a quart low from what I see.

The fleet had been sailing in and out for months. So deployment wouldn't have been a surprise. As for scaring them off, the orders were to press home the attack even if they were spotted during the last twenty-four hours. So a sudden surge of activity wouldn't have stopped them.

"We know that the Japanese were going to call off the attack if they lost the element of surprise." Absurd. Read the orders. Or have someone read them to you.
3. FDR and a few other high officials certainly seemed to do all they could to prevent Kimmel and Short from accidentally detecting the oncoming Japanese fleet. The vacant sea order was part of this apparent effort. So was the order for Kimmel to pull his ships from doing training north of the island.

The Scouting Force went west in the days before the attack. TOWARD the Japanese. Strange way to prevent detection. "certainly seemed" is a very weird way of saying "I'm making this up as I go along."

4. And of course there's the fact that Kimmel and Short were never told about the bomb plot messages, about the warning of imminent war that Tokyo gave Berlin, about the Japanese military map obtained by Martin Dies' congressional committee, about the warnings from the British that a Japanese fleet was heading toward Hawaii (the former head of England's Joint Intelligence Committee said after the war that British intel knew about the Japanese task force and that the Americans were warned).

The bomb plot message I've dealt with elsewhere. The British didn't know about the Kido Butai. If they had they would have scored big by warning the US about them. Or at least they would in a sane universe. In a CTers universe, no clue. The UK needed every ship available, and having a major part of their biggest ally's fleet sunk was not something they'd dream of doing.
 
[Edited to add: the reason why dive-bombers were allocated to attack other targets than battleships even when battleships were THE target for the attack was that the Japanese realized that their small bombs would need an improbably lucky hit to achieve anything else than superficial damage against them. This went awry when the Val pilots ignored softer targets after seeing that carriers weren't there and went in for the glory of attacking battleships.]
True. The horizontal bombers were fitted with modified naval shells, 16", and it was determined that they had to drop the bombs from above 10,000 to allow them sufficient time to build up speed to use kinetic energy to penetrate BB armor. The dive bombers, using smaller bombs, dropped from lower altitude, so their bombs had no chance of penetrating deck armor.
 
The spies reported that, the day before the attack. That was incidental to the attack as the battleships were the primary targets. Yamamoto's objectives for the attack was to sink at least one battleship and to damage at least three others badly enough to require at least 6 months for repairs. Any damage to other targets would be nice bonus.
From the General Outline of Orders and Plans (Japanese Monograph No. 97.)

The targets for the first group will be limited to about four battleships and four aircraft carriers; the order of targets will be battleships and then aircraft carriers.

The second group will attack the enemy land-based air strength according to the following assignment:
 
One comment to the CTers in this thread. I'm not giving you hell to protect FDR or anybody else. I'm just sick of people who are appallingly ignorant, completely disingenuous, or badly deluded, you pick it, making a hash out of history through poor scholarship, blatant axe-grinding or a deeply held belief that reptiles are living in the skins of the British royal family. Do not feel insulted, because there's nothing personal about this, I don't care what you believe, but I do hope you are not surprised to find out that some people do care about getting the facts straight and doing history without lying about the details.
 
Its commonly accepted in these here JREF forums that the burden of proof lies with the person who makes an assertion in the first place.

And your quoted figures stem from May 1944 onwards are relevant why? From Dec 41 to June 43 the US committed a total of 90,000 troops to the Pacific campaign. In the same time period the US had three army groups either deployed or deploying through North Africa, trroop build ups for D day had started and the for runner of the US 8th Army airforce had been deployed in Britain
 
If I miss anything important, point me at it, please.

(And sorry for the late appearance, Washington gifted me with fifty cases of books on WWII, and I'm happier than a hog in fresh slop right now.)

Well I suspect we have this covered so if you would prefer to do something of greater importance, such as sorting your socks draw, I am sure no one here would think less of you :)
 
So you think that I posit foul play in the Pearl Harbor case only or at least partly because I don't like FDR? It's actually much the reverse: The more I learn about FDR's handling of WW II, the more negatively I feel about him and his presidency.


Wait, what? :confused: You don't posit foul play because you dislike FDR; you posit foul play because you increasingly dislike FDR? :confused: That's a bizarre definition of "reverse".

Here, let me help you: If you intend to counter accusations that a personal dislike of FDR is your reason for preferring the conspiracy theory, and you claim "it's the reverse", your next sequence of words necessarily must be some variation of "I posit foul play because I like FDR" (or possibly "I'm not suggesting foul play").
 
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True. The horizontal bombers were fitted with modified naval shells, 16", and it was determined that they had to drop the bombs from above 10,000 to allow them sufficient time to build up speed to use kinetic energy to penetrate BB armor. The dive bombers, using smaller bombs, dropped from lower altitude, so their bombs had no chance of penetrating deck armor.
Bombs wouldn't have to penetrate the armour to do enough damage to a Battleship to put it out of action for many months, enough hits would wreck directors, secondary armamant, main turret tracks, deck fittings, superstructure and upperworks etc. Bomb damage could be seen as insurance.
 
One comment to the CTers in this thread. I'm not giving you hell to protect FDR or anybody else. I'm just sick of people who are appallingly ignorant, completely disingenuous, or badly deluded, you pick it, making a hash out of history through poor scholarship, blatant axe-grinding or a deeply held belief that reptiles are living in the skins of the British royal family. Do not feel insulted, because there's nothing personal about this, I don't care what you believe, but I do hope you are not surprised to find out that some people do care about getting the facts straight and doing history without lying about the details.

Oh snap!
 
Bombs wouldn't have to penetrate the armour to do enough damage to a Battleship to put it out of action for many months, enough hits would wreck directors, secondary armamant, main turret tracks, deck fittings, superstructure and upperworks etc. Bomb damage could be seen as insurance.

True, but those areas were also armored in most cases, and the fragments from a bomb would penetrate them, or if they did, would do less damage. The ship would need some fix-up time, but it could still steam and fight if it had to. There were more productive targets for the dive bombers, like the cruisers and destroyers.
 
True, but those areas were also armored in most cases, and the fragments from a bomb would penetrate them, or if they did, would do less damage. The ship would need some fix-up time, but it could still steam and fight if it had to. There were more productive targets for the dive bombers, like the cruisers and destroyers.

true, a Destroyer can be bombed to the bottom in no time. Same for a Cruiser.

Although there are examples in the Med of bombs going right through destroyer hulls in one side and out the other or even through the decks and out the bottom.
 
true, a Destroyer can be bombed to the bottom in no time. Same for a Cruiser.

Although there are examples in the Med of bombs going right through destroyer hulls in one side and out the other or even through the decks and out the bottom.

True. We started using super-fast fuzed bombs on "soft targets" in the Pacific around 1943 IIRC. In one case a bomb hit the bridge and apparently drove it into the deck below, effectively rendering command-and-control hors de combat. (This was obviously not used on skip bombing attacks. :rolleyes:)
 

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