Materialists......

[Kevin_Lowe]

Nobody will know what the problem is unless you actually state it. How am I supposed to know what this problem is from a disjointed and emotional rant like your OP?

That's Geoff in a nutshell.

He won't express his arguments clearly because they look stupid when expressed clearly. He can only express his arguments by making them as complicated and vague as possible, and then ranting about how he has made them crystal clear and if you can't understand it's all your fault.

Just state clearly, simply and precisely what you believe the problem to be. Leave out the ad hominem and the stuff about Jesus and fishes, it is not relevant.

He won't.

And if you claim that you have reason to believe that subjective experience is “over and above a physical process”, state your reasoning and define in which sense you are using the word “physical”.

He won't. He'll duck and weave with the usual rubbish about "What do you mean by physical? Isn't it obvious? Define all the hard terms for me, and then I'll drag the thread out a few more pages criticising your definitions, but I'll never post my own, because that would reveal that my definitions beg the question".

But don’t tell me it is stupid to claim that I don’t know what the problem if you refuse to state what the problem is.

Where's the fun for Geoff in that? He comes here to roleplay the martyred genius, not to communicate.

 

[nescafe]

Oh boy, did he bring up supervenience? Next thing you know, someone will say simpliciter.

~~ Paul

My $5.00 word of the day.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Oh boy, did he bring up supervenience? Next thing you know, someone will say simpliciter.

~~ Paul

Something like that, yes. There are two of those in this thread now (duplicates simpliciter.)

 

[Jeremy]

The following link may help:...You can not derive a statement about colors from any set of non-color statements...

What about spectra of light? You can make a color statements based on the electromagnetic radius.
In the same way that the color dichotomy is a false one, it seems to me that the mental/physical one is as well.

EDIT:

Yes, this helps. I wish Franko was here.

?

 

[hammegk]

I have posted many quotes on this site before to show that influential scientists are normally not materialists. Einstein was not, Hawking is not. I doubt, in fact, that any physicist is a materialist since if they knew precisely what was meant by “matter” they would be out of a job.

Indeed. The question then is "what the heck were they"? Dualists? Idealists? Some here are willing to agree material=not-material and act as though ontology is completely meaningless.

So let’s have no more of this nonsensical claim.

The nonsense is to claim you know what positions they held. Talk is cheap. I agree few appear to be materialists sfaik, but interactive dualism is non-sense.

Geoff thinks he has a viable alternative, and I think I do. I characterize his actual stance as material=not-material; mine is objective idealism.

If someone can provide me a logically defensible form of interactive dualism, I'll happily go back to being an interactive dualist.

 

[Robin]

Indeed. The question then is "what the heck were they"? Dualists? Idealists? Some here are willing to agree material=not-material and act as though ontology is completely meaningless.

Is it necessary for someone to have a label? Since Mach developed the philosophical position he did not label it. It has since come to be known as Positivism. Hawking labels himself a Positivist. I have posted quotes in the past from Einstein to show what his position was, I don't have the time or energy to keep posting these quotes since people keep getting it wrong.

The nonsense is to claim you know what positions they held. Talk is cheap.

Indeed it is cheap, luckily I have more, I let them talk for themselves.:
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/mach.htm
also:

"I . . . am a positivist who believes that physical theories are just mathematical models we construct, and that it is meaningless to ask if they correspond to reality, just whether they predict observations" (Stephen Hawking, "The Objections of an Unashamed Positivist," in The Large, the Small, and the Human, by Roger Penrose [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997], p. 169).

Einstein states that reality may be a meaningless concept (I don't have time to chase up these quotes an umpteenth time, especially since you ignored them last time). Ernst Mach's "The Analysis of Sensations and the Relation of the Physical to the Psychical" is generally regarded as being a seminal work in the field of philosophy of science.

I agree few appear to be materialists sfaik, but interactive dualism is non-sense.

Doubtless, but what relevance does it have to the philosophy of science?

Geoff thinks he has a viable alternative, and I think I do.

A viable alternative to what? What is the problem with Mach's position? With Hawkings?

I characterize his actual stance as material=not-material; mine is objective idealism.

I cannot see anywhere that Geoff has actually stated a position of his own, he merely criticises what he sees as other people's positions.

But I suppose as he believes that the mind supervenes on the physical brain that he is a supervenience physicalist, as defined in the Stanford Encyclopedia.

If someone can provide me a logically defensible form of interactive dualism, I'll happily go back to being an interactive dualist.[/QUOTE]

 

[UndercoverElephant]

EDIT:
?

Sorry, private joke for some of the old-timers. Franko was for a long time the most prolific poster on this board. His favourite three lines were:

Atoms OBEY the laws of physics.
You are made of atoms.
You OBEY the the laws of physics.

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?t=2209

 

[Z]

Has the distinguishment problem really been resolved, though? After all, a 'brain process' (or set, thereof) might feel exactly like a 'subjective experience' - in fact, that would be necessarily true, IF we accept the possibility that subjective experiences are a class of brain process.

So without knowing, for sure, which 'subjective experiences' are also 'brain processes' - possibly all of them - we cannot claim to distinguish between them by feeling.

Nor can we clearly distinguish between the sensation/qualia/feeling of a 'subjective experience' from a brain process (or set thereof), because, once again, all sensation/qualia/feelings may also be brain processes.

The only meaningful way to really distinguish between the two is if - and, with modern science, this is a big if - we can realize that subjective experiences are composed of numerous and different brain processes - that, for example, the subjective perception of 'red' is one process, the subjective perception of the brightness of that red is another process, and so on; so, just as we say we can distinguish a program from a subroutine, we might say that we can distinguish a subjective experience from a brain process. Yet since even subroutines are, themselves, programs, we may not be out of that loop yet.

In a way, the real problem - as I see it, anyway, and we all know I'm a moron - is that no matter how far you attempt to detach the notion of a subjective experience - a qualia, a feeling of 'what it is like', etc - you're still (if materialism is true) stuck with whatever the thing is being a brain process or set of processes. It's almost a catch-all mantra for physicalists - no matter what subjective quality you throw at them, they can reply with their catch-all term 'brain process'. It's little different, really, from the theists' standard reply of 'Goddidit' - it can cover anything and everything, no matter what.

And, in both cases, there's really no good defense against either, without first disproving the fundamental paradigm of either position. Which may, very well, be utterly impossible.

 

[davidsmith73]

Urgh. That is a sticky question. What about aspects of reality that can only be mathematically defined?

I would class mathematics as a language.

Could you try to define more explicitly "knowing the nature of..."

In this context, it would not be knowledge in the epistemological sense. It would be direct knowledge. Experience.

and could you provide an example, even if you can't be precise, of what you are driving at?

Redness

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Indeed. The question then is "what the heck were they"? Dualists? Idealists? Some here are willing to agree material=not-material and act as though ontology is completely meaningless.

I like to think Mercutio is in good company. See below.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Redness

What is this "redness" of which you speak? Can you define it? Can you specify when it occurs? How does it differ from the memory of a tomato? Is it the image of the color red in my mind, or is it the associations I have with red things? Why are you convinced this is not simply the result of brain processes?

~~ Paul

 

[Solitaire]

Another one of these threads!
Let's just skip to the end.

Subjective: dependent upon the mind or on an individual's perception for its existence.
Objective: not dependent on the mind for existence - actual, as in, a matter of fact.

Mental: the element of a person that enables them to be aware of the world and their experiences, to think, and to feel - the faculty of consciousness and thought.
Mater: relating to things perceived through the sense as opposed to the mind - tangible or concrete.

First Person: The one speaking.
Second Person: The one being addressed.
Third Person: A party neither being addressed nor speaking, and rather annoyed by the whole business.

Dualism: The claim that only matter and mind exist.
Idealism: The claim that only mind exists.
Materialism: The claim only that mater exists.
Realism: The claim that only real things exist.

(1) Internal Experiences (Effects) - Sensations
(2) External Things (Causes) - Stimuli

(A) 1 And 2 are not the same thing and should not be confused.
(B) 1 And 2 count for everything which exists.

(C) If real is defined as 1 then there exists a thing which isn't real - the world of causes, aka 2.
Conclusion: Idealism is false.

(D) If real is defined as 2 then there exists a thing which isn't real - the world of effects, aka 1.
Conclusion: Materialism is false.

(E) If real is defined as 1 and 2 then we find this an invalid option because it's just plain incoherent.
Conclusion: Dualism is false.

(F) If real is not defined in terms of 1 and 2 then nothing can meaningfully be described as real.
Conclusion: Realism is false.

Stick a fork in it, we're done.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

What is this "redness" of which you speak?

It is a property of an intentional object.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem/#3.3

Can you define it?

No. If I could do so, then it wouldn't be inherently subjective.

Can you specify when it occurs?

Yes. It is occuring right now when I look at the words "James Randi Educational Foundation".

How does it differ from the memory of a tomato?

It is perceptual. The memory of a tomato is not. When I imagine a tomato, there is no intentional object I can call a tomato. Remembering a tomato is not the same as hallucinating a tomato. When I hallucinate a tomato, this is also perceptual - the hallucinated tomato is an intentional object.

Is it the image of the color red in my mind.....

There are no "images of the colour red". There can be sensations of red. These can either be perceptual or non-perceptual.

, or is it the associations I have with red things?

No.

Why are you convinced this is not simply the result of brain processes?

Because no explanation has been offered as to how it could simply be the result of brain processes. As has been explained countless times already, the conclusion that minds are nothing over and above brain processes is forced upon the materialist because he has no other choice. It is logically inevitable that he must say this. But this does not give the materialist the right to claim that there is nothing mysterious about the fact that brain processes cause/generate subjective experiences. On the contrary, it is deeply mysterious, especially for a materialist. Materialists like to pretend that they can't see why anybody thinks there is a problem. What they actually ought to say is that even though it is very hard to explain how subjective experiences "arise" from brain processes, it still must be the case that they do.

I think the reason non-materialists can sometimes lose their patience with materialists is that they believe the materialists aren't being totally honest in this situation. To say that there is "nothing mysterious" about consciousness is a gross misrepresentation of the true situation. Indeed, it is the fact that consciousness provides such an intractable mystery from a materialistic point of view that the materialist feels the need to deny there is any mystery at all. Simply claiming that "I see no problem" is not a tenable position - some sort of attempt needs to be made to close the "explanatory gap". As hammegk put it, with reference to one Stimpson J Cat, claiming that you see no problem and trying to place the burden of evidence on the non-materialist is tantamount to sticking your fingers in yours ears and saying "Na Na Na, I can't hear you." Not much of a position, really.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Here is an explanation of the previous post, and the debate between disjunctivists and intentionalists.

As things stand, when we talk about "redness" we are unclear whether the redness is in our minds or on the surface of the tomato. This problem is particular acute for a brain in a vat because the BOV perceives a red tomato which doesn't actually exist. Therefore one might think that the redness must be in our minds. But it follows that the tomato is in our minds, and if a hallucinated tomato is in our minds then presumably when we percieve a real tomato, the tomato we directly percieve must also be in our minds - so direct realism has to be false. There are only two ways out of this:

1) Disjunctivism.

Disjunctivists deny that there is anything in common about the pyschological state of the BIV hallucinating a tomato and the pyschological state of a person veridically percieving a real tomato. The best that one can say, according to the dysjunctivist, is that when we think we perceive a tomato we are EITHER percieving a real tomato OR we are hallucinating a tomato. We can go no further. This either/or situation is called a "dysjunct", which is why the theory is called dysjunctivism.

2) Intentionalism.

Intentionalists say it is silly to claim that there is nothing in common between the psychological states of the BIV and the veridical perciever because they are in phenomenologically indistinguishable states. These states are also causal - if one hallucinates a tiger then one is likely to respond as if one percieved a real tiger, so the tiger is a cause of the same action in both cases. In which case, how can the dysjunctivist claim there is nothing in common between the two states? Clearly, they have a great deal in common. For the intentionalist, the object of awareness in both cases is an intentional object - it is the same psychological state. The only difference is that in one case (the veridical) there really is an object and the other (the BIV) there is no real object, only a "merely intentional object". But the intentionalist suffers no problems answering where the redness is. Redness is always a property of an intentional object (unless there are just raw sensations, in which case redness can just be a sensation - there is no object at all - as when you close your eyes and rub them and see red.)

 

[Arkan_Wolfshade]

It is a property of an intentional object.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem/#3.3

No. If I could do so, then it wouldn't be inherently subjective.

Yes. It is occuring right now when I look at the words "James Randi Educational Foundation".

It is perceptual. The memory of a tomato is not. When I imagine a tomato, there is no intentional object I can call a tomato. Remembering a tomato is not the same as hallucinating a tomato. When I hallucinate a tomato, this is also perceptual - the hallucinated tomato is an intentional object.

There are no "images of the colour red". There can be sensations of red. These can either be perceptual or non-perceptual.



No.



Because no explanation has been offered as to how it could simply be the result of brain processes. As has been explained countless times already, the conclusion that minds are nothing over and above brain processes is forced upon the materialist because he has no other choice. It is logically inevitable that he must say this. But this does not give the materialist the right to claim that there is nothing mysterious about the fact that brain processes cause/generate subjective experiences. On the contrary, it is deeply mysterious, especially for a materialist. Materialists like to pretend that they can't see why anybody thinks there is a problem. What they actually ought to say is that even though it is very hard to explain how subjective experiences "arise" from brain processes, it still must be the case that they do.

I think the reason non-materialists can sometimes lose their patience with materialists is that they believe the materialists aren't being totally honest in this situation. To say that there is "nothing mysterious" about consciousness is a gross misrepresentation of the true situation. Indeed, it is the fact that consciousness provides such an intractable mystery from a materialistic point of view that the materialist feels the need to deny there is any mystery at all. Simply claiming that "I see no problem" is not a tenable position - some sort of attempt needs to be made to close the "explanatory gap". As hammegk put it, with reference to one Stimpson J Cat, claiming that you see no problem and trying to place the burden of evidence on the non-materialist is tantamount to sticking your fingers in yours ears and saying "Na Na Na, I can't hear you." Not much of a position, really.

'nother newb question. Outside of the realm of philosophy, what is the value of recognizing "mind" and "brain processes" as seperate things? Does such an approach provide a functional advantage over a "mind=brain process" view?

 

[davidsmith73]

Can you define it?
~~ Paul

Since Geoff answered all your questions so well I won't add except for this one. As Geoff said, nobody can define a quality. And it is to this fact that I see materialists cling, as a defence of their position, which is absurd. Its like they are saying "see, you can't even define to me what you are talking about when you talk of this redness stuff!". Its what Dennet does to Chalmers, I think. So where does that leave us? In a deadlock. We can't even agree as to what it is we are talking about.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

'nother newb question. Outside of the realm of philosophy, what is the value of recognizing "mind" and "brain processes" as seperate things? Does such an approach provide a functional advantage over a "mind=brain process" view?

Outside the realm of philosophy, this stuff is irrelevant. But philosophy gets all over the place. It is certainly relevant to, say, the philosophy of science - and therefore indirectly it is relevant to science. It causes all sorts of problems for scientific pyschology, for example, which cannot decide whether or not mental things like "beliefs" should be considered to be causal. If you say they are causal then it looks like mental things are causing physical things, which sounds horribly like dualism. But if you say they are not causal, then how does one pyschologically explain why our mental states dominate our behaviour? It's minefield, basically.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

It is perceptual. The memory of a tomato is not. When I imagine a tomato, there is no intentional object I can call a tomato. Remembering a tomato is not the same as hallucinating a tomato. When I hallucinate a tomato, this is also perceptual - the hallucinated tomato is an intentional object.

So when I recall the memory of a tomato and re-experience the feelings related to it, that is not a quale? I thought it was.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

On the contrary, it is deeply mysterious, especially for a materialist.

It is equally mysterious for everyone, because no one has offered an explanation. Idealists think they offer one when they say "consciousness is a fundamental existent," but that is no explanation at all, but rather a lack of imagination.

I think the reason non-materialists can sometimes lose their patience with materialists is that they believe the materialists aren't being totally honest in this situation. To say that there is "nothing mysterious" about consciousness is a gross misrepresentation of the true situation. Indeed, it is the fact that consciousness provides such an intractable mystery from a materialistic point of view that the materialist feels the need to deny there is any mystery at all. Simply claiming that "I see no problem" is not a tenable position - some sort of attempt needs to be made to close the "explanatory gap". As hammegk put it, with reference to one Stimpson J Cat, claiming that you see no problem and trying to place the burden of evidence on the non-materialist is tantamount to sticking your fingers in yours ears and saying "Na Na Na, I can't hear you." Not much of a position, really.

But no one says that there is no mystery to be solved. What I say is that I think there is no problem with the mystery ultimately being solved as just brain function. If you say that consciousness is something else, then the burden of evidence is on you to justify your story. Meanwhile, I accept the burden of evidence and lay it at the feet of neuroscience, which gladly accepts it.

You could do the same for your position, but you appear to be taking the Interesting Ian approach that neuroscience cannot possibly offer an answer, regardless of the truth of the situation. In that case, I daresay you will never justify your story.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

So where does that leave us? In a deadlock. We can't even agree as to what it is we are talking about.

That is correct. You need to define what you are talking about well enough for the rest of us to go Aha! Of course this mysterious subjective experience thing must be something other than brain function. Otherwise, why would we agree that it is?

~~ Paul