Might you someday address the issue of why a Japanese fleet on a top secret, risky mission would be transmitting so many radio messages?
I have discussed this twice already. And I take it you still have not bothered to read Villa and Wilford's reply to Jacobsen's attack on Grogan.
The Japanese fleet broke radio silence because they thought it was safe to do so since they were using low-power LF. They didn't think those signals could be heard beyond a short range and that therefore there was no one close enough to hear them. As Farago noted, the German Navy made the same mistake in WW I.
From around 31 November to 3 December, the task force encountered horrific weather that included dense fog, fierce winds, and enormous waves. Communication via lamps/lights would have ranged from ineffective to worthless in those conditions. So they resorted to low-power LF transmissions to coordinate, thinking it was safe to do so.
For more on the myth of radio silence, see Villa and Wilford's reply to Jacobsen:
“Signals intelligence and Pearl Harbor: The State of the Question,” Intelligence and National Security, 21:4, 2006, pp. 520-556,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520600885665).
Might you someday address the fact that the U.S. did not need the attack on Pearl Harbor to be successful in order to be at war with Japan since the mere attempt of an attack would have been more than sufficient justification?
That is an absurd argument from a logical standpoint alone, and we have credible anecdotal evidence that FDR believed that only a substantial attack would generate enough outrage to get a majority of the public to support entering the war.
Every attack-attempt-only scenario that you can posit would involve huge risks of exposure of FDR's foreknowledge, which in turn would have raised all sorts of questions and objections.
Furthermore, previous incidents where small numbers of American lives were lost in German attacks had proven insufficient to cause the public to call for the enormous step of entering the war in Europe (and keep in mind that that was FDR's main goal). Many Americans were aware or suspected that FDR was pursuing a confrontational policy in the Atlantic, so they were not about to support a call for war over such incidents, even though they had no use for Hitler.
Might you someday address the fact that the attack on Pearl Harbor wasn't needed at all to get war between the U.S. and Japan, the Japanese assault upon the Philippines would have been more than sufficient?
This is getting into silly territory. I've already talked about the evidence that FDR likewise used our forces in the Philippines as bait, that he brazenly misled MacArthur about his intention to reinforce the Philippines, etc., etc.
But FDR needed a surprise attack, not a regular battle. Given the location of the Philippines and the disposition of the various forces in the region, a surprise attack would have been impossible to claim. Not even the most gullible people alive would believe that FDR and other high officials "had no idea" that the Japanese were going to attack the Philippines.
FDR egregiously miscalculated. He thought that an attack on Pearl would be bad, but not nearly as bad as it ended up being. Similarly, he didn't think that MacArthur's forces would suffer the catastrophic defeat that they ended up suffering. That was why FDR and his accomplices engaged in such a vicious, determined cover-up.
What must be faced is the credible evidence that FDR and other high officials knew the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor: the Dies disclosure, the Don C. Smith disclosure (via his daughter, Helen Hamman), the Stahlman disclosure, the Burns disclosure, the Ranneft diary, the mutually corroborating disclosures of Ogg and Hosmer, the fierce attempt to suppress the Magic intercepts, the ludicrous lies about why Kimmel and Short were cut off from Magic in November and December, the bizarre decision to move the Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbor, the Vacant Sea order (issued shortly after the Kido Butai began its journey--my, what a coincidence), Marshall and Stark's surreal actions on December 7, the Gillette disclosure (via his nephew, Thomas Gillette), the Ketchum disclosure, the mutually corroborating disclosures of Cavendish-Bentick and Ridsdale, the Seymour disclosure, the mass of disclosures about the existence of the Winds execute message, etc., etc., etc.