Materialists......

[hammegk]

The mental representations are a formatted image of the external world. Detected by my eyes and other sensory organs, and processed by my brain. I already said that.


I don’t believe I claimed that. They are just as real as the image of this web site produced by your monitor. Quite unlike what the website truly is, but it is far more coherent. Also, like the image on your monitor, my mental representation is dependent on the processes and signals that produce it.


Yes, like the image on your computer monitor is only the final process of the striking the phosphor screen with an electron beam, or the uses of electric signals to align thousands of liquid crystals to allow for the passage of light. The image produced is nothing at all like the web page you are reading however. The real web page is magnetic impression on a small spinning metal or glass disk. It contains no letters, no numbers, and no images; it is completely intelligible to anyone in its physical form. It has taken a lot of changing and processing to produce what you can read and understand.

In my opinion, my experiences are not unlike an internal monitor within my brain. The images produced are simply my brain’s interpretation of the firing of neurons and such, not unlike the image on your monitor is produce by its interpretation of the electronic signal sent by your computer into an electron beam traced onto phosphor screen.

Are you an objective idealist too? I agree with all you said there (although there's a lot unsaid, too).

 

[Robin]

Positivism is the denial of metaphysics, and 100% acceptance of "the epistemological privilege of Science" to answer all questions worth asking.

It is not a denial of metaphysical questions at all. As soon as any metaphysical position can be shown to have an observable consequence then it will become knowable. If it has no observable consequence then on what basis do we claim to know it?

IOW, a copout by some of greatest minds and thinkers to avoid the question "Should we" (drop the themonuke, splice this gene 'there') etc.

It certainly is not. Russell was a positivist and campaigned tirelessly against the use of nuclear weapons. But science is descriptive, not prescriptive. Science tells us what will happen if we jump off the cliff, but leaves the decision whether or not to to us.

By the way, even arch materialist Richard Dawkins says that we can rebel against genetic imperatives, so not even the materialists avoid "should we" questions.

And it's a darn shame Mach isn't here to give his views in today's world, ...

He may not be here, but his influence continues in the philosophy of science, as shown by the Hawking quote.

...although I put him near if not firmly in the camp of materialists.

No, since materialism is a metaphysical position he is clearly not in that camp. However he does speak positively of the value of naive realism as the default philosophy of most people.

No more or less than any man's worldview will have on how he proceeds.

Well why did you bring it up then?

He declares himself to be a neutral monist.

And has promised to say what he means by it when he has completed his exams.

I think not.

He has asserted that the mind supervenes on matter. He has asserted that any possible God would be limited to what is physically possible.

If not a physicalist then he will do until one comes along.

And I still await an answer to: "If someone can provide me a logically defensible form of interactive dualism, I'll happily go back to being an interactive dualist."

You will be waiting a long time if you only ask it in this forum. I doubt there are any interactive duallists here at all.

Interesting Ian perhaps.

 

[hammegk]

It is not a denial of metaphysical questions at all. As soon as any metaphysical position can be shown to have an observable consequence then it will become knowable. If it has no observable consequence then on what basis do we claim to know it?

Do moral and ethical decisions have observable consequences?

It certainly is not. Russell was a positivist and campaigned tirelessly against the use of nuclear weapons.

A self-declaration of positivism may obscure other thoughts.

But science is descriptive, not prescriptive.

You and I agree on that. How about everyone else on the planet? I suspect 'prescriptive' is closer to it.

Science tells us what will happen if we jump off the cliff, but leaves the decision whether or not to to us.

"maybe" ....

By the way, even arch materialist Richard Dawkins says that we can rebel against genetic imperatives, so not even the materialists avoid "should we" questions.

I find that less than convincing, somehow, and of no particular use to this discussion. A self-declaration of materialism may obscure other thoughts.

No, since materialism is a metaphysical position he is clearly not in that camp. However he does speak positively of the value of naive realism as the default philosophy of most people.

I suspect he was actually a dualist, but we'll never know.

Well why did you bring it up then?

Do you disagree one's worldview determines at least some courses of action and thought?

He has asserted that the mind supervenes on matter. He has asserted that any possible God would be limited to what is physically possible.

No. That's one possibility materialists have to try to make sense of their position.

You will be waiting a long time if you only ask it in this forum. I doubt there are any interactive duallists here at all.

None that would admit it.

Interesting Ian perhaps.

I share that suspicion re II, although he vehemently denies it and asserts that his subjective idealism is a different critter.

 

[Robin]

Do moral and ethical decisions have observable consequences?

Yes and if I were taking an ethical decision science will be a great help to me in many cases.

A self-declaration of positivism may obscure other thoughts.

Yet it does not appear to have obscured any thoughts in Russell.

You and I agree on that. How about everyone else on the planet? I suspect 'prescriptive' is closer to it.

I suppose we would have to ask them. I have never heard of anybody that thinks science should be prescriptive, but I have heard the reverse many times.

The existence of ethics committees in almost all science faculties would suggest that scientists themselves like science to be descriptive not prescriptive.

I find that less than convincing, somehow, and of no particular use to this discussion. A self-declaration of materialism may obscure other thoughts.

Why?

I suspect he was actually a dualist, but we'll never know.

What would lead you to that suspicion? Since he never said or implied anything of the sort and quite unambiguously said otherwise, I thought the more rational suspicion would be that he was not a dualist.

Do you disagree one's worldview determines at least some courses of action and thought?

Yes I do, but are you suggesting that a sufficient proportion of the world's scientists are interactive dualists for this to have impact on the course of science. I would have thought that the proportion of scientists even entertaining this belief as an outside possibility would be vanishingly small.

No. That's one possibility materialists have to try to make sense of their position.

It is a possibility that Geoff has vigorously defended. He has unambiguously denies there can be any difference between logical possibility and physical possibility. I can't see how you could get more materialist than that.

I share that suspicion re II, although he vehemently denies it and asserts that his subjective idealism is a different critter.

I am sorry, I did not realise that II denied being a dualist. I cannot understand what his television analogy and defense of transmission theory was about unless to illustrate some aspect of dualism.

Perhaps I should just let him speak for himself.

 

[nescafe]

Then we are going to have trouble agreeing on the borders of science.

Paul Feyerabend agreed with you (from what I have read of him, which is not much), but saw that as one of science's strengths.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Sometimes I'm amazed your ego fits inside your skull.

Oh wait, maybe it's not inside your skull.

This was uncalled for. I apologize.

No, that was their attempt at an answer to the same question still being asked today. Science relegated that answer to the trash heap, and in doing so answered some other questions. The start of the scientific revolution is when somebody (Galileo, Newton) started looking for laws as to predict the behaviour of things, instead of asking "what things are". As a result, science opted out of the metaphysical part of the previous questions - and whilst it has proven very successful at answering the non-metaphysical "how does this happen" questions it pays the price of being theoretically unable to answer metaphysical questions. In other words it is the very strength of science for answering empirical questions which makes it incapable of answering metaphysical ones. However, it is a serious mistake to conclude from this that the metaphysical questions have gone away. That would be blatant scientism. Scientism bad.

Of course the questions haven't gone away. I daresay their relevance has, to a large degree.

The fact that science can't answer the "what things are" questions is telling. Can you make even a vague proposal about how some other method of investigation is going to answer those questions? If 3,000 years of logic hasn't managed to, and science can't, then what's left? I think there is a good chance that "what things are" questions are fundamentally unanswerable.

You can call me scientistic if you like, but I really don't see another tactic here. Fuzzy descriptions of idealist worlds, with consciousness as a fundamental existent, or Being = 0, or mathematical axioms tossed hither and yon, just aren't giving satisfactory answers. You look around, you ponder the world, you introspect, you blah blah bah and redefine every term, and when the day is done, all you can do to get any actual results is poke things and see how they behave. I see no benefit in adopting one of these term-fests as my personal metaphysic, because I still don't have any answers. There is no satisfaction in a (supposedly) logically consistent story.

I suppose if there is for others, then that is fine.

~~ Paul

 

[Robin]

Paul Feyerabend agreed with you (from what I have read of him, which is not much), but saw that as one of science's strengths.

Yes, if you were ever to define a border to science, scientists would immediately become much more interested in what was on the other side of the border.

But I can see no reason at all why the subjectiveness of experience should represent a border to science.

 

[hammegk]

Yes and if I were taking an ethical decision science will be a great help to me in many cases.

Please name an ethical decision you would invoke science to answer.

Yet it does not appear to have obscured any thoughts in Russell.

True, yet he been shown to be wrong about other things; his life's work one of them.

I suppose we would have to ask them. I have never heard of anybody that thinks science should be prescriptive, but I have heard the reverse many times.

Don't get away from the same-old same-old crowd much, huh?

The existence of ethics committees in almost all science faculties would suggest that scientists themselves like science to be descriptive not prescriptive.

! Yeah, you got it! Let's have a meeting. ROTFL.

What would lead you to that suspicion? Since he never said or implied anything of the sort and quite unambiguously said otherwise, I thought the more rational suspicion would be that he was not a dualist.

I haven't run across his denial of the 'psyche'. If I'm wrong, no harm done sfaik.

Yes I do, but are you suggesting that a sufficient proportion of the world's scientists are interactive dualists for this to have impact on the course of science. I would have thought that the proportion of scientists even entertaining this belief as an outside possibility would be vanishingly small.

They don't even admit it to themselves. They act as if they are "materialists".

It is a possibility that Geoff has vigorously defended. He has unambiguously denies there can be any difference between logical possibility and physical possibility. I can't see how you could get more materialist than that.

Interesting that we come to such different conclusions. Enough from me re Geoff's philosophy.

I am sorry, I did not realise that II denied being a dualist. I cannot understand what his television analogy and defense of transmission theory was about unless to illustrate some aspect of dualism.

Enough from me re II, too. He does have the courage of his convictions, unlike too many here.

Perhaps I should just let him speak for himself.

Agree.

 

[nescafe]

Are you an objective idealist too? I agree with all you said there (although there's a lot unsaid, too).

Based on a quick scan of the topic, Objective Idealism has no more explanatory power than materialism, and is a heck of a lot more confusing.

Replacing "minds are mysterious because the patterns of chemical and electrical discharge in the brain are really, really complicated" with "minds communicate by some ill-defined means and thoughts that are coherent among those communicating minds define consensual reality" does not seem to be a giant leap forward in understanding -- it is just replacing a mechanism that (while not explicable right now) is becoming more and more explicable with one that does not appear to have any means of explanation beyond what is in the definition.

 

[I less than three logic]

Are you an objective idealist too? I agree with all you said there (although there's a lot unsaid, too).

Honestly, I don’t know what I would be classified as. Most of these philosophy terms you all are using make little sense to me. I don’t give it much thought I guess. I’m just here stating my opinions for the time being.

 

[nescafe]

But I can see no reason at all why the subjectiveness of experience should represent a border to science.

Neither can I, and I don't think JustGeoff is arguing that either. I don't think science explaining the subjective experience will falisfy Neutral Monadism or Objective Idealism, but that is because I do not think there is anything they cannot be made to explain (and yes, I do think that is a flaw).

 

[hammegk]

Based on a quick scan of the topic, Objective Idealism has no more explanatory power than materialism, and is a heck of a lot more confusing.

In terms of epistemology, it shares the same ground as materialism.

Replacing "minds are mysterious because the patterns of chemical and electrical discharge in the brain are really, really complicated"

For minds associated with what we perceive as neural systems, true also for objective idealists.

with "minds communicate by some ill-defined means"

The typing on my screen appears well-defined. Maybe you're having a computer problem.

Again, think 'perceived neural systems'.

it is just replacing a mechanism that (while not explicable right now) is becoming more and more explicable

And regarding those minds/perceived neural systems, same answer again.

I don't agree with "thoughts that are coherent among those communicating minds define consensual reality"; say what?

 

[Robin]

Please name an ethical decision you would invoke science to answer.

For example “Should a pregnant woman take pill X to help alleviate the adverse effects of pregnancy”. Science would be needed to tell you what the effects of the pill would be.

Again “Should I drop an atomic bomb on Hiroshima?”. Perhaps if science had told Truman more about the lingering after effects of radiation he might have thought twice.

How about “What can be done about poverty?”. Surely science can have an input there? Agricultural science if nothing else.

True, yet he been shown to be wrong about other things; his life's work one of them.

It is a bit like saying that Newton was shown to be wrong about his life’s work because of relativity and QM, or that Einstein was shown to be wrong about his life’s work by QM.

There is nothing wrong with having been shown to be wrong about something.

Goedel theorems built upon the PM. If Russell and Whitehead had never attempted it, it would never have been shown to be impossible.

And PM has much value even if it is uncompleteable. Much of modern mathematics and logic depends upon Russell and Whitehead’s work.

Don't get away from the same-old same-old crowd much, huh?

Well I have (from memory) discussed this with, let’s see, Christians, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, Atheists, Agnostics, Satanists, followers of Rajneesh and Guhu Maharajee. I have discussed it with factory workers, postal workers, bank workers, university academics, unemployed layabouts, carpenters, park rangers.

I have read the conservative columnists and the left wing columnists and those in between. I read the metaphysicians, the ethicists, the political philosophers, the positivists and even foolishly attempted to read the existentialists and semioticians.

I have never come across anyone who has ever expressed the view that science should be prescriptive. Never.

Who did I miss? Perhaps you can link someone who believes science should be prescriptive?

They don't even admit it to themselves. They act as if they are "materialists".

I suspect there is times that you will act as though you were a materialist.

 

[nescafe]

I don't agree with "thoughts that are coherent among those communicating minds define consensual reality"; say what?

Trying to rip the concept of God out of this sentence (found on the first website I linked to -- the word "quick") and what it implies:

The permanence of objects occurs because they exist as ideas in the universal mind of god, and are maintained by the will of god (Schopenhauer’s impersonal will ). The transience of my mental images is due to the restlessness of my mind ; my will is not powerful enough to maintain my images. The factor of will is the factor that Berkeley ignored.

 

[davidsmith73]

That is correct. You need to define what you are talking about well enough for the rest of us to go Aha!

I don't need to. It is only the blind materialists who insist on a definition before debate proceeds. But one cannot be given by virtue of the nature of quality so the debate doesn't go anywhere.

Anyway, I would have thought the word "redness" would be enough for evryone to go Aha! Did not Wittgenstein even pass this first hurdle?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I don't need to. It is only the blind materialists who insist on a definition before debate proceeds. But one cannot be given by virtue of the nature of quality so the debate doesn't go anywhere.

Are you sure it's just blind materialists, and not more likely people who realize that a debate on undefined terms is meaningless? If, in fact, it is impossible to define the terms well enough for everyone to agree, then perhaps there is another debate that ought to take place first.

Anyway, I would have thought the word "redness" would be enough for evryone to go Aha!

It's enough for people to agree that they see red, can recall memories of red, and that a tomato is red. It is nowhere near enough for people to draw conclusions about the metaphysical reality of red.

I, for one, am not demanding definitions just to be a hard-ass. In fact, I'm happy to begin a debate about qualia or whatever without definitions, as long as I can stop part way through and point out that we could go in one of many possible directions depending on what you actually mean by some term. Otherwise it's just a Postmodern merry-go-round.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Neither can I, and I don't think JustGeoff is arguing that either. I don't think science explaining the subjective experience will falisfy Neutral Monadism or Objective Idealism, but that is because I do not think there is anything they cannot be made to explain (and yes, I do think that is a flaw).

Or, looked at another way, there is nothing they explain at all. The only way metaphysics will explain anything is when, someday, someone works out the logic of all the metaphysical models and demonstrates that only one of them is logical and the rest are flawed. Then I will gasp and shake my head and express my amazement.

~~ Paul

 

[Arkan_Wolfshade]

For example “Should a pregnant woman take pill X to help alleviate the adverse effects of pregnancy”. Science would be needed to tell you what the effects of the pill would be.

Again “Should I drop an atomic bomb on Hiroshima?”. Perhaps if science had told Truman more about the lingering after effects of radiation he might have thought twice.

How about “What can be done about poverty?”. Surely science can have an input there? Agricultural science if nothing else.
...

You can also use scientific method to address moral/ethical questions by the use of fuzzy logic.

Taking your first example; you would apply values of risk to the pregnancy on a scale (age of fetus 1 day to 9 months, or risk factors that the drug could effect, etc) and determine if the benefits outweigh the risks.

Your second example is a very good one for highlighting how science can affect a ethical decision. It took the science of understanding the effects of the bombs to be dropped, not only physically, but psychologically (on the Japanese), and sociologically (on the US and her allies).
Now, I suppose it could be argued that doing so is just looking at supporting data but that science itself is not the deciding factor of the ethical decision; but I tend to lean towards the idea that more information helps you make better choices.

 

[hammegk]

When did "Science" subsume math and logic? I missed the memo.

 

[davidsmith73]

Are you sure it's just blind materialists, and not more likely people who realize that a debate on undefined terms is meaningless?

Both! This is the only debate that can have meaning on the basis of an undefined term. No debate is possible on the direct knowledge of quality itself, but debate can progress with direct knowledge of the term in place. Qualitative experience is direct knowledge. There is no possibility of error on their nature.

(all this is very much my thoughts in progress)

If, in fact, it is impossible to define the terms well enough for everyone to agree, then perhaps there is another debate that ought to take place first.

I don't understand. What debate?

Just because it is impossible to define the terms, doesn't mean that we can't know what we are refering to by the word "quality". I know exactly what the word is refering to. The only way you can progress is to examine direct knowledge, which is not knowledge of physical things but of qualitativeness.

It's enough for people to agree that they see red, can recall memories of red, and that a tomato is red. It is nowhere near enough for people to draw conclusions about the metaphysical reality of red.

I think you miss the point. There is no "conclusion" drawn about the nature of quality. It is direct knowledge.

I, for one, am not demanding definitions just to be a hard-ass. In fact, I'm happy to begin a debate about qualia or whatever without definitions, as long as I can stop part way through and point out that we could go in one of many possible directions depending on what you actually mean by some term.~~ Paul

This seems a contradiction. If you are happy to start the debate without a definition of quality then I assume you know what we are talking about (have direct knowledge?). So why would you demand definitions half-way through the debate? The truth of what we are talking about, in your experience, has been established before that point, or it seems from what you have said.