Materialists......

[UndercoverElephant]

And you should try reading Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigations is one long argument against your idea of the inherent privacy of the mental.

It is also an argument about all sorts of other supposedly priviledged forms of knowledge.

My academic encounter with Wittgenstein starts in September. You can be assured I will get back to you on the subject.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Isn't that equivalent to "physicalism", then ?

Not if physicalism includes things like QM and string theory. String theory describes a world of 1-dimensional strings vibrarting in 10- or 11-dimensional space. Does that sound like the world you call "physical"?

Kinda like Intelligent Design denies darwinism without providing an alternative ?

No. Different to that.

Kant again ? Don't tell me philosophy hasn't moved forward since then.

Philosophy has moved forward since then. It's just that many of the people posting in this thread are yet to arrive at where philosophy was in 1787.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Both axioms are not falsifiable. One of them assumes determinism is true and that minds have no causal power, without a meaningful definition of "mind".

Please explain. One axiom could be falsified by finding things that don't obey logic or behave completely arbitrarily, even in the large. The other could be falsified by finding things whose behavior we cannot grok. Granted, it might take a long time to become convinced that the axioms were falsified.

It is not unknowable in principle. It is just only knowable to you, personally.

I meant unknowable to others.

Both materialism and idealism do this very successfully.
...
No he does not. He defines everything as mind and knows exactly what he means.

But you should be giving materialists and idealists the same trouble that you are giving me. If one says that everything is material, you should be arguing that we know what material is and it doesn't include mental things. Similarly, if one says that everything is mind, you should argue that we know what mind is and that doesn't include chairs.

You criticized my use of physical because the everyday definition of physical means external, material stuff and doesn't include mental experiences. Similarly, the everyday definitions of material and mind don't include each other.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Whoops, here we go again. How can you know what "physical" has never meant when you assert so aggressively that you don't know what it means?

Because before QM, everybody knew what it meant. Einstein raised a few eyebrows, but even "space-time" is identifiably "material". Wave/particle dualities are another kettle of fish.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Pretend none of us have. Could you tell us what in your opinion is Witt's answer to things?

Can you tell us both of them as well?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

By definition, a p-zombie is physically and behaviourally indistinguishable from a normal human. The only difference is that it has no Self -- even though it acts like it does, and it will claim you are an idiot for stating that it does not have one.

I judge it to be incoherent based on the Duck Principle.

It has no mind. It hasn't a "self", either but cognitive scientists have some fairly screwed up definition of "self", some of which could actually belong to a p-zombie.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Why do you think you made it into my signature quotes? Why are you still asking the same question? You already know the answer.

Touche. Let me ask it a different way:

So under materialism I can't have any sort of subjective experiences that are commonly referred to as consciousness?

You can't neutralise neutrality.

So you understand QM enough to make it the source of consciousness and to claim that it always endows consciousness consistently. I'm impressed.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

On the other hand the PEAR guys have made no significant contribution for science, spent a quarter of a century performing nonsense experiments under the aegis of one of the most respected academic institutions in the world and instead of suffering the ignominy that they are due, are retiring respected scientists seeking commercial partners to further exploit their pseudo science.

They jury is still out on PEAR.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

A typically vague insinuating comment. The fact is if you think the p-zombie thought experiment has anything to do with free will then you have missed the point of it.

Perhaps you can show me up by linking a version of it that concerns free will in any way.

P-zombies are not unrelated to the debate about free will.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I think some do, and also qualia, intention, etc.

~~ Paul

Edited to add: Well, I thought so, but now I can't find much about p-zombies and free will.

That is because the p-zombie literature belongs exclusively to cognitive science and philosophy of mind, and the free will question is mainstream philosophy. Hammegk is quite correct, though. P-zombies cannot possibly have libertarian free will.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Geoff, are you proposing a form of dialectical monism?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialectical_monism

~~ Paul

I have posted the above link on this board at least ten times.

Of course I am. Dialectical monism is where Hegel meets Taoism.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Not if physicalism includes things like QM and string theory. String theory describes a world of 1-dimensional strings vibrarting in 10- or 11-dimensional space. Does that sound like the world you call "physical"?

Yes, Geoff, it does. You've drawn a line somewhere, but I'll be damned if I can understand where.

Because before QM, everybody knew what it [physical] meant. Einstein raised a few eyebrows, but even "space-time" is identifiably "material". Wave/particle dualities are another kettle of fish.

You chastise me for not using the common definition of physical, yet claim that the common definition is now useless. Why won't you let me redefine the word?

Ah, but it's not useless to you, because now you can point to physical-but-not-really-only-kidding things like QM and put them to good use in metaphysics that need interfaces between the physical and the mysterious.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

They jury is still out on PEAR.

They seem to have convicted themselves already.

~~ Paul

 

[chriswl]

Pretend none of us have. Could you tell us what in your opinion is Witt's answer to things?

Well, on the particular question of the distinction between inner and outer... He showed that introspection has no role to play in the definition of sensation words (like pain and... well actually pain was always the example he used). We only learn how to use such words through participating in public "language games" that do not at any point reference anything that is inner or hidden. So, when I say "I am in pain", I am not really refering to some private, inner sensation at all. And when I observe that you are in pain I am not inferring something that is hidden from me.

"It follows that any genuine (rule-governed) language must refer only to things and properties whose presence can be publically verified: in particular there must be public criteria for the presence of sensations if meaningful sensation words are to be possible." -- McGinn: Wittgenstein on Meaning

So either we are unable to talk about even our own inner sensations, because language is incapable of accessing "true" inner experience. Or we truly can talk about our experiences and the experiences of others because, for example, pain is actually nothing more than the public pain-behaviour we are talking about.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Well, on the particular question of the distinction between inner and outer... He showed that introspection has no role to play in the definition of sensation words (like pain and... well actually pain was always the example he used). We only learn how to use such words through participating in public "language games" that do not at any point reference anything that is inner or hidden. So, when I say "I am in pain", I am not really refering to some private, inner sensation at all. And when I observe that you are in pain I am not inferring something that is hidden from me.

If I'm not referring to an inner sensation, then why do I say "I am in pain" at appropriate times?

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Please explain. One axiom could be falsified by finding things that don't obey logic or behave completely arbitrarily, even in the large. The other could be falsified by finding things whose behavior we cannot grok. Granted, it might take a long time to become convinced that the axioms were falsified.

The problem is deciding what sort of entities do or do not have causal power, namely "minds" and how you define them.

But you should be giving materialists and idealists the same trouble that you are giving me.

Have you seen how much trouble I give lifegazer?

If one says that everything is material, you should be arguing that we know what material is and it doesn't include mental things. Similarly, if one says that everything is mind, you should argue that we know what mind is and that doesn't include chairs.

Idealists just claim that chairs are the sort of things which exist in minds.

You criticized my use of physical because the everyday definition of physical means external, material stuff and doesn't include mental experiences. Similarly, the everyday definitions of material and mind don't include each other.
~~ Paul

??

I have no idea what the last sentence was supposed to mean.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Touche. Let me ask it a different way:

So under materialism I can't have any sort of subjective experiences that are commonly referred to as consciousness?

Under materialism the whole idea of "subjective experiences" are deeply problematic and "consciousness" can only mean "brain processes".

So you understand QM enough to make it the source of consciousness and to claim that it always endows consciousness consistently. I'm impressed.

At what point did I say that?

That is not my position.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Yes, Geoff, it does. You've drawn a line somewhere, but I'll be damned if I can understand where.

Newton and Einsten described things I can relate to my own experiences. Planck and Schrodinger described things I cannot.

You chastise me for not using the common definition of physical, yet claim that the common definition is now useless. Why won't you let me redefine the word?

Because your redefinition is unjustifiable.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Because your redefinition is unjustifiable.

You said:

I do not understand why you want to redefine "physical" to mean "mental too" unless it is to satisfy your dualistic leanings.

Why would the materialist want to define material to mean mental, too? Why would the idealist want to define mind to mean physical, too? In their cases, they want the single fundamental existent to include everything. In my case, I'm trying to define a word for those things that scientists can observe and understand. Even if I was making an ontological definition, it would be for the same reason as materialists and idealists.

You're the only one using a neutral word for the single fundamental existent, and there's something to be said for that. Maybe I should try using "sci-observable."

~~ Paul

 

[Robin]

P-zombies are not unrelated to the debate about free will.

You must have seen a different version of the argument to the ones I have seen. Please point me to this new version.