Merged Pearl Harbor: "Revisionists" vs. "Traditionalists"

Ah, so Hokkaido was sneaking up on Oahu. I never thought if it that way.

There is one Japanese/Ainu legend that has Hokkaido perched on the back of a giant Hanasaki crab..........it use to move about to vex the fishermen trying to find port...
 
At what point would Takeo have thought something was unusual?

Given he had no idea when the attack would occur how would he even deem something to be unusual?

The signs that the US thought that an attack was impending would be mostly unmistakable though not necessarily immediately obvious.

Deploying additional AA guns and manning them, deploying barrage balloons, increased combat air patrols, keeping troops on base in a state of increased readiness (which would also include things like fortifying the base perimeter and gates), even increased readiness on the ships (keeping the crews mostly onboard and not often out on pass in peacetime would be unusual). If nothing else, it would generate comment among the population and Takeo might hear or see things that would tell him something was up with the US military.

It would inconceivable for any commander, expecting a military attack, to not take steps to strengthen his defenses and increase his readiness. The break in routine for a peacetime military would be probably rather obvious.
 
The USN would monitor the regular radio circuits of the IJN for intercepts. It is not unreasonable to think that for a special purpose -- like attacking the US fleet in Pearl Harbor -- that the scouting sub would be told to transmit on a lesser used frequency or one that typically the IJN doesn't use. So it is not all that unlikely that a solitary or small number of messages could escape detection.

The messages from a scouting sub makes a lot of military sense. If the US carriers were in the Islands but not at Pearl Harbor, knowing that they were there would be very useful if not important to the task force.

What does not make sense is why the task force would advertise its presence by sending many messages especially back to fleet HQ. It has its mission. It has its instructions. It made its plans. It is also very important the mission succeeds.

One of the ONLY reasons (I can think of) why they would transmit in any volume to HQ would be because Admiral Yamamoto, on this most vital and risky of missions, wanted to exercise tactical control. I doubt that he lacked faith in the ability of the task force commanders of this elite force.
 
The signs that the US thought that an attack was impending would be mostly unmistakable though not necessarily immediately obvious.

Deploying additional AA guns and manning them, deploying barrage balloons, increased combat air patrols, keeping troops on base in a state of increased readiness (which would also include things like fortifying the base perimeter and gates), even increased readiness on the ships (keeping the crews mostly onboard and not often out on pass in peacetime would be unusual). If nothing else, it would generate comment among the population and Takeo might hear or see things that would tell him something was up with the US military.

It would inconceivable for any commander, expecting a military attack, to not take steps to strengthen his defenses and increase his readiness. The break in routine for a peacetime military would be probably rather obvious.
Yoshikawa would have had to send this information through the telegraph system, which could have been experiencing "technical difficulties". I do smile at the idea that an alerted Hawaii would allow a consular official to send telegrams to Tokyo.
 
that the scouting sub would be told to transmit on a lesser used frequency or one that typically the IJN doesn't use. So it is not all that unlikely that a solitary or small number of messages could escape detection.

The messages from a scouting sub makes a lot of military sense.

I cannot find the source that mention this but I believe the sub sent a four letter code out using a freguency used by Japanese fishing boats/merchant ships
 
I cannot find the source that mention this but I believe the sub sent a four letter code out using a freguency used by Japanese fishing boats/merchant ships

**CT Mode**

And it is a strange coincident that the Americans were not monitoring that specific frequency

**Return to normal mode**
 
And Bob doesn't even know the location of the Anchorage. (He'll be off to Google that now, for the first time.) That would make the message irrelevant to his DF quibbles.

The Lahaina anchorage was used as an alternative anchorage to Pearl Harbor. Given this fact, and how close the Lahaina anchorage was to Pearl Harbor, it makes perfect sense that the task force would have wanted to know if any U.S. naval ships were there in any numbers.

This information was relayed from a submarine division HQ to I-72, which in turn relayed it to the task force. Since I-72 was operating in support of the task force, it's no surprise that it received this info and then relayed it to the task force.
 
Yoshikawa would have had to send this information through the telegraph system, which could have been experiencing "technical difficulties". I do smile at the idea that an alerted Hawaii would allow a consular official to send telegrams to Tokyo.

We know that the task force received at least two other reports via Tokyo that originated with the Hawaiian consulate. Also, the Japanese had set up a system for Japanese spies on Oahu to visually signal Japanese subs in the area.

Furthermore, as the Mori phone call proved, even if we had taken the extreme step of shutting down the consulate as part of the heightened alert status, Japanese spies may still have been able to contact Tokyo.

However, even in the hours immediately following the attack, we did not cut off all diplomatic communications. For example, officials at the New Orleans consulate were even able to burn papers hours after the attack.

FDR, not wanting to risk that Tokyo might somehow be alerted to any marked change in alert status, even if the consulate were shut down, played it safe.

The Vacant Sea order, issued at the same time the Kido Butai set sail (my, what a coincidence), is another indication that FDR was clearing the way for an attack on Pearl Harbor.

Yet another indication is the disclosure that, before the attack, FDR ordered a high-ranking Red Cross official to prepare for casualties in Hawaii.
 
We know that the task force received at least two other reports via Tokyo that originated with the Hawaiian consulate. Also, the Japanese had set up a system for Japanese spies on Oahu to visually signal Japanese subs in the area.

Which would have required prior knowledge of both parties to be in the correct spot at the correct time to signal.

Furthermore, as the Mori phone call proved, even if we had taken the extreme step of shutting down the consulate as part of the heightened alert status, Japanese spies may still have been able to contact Tokyo.

And? You're still looking at time lags - how quickly do you expect that a heightened alert status would be noticed, and how soon could it be reported?

However, even in the hours immediately following the attack, we did not cut off all diplomatic communications. For example, officials at the New Orleans consulate were even able to burn papers hours after the attack.

That's normal at such times - for example the British Embassy in Berlin was not ocucpied by the Nazis during WWII.

FDR, not wanting to risk that Tokyo might somehow be alerted to any marked change in alert status, even if the consulate were shut down, played it safe.

The Vacant Sea order, issued at the same time the Kido Butai set sail (my, what a coincidence), is another indication that FDR was clearing the way for an attack on Pearl Harbor.

Your premise (FDR LiHOP) is flawed, no one with an ounce of sense would allow a significant portion of their military capacity to be damaged in order to get a causus belli. Intercepting the fleet at the time of the attack would be sufficient, and would have much less impact on future military operations.

Yet another indication is the disclosure that, before the attack, FDR ordered a high-ranking Red Cross official to prepare for casualties in Hawaii.

Where in the FDR library or ICRC archives might we find this order? When was it given? Otherwise all you have is a statement.
 
All I know about the Pearl Harbour attack is the US miltary authorities were aware the Japanese were going to attack they were just not certain of where and exatctly when.
 
The Lahaina anchorage was used as an alternative anchorage to Pearl Harbor. Given this fact, and how close the Lahaina anchorage was to Pearl Harbor, it makes perfect sense that the task force would have wanted to know if any U.S. naval ships were there in any numbers.

This information was relayed from a submarine division HQ to I-72, which in turn relayed it to the task force. Since I-72 was operating in support of the task force, it's no surprise that it received this info and then relayed it to the task force.
That doesn't actually say where the anchorage is.
 
We know that the task force received at least two other reports via Tokyo that originated with the Hawaiian consulate. Also, the Japanese had set up a system for Japanese spies on Oahu to visually signal Japanese subs in the area.
Did you get this information from Japanese records? What did they say about whether they transmitted?

Furthermore, as the Mori phone call proved, even if we had taken the extreme step of shutting down the consulate as part of the heightened alert status, Japanese spies may still have been able to contact Tokyo.

However, even in the hours immediately following the attack, we did not cut off all diplomatic communications. For example, officials at the New Orleans consulate were even able to burn papers hours after the attack.

FDR, not wanting to risk that Tokyo might somehow be alerted to any marked change in alert status, even if the consulate were shut down, played it safe.
You assume.

The Vacant Sea order, issued at the same time the Kido Butai set sail (my, what a coincidence), is another indication that FDR was clearing the way for an attack on Pearl Harbor.
Oddly enough, I can't find any sources for this but conspiracy websites. Of course, clearing the sea is also consistent with being unaware the attack is coming.

Yet another indication is the disclosure that, before the attack, FDR ordered a high-ranking Red Cross official to prepare for casualties in Hawaii.
Again, facts primarily found on conspiracy websites and second-order personal stories. Nothing in the records. I like how FDR "ordered" a guy who he could not actually command to lay in supplies.

I love how you keep presenting facts that had to have come from Japanese records, but carefully phrase around admitting it.

http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1948/07/pearl-harbor-in-retrospect/305485/2/

There were many "magic" messages showing Japanese interest in conditions existing in Hawaii, largely requests for information of military value. Some concerned the location of anchorages of our warships in Pearl Harbor, by limited sections of that area, their arrival and departure, and so forth. These messages were primarily of naval interest, and the Navy apparently took them to mean two things: first, that Japanese spies there were looking down our throats—a deplorable condition which the Army and Navy had known for thirty years or more; and second, that the Japanese were planning an attack on our fleet, by air or submarines or both.

But since the fleet might eventually be a deterrent to them, it would have been strange indeed had they not made plans to attack it if they could. We ourselves had plans for contingencies far less obvious than that. It is difficult to believe that any senior Army or Navy officer in Hawaii would have found it news had he been told by Washington that the fleet was under close Japanese espionage and the subject of aggressive planning. Indeed, a naval officer would have replied that the fleet had no intention of meeting a major attack at their moorings in Pearl Harbor!
...
The last twenty-four hours in Washington before the bombs fell have come in for much scrutiny. Why did the President, with most of the Japanese final answer before him, conclude that it meant war and then, after a fitful attempt to reach Admiral Stark by telephone, quietly go to bed? Why was he in seclusion the following morning? Why was no action taken on the Japanese reply by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy when they met on that Sunday morning? Why did they not consult the President, or he send for them? Where was everybody, including my humble self? Why, in short, didn't someone stage a last-minute rescue, in good Western style?

The picture undoubtedly is one of men still working under the psychology of peace. They were, to quote Secretary Stimson again, "under a terrific pressure in the face of a global war which they felt was probably imminent. Yet they were surrounded, outside of their offices and almost throughout the country, by a spirit of isolationism and disbelief in danger which now seems incredible." They were men who thought they had done their possible to prepare for impending war, and who had no idea that there was an innocent maiden in need of rescue.​
 
We know that the task force received at least two other reports via Tokyo that originated with the Hawaiian consulate. Also, the Japanese had set up a system for Japanese spies on Oahu to visually signal Japanese subs in the area.
Yeah, and that's in the real world. Try to keep up.
Furthermore, as the Mori phone call proved, even if we had taken the extreme step of shutting down the consulate as part of the heightened alert status, Japanese spies may still have been able to contact Tokyo.
And report the status of the hyacinths. That's important intell.
However, even in the hours immediately following the attack, we did not cut off all diplomatic communications. For example, officials at the New Orleans consulate were even able to burn papers hours after the attack.
Wow, I guess everything you say is true then. And Andrew Jackson was a Kaitempei spy too!
FDR, not wanting to risk that Tokyo might somehow be alerted to any marked change in alert status, even if the consulate were shut down, played it safe.
He wouldn't want the Japanese to know we knew they were coming. But there's no reason not to alert our forces. Only an idiot would believe in LIHOP.
The Vacant Sea order, issued at the same time the Kido Butai set sail (my, what a coincidence), is another indication that FDR was clearing the way for an attack on Pearl Harbor.
Have you even read it? Got a copy? Care to show how it helped the Japanese? They were traveling the hard way to Hawaii, something nobody else did.
Yet another indication is the disclosure that, before the attack, FDR ordered a high-ranking Red Cross official to prepare for casualties in Hawaii.
Crap, the Hawaiian Red Cross reports makes fools out of anybody who tries that one. They started preparing for war before Kimmel and Short did, in some particulars in January of 1941. Even the INHQ didn't know about the attack then, but anyone can read the papers.

Please, try harder, this isn't much of a challenge.
 

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