Skeptic Ginger
Nasty Woman
- Joined
- Feb 14, 2005
- Messages
- 96,955
It's kind of hard to evaluate something that is in a book but if the highlighted bit is a claim in that book, it's false.The virus we have is very close to the bat virus. Not any particular virus, but all the parts look like known virus parts.
Tracking down various variants, the bat virus remains were collected and sequenced in China. No live virus from the bat feces could be grown in lab. It's all in the Quammen book. He called and zoomed a number of scientists around the world during the pandemic year.
https://www.amazon.com/Breathless-S...77503346&sprefix=david+quammen,aps,159&sr=8-2
I quote quite a bit here but that's because the article is exceptionally thorough and long. To review what has already been covered in this thread:
MIT Tech Review - PANDEMIC TECHNOLOGY PROJECT - Inside the risky bat-virus engineering that links America to Wuhan - China emulated US techniques to construct novel coronaviruses in unsafe conditions.
Those chimera viruses were not closely related to COVID. But Shi learned the technique from her work with Baric and used it. Shi also acquired the human adapted mice strain from Baric.In 2013, the American virologist Ralph Baric approached Zhengli Shi at a meeting. Baric was a top expert in coronaviruses, with hundreds of papers to his credit, and Shi, along with her team at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, had been discovering them by the fistful in bat caves. In one sample of bat guano, Shi had detected the genome of a new virus, called SHC014, that was one of the two closest relatives to the original SARS virus, but her team had not been able to culture it in the lab. Baric had developed a way around that problem—a technique for “reverse genetics” in coronaviruses. Not only did it allow him to bring an actual virus to life from its genetic code, but he could mix and match parts of multiple viruses. He wanted to take the “spike” gene from SHC014 and move it into a genetic copy of the SARS virus he already had in his lab. The spike molecule is what lets a coronavirus open a cell and get inside it. The resulting chimera would demonstrate whether the spike of SHC014 would attach to human cells.
Baric asked Shi if he could have the genetic data for SHC014. “She was gracious enough to send us those sequences almost immediately,” he says. His team introduced the virus modified with that code into mice and into a petri dish of human airway cells. Sure enough, the chimera exhibited “robust replication” in the human cells—evidence that nature was full of coronaviruses ready to leap directly to people.
The NIH knew about Shi's work back in 2015.
A lot of attention has been paid to the new Level 4 Biosafety lab at the WIV. But it was only recently completed. The work on coronaviruses prior to the pandemic was carried out at BSL-2.
The NIH decided the risk was worth it. In a potentially fateful decision, it funded work similar to Baric’s at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, which soon used its own reverse-genetics technology to make numerous coronavirus chimeras.
Unnoticed by most, however, was a key difference that significantly shifted the risk calculation. The Chinese work was carried out at biosafety level 2 (BSL-2), a much lower tier than Baric’s BSL-3+.
Back when Daszak was basking in his million dollar glory days:
Shi managed to culture WIV1 in her lab from a fecal sample and show that it could directly infect human cells, proving that SARS-like viruses ready to leap straight from bats to humans already lurked in the natural world. This showed, Daszak and Shi argued, that bat coronaviruses were a “substantial global threat.” Scientists, they said, needed to find them, and study them, before they found us.
Many of the other viruses couldn’t be grown, but Baric’s system provided a way to rapidly test their spikes by engineering them into similar viruses. When the chimera he made using SHC014 proved able to infect human cells in a dish, Daszak told the press that these revelations should “move this virus from a candidate emerging pathogen to a clear and present danger.”
All one need do is look at papers Shi coauthored before the COVID pandemic when they weren't trying to hide anything.
Two years later, Daszak and Shi published a paper reporting how the Chinese lab had engineered different versions of WIV1 and tested their infectiousness in human cells. The paper announced that the WIV had developed its own reverse-genetics system, following the Americans’ lead. It also included a troubling detail: the work, which was funded in part by the NIH grant, had been done in a BSL-2 lab. That meant the same viruses that Daszak was holding up as a clear and present danger to the world were being studied under conditions that, according to Richard Ebright, matched “the biosafety level of a US dentist’s office.”
When Shi was denying the virus was even in the WIV lab, she also claimed they had no live bats. Evidence was provided in the thread supporting the opposite, that they did indeed have live bats in the lab. Here is one of a number of sources:
Yup, the Wuhan Institute of Virology Kept Live Bats within Its Walls
In 2015, Shi Zhengli — a.k.a. “Bat Woman” — and a group of other virologists announced that they had “generated and characterized a chimeric virus expressing the spike of bat coronavirus SHC014 in a mouse-adapted SARS-CoV backbone.” Other scientists in the field warned that this research, designed to help prevent another SARS pandemic, was setting up a higher risk of setting off another pandemic. Nature magazine, November 12, 2015:
But other virologists question whether the information gleaned from the experiment justifies the potential risk. Although the extent of any risk is difficult to assess, Simon Wain-Hobson, a virologist at the Pasteur Institute in Paris, points out that the researchers have created a novel virus that “grows remarkably well” in human cells. “If the virus escaped, nobody could predict the trajectory ,” he says.
“The only impact of this work is the creation, in a lab, of a new, non-natural risk,” agrees Richard Ebright, a molecular biologist and biodefence expert at Rutgers University in Piscataway, New Jersey. Both Ebright and Wain-Hobson are long-standing critics of gain-of-function research.
Daszak, Shi and the Chinese government are proven liars when it comes to covering up the lab leak.
