Since when does the definition of material exclude QM stuff?
As soon as QM starts talking about "uncollapsed wave functions". "Material" is the name for one half of the quantum "duality" - the quantum world as experienced by us. Specifying the nature of the quantum world when it is not being experienced by us is where the problems all start.
My definition of physical is not open-ended. If you can find things that behave illogically or truly inconsistently, or things whose governing laws cannot be determined by observation, then I'd be willing to entertain the idea that they are not physical.
How would one establish that something had governing laws which could not be determined by observation?
There can be
no such thing, and even if there was I can't see why such a thing should be "non-physical".
Like inner experience. Certainly you agree that my inner experience can be observed to some degree by others.
No, I would not agree. You cannot partially observe my experiences. You cannot observe them
at all. You can observe only their consequences.
To what degree does it need to be observable by others before you'd say it was physical?
I never agreed to your definition of physical in the first place. It doesn't mean anything to me.
But as a monist, don't you say that they are not dualistic, even if they seem that way?
No. The world of mind-and-matter really is dualistic. It is only from the POV of things in themselves that they are one sort of thing.
Consciousness does not have an extension in space and time?
Some components of consciousness are extended in time. None are extended in space, unless you are going to start including all of the material things you experience as being part of consciousness, which would be heading towards idealism. My fear has no extension in space.
Why does it make the word more meaningless than any other word we would use for the single existent?
Because it is already in use as a description of "material". If you use the term "neutral stuff" you are making it quite clear that you are not talking about mind and not talking about matter. If you use "physical" then this is far from clear.
If there is only one fundamental existent, then everything should appear to be that existent.
Exactly. And some things do not appear to be physical.
Call it physical, ideal, what difference does it make? If you can't get everything to fit its description, then you are not a monist.
And there is the crux of the problem.
You are not supplying a meaningful description of "physical".