Materialists......

I am not using the words material or mental. Apparently, however, you will not let me use any word except "neutral stuff."

That is because "physical" already encompasses "material". I would not allow hammegk to claim that mental stuff is neutral either.

I do not understand why you want to redefine "physical" to mean "mental too" unless it is to satisfy your dualistic leanings.

Of course I can't explain what physical actually means.

Can you explain what "material" means?

That would be tantamount to explaining what the single fundamental existent actually is, which we agree is nonsense. I am providing a definition of physical from an epistemological viewpoint, not an ontological one. The axioms are falsifiable.

It is no use even as an epistemological viewpoint.

And you are not doing this anyway. You are making ontological claims as well as epistemological ones.

It defines their nature from the point of view of what we can know about them. Of course I can't specify what they actually are. And materialism, idealism, and neutral monism don't either.

That isn't true. Materialism specifies matter as stuff existing in space. Idealism specifies mind as stuff existing in minds. Neutral monism denies both. You aren't offering any specification at all because you are deferring to unknown future physics at a time when you cannot even agree what quantum mechanical entities are with respect to matter.

Please complete the following (bearing in mind that we already know what we mean by mind and matter - we do not depend on future science to tell us what these things mean) :

Materialism says everything is made of matter and energy.
Idealism says everything is made of mental stuff.
Neutral monism says both of the above are wrong and everything is made of stuff which neutral between mind and matter.
Paul's physicalism says everything is .........................
 
Why should anything be something other than the fundamental existent?

Because if they are not given any other description then all you are doing is invented a new term for "exists". You have not added any new meaning to anything, you've just redefined a word which already means something to mean something else. Why bother? What's the point? You just set up a new set of arguments about "different types of physical". You have gained nothing.

Is a p-zombie even a coherent concept under monism?

I don't see why not.
 
kant.jpg


Kant did not live for nothing. How badly he is still needed. This whole debate is what Kant tried to put a stop to. If everyone posting here and now understood Kants position and why he defended it, this debate would be so much more productive. As it stands, it's going nowhere.
 
Geoff said:
That is precisely what you are doing. You define physical to mean "everything" and to mean nothing else. So it doesn't mean anything. It is a tag which can be attached to everything which exists. We already have a word for that : "exists". If something exists we say "X exists". You are now just saying "X is physical" instead, and then claiming that there is no reason why minds can't be physical. You are just redefining "exists" as "is physical". That is NOT what "physical" has ever meant.
I am relying on two axioms to conclude that anything that can meaningfully be said to exist is physical. The axioms are falsifiable. I did not merely define physical that way.

I give up. If it is required that subjective experience be fundamentally different from everything else and unknowable even in principle, then there is no way to define a term to refer to a single fundamental existent, either ontologically or epistemologically.

An idealist has the same problem. He cannot define a word to encompass everything.

A neutral monist apparently plays a trick by declaring everything to be the same thing, but then invoking a nonexistent existent to make them appear different.

Sorry for wasting everyone's time.

~~ Paul
 
Geoff said:
Can you explain what "material" means?
I cannot explain what "material stuff" actually is, no.

It is no use even as an epistemological viewpoint.

And you are not doing this anyway. You are making ontological claims as well as epistemological ones.
What ontological claims am I making? Remember, I'm only trying to give a definition of physical here. Heck, this allows for dualism.
Definition 1: The term "real" is defined to refer to everything which has any kind of effect on something else which is real. This self-referential definition is completed with the definition that I am real.

Definition 2: The term "physical" is defined to refer to anything which is, in principle, observable.

Now we need an axiom that says that real things are logical and consistent:

Axiom 1: Everything real can be described according to some set of consistent logical rules.

Now we need a useful epistemology that allows us to determine natural laws:

Axiom 2: The natural laws describing real events can be determined through observation of the effects those events have.

If axioms 1 and 2 are correct, then anything that can meaningfully be said to exist (a real thing) is physical.

Geoff said:
That isn't true. Materialism specifies matter as stuff existing in space. Idealism specifies mind as stuff existing in minds. Neutral monism denies both. You aren't offering any specification at all because you are deferring to unknown future physics at a time when you cannot even agree what quantum mechanical entities are with respect to matter.
Ah, well, to me that doesn't specify what stuff actually is at all.

Materialism says everything is made of matter and energy.
Idealism says everything is made of mental stuff.
Neutral monism says both of the above are wrong and everything is made of stuff which neutral between mind and matter.
Paul's physicalism says everything is ...
unanswerable due to the incoherence of the question. Paul's physicalism only talks about what sorts of things we can know something about, if the axioms are correct.

The problem is that stating that something is matter or mind doesn't tell me what it is at all. Those are just two words for the same thing: the stuff. If you want the two words to be meaningfully different, you have to define what they actually are and then run some experiments to show that they can be distinguished. I daresay you can't even do the first of those two tasks.

If I cannot distinguish materialism, idealism, and neutral monism, then I have no reason to think they are different, in spite of the descriptive differences that philosophers might use.

~~ Paul
 
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Geoff said:
I don't see why not.
We've had other threads about p-zombies. I'm not convinced they are coherent under any monisms. Certainly not under materialism. By definition not under idealism. Under neutral monism?

~~ Paul
 
We've had other threads about p-zombies. I'm not convinced they are coherent under any monisms. Certainly not under materialism.
And I'd say a p-zombie is all that is possible under materialism. Another reason materialism fails for me.

The "thought" exists that I think, and I think I'm not a p-zombie. ;)



By definition not under idealism. Under neutral monism?

I don't see why not.
Hmm. I'd say a p-zombie is not logically possible for an idealist; nor for a neutral monist.
 
Hammegk said:
And I'd say a p-zombie is all that is possible under materialism. Another reason materialism fails for me.
So under materialism I can't have any sort of "mind" at all?

... nor for a neutral monist.
So the nonexistent existent that endows the neutral substance with mental capacity can't be somehow neutralized, thus producing p-zombies? Surely QM allows that.

~~ Paul
 
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I just can't get around this. I can't point to a part of my computer and say "that's openOffice, right there". I mean I could point to the data or the parts of RAM it is stored in or the processor, but the true "openOffice" is that quality of managing my documents. Does that supercede from 0 (or whatever it is you are saying?).
 
Definition 1: The term "real" is defined to refer to everything which has any kind of effect on something else which is real. This self-referential definition is completed with the definition that I am real.

Definition 2: The term "physical" is defined to refer to anything which is, in principle, observable.

Now we need an axiom that says that real things are logical and consistent:

Axiom 1: Everything real can be described according to some set of consistent logical rules.

Now we need a useful epistemology that allows us to determine natural laws:

Axiom 2: The natural laws describing real events can be determined through observation of the effects those events have.

If axioms 1 and 2 are correct, then anything that can meaningfully be said to exist (a real thing) is physical.
This is an attempt to describe scientific naturalism. I should not have offered it as a definition of physical. Doing so out of context just causes confusion.

~~ Paul
 
But his "private" sensations are, in a sense, observable to you, are they not? Even over the Internet.

I cannot feel his private sensations. If he hits his thumb with a hammer, I can't feel his pain. if I'm there, I can hear him curse, and watch him waving his hand in the air, all indicative of someone in pain. I can see signs of someone experiencing pain, I can tell you that the neural process that creates the sensation of pain is a physical, biological thing. But of the sensation of pain, I can only feel my own.

Yes, sensing pain comes about in a very materialistic way, but ouch is a private experience in my own self-consciousness. You can hook me up to machines and measue the infliction of pain upon my nervous system, but my suffering isn't visible to your devices. And if you admit to my suffering, it's an inference on your part based on the evidence of my behavior. You don't feel my pain, thank goodness. Also pain and suffering aren't the same thing. Ask someone who has to live with pain on a daily basis. You wiil fiind that there are times the circumstances that produce the pain and the sensation of it in the consciousness mind are as intense as usual, but for the moment the individual isn't suffering it.

Right now I'm imagining a Kray tree of the sort that grows on the planet Myr, or Sivit Prime. If I described this too you, you could imagine something simillar, but you'd not be doing my imagining or my content of imagination.
Is my Kray tree physical? Sure, all the neurons being fired off to produce this mental image are physical. But is this imagined content physical?
No, it isn't. it's imaginary. There are no Kray trees, There are no Sivits living in their branches, except in stories I wrote. Are stories physical? Are they the same thing as the pieces of paper they are written upon? No. The brain activity that produces my imaginings is physical, but the conent of my imaginings isn't. Sure there's some brain activity that happens every time I imagine a Kray tree. But that isn't a Kray tree. Of course a Kray tree is fictionally physical. Just like it's fictionally a tree. But that doesn't count for physicality unless we cannot tell the difference between the content of imaginatiion and the content of the real world.

There's a maple tree across the street. It's real. it's material. I just took a good look at it. But you don't have access to my sensations of it. If you were here, you could see it for yourself, but while we would be talking about the same objective tree, you mental content wouldn't be the same as mine.

Imagination runs all over the place. Mine takes me out to other planets in other times. Faster than the speed of light, I'm already 258 light years away at the Kohi System in seconds. It's a trival statement about our mental content. It's not bound in space and time, but encompasses space and time within itself. I'm talking about mental content.

Agknowlegding the simple fact that the contents, like the contents of a story, of our mentation aren't physical things and that our sensations and feelings (as such content) are unique to our own self-consciouness and cannot be first person to anyone else, doesn't prove anything metaphysics wise. It doesn't question science. it doesn't prove any woo-woo. You can make that distinction any day and still be a thorugh going Materialist. It's just something to be considered when it comes to metaphysical querstions.

Knowing your own inner, mental, first person content, you can understand why humans, for example, come up with notions of an afterlife, Nothing of such is proven, but you get the psychology of it. The contents of our minds seem to transcend physical boundaries, so that it is hard for us to imagine that someting with the capacity of self-transendence could cease to exist. The "I" of our self-awareness seems ultimately to transcend time and dwell in eternity.
I'm not saying we have a soul that does so. I'm not saying that we physically do so. But if you see the simple difference between the first-person, subjective content of our minds and the third-person content of our environments, then you know why we get into these arguments and why we reach for metaphysical answers.
Science helps, but Science can't call the Metaphysical game excpet to shoot down anything that runs afowl physical reality. Beyond Science we carry on with assumptions and preferences. Even if someone's metaphysic seems more supportive of woo-woo, if the woo-woo in question claims to have a repeatable, marketable product or goods, then it must measure up to scientific testing. If someone describes to me his revelation of the afterlife, I take it that this is an objective place that impacts the physical world. So I need more evidence than that his scriptures say so. At best I can find metaphorical and poetic meaning in his revelation, but not affirm it as objectively real.

In my opinon the objective content area in Metaphysics is small. There are no elaborate systems or content of metaphyics that are objective. The Swedenborgian kind of metaphysics that tells you about the planes of spirit beings is just fantasy. The metaphysical positions discussed in this thread are all viable ones. They are all close to that edge where metaphysics can still play objective.

I just found it very, very strange that my imagined Kray trees, according to "Materialism" or "Physicalism," were physical things.
 
If everyone posting here and now understood Kants position and why he defended it, this debate would be so much more productive. As it stands, it's going nowhere.
And you should try reading Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigations is one long argument against your idea of the inherent privacy of the mental.
 
JustGeoff said:
That isn't true. Materialism specifies matter as stuff existing in space.

Isn't that equivalent to "physicalism", then ?

Idealism specifies mind as stuff existing in minds.

A little circular.

Neutral monism denies both.

Kinda like Intelligent Design denies darwinism without providing an alternative ?

JustGeoff said:
Kant did not live for nothing. How badly he is still needed. This whole debate is what Kant tried to put a stop to. If everyone posting here and now understood Kants position and why he defended it, this debate would be so much more productive. As it stands, it's going nowhere.

Kant again ? Don't tell me philosophy hasn't moved forward since then.
 
That is NOT what "physical" has ever meant.
Whoops, here we go again. How can you know what "physical" has never meant when you assert so aggressively that you don't know what it means?

Physical has meant a number of things, among them "non-abstract".
 
You are talking about a branch of philosophy called essentialism. What is that makes X essentially X? Is it something to do with its origins? etc.....
As noted before I am not talking about essentialism. My statement makes perfect sense without reference to any "..isms".
When I am talking about non-existence I am not talking about the non-existence of a match, burned or otherwise. I am talking about the complete abscence of existence.
So when you say "the match does not exist", are you then talking about some state ontologically prior to the big bang, or subsequent to the little whimper?

But then did the universe come from nothing, or like the match were it's constituents in some other arrangement?

Can something come from nothing?
 
Did he? I don't read his posts.

That page is just a simple version of Derren Brown does.
Oh, so you worked it out straight away because you have seen the trick before. You didn't mention that part.

Have you worked out the same thing about synchronicity, PEAR, ganzfeld etc?
 
Kinda like Intelligent Design denies darwinism without providing an alternative ?
I.D. does not deny darwinism. It states that darwinism "may not be", up to "probably isn't", the entire answer to all things darwinism purports to explain.


chriswl said:
And you should try reading Wittgenstein.
Pretend none of us have. Could you tell us what in your opinion is Witt's answer to things?
 

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