1. Has there ever been a satisfactory reason given for why the Carriers left only days (?) before the attack?
Which Carriers (by which I assume you mean aircraft carriers) do you mean? The US had 7 at that point:
Enterprise and Lexington were escorting fighter squadrons to Wake Island and Midway.
Enterprise *was* supposed to have been back December 6 but storms prevented her arrival.
She was close enough, tho, that her own aircraft were shot at by friendly fire during the attack.
Hornet was off Norfolk VA undergoing a shakedown cruise, which was also where Yorktown and Ranger were -- nowhere near Pearl.
Saratoga was at least in the right ocean, but was in San Diego while Wasp was at anchor in the Atlantic.
So who was it that you have heard left "just days before"?
2. Was there any plausible reason given why the mobile radar (?) system that they got from the British (?) failed to detect the Japanese fleet?
Again -- who was it that told you it didn't?
On That Day, the Opana Radar Site detected approaching aircraft at 7:02 a.m. This was well after the end of the site's scheduled operating day.
Again, this was a matter of luck: they were detected because the transport to take PVTs Lockard and Elliot back to base for breakfast was late and they were goofing with the equipment (which, BTW, had been developed by the US).
The info went to Fort Shafter, were it was assumed that the contact was a flight of Army B-17's who were scheduled to arrive that morning and Opana was advised not to worry.
Still goofing, Elliot and Lockard continued plotting the incoming planes until 7:40 when contact was lost.
They went to get their breakfast, only to hear about the attack when they got there. They skipped breakfast and hauled *** back to Opana, where they monitored the attack until it ended.
3. Was it standard practice for the USAAF to park their aircraft in neat, straight rows (?) so that a potential enemy ground attack aircraft could easily damage/destroy them with single strafing runs.
Yes, it was and is -- because it also makes it much easier to get them in the air without crashing into each other.
4. Has there ever been a reason given why the Japanese strike force did not send the third wave of aircraft (?) to deliver the coup de grace, given that they had the base on its knees.
Actually, four generally accepted reasons, in no particular order:
1. The Japanese didn't really know how close Enterprise and Lexington were.
2. They realized that their carriers were now within range of land based bombers, and they had no idea how many could be brought to bear.
3. After the initial surprize, the US really was kicking ***: nearly two thirds of their losses came from the second strike. Had a third strike proceeded, this would have continued -- some estimates of the academic "what if" crowd run to 3/4.
4. And finally, the clock was running. Basically only the Brits were good at night carrier landings at that point, and a third wave would have required quite a bit on on the job training (and associated losses) that the Japanese simply weren't will to risk
I would personally add that having crippled the Pacific fleet was enough -- there was no strategic advantage in total destruction.
Also, about 40 years ago (as a teenager) I read a short account in a book about the WWII that suggested Japanese attack plan for Pearl Harbor was very similar to a "mock" attack planned and executed by the US Navy nine years earlier, right down to the number of squadrons and the types of weapons and aircraft used. Is this true or not?
I won't go down to the numbers and types, but yes a mock attack was staged in '33 and monitored by the Japanese. They followed that example pretty much exactly -- including the fact that ships were taken out, but not facilities. Had the latter happened, maybe another three? four? years of war -- but no change in the final outcome.
HTH.