.... ETA laboratory biosecurity was far worse in the past than it is now.
Adding some additional notes to this, so it went from atrocious to just very bad?
People (not just you) have this idealistic belief that health care institutions run perfectly or nearly so, everyone taking proper infection control measures, labs with perfect or nearly perfect safety records.
It's simply not true. I have been fighting with employees over the last 30 years to take infection control more seriously. Reality is this doesn't happen. Why do you think nosocomial infections are so rampant? You would think we would know better, but we don't. It's all about what you pay attention to.
Take the nurse who gives excellent clinical care including acting to prevent nosocomial infections but when they get a needle stick, not only do they not know the procedure, neither does the nurse manager. I spent 6 months documenting all the errors causing and following up on needle sticks. I presented my findings to the nurses and nurse managers. Then I waited a month and collected the same data for the next 6 months. NOTHING CHANGED. This is where I learned from one of the nursing educators to look for something besides a knowledge deficit.
Look what happened when the nurse in TX contracted ebola. The large hospital in TX that should have been prepared to receive patients with exotic diseases was unprepared for the ebola patient. That was in 2014! You think hospitals are better prepared now?
Oct. 13, 2014 -- Nina Pham, a 26-year-old nurse at Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital, is the first person to catch Ebola in the U.S.
She wasn’t one of the 48 people who were already being watched because they had contact with Duncan while he was contagious. Her diagnosis has put the U.S. health care system on alert that better training and protective equipment might be needed before all hospitals can safely care for Ebola patients....
Health officials aren’t sure how Pham was exposed to the virus. On Sunday, Daniel Varga, MD, chief clinical officer at Texas Health Resources, said she was wearing a gown, gloves, mask, and face shield while she cared for Duncan at the hospital.
SARS spread in a Toronto, CA hospital because they hadn't yet figured out one could not reuse protective gowns.
SARS victims and heroes remembered
"In terms of containing the risks to those on the front lines of SARS, that was one of the key problems. And when I say the infrastructure, I mean from the top down. Decisions were not made in a timely manner and when they were made, they were not made (communicated) to the front lines."
There was that ED doctor in Hong Kong who treated SARS patients, developed a fever and still went on vacation to Disneyland Tokyo.
I have so many horror stories people who don't work with compliance would be shocked.
How does the biolab at UNC keep losing their research mice? That's nuts! And that F&M lab leak in the UK, the organisms were discharged in the waste effluent, picked up on car tires and spread from there.
We just are not the perfect little compliant health care workers and researchers people imagine us to be.
And in this thread specific problems at the WIV are well documented.