Merged Pearl Harbor: "Revisionists" vs. "Traditionalists"

My understanding, such as it is, was that the code breakers could read about 10% of a message by about December 1941 (the current edition of JN-25 had come into service about December 1940). With the increase in traffic and the increasing availability of personnel (especially with an increasing degree of experience in code breaking, you don't just sit some new guy down, after some training, and *poof* he can work as well as the experienced ones, i.e. they (at Pearl Harbor CIU) started with 3 real cryptanalysts in December 1941 and by May 1942 had 6 more fairly competent and 50 who were getting the feel for the work...).

By May 1942 they had recovered about 1/3 of the JN-25B lexicon and could read perhaps 90% of a typical message. On June 1, a new edition came into force (its deployment had been delayed some months) and the cryptanalysts had to essentially start anew but by that time the Midway orders had been transmitted and decrypted (to give an idea of how close the timing of the change was).
Your source for this, please?
 
Assume for the sake of argument there was an attempted assault on PH by the Japanese that, due to advance knowledge, was defended against.
By what reasoning could anyone conclude that the U.S. wouldn't be in the war after that? Japan had decided that the U.S. was in the war.

It really doesn't matter what the American public wants at that point.

Can you give some modestly plausible response by the American public to a Japanese declaration of war that would somehow result in the U.S. and Japan not being at war?

For that matter, why waste time waiting for a Japanese attack all?
It's the Germans you want to be at war with, so why not try to set them up instead? That the attack led to war with Germany was hardly a foregone conclusion, so why take the chance Hitler might abandon his allies and not declare war on the US?
 
For that matter, why waste time waiting for a Japanese attack all?
It's the Germans you want to be at war with, so why not try to set them up instead? That the attack led to war with Germany was hardly a foregone conclusion, so why take the chance Hitler might abandon his allies and not declare war on the US?

The Back-Door-To-War theory falters badly when we remember that we didn't declare war on Germany until after the Germans had declared war on us.
 
Your source for this, please?

The Codebreakers (abridged) by David Kahn, 1973, 10th Printing, paperback

Chapter The Scrutable Orientals
page 301 for when JN-25B went into service
page 307 for how much of the lexicon had been recovered by early May 1942.

He opens the book by relating how Magic worked up to and including Pearl Harbor. Later in the chapter I mention above, he goes into some detail about the cryptanalysis against the Japanese once the war broke out.

This book constitutes pretty much the sum of my knowledge of Magic, etc.

I do recall seeing a comment in a youtube about codebreakers (I forget the exact title) where a commentator said that someone had gotten (perhaps a FOIA) the code list for JN-25 and it was ONLY about 16,000 groups. Disbelief was expressed since the code was supposed to be 50,000 groups.

In case anyone wonders, the code list of 16,000 groups looks like about 30% of 50,000 groups which would be consistent with what was indicated as recovered. I would doubt that there was any particular interest in continuing to recover groups for a retired edition or any real effort to obtain the code book itself after the war was over.
 
The Codebreakers (abridged) by David Kahn, 1973, 10th Printing, paperback

Chapter The Scrutable Orientals
page 301 for when JN-25B went into service
page 307 for how much of the lexicon had been recovered by early May 1942.

He opens the book by relating how Magic worked up to and including Pearl Harbor. Later in the chapter I mention above, he goes into some detail about the cryptanalysis against the Japanese once the war broke out.

This book constitutes pretty much the sum of my knowledge of Magic, etc.

I do recall seeing a comment in a youtube about codebreakers (I forget the exact title) where a commentator said that someone had gotten (perhaps a FOIA) the code list for JN-25 and it was ONLY about 16,000 groups. Disbelief was expressed since the code was supposed to be 50,000 groups.

In case anyone wonders, the code list of 16,000 groups looks like about 30% of 50,000 groups which would be consistent with what was indicated as recovered. I would doubt that there was any particular interest in continuing to recover groups for a retired edition or any real effort to obtain the code book itself after the war was over.

Thanks. I'll have to look that over.

As for the code groups, there are groups dedicated to that kind of thing, for funnsies and professionally. Rather difficult to get an invite to their forums.
 
catsmate1 are you implying the Japanese conspired to attack the US?
Can a country be said to conspire in this way? Well it's really a matter of semantics.
The following appears in a 2008 article by Douglas Deitrich
<snip>
I can find no unbiased or reputable source for that quote.

How many times are you going to use that circular argument?
Before you use terms like "circular argument" I suggest you understand what they mean.

The Back-Door-To-War theory falters badly when we remember that we didn't declare war on Germany until after the Germans had declared war on us.
A minor detail. :rolleyes:
 
Just a bit of humor. And yes, there was a conspiracy in Japan to attack Peal Harbor without warning.
The biggest problem with this conspiracy theory is that there is far, far too much evidence supporting it. Pssst, I predict the next thing you'll try to tell us is that the Kido Butai did not transmit. ;)
 
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The biggest problem with this conspiracy theory is that there is far, far too much evidence supporting it. Pssst, I predict the next thing you'll try to tell us is that the Kido Butai did not transmit. ;)

It's not a conspiracy theory, it was an actual conspiracy. Perfect example of the difference between the two.

Oh, and have I mentioned lately that Kido Butai did not transmit?
 
I've read all the posts in this thread but have not seen anyone claim whether the Kido Butai did or did not transmit. :duck:

But seriously...

It was proved earlier in this thread that with a single receiver and a single transmitter, both moving relatively slowly, you could possibly get direction but definitely not a distance. BTF has not brought this crap up lately even though he never admitted that he was wrong.

Can we assume that since he hasn't mentioned this after his last few fringe resets that he finally got the point?
 
It's not a conspiracy theory, it was an actual conspiracy. Perfect example of the difference between the two.

Oh, and have I mentioned lately that Kido Butai did not transmit?

I've adopted the form of using that phrase to end all of my posts in this thread in the style of Cato the Elder; after the Second Punic War, he would close every single speech, no matter the topic, with "And for the rest, I hold that Carthage must be destroyed."
 
Just a bit of humor. And yes, there was a conspiracy in Japan to attack Peal Harbor without warning.

Really? Japan conspired with itself?

Or, do you mean that some factions within Japan conspired with other factions within Japan, while keeping still other factions out of the loop?

I think I read somewhere that certain senior IJN officers were not happy with the surprise attack the USA, Adm. Yamamoto being one of them. AIUI even though the attack was his idea, he thought the whole thing was bungled. True?
 
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Really? Japan conspired with itself?
I mean the Japanese military and government conspired to attack the US without prior declaration of war.

Or, do you mean that some factions within Japan conspired with other factions within Japan, while keeping still other factions out of the loop?
The attack on Pearl Harbor was a closely guarded secret. It was a "need to know" operation.
I think I read somewhere that certain senior IJN officers were not happy with the surprise attack the USA, Adm. Yamamoto being one of them. AIUI even though the attack was his idea, he thought the who thing was bungled. True?
He wasn't interested interested in giving the US a fair warning, the attack had to be a surprise if the bulk of the attacking force was to survive, as shown by the wargames played out a few months earlier. He didn't want the Gaimudaijin to send the "Final Communication to the United States" (known popularly as The Fourteen Part Message (because of the number of telegrams needed to transmit it) and finally allowed it on the grounds that it be delivered no more than 45 minutes before the attack was to begin.
 
Might as well throw this out again:

The 14-part message was not a declaration of war. It did not break off negotiations with the US. It was not an ultimatum.

The declaration of war is here: http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/269.html

The 14-part message is here: http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/411206d.html

The timing of the delivery of the 14-part message, 1/2 hour before the attack on Pearl Harbor, ensured that it would have no effect on the attack. For a warning to occur based on that message the following events would have had to happen:

Japan delivers note on time.
Hull reads note.
Hull responds to Nomura and Kurusu.
They reply, etc.
Hull talks to FDR, explains note.
FDR correctly interprets this as a war warning.
FDR advises SecWar and SecNav to alert all forces.
SecWar and SecNav compose warning message.
Warning messages are handled through military channels, if available, to all commands.
Local commanders assimilate warning message and act properly.

On the other hand, if the US had acceded to every demand in the 14-part message:

Japan delivers note on time.
Hull reads note.
Hull responds to Nomura and Kurusu.
They reply, etc.
Hull talks to FDR, explains note.
FDR agrees to completely change US policy without consulting Congress.
FDR communicates this to Hull.
Hull explains things to Nomura and Kurusu.
They discuss any fuzzy details.
Nomura and Kurusu return to their embassy to contact Tokyo.
(Originally they were ordered to destroy all codes, but got permission to retain one low level code.)
Somehow they get the information to Tokyo.
Gaimudaijin receives message.
Foreign Minster interprets message correctly.
Foreign Minster goes to Prime Minister and explains message.
Prime Minister contacts SecWar and SecNav, who contact their forces to halt attack.

In both the above cases you can see that more than 1/2 hour was needed. So the timing issue is just a farce.
 
I mean the Japanese military and government conspired to attack the US without prior declaration of war.
It was always my understanding the the Japanese messed that up, and intended to declare war before the outbreak of hostilities. Not that I am proposing anything. I am no historian. The sequence of events does not address that, but am unsure if that really means anything?
 
It was always my understanding the the Japanese messed that up, and intended to declare war before the outbreak of hostilities. Not that I am proposing anything. I am no historian. The sequence of events does not address that, but am unsure if that really means anything?

There was no declaration of war written before the attack, so it could not have been delivered before the attack. Yamamoto insisted that the attacks be launched in such a manner as to preclude warning to the targets.
 
Some interesting passages in the 14 part message

"Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation."

For those who are unfamiliar with the term "French Indo-China", read Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia. Was this the beginnings of what eventually resulted in the Vietnam War?

"The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area." It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government."

To me, that sounds like a prediction/resignation from the Japanese that America was about to enter WW2 anyway.

"The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations"

Now I know hindsight is always 20/20, but this really does read like a threat to me.

The whole tenor of the 14 part message is that Japan see themselves as "the good guys", willing to compromise, back-down and modify their stance, while they see America and Great Britain as "the bad guys" remaining staunch and unbending.
 

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