Materialists......

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

It causes all sorts of problems for scientific pyschology, for example, which cannot decide whether or not mental things like "beliefs" should be considered to be causal. If you say they are causal then it looks like mental things are causing physical things, which sounds horribly like dualism. But if you say they are not causal, then how does one pyschologically explain why our mental states dominate our behaviour? It's minefield, basically.

Bah, it's only a minefield if you fret over it philosophically.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

So when I recall the memory of a tomato and re-experience the feelings related to it, that is not a quale? I thought it was.

~~ Paul

I thought you didn't believe in qualia?

You not find any mention of qualia in my account (above) of intentional objects. Since you don't believe in qualia, why are you now asking questions about them?

Certainly, though, remembering a tomato is phenomenologically very different to perceiving one.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I thought you didn't believe in qualia?

You not find any mention of qualia in my account (above) of intentional objects. Since you don't believe in qualia, why are you now asking questions about them?

Certainly, though, remembering a tomato is phenomenologically very different to perceiving one.

Just wondering. Hey, I might "believe in" qualia if someone would define them coherently.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

It is equally mysterious for everyone, because no one has offered an explanation. Idealists think they offer one when they say "consciousness is a fundamental existent," but that is no explanation at all, but rather a lack of imagination.

That is a fair enough viewpoint, but making comments such as this about other metaphysical positions does not change the fact that conciousness is deeply mysterious for a materialist. This thread is called "materialists...." not "idealists...." In other words, the fact that you believe that idealism doesn't solve the mystery is not an excuse to dismiss the mystery from a materialistic point of view. Idealism being wrong doesn't make materialism any more right.

But no one says that there is no mystery to be solved. What I say is that I think there is no problem with the mystery ultimately being solved as just brain function.

Then what would be the mystery?

What is your justification for saying you think there is no problem with the mystery having a materialistic solution? The very reason why it is a mystery is precisely that it is hard to see how a materialistic solution is possible. It that isn't the mystery, then there isn't a mystery.

If you say that consciousness is something else, then the burden of evidence is on you to justify your story.

*The following response is of critical relevance to this discussion*

Why? Materialism is not some sort of default position that every other position has to give way to. Exactly why is the burden of evidence on the non-materialist when the whole reason there is a mystery is because no materialistic explanation of consciousness is remotely obvious? Only if there really was an obvious materialistic explanation, and hence no mystery, would the burden of evidence be on the non-materialist. There is a hidden assumption behind your question. That assumption is that, for reasons that have nothing to do with consciousness, materialism looks like it makes sense. I made this abundantly clear in the opening post. Your reasons for thinking of materialism as the default position have nothing to do with this debate. In the context of this debate, you cannot cite "materialistic science has answered lots of other hard questions" as a reason for placing the burden of evidence on the non-materialist. This is a debate about consciousness not all the other problems that materialism has no difficulty with.

So the burden of evidence cannot be on the non-materialist provided you are clear about why the mystery is mysterious and you are not allowed to cite non-related evidence in support of materialism as the default position.

Meanwhile, I accept the burden of evidence and lay it at the feet of neuroscience, which gladly accepts it.

But which has to "play the futures market" (Churchland's term) in order to do so. In other words it has to depend on promises, and there is no sign that those promises can be delivered on. One does not lend money to people unless one believes they are capable of repaying it.

You could do the same for your position, but you appear to be taking the Interesting Ian approach that neuroscience cannot possibly offer an answer, regardless of the truth of the situation. In that case, I daresay you will never justify your story.

~~ Paul

Neuroscience indeed cannot offer an answer. It may be able to offer part of an answer, but not the whole answer. However, my position is not dependent on making this claim. It is a side-issue. For me, the question of neuroscience providing a complete answer is a non-issue. I don't even reach that question. You are trying to priviledge neuroscience (and materialism), and I've just explained why that is disallowed.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

That is correct. You need to define what you are talking about well enough for the rest of us to go Aha! Of course this mysterious subjective experience thing must be something other than brain function. Otherwise, why would we agree that it is?

~~ Paul

There is a way out of the deadlock, but it involves both sides agreeing to stop forcing their own metaphysical position onto the questions/definitions and having a look at the phenomenology. That is why I have been talking about intentionalism. I see no reason why we cannot all agree that there are such things as the objects of perception - intentional objects. We can also agree that these intentional objects have properties such as colours. We percieve a red tomato, for example, and there need be no argument about "where the redness is" or "what the redness is". Redness is a property of intentional objects. This much, we ought to be able to agree on, but I suspect that most of the materialists will find this very simple task unbelievably complicated and start asking all sorts of metaphysical questions before they can answer any questions. In other words, they will refuse to take part in the debate unless they know in advance how to arrange all the carts in front of all the horses in order to make sure their answers support materialism, instead of pursuing the truth by starting with open questions and following the logic implied by the answers. That is precisely what happened last time I tried to take this route.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Just wondering. Hey, I might "believe in" qualia if someone would define them coherently.

~~ Paul

Forget qualia and tell me if you accept my intentional account of perception.

I've already explained that qualia only get invented as a result of materialists getting their own definitions mixed up. Forget materialism (temporarily) and we can forget qualia (temporarily).

 

[nescafe]

So the burden of evidence cannot be on the non-materialist provided you are clear about why the mystery is mysterious and you are not allowed to cite non-related evidence in support of materialism as the default position.

So what other philosophical viewpoint has spawned a problem-resolving mechanism as practical and powerful as science?

Dualism (in most its incarnations) is fairly easily disprovable, and idealists spend a significant of their time arguing with everyone over what exactly they mean (rather like in this thread).

 

[UndercoverElephant]

So what other philosophical viewpoint has spawned a problem-resolving mechanism as practical and powerful as science?

None, but this is completely irrelevant. The fact that science has proved to be an excellent tool for answering empirical questions makes no difference when the questions being asked are metaphysical/ontological. Science has never answered a single metaphysical question in the entire time it has existed. What makes you think it can answer this one?

Dualism (in most its incarnations) is fairly easily disprovable, and idealists spend a significant of their time arguing with everyone over what exactly they mean (rather like in this thread).

Well, since I'm none of the above......

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

This thread is called "materialists...." not "idealists...." In other words, the fact that you believe that idealism doesn't solve the mystery is not an excuse to dismiss the mystery from a materialistic point of view. Idealism being wrong doesn't make materialism any more right.

I'm not dismissing the mystery.

What is your justification for saying you think there is no problem with the mystery having a materialistic solution? The very reason why it is a mystery is precisely that it is hard to see how a materialistic solution is possible. It that isn't the mystery, then there isn't a mystery.

Then there isn't a mystery. Or, more precisely, there isn't any more of a mystery for materialists. Sorry, the fact that anyone thinks "consciousness is a fundamental existent" is somehow less mysterious than "consciousness is a product of brain function" is just silly.

Why? Materialism is not some sort of default position that every other position has to give way to. Exactly why is the burden of evidence on the non-materialist when the whole reason there is a mystery is because no materialistic explanation of consciousness is remotely obvious?

I'm not making materialism the default position. I'm saying that anyone who makes a claim about consciousness has the burden of proof for their particular claim. Scientists are working on the problem as we speak. Are there some idealist or dualist scientists somewhere working on their version of the problem?

But which has to "play the futures market" (Churchland's term) in order to do so. In other words it has to depend on promises, and there is no sign that those promises can be delivered on. One does not lend money to people unless one believes they are capable of repaying it.

Screw this. Idealists and dualists have nothing but a promise. There is no work toward turning the promise into a delivery, because they don't think they have to deliver anything other than "but it's a fundamental existent."

There is no answer there. There is only the illusion of a problem redefined.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

None, but this is completely irrelevant. The fact that science has proved to be an excellent tool for answering empirical questions makes no difference when the questions being asked are metaphysical/ontological. Science has never answered a single metaphysical question in the entire time it has existed. What makes you think it can answer this one?

What makes you think this is a metaphysical question? Or, looking at it another way, what makes you think it is any more metaphysical than, say, phlogiston? And science has answered that question.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

We percieve a red tomato, for example, and there need be no argument about "where the redness is" or "what the redness is".

I don't know, we managed to argue with Interesting Ian about this for months.

In other words, they will refuse to take part in the debate unless they know in advance how to arrange all the carts in front of all the horses in order to make sure their answers support materialism, instead of pursuing the truth by starting with open questions and following the logic implied by the answers. That is precisely what happened last time I tried to take this route.

Sometimes I'm amazed your ego fits inside your skull.

Oh wait, maybe it's not inside your skull.

~~ Paul

 

[nescafe]

Dennett's 3 Stances

with examples by Terry Bisson

"Meat. They're made out of meat."

"Meat?"

"There's no doubt about it. We picked up several from different parts of the planet, took them aboard our recon vessels, and probed them all the way through. They're completely meat."

This is an example of the physical stance. They took some objects, examined them in a way that is (presumably) congruent with scientific investigation, and found that they are completly made of meat.

"They do, but what do you think is on the radio? Meat sounds. You know how when you slap or flap meat, it makes a noise? They talk by flapping their meat at each other. They can even sing by squirting air through their meat."

This is an example of using the design stance, specifically with respect to the flapping and squirting meat sounds. They analyzed what the meat sounds were for, and found that they were for communication of some sort.

"Omigod. So what does this meat have in mind?"

"First it wants to talk to us. Then I imagine it wants to explore the Universe, contact other sentiences, swap ideas and information. The usual."

This is an example of the intentional stance. Specifically, the attribution of will and desire to the meat creatures coupled with inferring what the meat beasties want to do based on those inferred wills and desires. The "Then I imagine" bit.

 

[hammegk]

Wow! That nearly convinced me materialism=True.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Science has never answered a single metaphysical question in the entire time it has existed.

There is something about this statement that I really love. It's so much cleverer than "Science has never answered a single nonscientific question is the entire time it has existed." And it so well parallels "Philosophy has never answered a single scientific question in the entire time it has existed." Well, except back when science was philosophy.

~~ Paul

 

[hammegk]

There is no answer there. There is only the illusion of a problem redefined.

~~ Paul

Sure, but I choose to believe I'm thought, not after-thought.

Did Uppie convince you thought is an assumption rather than a 100% fact?

 

[nescafe]

Science has never answered a single metaphysical question in the entire time it has existed.

What makes these metaphysical questions that science cannot answer even relavent, except for giving us something to argue over and hone our command of the logical fallacies^W^W^W^W^W reasoning skills?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

What makes these metaphysical questions that science cannot answer even relavent, except for giving us something to argue over and hone our command of the logical fallacies^W^W^W^W^W reasoning skills?

Why is metaphysics relevant to mankind? Because mankind seeks answers. As Heidegger would put it: "Dasein (human, 'there-being') is a unique form of being in that it is ontically ontological." By this he means that it is an empirical (ontical) fact that human beings ask questions about the nature of being (ontological questions). Astrology could theoretically disappear tomorrow and nobody would neccesarily feel the need to re-invent it. But metaphysics is not so easily avoided - unless answers are provided for these questions people will continue to ask them forever more. If you try to eliminate metaphysics, somebody will neccesarily re-invent it.

 

[hammegk]

What makes these metaphysical questions that science cannot answer even relavent,...

Answering the question "Should we" rather than "Could we, Yes, and heeeeere's how".

 

[UndercoverElephant]

There is something about this statement that I really love. It's so much cleverer than "Science has never answered a single nonscientific question is the entire time it has existed." And it so well parallels "Philosophy has never answered a single scientific question in the entire time it has existed." Well, except back when science was philosophy.

~~ Paul

Science still is (a branch of) philosophy.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Then there isn't a mystery. Or, more precisely, there isn't any more of a mystery for materialists.

I have just explained to you why this defence doesn't work. You are appealling to the perceived weaknesses of other metaphysical positions in an attempt to defend materialism from its own weakness. This is not a valid argument. You are trying to say "but idealism can't be right...." as an attempt to defend materialism. It doesn't work.

Sorry, the fact that anyone thinks "consciousness is a fundamental existent" is somehow less mysterious than "consciousness is a product of brain function" is just silly.

This is irrelevant. You cannot cite perceived weaknesses with other positions in support of materialism. It doesn't work. Does undermining the Quran make the Bible any more true?

I'm not making materialism the default position. I'm saying that anyone who makes a claim about consciousness has the burden of proof for their particular claim.

There are a number of different ways in which this can be interpreted.

Scientists are working on the problem as we speak. Are there some idealist or dualist scientists somewhere working on their version of the problem?

There are some neutral monist scientists working on it, yes. Their names are Penrose and Hameroff.