Materialists......

[UndercoverElephant]

Er.. Chriswl put a pretty good case that the concept of a p-zombie was incompatible with the concept of materialism.

Well, of course it is. P-zombies were invented to falsify materialism. They manage to do so exactly because:

1) The concept of a p-zombie is incompatible with materialism.
2) The concept of a p-zombie is nevertheless perfectly coherent on its own to any materialist who is not an eliminative materialist. If you can meaningfully define "mind" at all, in such a way as it can be distinguished from a brain process, then there is no reason why you cannot conceive of a p-zombie.

To argue that because p-zombies are incompatible with materialism does not stand as a defence of materialism because it is overt question-begging. The cart has once more been firmly placed before the horse in the following manner:

1) Materialism is true
2) P-zombies are incompatible with materialism
3) Therefore, p-zombies are incoherent
4) Therefore, p-zombies do not falsify materialism.

The above line of reasoning is both question-begging of the very worst sort and obviously assumes its conclusion, it is also unsound because it is perfectly legitimate to reject the first premise. P-zombies are not incoherent in their own right. It is perfectly possible to imagine something which looks and behaves exactly like a human but has no mind. You can do it now: imagine a very sophisticated android. Now, if you can imagine a very sophisticated android which is externally indistinguishable from a human you can also imagine a p-zombie. The only reason for rejecting the concept of a p-zombie is because of previous assumption that materialism is true. If your point is to try to defend materialism then this defence is useless. I can defend any bit of the Bible you could care to name in exactly the same fallacious way:

1) The Bible is literally true.
2) Evolution is incompatible with a literal reading of Genesis.
3) Therefore evolution is incoherent.
4) Therefore evolution does not falsify the claim that the Bible is literally true.

Utterly useless, but the logical form is identical to the one you appear to be using to defend materialism on the grounds that p-zombies are incoherent.

And now you are defending the relevance of hammegk's comment by saying that there are some other unrelated arguments that might involve p-zombies and free will.

No, I am defending the claim that p-zombies cannot have LFW. That is all.

Even if such argument exist, which I doubt - so what? We are not discussing these arguments. We are discussing the standard p-zombie argument.

It makes little difference to the standard p-zombie argument. It is a side-issue.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Essentially the p-zombie argument assumes it's conclusion. They are showing that consciousness cannot be physical. So they posit something that is physically identical to a human but not conscious. But if consciousness was physical then the p-zombie would not be physically identical.

They are assuming that consciousness is not physical and then using that premise to prove that consciousness cannot be physical.

Bolding by Geoff. The line in bold is where you assume your conclusion. The proponents of the p-zombie argument do no such thing. If you think that they do, please lay out the line of reasoning as I did in my last post.

 

[Belz...]

1) A p-zombie, by definition, is physically indistinguishable from a conscious human being.

2) For materialism, mind is just processes that happen in certain kinds of physical object (e.g. human brains).

3) As a p-zombie is physically indistinguishable from a conscious human (1) it would exhibit the same physical brain processes as a conscious human.

4) For materialism, these physical brain processes are conscious states (2), therefore the alleged p-zombie is in fact conscious.

5) Therefore, under materialism, there can be no p-zombies.

Thanks to both you and nescafe for pointing this out. I thought p-zombies were only indistinguishable from humans by behaviour, not once you prodded their brains with instruments.

ETA: And thanks to Paul, too.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

s/self/mind/g, and my refutation still works (in any monist stance, that is. A dualist stance is compatible with a p-zombie, but that is a different matter).

Please see last post but one.

 

[Belz...]

Not if physicalism includes things like QM and string theory. String theory describes a world of 1-dimensional strings vibrarting in 10- or 11-dimensional space. Does that sound like the world you call "physical"?

To the best of my knowledge string theory is still in its infancy. Anyway, anything real and that can be described by science would be physical, right ?

No. Different to that.

<sigh> Different how ?

Philosophy has moved forward since then. It's just that many of the people posting in this thread are yet to arrive at where philosophy was in 1787.

Now _that's_ funny.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Thanks to both you and nescafe for pointing this out. I thought p-zombies were only indistinguishable from humans by behaviour, not once you prodded their brains with instruments.

ETA: And thanks to Paul, too.

P-zombies are, by definition, totally indistinguishable from humans by their behaviour and equally indistinguishable by any other means.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Do you wish to join the Paul/Stimpy camp and insist a physical/material monism allows the possibility of the attributes of consciousness/intent including free will, which are the basics of idealism?

You realize, of course, that if you could come up with a logical proof that physical stuff cannot give rise to subjective experience, you will have made more progress in metaphysics than has been made in the past 3,000 years. Go for it, man!

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Why not? "Chairs are things which exist in minds". There is no problem here. There may be other problems, particularly if you try to defend idealism like lifegazer does. He is a very good example actually, and I attack him with great enthusiasm accordingly.

But mind doesn't include chairs by its common definition, and it is the common definition of physical that you were admonishing me to preserve.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

To the best of my knowledge string theory is still in its infancy. Anyway, anything real and that can be described by science would be physical, right ?

That depends on your definition of science and your definition of physical.....

Now _that's_ funny.

It's also true. The arguments being played out in this thread, especially those being provided by Paul, are just modern versions of the arguments going on just before Kant between people like Berkeley, Hume, Leibniz and Newton. Kant turns up and pulls the rug out from beneath the whole lot of them. From that moment onwards, philosophy changed. After Kant, it was impossible to conduct those pre-Kantian debates without eventually being forced back to a discussion of Kant. In 2006, this is still the case. That is why every person who goes to University to study philosophy has no option but to study "A Critique of Pure Reason". It is compulsory. No other philosopher, before or since, is compulsory in the same way. You can reject Kant, but ignore him at your peril.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

But mind doesn't include chairs by its common definition....

Oh yes it does. It include the perceptual chairs that you actually experience. If you take LSD and see a chair start walking across that strangely-patterned carpet then most people will be happy to admit that walking chairs exist only in minds. But if the chair you experience when you are on acid exists in your mind, then so do the chairs you experience the rest of the time.....unless you can defend direct realism or want to defend disjunctivism.

 

[Belz...]

Materialists just define minds as brain processes and therefore never get round to considering the relationship between mental content and the metaphysical subject ("I"). If you add a metaphysical subject to the materialists picture of a reality then "mind" appears automatically because it is the result of an interaction between the metaphysical subject and the physical brain.

That's an interesting string of unsupported assertions. What's a metaphysical subject, and how do you know it "automatically" interracts with the brain ?

 

[Belz...]

P-zombies are, by definition, totally indistinguishable from humans by their behaviour and equally indistinguishable by any other means.

Yes. Thanks for clearing that up. P-zombies ARE incoherent under materialism, then.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

To argue that because p-zombies are incompatible with materialism does not stand as a defence of materialism because it is overt question-begging. The cart has once more been firmly placed before the horse in the following manner:

1) Materialism is true
2) P-zombies are incompatible with materialism
3) Therefore, p-zombies are incoherent
4) Therefore, p-zombies do not falsify materialism.

Hold on. If we are going to ask whether p-zombies are coherent, we have to do it under a particular metaphysic. So (1) is exactly what we want to assume when considering p-zombies under materialism. Your Bible analogy is irrelevant because the Bible is a set of purported facts, not a metaphysic.

If you can meaningfully define "mind" at all, in such a way as it can be distinguished from a brain process, then there is no reason why you cannot conceive of a p-zombie.

If you define mind so that it is ontologically distinguished from brain processes, then yes. But then you are assuming a different metaphysic, which might indeed allow for p-zombies. Just defining mind to be a particular subset of brain processes doesn't make p-zombies coherent, just as defining weather to be a particular subset of atmospheric processes doesn't make w-climates coherent.

If you think I am incorrect, then prove that p-zombies are coherent under materialism without assuming any particular metaphysic.

~~ Paul

 

[Belz...]

That depends on your definition of science and your definition of physical.....

No Belz-physical for you. I'll still with the actual definition of the word, thanks.

It's also true. The arguments being played out in this thread, especially those being provided by Paul, are just modern versions of the arguments going on just before Kant between people like Berkeley, Hume, Leibniz and Newton. Kant turns up and pulls the rug out from beneath the whole lot of them. From that moment onwards, philosophy changed. After Kant, it was impossible to conduct those pre-Kantian debates without eventually being forced back to a discussion of Kant. In 2006, this is still the case. That is why every person who goes to University to study philosophy has no option but to study "A Critique of Pure Reason". It is compulsory. No other philosopher, before or since, is compulsory in the same way. You can reject Kant, but ignore him at your peril.

The whole problem with this line of reasoning is that truth is independant of philosophy. No matter how much you defend either monism or ism, the evidence doesn't change. So I'm perfectly comfortable beign stuck in pre-imperial roman times in terms of philosophy, so long as I accept REAL evidence.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

It's also true. The arguments being played out in this thread, especially those being provided by Paul, are just modern versions of the arguments going on just before Kant between people like Berkeley, Hume, Leibniz and Newton. Kant turns up and pulls the rug out from beneath the whole lot of them. From that moment onwards, philosophy changed. After Kant, it was impossible to conduct those pre-Kantian debates without eventually being forced back to a discussion of Kant. In 2006, this is still the case. That is why every person who goes to University to study philosophy has no option but to study "A Critique of Pure Reason". It is compulsory. No other philosopher, before or since, is compulsory in the same way. You can reject Kant, but ignore him at your peril.

Give us a summary of Kant.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

What's a metaphysical subject, and how do you know it "automatically" interracts with the brain ?

I did not say that it automatically interacts with the brain. I said "mind" automatically appears if you add a metaphysical subject to a physical brain.

A metaphysical subject is what you call "I". Not your body, not the contents of your mind but the thing which observes your mind.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Oh yes it does. It include the perceptual chairs that you actually experience. If you take LSD and see a chair start walking across that strangely-patterned carpet then most people will be happy to admit that walking chairs exist only in minds. But if the chair you experience when you are on acid exists in your mind, then so do the chairs you experience the rest of the time.....unless you can defend direct realism or want to defend disjunctivism.

The average guy doesn't think mind includes chairs.* You are allowing the idealist to include them in mind precisely because that's what the idealist needs to obtain one fundamental existent.

But anyway, forget it. I've given up trying to define physical. We'll continue not having any idea what it means.

~~ Paul

* And certainly doesn't include whatever mechanism idealism employs to assure commonality of chairs.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

No Belz-physical for you. I'll still with the actual definition of the word, thanks.

Which definition are we using?

1 a : having material existence : perceptible especially through the senses and subject to the laws of nature *everything physical is measurable by weight, motion, and resistance Thomas De Quincey* b : of or relating to material things

2 a : of or relating to natural science b (1) : of or relating to physics (2) : characterized or produced by the forces and operations of physics

Ooh, I like that second one. It might be useful in a description of scientific naturalism.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Hold on. If we are going to ask whether p-zombies are coherent, we have to do it under a particular metaphysic.

No we do not. We can ask whether they are coherent in their own right. We can also ask whether they are compatible with various metaphysical positions. But it is not valid to assume a metaphysical position, decide that p-zombies are inconsistent with that metaphysical position, and then claim that the concept of a p-zombie is itself incoherent. All we can do is say that materialism (for example) is incompatible with a p-zombie. If p-zombies are coherent as a concept on their own, then this falsifies materialism, not the possible existing of p-zombies. Any other procedure involves assuming your conclusion. The relevance of eliminativism is that for an eliminativist (if he is not a pseudo-eliminativist who goes on talking about minds) there is no longer a word "mind". If there is no such thing as a mind, and only brain processes, then the concept of a p-zombie never gets off the ground. Only a true eliminativist can deny he knows what is meant by "p-zombie". You, on the other hand, are perfectly capable of forming a concept of a p-zombie because you know damned well what "mind" means.

So (1) is exactly what we want to assume when considering p-zombies under materialism. Your Bible analogy is irrelevant because the Bible is a set of purported facts, not a metaphysic.

Genesis is packed with metaphysical claims of all varieties.

The analogy with the bible is very relevant indeed. It demonstrates the logical form of the argument being supplied against p-zombies. You have just tried to reject it on the grounds that "the bible is a set of purported facts, not a metaphysic". This is false on two grounds. First, the Bible does make metaphysical claims and second, the claim that materialism is true is also "a purported fact" in exactly the same way the Bible is. In both cases we are testing this purported fact and in both cases the purported fact turns out to lead to very serious problems.

If you define mind so that it is ontologically distinguished from brain processes, then yes. But then you are assuming a different metaphysic, which might indeed allow for p-zombies.

NO!!!!

Why do you assume that I am putting the cart before the horse like you do? I am not assuming any metaphysical position. All I am doing is pointing out that there is no reason why the concept of a p-zombie is in itself incoherent, so long as you can distinguish between a brain process and a subjective experience. Which brings us very nicely back to the opening post in this thread.

M1) What the materialist is actually entitled to say is the following:

"Somehow, in some way that we really do not understand, subjective experiences and brain processes are one and the same thing. They must be, otherwise we cannot understand where the additional "thing" has come from. It would be incompatible with physicalism."

(M2) What the materialist is not entitled to say:

"I cannot tell the difference between subjective experiences and brain processes. They are identical, and indiscernable. I do not know what you mean by "inherently subjective". No such things exist."

To defend the position you want to defend, you now need to defend M2. M1 is not enough. M1 allows for p-zombies. M2 does not, but it's stupid.

Just defining mind to be a particular subset of brain processes doesn't make p-zombies coherent, just as defining weather to be a particular subset of atmospheric processes doesn't make w-climates coherent.

No, but denying that the word "mind" means anything at all makes p-zombies incoherent.

If you think I am incorrect, then prove that p-zombies are coherent under materialism without assuming any particular metaphysic.
~~ Paul

X1) "prove that p-zombies are coherent under materialism"
X2) "without assuming any particular metaphysic"



No, I cannot do this. It's logically impossible to prove something is coherent under a particular metaphysic with assuming a particular metaphysic. We are back in square-circle territory.

I can prove that p-zombies are coherent in their own right, provided one allows me to use folk psychological terms to define what is meant by "mind". There is only one metaphysical position which explicitly rules out the use of folk psychological terms, and it is eliminativism. However, the eliminitavist need not defend his position by assuming eliminativism is true. He just has to honestly believe that there is no such thing as a mind.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Give us a summary of Kant.

~~ Paul

OK, if I get a spare moment between answering all the other posts.