If nine friends tell you a car is blue, and one says it is red, it is probably fair to say that he may be mistaken.
As others have pointed out, this analogy is rather thin. The authenticists we've seen here don't understand that preponderance is not a numerical scoreboard where each tidbit of evidence has equal weight. They don't understand that preponderance has to involve affirmative evidence, not just erosion of faith in some other claim.
Others have proposed abandoning this analogy. Let's fix it instead.
If the one friend tells you the car is red, but does so on the basis of a measured spectroscopic examination of the light it reflects, this is strong evidence.
The non-authenticist view, of course, is that none of the nine friends is particularly reliable, being either blind, drunk, guessing, lying, or relying on another unreliable source, so that there is no good reason to question the red photo.
No, I would say this is largely a straw man version of the critical approach, but at least you're on the right track in saying the quality of testimony and its factual basis matter. If the nine friends tell you it's blue -- but do so by such lines of inference as blue being the popular color for that model, or blue is a nice color, or their cousin claims he saw the car and it's blue -- then this is much weaker evidence. It's not really evidence at all; it's pure inference.
If he produces a photo of the red car, then one might still think that it has been recently resprayed, or that he simply took a photo of the wrong car.
One might, but then this glosses over what really happens among sindonists. They might speculate the car was red when tested, but was blue when observed by others. But if the identity of the car is unquestioned, and excavating the paint layers shows no blue, then the speculation is not supported by evidence. If the sindonists then speculate the blue layer was stripped away, in defiance of common practice, then you begin to see the pattern of desperation.
Curiously, exactly the same logic was used by the authors of the paper on the radiocarbon dating, to account for some anomalies in the results, so the general value of such reasoning should not be rejected.
But applying the "general value" glosses over important differences. Yes, speculation always occurs in error analysis. But there is a difference between attributing error to known possible causes (whether or not they were proven to have actually arisen in some study), and increasingly desperate speculation (with little precedent and no evidence) clearly intended to prop up the desired predetermined belief. It is important to be able to imagine many various ways in which observations might arise, but recalcitrance does not generate useful hypotheses.
There is a new article on academia.edu by a scientist whose early peer-reviewed work on X-rays and lasers quite independent of his Shroud studies surely entitles him to be called so, but who nevertheless believes in the authenticity of the Shroud.
I haven't seen it, so I won't comment on it specifically. However, you bring up a point that's very common in fringe argumentation and which we discussed in this thread many weeks ago.
The question is what constitutes science. Indeed someone who has formal training and education in the sciences and who has demonstrably contributed to the field has the right to be called a scientist. But fringe claimants and skeptics often differ on the relationship between that and conclusions drawn ostensibly in other areas.
Succinctly, fringe claimants sometimes say that science is whatever a scientist produces. Jabba has employed that maxim here, although not to great effect. He presented opinions rendered by a person with legitimate scientific credentials, but in a field unrelated to his expertise and without any demonstrated factual basis. "Dr. Smith is an accomplished physicist, and he believes the Shroud is authentic," is a persuasive argument among the fringe, but isn't sicence.
Succinctly then in contrast, skeptics say that science is what is produced by adherence to the scientific method, irrespective of who produces it. (This is tantamount to defining "scientist" as anyone who draws his conclusions according to scientific methodology, but it is certainly not a rejection of formal education, experience, and judgment on the part of professionals.) Apparatus such as peer review helps ensure proper application of the method.
Expert judgment does come into play, of course. But it is overplayed in fringe argumentation. The law looks at various factors to weigh whether an expert's judgment should be considered probative: basis in fact and sound method, actual investigation, consensus in the field, etc. Absent these, opinions rendered even by an expert may not constitute probative expert judgment.
I think I shall use that as the basis for more considered Shroud discussion on a new thread, if I'm allowed.
Nothing technically prevents you from starting a new thread, although it is considered a mild breach of the rules. The worst that could happen is that the moderators will merge it back into this one. As you've seen, there has been an attempt to engage the moderators to express the desire to keep Jabba's advocacy here and move a less contentious discussion elsewhere.
Seriously, though, the bible can be useful, but, as I said, one should avoid too much reliance on it, and one certainly shouldn't cherry pick one word from one of the four accounts of the burial of Jesus in order to discredit the Shroud.
But your detailed analysis nothwithstanding, there would be no controversy but for the Bible. The cloth is purported to be an artifact from a story in it. Discovered or contrived, the relationship between it and the cloth is obvious and inescapable. All I can really do is endorse your admonition not to cherry-pick the accounts, but that boils down to the perennial exegetical problem in all of Christian theology -- cherry-picking the Bible is pretty much all that ever happens.