Materialists......

Could you give me the short version of how they aren't coherent under materialism ?

By definition, a p-zombie is physically and behaviourally indistinguishable from a normal human. The only difference is that it has no Self -- even though it acts like it does, and it will claim you are an idiot for stating that it does not have one.

I judge it to be incoherent based on the Duck Principle.
 
Could you give me the short version of how they aren't coherent under materialism ?
1) A p-zombie, by definition, is physically indistinguishable from a conscious human being.

2) For materialism, mind is just processes that happen in certain kinds of physical object (e.g. human brains).

3) As a p-zombie is physically indistinguishable from a conscious human (1) it would exhibit the same physical brain processes as a conscious human.

4) For materialism, these physical brain processes are conscious states (2), therefore the alleged p-zombie is in fact conscious.

5) Therefore, under materialism, there can be no p-zombies.
 
Oh, so you worked it out straight away because you have seen the trick before. You didn't mention that part.

I have seen it before. I worked it out straight away that time too. I've just finished a year studying all manner of ways which human cognitive processing gets fooled. After a while, you become aware of the misdirection and can learn how to get fooled less easily.

Have you worked out the same thing about synchronicity, PEAR, ganzfeld etc?

These are all different cases.
 
1)4) For materialism, these physical brain processes are conscious states ....
Which is the circularity noted before in this thread and many others, which is why:

5) Therefore, under materialism, there can be no p-zombies.

does not follow. Under materialism nothing is possible except p-zombies, which have the same compatibilistic free will as any programmed machine.
 
There is no clash between being open-minded and looking for a trick at the same time.
Which is precisely what I tell people that accuse me of being closed-minded about psychic phenomena.
I don't see why. Unless people are intimidated by other peoples qualifications, as I suppose some of them might be.
I don't think that there is any question whatsoever that people will be more likely to take a site seriously if the url is princeton.edu than they would if it were mysticfreeksforjesus.com. People will take a professional looking site more seriously than one with blinking icons. If someone has a good qualification from a recognized institution they will be immediately taken more seriously than the guy with the "PhD in results".
They are paraphyschology. This is science, or at least it is trying to be science.
That is what I question. I classify them with Clifford Pickover and believe I can make a very good case
They are attempting to be as objective as possible. The problem with the PEAR project is that its results are either negative or borderline.
The actual results demonstrate no statistical significance at all. But they publish results with massive statistical significance. That is not science. That is trickery.
But the open-minded skeptic was still pursuing a policy which is more likely to yield results in the future.
Not when it comes to parapsychology it won't. When it comes to parapsychological claims the open-minded skeptic will always arrive back where the closed-minded skeptic went straight away. That has just been demonstrated over and over and over again.
What you are talking about applies just as much to science as anything else. There are many examples throughout the history of science of several people stumbling across some sort of new effect and just "not noticing" it because it was so contrary to what they were expecting. Either that or they dismiss the result as a mistake instead of trying to find out what was actually happening. Finally, somebody comes along who is open-minded enough to think "that's interesting, and totally unexpected" and pursue it instead of rejecting it.

On the other hand, some scientists, such as Blondlot, convinced themselves they saw something which wasn't actually there and ended up pursuing something which didn't exist.
Poor old Blondlot paid dearly. He is not remembered for his genuinely important contributions to physics, but to a testable hypothesis he published that was tested and found wanting.

On the other hand the PEAR guys have made no significant contribution for science, spent a quarter of a century performing nonsense experiments under the aegis of one of the most respected academic institutions in the world and instead of suffering the ignominy that they are due, are retiring respected scientists seeking commercial partners to further exploit their pseudo science.

And they did it by carefully avoiding a testable hypothesis and even casting doubt upon the necessity of a testable hypothesis.

That is the difference.
Sometimes assuming the Bible is true saves time. :(
Except that in all the cases I quoted, assuming materialism always led to the same answer as saying "that's interesting and totally unexpected" and pursuing it.
 
does not follow. Under materialism nothing is possible except p-zombies, which have the same compatibilistic free will as any programmed machine.
Except that you have missed the point about p-zombies is not their free will, it is their consciousness. None of the p-zombie arguments I have heard make any mention of free will.
 
I have seen it before. I worked it out straight away that time too. I've just finished a year studying all manner of ways which human cognitive processing gets fooled. After a while, you become aware of the misdirection and can learn how to get fooled less easily.
And yet you still think that PEAR is genuinely trying to be objective science.
These are all different cases.
Yes, it takes a good long look at the experimental procedures to see the misdirection of autoganzfeld and the misdirection of PEAR is hidden deeply in their papers. The misdirection of synchronicity is linguistic and should be obvious pretty much straight away.

They are none of them any more science than Dr Cliff and anybody who gives them any credence cannot claim to be "fooled less easily".
 
I agree a point has been missed. ;)
A typically vague insinuating comment. The fact is if you think the p-zombie thought experiment has anything to do with free will then you have missed the point of it.

Perhaps you can show me up by linking a version of it that concerns free will in any way.
 
Belz... said:
Could you give me the short version of how they [p-zombies] aren't coherent under materialism?
Materialism holds that consciousness is just brain activity. A p-zombie is supposed to be indistinguishable from a human being, but lack consciousness (or some such mental quality). Under materialism there is nothing for a p-zombie to lack: Physical identity means mental identity.

I think p-zombies require dualism to be coherent.

~~ Paul
 
Hammegk said:
Which is the circularity noted before in this thread and many others, which is why:
I don't understand. Why is it circular to say that conscious states are brain processes?

does not follow. Under materialism nothing is possible except p-zombies, which have the same compatibilistic free will as any programmed machine.
You are defining mind to be something that cannot exist under materialism, then announcing that, under materialism, there are no minds. No argument there.

Is there any way to tell whether that is the actual state of affairs?

~~ Paul
 
Robin said:
Except that you have missed the point about p-zombies is not their free will, it is their consciousness. None of the p-zombie arguments I have heard make any mention of free will.
I think some do, and also qualia, intention, etc.

~~ Paul

Edited to add: Well, I thought so, but now I can't find much about p-zombies and free will.
 
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I am relying on two axioms to conclude that anything that can meaningfully be said to exist is physical. The axioms are falsifiable. I did not merely define physical that way.

Both axioms are not falsifiable. One of them assumes determinism is true and that minds have no causal power, without a meaningful definition of "mind".

I give up. If it is required that subjective experience be fundamentally different from everything else and unknowable even in principle....

It is not unknowable in principle. It is just only knowable to you, personally.

, then there is no way to define a term to refer to a single fundamental existent, either ontologically or epistemologically.

????

Both materialism and idealism do this very successfully.

An idealist has the same problem. He cannot define a word to encompass everything.

No he does not. He defines everything as mind and knows exactly what he means.

A neutral monist apparently plays a trick by declaring everything to be the same thing, but then invoking a nonexistent existent to make them appear different.

I'm too drunk to work out exactly what you just said, but it sounds azbout right.... :)
 
I cannot explain what "material stuff" actually is, no.

OK. You've already said materialism is dumb, so technically you aren't the target of this thread anyway.

What ontological claims am I making? Remember, I'm only trying to give a definition of physical here. Heck, this allows for dualism.

You tried to define physical by supplying stimpy's version of metaphysical naturalism.

The problem is that stating that something is matter or mind doesn't tell me what it is at all. Those are just two words for the same thing: the stuff.

So why not just call it "information"?

If you want the two words to be meaningfully different, you have to define what they actually are and then run some experiments to show that they can be distinguished. I daresay you can't even do the first of those two tasks.

The first is easy. One is subjective/mental. The other is objective/material. The second is impossible because the experimental method depends on objectivity.

I think we have been here before. In your case, at least four years ago.

If I cannot distinguish materialism, idealism, and neutral monism, then I have no reason to think they are different, in spite of the descriptive differences that philosophers might use.

~~ Paul

One of them claims everything is mind. One of them claims everthing is matter. One of them claims everything is something neutral between mind and matter. Why can you not see any difference between these?
 
We've had other threads about p-zombies. I'm not convinced they are coherent under any monisms. Certainly not under materialism. By definition not under idealism. Under neutral monism?

~~ Paul

Not coherent under neutral monism. Don't see why they incoherent to a materialist, apart from the fact that materialism is itself incoherent.
 
So under materialism I can't have any sort of "mind" at all?

Why do you think you made it into my signature quotes? Why are you still asking the same question? You already know the answer.

So the nonexistent existent that endows the neutral substance with mental capacity can't be somehow neutralized, thus producing p-zombies? Surely QM allows that.

Yes. :)

You can't neutralise neutrality.
 
I just can't get around this. I can't point to a part of my computer and say "that's openOffice, right there". I mean I could point to the data or the parts of RAM it is stored in or the processor, but the true "openOffice" is that quality of managing my documents. Does that supercede from 0 (or whatever it is you are saying?).

????
 

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