Merged Pearl Harbor: "Revisionists" vs. "Traditionalists"

To avoid posting an overly massive message, I’m going to split this material on the Lurline bearings and the radio-silence myth into two or three parts. I will start with an extensive review of historian Ladislas Farago’s treatment of Grogan and the Lurline bearings.

But before I do so, I think it is worhth noting that for years the traditionalist explanation for the Lurline bearings was that Grogan was listening to Russian ships and that, in spite of his radio knowledge and decades of experience in listening to ships in the Pacific, he mistook them for Japanese ships. That theory, though advanced by “experts” (including one from NSA), was never really plausible and now stands refuted and discarded.

So now we’re told, by Jacobsen, that Grogan did indeed hear Japanese ships but that they were Japanese commercial vessels that were “bunched up” (his words)—not in the North Pacific, but in Japan’s home waters! One problem with this theory is that it requires one to believe that most of Grogan’s DF bearings were off by a staggering degree and that some of his anomalous bearings were much more accurate. Yet, Villa and Wilford point out that the bulk of Grogan’s bearings are consistent with the 3rd Battleship Division’s position reports that the task force “moved about ten degrees east along the forty-second parallel (179°W to 169°W) from 30 November to 2 December” (“Warning at Pearl Harbor: Leslie Grogan and the Tracking of the Kido Butai,” The Northern Mariner, 21:2, April 2001, p. 6).

So far I have only read two extracts from Jacobsen’s article. I will be getting the entire article this weekend. Villa and Wilford respond in detail to Jacobsen’s article in their 2006 paper “Signals intelligence and Pearl Harbor: The State of the Question,” Intelligence and National Security, 21:4, 2006, pp. 520-556, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520600885665). They seem to make some very strong points, but I want to read Jacobsen’s entire article before commenting further on their response.

One thing I will be curious to see is how Jacobsen explains the repeat-backs that Grogan heard for two nights in a row, and the fact that the rebroadcasts were acknowledged almost verbatim. I can think of two arguments: (1) Grogan was simply mistaken about the repeat-backs and so they don’t need to be explained because they never occurred, or (2) the repeat-backs came from the Japanese commercial vessels. The first argument is implausible, given Grogan’s extensive radio knowledge and decades of experience. The second argument seems equally implausible, unless one could come up with a credible reason that commercial vessels in Japanese home waters would have needed to use repeat-backs.

Before I get to Farago’s analysis, let me say a quick word about the myth of radio silence. We have a number of examples of radio transmissions from the task force. One of them comes from a famous collection of Pearl Harbor papers edited by Goldstein and Dillon, The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans (New York: Prange Enterprises, 1993). Therein we learn that on 12/6 (12/7 Tokyo time) the skipper of submarine I-72, one of the subs working in support of the task force, radioed a message to the “Advance Force and Task Force” that “the enemy is not in the Lahaina anchorage” (p. 243). In an article titled “Hawaii Operation,” Vice Admiral Shigeru Fukudome discussed the fact that I-72 was part of the task force’s submarine forces (in Paul Stillwell, editor, Air Raid, Pearl Harbor!: Recollections of Day of Infamy, Annapolis, Maryland: U.S. Naval Institute, 1981, pp. 66-67).

One more point about the radio-silence myth: As I mentioned earlier, A. J. Barker studied the evidence relating to the SS Lurline DF and signal info and concluded that Grogan must have heard and DF’d the Japanese task force. He realized that this contradicted the radio-silence story and he provided a very sensible explanation for why the task force would have used low-power LF signals, just as Grogan reported:

“To ensure wireless silence [among the ships of the task force], radio transmitters were sealed and most intership messages were passed by means of flags and signal lamps. Nevertheless, some wireless communication had to take place, for it would have been sheer folly to expect the voyage for this armada of ships to be coordinated without it. Shortwave signals from Japan could be picked up by the larger ships, but for the small craft—more especially the low-lying submarines—this was impossible, because of their low aerials and the curvature of the earth. To solve this problem, Nagumo’s radio technicians had to resort to a subterfuge. High frequency (shortwave) signals, picked up by one of the carriers, were retransmitted simultaneously on a low frequency. These short range signals the smaller ships could intercept. . . .” (Pearl Harbor, New York: Ballantine Books, 1969, p. 81)

And now to Farago’s discussion:

Historian Ladislas Farago thoroughly investigated Grogan’s background and was impressed with his expertise and experience. He was also impressed with the radio expertise of the man who contacted him about Grogan: Grogan’s friend H. W. Dickow. Farago also investigated the SS Lurline’s radio equipment. In the course of his research, Farago discovered more information that tended to substantiate that Grogan tracked the Japanese task force, such as the fact that the Pacific—not just the North Pacific, but the whole Pacific—was virtually devoid of commercial Japanese ships because they had been recalled to Japanese home waters. I quote again from Farago’s treatment of the Grogan intercepts and DFs. I start where he’s explaining what he did after receiving a letter from Dickow:

“My own first step was to check out Mr. Dickow. His credentials left no doubt in my mind that he was a responsible citizen, a distinguished member of his profession, well qualified to examine the information and vouch for his informant [Grogan]. He served in the U.S. Navy during World War I, and was in charge of radio KHK at Wahiawa, Oahu. Founder and one-time publisher of the national magazine Radio and co-editor of the authoritative reference work Radio Handbook. He was senior radio engineer with the U.S. Army Signal Corps during World War II, in charge of the design and construction of MS-2, the Army’s big monitoring station on the West Coast. He himself offered as “references” Colonel Robert E. Schukraft, a former member of the “Magic” staff, and Commander Jennings B. Dow, USN (Ret.), who could attest to his credibility and vouch for his responsibility.

“I then flew to San Francisco for a meeting with Mr. Dickow. Then he introduced me to Mr. Leslie E. Grogan, his informant, whose own credentials included a reserve commission in the U.S. Navy with years of service in naval communications. As second radio officer aboard the Lurline in December 1941, it was Mr. Grogan who first spotted the oncoming fleet of Admiral Nagumo and then succeeded in tracking it for several days. He participated in the drafting of the report and was present during its presentation to Naval Intelligence on December 3, 1941. . . .

“The documentation he proceeded to produce appeared to be adequate to substantiate his claim. It included his diary, preserved intact over the years, containing, not only the running account of the “interception,” but also entries copied verbatim from the Lurline’s sequestered logbook. In addition, he had a carbon copy of the report presented to Naval Intelligence on December 3, 1941, as drafted by John S. Chapin, chief radio officer of the Lurline, signed by Grogan and every member of the ship’s radio staff, and endorsed by Captain Charles Redmond, master of the vessel. . . .

“Not only was the Pacific incongruously quiet, but it was also more or less deserted. The British blockade had banished all German shipping from the seven seas; and the Kriegsmarine could not or would not spare any of its U-boats or surface raiders for this vast oceanic space with its myriads of volcanic and coral islands. Absent, too, were the ships of the Japanese. When the crisis deepened and prospects of an “understanding” with the United States waned, they ordered their ships to return to their home ports. Between June and November 1941, for example, only two of their famous Pacific liners were allowed to cross the ocean comma, and then only to evacuate Japanese nationals from the United States and Hawaii.

“She [the SS Lurline] was a famous and popular ship, one of the best of the luxury liners serving the Pacific, and, of course, carried the most modern equipment in all her departments. Its contingent of radio officers was first rate. They had excellent facilities to ensure perfect communications at sea and the safety of the vessel. Her batteries of radios enabled the staff not merely to handle the incoming and outgoing messages with dispatch, but also to monitor the radio traffic of the ocean.

“The equipment included the RDF (radio direction finder), a special electronic device with a directional (loop) antenna, radio compass, homing adapter, and other directional-sensitive instruments. With the help of the RDF, the radiomen of the Lurline could establish the position or bearing of ships by determining the direction from which their transmitted signals originated. . . .

“Grogan could easily locate—and even identify (from their callsigns and the familiar sounds of their radios)—every ship known to be at large in the Pacific. There seemed to be nothing missing in the strict order of the sea. But then, all of a sudden, shortly after five a.m., his loop antenna picked up the faintest of signals.

“Grogan did not know it then but he had stumbled upon Admiral Nagumo’s force on its way to war.

“Intrigued by the strange signals obviously coming from a lower power transmitter, their mystery deepened by the totally unexpected circumstances of the pick-up, he strained to follow them down. He succeeded, in fact, in sustaining reception, intermittently, for days.

“Grogan assumed intuitively that he was picking up transmissions of an “unfriendly” sender that had reason to make itself as inaudible as possible. And alert as he was to exigencies of the crisis, he refused to rule out the possibility that the transmission could be emanating from a wayward Japanese force.

“How was it possible, then, that Grogan’s RDF could pick up radio transmissions from a force that was supposedly maintaining ‘strict’ radio silence? Here is Grogan’s own fascinating answer to this question. . . .


​
“’It was necessary for the Japanese to find a means of secret wireless communication between the ships of Nagumo's Striking Force, and his advance units. It would be sheer folly to expect that a huge armada of ships, widely scattered at times, would be sent to sea, and remain there for ten or eleven days, without some form of intercommunication. It was necessary to transmit orders and instructions, either to individual ships or to the Combined Fleet. Acknowledgement of such orders was mandatory to insure their proper execution. While the larger ships of the Striking Force were able to receive signals regularly from their homeland on the high frequencies, it was impossible for the low-lying submarines to do so . . . Submarines could often not intercept the high-frequency signals from Tokyo or other shore stations in Japan . . . other small craft found themselves in the same predicament. . . .’


​
“’The Japanese were able to solve this problem by resort to "hoax." It was only necessary for one ship to pick up the high-frequency signals from the homeland and then retransmit this same signal, simultaneously, on a low frequency which the smaller craft could intercept.


​
[An intercepted high-frequency signal from Japan would be used to] ‘"key" a transmitter whose frequency could be selected at will—in this case 375 kilocycles, as was chosen by the Japanese for secrecy on the run to Hawaii. A 375 kilocycle signal would fall in the band reserved for direction finding, a master of strategy by the Japanese, because no intercept or monitoring station would look for a Japanese signal in this band. Moreover, the power of the 375-kilocycle transmitter was low enough to severely limit its range. Assuming that a particular intercept or monitor station had, by sheer coincidence, tuned across the spectrum and discovered a Japanese signal on 375 kilocycles, the receiving operator would not have known what to do about it. . . . And unless the operator had returned to this same portion of the spectrum on successive nights to confirm any suspicions he might have had, as was done by the Lurline’s Radio Officer, there would have been no effort made to evaluate the incident. It was only because the 375-kilocycle signals, transmitted from one or more Japanese ships of the Striking Force, were heard on successive nights that the Lurline’s Radio Officer was able to confirm his original belief to the extent that he had discovered a group of moving objects.’” (The Broken Seal, Bantam Book Edition with Postscript, New York: Bantam Book, 1968, pp. 381-386)

Farago pointed out that there was precedence for Grogan’s deduction that the Japanese were using the ruse of simultaneously retransmitting HF-received messages on a low-power low frequency. Said Farago:

“During World War I, the Germans had made widespread use of this electronic ruse with transmissions from so-called “buzzers” aboard their warships. Intended for short-range communications, these were low-power transmissions between ships sailing together. . . . [Quoting John Carroll] ‘The Germans were so sure that they could not be intercepted that they used unencrypted language when communicating. . . .’” (The Broken Seal, pp. 386-387)
 
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^ Looks like we are starting over at the beginning folks.

Ignore the counter evidence, reassert previous claims, repeat.
 
One problem with this theory is that it requires one to believe that most of Grogan’s DF bearings were off by a staggering degree and that some of his anomalous bearings were much more accurate.


They are only off by a staggering degree if you plot them on the wrong chart projection. Here is one rough bearing plotted on the proper chart projection.

zAEqD.png



I can think of two arguments: (1) Grogan was simply mistaken about the repeat-backs and so they don’t need to be explained because they never occurred, or (2) the repeat-backs came from the Japanese commercial vessels.


(3) The Japanese radiomen left behind to deceive US SIGINT did their job and repeated back all the messages addressed to their ships.


Shortwave signals from Japan could be picked up by the larger ships, but for the small craft—more especially the low-lying submarines—this was impossible, because of their low aerials and the curvature of the earth.


Curvature of the Earth??? Ridiculous. Subs were perfectly capable of receiving LF and VLF. Those wires you see running atop subs? They are low frequency antennas.
 
To avoid posting an overly massive message, I’m going to split this material on the Lurline bearings and the radio-silence myth into two or three parts. I will start with an extensive review of historian Ladislas Farago’s treatment of Grogan and the Lurline bearings.

SNIP WALL OF TEXT......>>>>>

Okay, either you or the quoted parties appear to want to rewrite the behaviour of radio:

One of the quoted parties doesn't appear to understand DF - they conflate the ability to detect radio on a bearing, and the abiilty to find the position of the transmitter. For the nth time, DF gives a bearing, not a position, unless triangulated by multiple detector positions (and even then within the limitations of the basic DF technology).

HF was the primary means of long-range communication because it bounces off the ionosphere - it doesn't require line-of-site for reception.

Submarines can receive LF and VLF because it can be received whilst submerged (not too deep though) - not because they can't receive HF.
 
^ Looks like we are starting over at the beginning folks.

Ignore the counter evidence, reassert previous claims, repeat.

Classic example of fringe reset

----------------------

Ships at sea communicated by flag and Aldis lamps.......again where are the Japanese sources?

Have you taken the time to view the fleet communication log with navy HQ, if no why not?
 
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FYI, the same bearing from the same position plotted on a Mercator chart:

XJe9u.png


I suspect this is what caused the declaration of the "staggering error".
 
But the purple one is a possibility, right? ;)

I'll go with the green one that is furthest away.

Well, let's see. For the sake of fairness, let's quote Skwinty's post.

the limitation in animal tracking is the size of the equipment in relation to the power output.

All you need is a receivable signal, ascertain the direction the peak in signal strength occurs.

Draw a long line on your chart with the relative bearing.

Repeat a fair distance and time away from your first point and draw the corresponding long line on the chart.

Where they intersect indicates the "probable position" of the source over the amount of time spent locating.

It's not rocket science.

Note how his more recent claims have gotten a lot more complex, adding some technobabble about "compensating for speed and direction" as a handwave, since he realizes that he was inaccurate. Of course, compensating for anything requires knowledge of what you're compensating for, which is kind of paradoxical in this case,

Here's the base image.
picture.php


Here's yours. Green courses are northward, black are southward, purple is eastward, in case anyone missed that earlier.
thum_5559550770788a4af3.jpg


And here, since Bobby hasn't even acknowledged my post, just like I predicted, is the answer.
picture.php


So if you were referring to the longest green path going north, yep. Still an noticeable difference, especially depending on scale.

Thing is, every single path you drew is perfectly plausible. Which demonstrates exactly why it's effectively useless to take two bearings from a moving receiver on a transmitter over any significant period of time and try to determine the location and/or course of the source. It's only really useful if you get at least two bearings at the roughly the same time. Which means that for course, you need two locations, which means at least four bearings, one each at each location from each receiver.

The confusion here lies in, quite simply, conflating a stationary source and a moving one. You can't use a single moving receiver with only bearingsto try and triangulate anything over thousands of square miles. You can't even tell, accurately, if the transmitter is moving or not. No amount of blather or personal attacks or textwalling or "fringe resets" will change that.
 
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Classic example of fringe reset

----------------------

Ships at sea communicated by flag and Aldis lamps.......again where are the Japanese sources?

Have you taken the time to view the fleet communication log with navy HQ, if no why not?

What is the definition of an FR anyway? Is it when someone's getting spanked and tries to reset the debate back to a more favorable position (for them) it was in earlier, while ignoring everything presented since? If so, why is it called "fringe"?

PS: It's also interesting that Bobby's wall o text ignores the Japanese sources; y'know, the primary ones. If one piece of evidence is contradicted by a more objective one, then the less objective one is probably wrong. Clearly wrong, in this case. He claims to "address" the matter, and then tap dances around the strongest evidence.
 
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fringe vs alternative, fringe are ideas based on partial data and made up stuff alternatives addresses all information but arrives at a different conclusion

He's avoiding Nipponese sources because,......because, 1 he doesn't know they exist, 2 they don't say what he wants to believe.........
 
What's funny is I understood the problems with trying to claim course detection with only directional data and I'm not a radio guy. I'm a math/computer science guy.

Trying to use one mobile transmitter and one mobile receiver to get position is like trying to plot an unknown polynomial function given only slope values for a few values of x and no y values at all.

Why bother wasting the time and resources to invent RADAR at all if you only need the 'RAdio Detection' and not the 'And Ranging' part? :confused:

ETA: Also, I'm not an idiot. ;)
 
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“How was it possible, then, that Grogan’s RDF could pick up radio transmissions from a force that was supposedly maintaining ‘strict’ radio silence? Here is Grogan’s own fascinating answer to this question. ...[snipped for brevity]


I see lots of claims being made about what the Japanese were doing. What I don't see is any corroborating evidence for those claims. In the quote you cites it supplies precisely zero in the way of corroboration. Just arguments from incredulity which boil down to: "Well, ships in a task force must use radio communication or else they get lost/don't know what to do/insert other reason here!"

So again we are still left with my question from before, and still unanswered: What do Japanese sources say about radio communication from the task force? If Japanese records indicate the fleet made no transmissions, then either Grogan is wrong about the source, or the Japanese falsified their records. If the latter is the claim, then one must provide compelling reasons why the Japanese would falsify their records to indicate the task force did not transmit radio messages when in fact it did.
 
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Bob, it simply doesn't add up. The IJN were not idiots. They knew US sigint was listening. The US sigint guys were not idiots either, and the IJN knew this, hence the IJN used radio silence combined with deception broadcasts. Nice and simple, and it worked. End of story.
 
What's funny is I understood the problems with trying to claim course detection with only directional data and I'm not a radio guy. I'm a math/computer science guy.
Art major. Now all know my shameful secret.

Trying to use one mobile transmitter and one mobile receiver to get position is like trying to plot an unknown polynomial function given only slope values for a few values of x and no y values at all.

Why bother wasting the time and resources to invent RADAR at all if you only need the 'RAdio Detection' and not the 'And Ranging' part? :confused:

ETA: Also, I'm not an idiot. ;)
Neither am I.

In fact, I am literally a certified smart person. Then again, I chose to be an illustration major.
 
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One thing I will be curious to see is how Jacobsen explains the repeat-backs that Grogan heard for two nights in a row, and the fact that the rebroadcasts were acknowledged almost verbatim. I can think of two arguments: (1) Grogan was simply mistaken about the repeat-backs and so they don’t need to be explained because they never occurred, or (2) the repeat-backs came from the Japanese commercial vessels. The first argument is implausible, given Grogan’s extensive radio knowledge and decades of experience. The second argument seems equally implausible, unless one could come up with a credible reason that commercial vessels in Japanese home waters would have needed to use repeat-backs.

I will repost the article from the NWCR that I did earlier:
http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/...hing-the-Fox-Unaware---Japanese-Radio-Denial-

Do you honestly not know that the Japanese had a whole deception program in place that had radio operatives from the larger ships on shore in Japan pretending to be the actual ships in the Kido Butai? That's where the repeat-backs were coming from. No need for fishing vessels.

​
“’It was necessary for the Japanese to find a means of secret wireless communication between the ships of Nagumo's Striking Force, and his advance units. It would be sheer folly to expect that a huge armada of ships, widely scattered at times, would be sent to sea, and remain there for ten or eleven days, without some form of intercommunication. It was necessary to transmit orders and instructions, either to individual ships or to the Combined Fleet. Acknowledgement of such orders was mandatory to insure their proper execution. While the larger ships of the Striking Force were able to receive signals regularly from their homeland on the high frequencies, it was impossible for the low-lying submarines to do so . . . Submarines could often not intercept the high-frequency signals from Tokyo or other shore stations in Japan . . . other small craft found themselves in the same predicament. . . .’

Quoting from the above (the section on "radio silence" starting p.108):
"
Once a message had been copied and decoded aboard one of these ships, its contents were disseminated throughout the Kido Butai, by semaphore flags during the day or narrow-beam signal lamps by night.41 The ships sailed close enough to one another, usually less than a kilometer, to relay messages by visual means through the formation. The same signaling methods were used to arrange refueling and repositioning of ships.
"
Semaphore etc had been used for years for forces as large as the Kido Butai. Gorgan's argument is one from incredulity.
 
A few points in reply:

* World War II-era submarines frequently had to surface or come very close to the surface in order to receive radio transmissions. So sending repeat-backs would have ensured full radio reception by the subs--and also by the smaller vessels.

* Yes, I am aware that Jacobsen has written several articles. I thought it was clear that I was referring to his article on the Lurline bearings.

I've read Jacobsen's review of Stinnett's Day of Deceit. If Jacobsen's article on the Lurline bearings is anything like this "review" of Stinnett's book, it will be of limited value. Yes, Jacobsen did make some valid points, and many revisionists have noted those same problems, but Jacobsen simply ignored or waved aside a lot of Stinnett's evidence--I suspect because he had no good answer for it.

* As for the claim that Grogan was hearing radio-deception repeat-backs from Japan, how do you explain the fact that the bulk of Grogan's bearings are consistent with the track of the task force in the North Pacific for those days?

Also, we have records of intercepted Japanese naval communications that clearly were not part of any radio-deception effort but that were sent by the task force en route to Hawaii. I think Villa and Wilford prove this beyond a reasonable doubt. For example, as Wilford notes,

These USN intercepts could not all have represented Japanese radio deception. Radio deception did not include the transmission of secret call signs, code movement reports, and traffic between aircraft carriers and oil tankers. Secret call signs suggest clandestine activities, whereas code movement reports and carrier-tanker traffic suggest movement away from home waters. . . . The Japanese would never have sent a false message indicating that the Akagi was conversing with oil tankers on a "tactical circuit" when previous false messages showed the carrier in home waters--oil tankers meant long voyages, not anchorage in Kyushu. (Pearl Harbor Redefined: USN Radio Intelligence in 1941, New York: University Press of America, 2001, p. 73)​

* Another problem with the idea that Grogan was hearing and DFing false radio transmissions from Japan is that the repeat-backs were broadcast late at night, which means that the ships that were transmitting those signals had to be under darkness at the same time the Lurline was under darkness. So those signals could not have been coming from Japan.

* In the replies I've read as of this writing, I haven't seen anyone deal with Farago's point that the German Navy did exactly what the Lurline evidence indicates the Japanese task force did. As Farago noted, the German Navy was so confident that their low-power rebroadcasts would not be heard beyond a relatively short distance that they used them frequently. And Farago goes on to note that the British were able to intercept those signals and gleaned a great deal of useful intelligence from them.

* It seems apparent that no one who has replied so far has bothered to read Villa and Wilford's article on the Lurline bearings, because people keep repeating claims that are refuted by Villa and Wilford. Here is a link to their article on the Lurline bearings:

http://www.thestormunleashed.com/files/docs/warning_at_ph.pdf

* It also seems apparent that no one who has replied so far has bothered to read any of the other Villa and/or Wilford sources that I've cited. One person asked me if I was not "honestly" aware that the Japanese engaged in radio deception from Japan to try to create the radio-signal illusion that the task force's ships were in home waters. Yes, of course, I am aware of that. Villa and Wilford discuss this deception and they also answer the claim that that deception accounts for all the USN intercepts.

* Finally, as for the claim that even taking numerous DF bearings over the course of two days on a huge, slow-moving target would not yield even a ballpark triangulation effect, we'll just have to agree to disagree. This claim strikes me as convoluted and as missing (or avoiding) the forest for the obvious trees. And, again, we are left with the fact that the bulk of Grogan's bearings match up well with the track of the task force for those days--they don't match exactly, of course, but they are certainly close enough to render silly any suggestion of chance.
 
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I've read Jacobsen's review of Stinnett's Day of Deceit. If Jacobsen's article on the Lurline bearings is anything like this "review" of Stinnett's book, it will be of limited value. Yes, Jacobsen did make some valid points, and many revisionists have noted those same problems, but Jacobsen simply ignored or waved aside a lot of Stinnett's evidence--I suspect because he had no good answer for it.

Phil just recognized that Stinnett didn't have any evidence and waving off his bald assertions was the only thing to do. No sane person reads Stinnett and believes his garbage.

I wish Phil was still around, he still owes me a beer.
 
And still absolutely nothing about the Japanese records, despite trying to make it look like you did by going "we have records of the Japanese".

Bobby said:
* It also seems apparent that no one who has replied so far has bothered to read any of the other Villa and/or Wilford sources that I've cited. One person asked me if I was not "honestly" aware that the Japanese engaged in radio deception from Japan to try to create the radio-signal illusion that the task force's ships were in home waters. Yes, of course, I am aware of that. Villa and Wilford discuss this deception and they also answer the claim that that deception accounts for all the USN intercepts.
You're dodging around the fact that the Japanese deception is backed up by Japanese accounts. Did V and W discuss said accounts? Did they talk about how they also said that they didn't transmit?

* Finally, as for the claim that even taking numerous DF bearings over the course of two days on a huge, slow-moving target would not yield even a ballpark triangulation effect, we'll just have to agree to disagree. This claim strikes me as convoluted and as missing (or avoiding) the forest for the obvious trees. And, again, we are left with the fact that the bulk of Grogan's bearings match up well with the track of the task force for those days--they don't match exactly, of course, but they are certainly close enough to render silly any suggestion of chance.
Nope. You're arguing from hindsight. It wouldn't be enough to tell where the target was, or how fast it was moving, or what course it was on, with any functional degree of certainty, especially over the distances in question. I note that you don't actually say the claim is wrong.

You can only claim Grogan's bearings roughly matched the course of the task force if you have independent records of what the task force's course was. What records would these be? Japanese, perhaps? What did they say about whether they transmitted? Why are you refusing to even directly acknowledge that the Japanese have evidence in the matter?
 
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I have the same problem with another kind of True Believer. I ask them "Can you prove any god or gods exist?" and they reply "We're not talking about that, we're talking about what brand of coffee He drinks!"

They just don't see the problem.
 

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