Materialists......

[Crispy Duck]

Geoff,

I'm not sure what you mean by this. How can one subjectively distinguish between subjective and objective?

I think this is at the heart of the whole debate here. I don't agree with you that Paul's statement is that same as saying that there is only one concept. Paul was (I believe) making that same point that I'm making - that there is no *subjective* difference between "having a brain process" and "having an experience" - either (a) they both feel exactly the same or (b) one or other doesn't ever happen. We could never go into a lab and ask a subject to press button A when they have a subjective experience and button B when they have/feel/experience a brain process. Brain processes aren't subjectively accessible, although they can be objectively measured, and without them it would be "dark inside".

I'm honestly at a loss as to what the big deal is...?

 

[hammegk]

Why would you say the chance is slim? I am sure you know how far we are from explaining things completely... I think there is plenty of room for other stuff.

Agreed. Some of the problem arises just trying to define 'libertarian free-will' as something actually differing from "compatabalistic free-will."

Behaviorists can argue that materialism allows changes to the brain wiring/progamming/whatever solely by public and private behavior, rather than more more directly as libertarian free-will implies to me.

I "choose " to act as if free-will is a given, and hope that it is libertarian.

From time to time I wonder about the causal efficacy (regarding changes in one's own wiring/programming) of what the religious deem prayer. It would seem to me materialists have no similar course of action that would not be hypocritical.

 

[DreadNiK]

Even this is enough. There are two conceptual perspectives on it. These two can be distinguished, very easily.

This whole argument came about because somebody in another thread tried to claim that he "really had no idea what I meant by 'inherently subjective'". Well, I hope he's reading this, and I hope he now has some idea. The subjective perspective is inherently subjective. QED. That is all I wanted to establish. Nevertheless, it was still like extracting teeth to get (some of) the materialists to admit even this. The real problem, of course, is that this is the top of a very slippery slope.

Fine, we agree on this. I never held that we didn't, I merely addressed the points that were raised, the main one being that I disagree with the dismissal of someone as a 'total idiot' because they aren't quite careful enough with their phrasing for your liking at all times. I still think there is no value to be found here.

 

[rocketdodger]

From time to time I wonder about the causal efficacy (regarding changes in one's own wiring/programming) of what the religious deem prayer. It would seem to me materialists have no similar course of action that would not be hypocritical.

I am violently anti-religious so I would prefer the phrase "what the spiritual deem meditation."

 

[DreadNiK]

From time to time I wonder about the causal efficacy (regarding changes in one's own wiring/programming) of what the religious deem prayer. It would seem to me materialists have no similar course of action that would not be hypocritical.

Well what about people who give themselves inspirational speeches in front of mirrors. I'm sure they exist outside of movies and TV. A materialist could still believe (enough for the purposes of explaning this 'rewiring' that confidence or whatever will improve their chances of whatever they pray for. Obviously neither method will work when applied to say, praying for the safe return of a missing person or whatever.

 

[DreadNiK]

Geoff,

I'm honestly at a loss as to what the big deal is...?

I tend to think that statement is an indicator that someone has reached a point they believe further philosophy discussion on is nothing more than navel-gazing.

 

[hammegk]

I'm honestly at a loss as to what the big deal is...?

It would depend on your answer to the question; "What is more real to me, my perceptions, or choosing to accept they don't exist other than as an in-animate physical world complex system computation is all that exists?".

 

[Arkan_Wolfshade]

I tend to think that statement is an indicator that someone has reached a point they believe further philosophy discussion on is nothing more than navel-gazing.

Perhaps a Mel Brooks reminder is in order

Dole Office Clerk: Occupation?
Comicus: Stand up philosopher.
Dole Office Clerk: What?
Comicus: Stand up philosopher. I coalesce the vapors of human existence into a viable and meaningful comprehension.
Dole Office Clerk: Oh, a ******** artist!

 

[Crispy Duck]

I tend to think that statement is an indicator that someone has reached a point they believe further philosophy discussion on is nothing more than navel-gazing.

I'm not sure how to interpret that, DreadNiK In this case, it's an indicator that this whole thread seems to be about whether 3+3 makes six, or half-a-dozen, although I'm still not sure if I've understood it properly. Geoff's extraordinary vehemence seems to indicate that he thinks that Paul and I (amongst others) are victims of some hugely important fundamental misunderstanding, but I really can't see it.

 

[Crispy Duck]

It would depend on your answer to the question; "What is more real to me, my perceptions, or choosing to accept they don't exist other than as an in-animate physical world complex system computation is all that exists?".

Well, my answer to that particular question would be "what on earth are you going on about?"... but I'm sure you could re-phrase it to be intelligible.

 

[nescafe]

Geoff - let's say that, by some freak of nature, I woke up this morning without any brain processes. Would I know that I had ceased to have brain processes? Is this question relevant to your point, or am I still misunderstanding the point you're trying to make?

You would be a lump of dead meat.

Perhaps you meant "Let's say that, by some freak of nature, I woke up this morning without any subjective experience. Would I know that I had ceased to have subjective experiences?", which, as a sentence is meaningless and points at the need for some sort of non-self-referential definition of a subjective experience.

Trying to break subjective experience down into units like qualia I do not see as ultimatly useful because it either leads to some form of mind-matter dualism (which is generally fairly easy to disprove via proof-by-contradiction) or some form of idealism (the varieties of which I have looked at generally end up defining themselves in terms of what they are not (specifically, not materialism or naturalism)). Similarly, defining "mind" as "that which is built from subjective experience" does not help either.

For now, I will just note that we do not have an answer right now, but we are learning more about what the functional units of the brain are and how they work together, and that will lead to better and better theories of what the Self is and how sensory input and memory turn into subjective experience.

Why yes, I have read rather alot of Dennet.

(humor added)

 

[I less than three logic]

Wow, busy thread.

Thankyou, ILT3L, you have passed the "I'm not completely stupid" test, regardless of your name.

Well, I’m glad I’ve passed your test. However, I’m afraid you have not passed mine. My name makes perfect sense; you simply have to connect the dots.

I’m afraid I haven’t read most of the responses yet. I’ll have to take some time to do so before adding anything else, well that is if I see a reason to after seeing where this goes.

 

[DreadNiK]

I'm not sure how to interpret that, DreadNiK In this case, it's an indicator that this whole thread seems to be about whether 3+3 makes six, or half-a-dozen, although I'm still not sure if I've understood it properly. Geoff's extraordinary vehemence seems to indicate that he thinks that Paul and I (amongst others) are victims of some hugely important fundamental misunderstanding, but I really can't see it.

Well for me this thread is for clarifying my philosophies by having to express them and potentially have them challenged. My main problem was the ridiculous arrogance displayed.

In any case, all I feel has been said/agreed is "Two different concepts are two different concepts, in this case, the concept of the mind is different from the concept of brain process, even though in reality A may be nothing more than than a concept, whereas B is observable."

And to that, I say: So what?

I'm not sure that is entirely accurate, but my So What? still holds. The main point here of asking that, rather than for pedantry or anything else, is that if it makes no difference to anything, you can hardly call people 'total idiots' for not having considered the question enough to phrase their position as carefully as you'd wish, and then equate them with creationists. That is called being arrogant and probably trolling.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Geoff,



I think this is at the heart of the whole debate here. I don't agree with you that Paul's statement is that same as saying that there is only one concept. Paul was (I believe) making that same point that I'm making - that there is no *subjective* difference between "having a brain process" and "having an experience" - either (a) they both feel exactly the same or (b) one or other doesn't ever happen. We could never go into a lab and ask a subject to press button A when they have a subjective experience and button B when they have/feel/experience a brain process. Brain processes aren't subjectively accessible, although they can be objectively measured, and without them it would be "dark inside".

I'm honestly at a loss as to what the big deal is...?

"Brain processes aren't subjectively accessible" is what matters. Subjective experiences are always subjectively accessible.

Perhaps I should provide some context. The two people who claimed they "had no idea" what the difference between these two things/perspectives is are both people who are veterans of previous encounters with myself on this site. During those encounters they learned that once you allow the definition of things like "inherently subjective experiences" then you are letting yourself in for serious problems down the line because people can then use those definitions to offer logical proofs against materialism. So instead of accepting the distinction they decided to try to cut off the argument at its source by denying they had any idea what "inherently subject experience" could possibly mean. To anyone who is not aware of these consequences, it must seem extremely bizarre indeed that anyone would deny that they knew how to distinguish between a subjective experience and a brain process.

It is in fact very easy to show why there must be inherently subjective things. We have two concepts "subjective experience" and "brain process" . Now, pretty much everyone agrees that with a sufficiently advanced neuroscience we ought to be able to track down the exact brain process which is responsible for a particular set of experiences. At this point we still have two concepts, but they map onto each other in such a way that they look like they could be "the same thing". But, crucially, there is still two of them and now it can be stated that the only difference between them is that one of them is objective and the other is subjective. Therefore it follows, logically, that the subjective experience is inherently subjective. It must be, because if it were not so then there really wouldn't be any way to distinguish between them - they would be absolutely identical.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I'm not sure that is entirely accurate, but my So What? still holds. The main point here of asking that, rather than for pedantry or anything else, is that if it makes no difference to anything, you can hardly call people 'total idiots' for not having considered the question enough to phrase their position as carefully as you'd wish, and then equate them with creationists. That is called being arrogant and probably trolling.

This troll was the person that asked for a philosophy forum to be put here in the first place, the week this website opened for business. There is a lot of history between myself and Paul. He has had five long years and many thousands of posts (this is my third incarnation on this board) to "consider the question", and this had much to do with why I reacted to his post so vehemently. If he was a person I'd never encountered before I would have been a lot softer on him. Basically, he knew precisely what he was doing. He was trying to make out he "really doesn't understand" something he understands very well indeed. Yes, I went in with all three feet. He asked for it.

 

[nescafe]

It is in fact very easy to show why there must be inherently subjective things. We have two concepts "subjective experience" and "brain process" . Now, pretty much everyone agrees that with a sufficiently advanced neuroscience we ought to be able to track down the exact brain process which is responsible for a particular set of experiences. At this point we still have two concepts, but they map onto each other in such a way that they look like they could be "the same thing". But, crucially, there is still two of them and now it can be stated that the only difference between them is that one of them is objective and the other is subjective. Therefore it follows, logically, that the subjective experience is inherently subjective. It must be, because if it were not so then there really wouldn't be any way to distinguish between them - they would be absolutely identical.

Which seems to be the whole zombie/zimboe argument all over again.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Which seems to be the whole zombie/zimboe argument all over again.

I don't agree. Perhaps you'd like to explain it. To be honest, Dennett drives me up the wall - and I'm not the only one. What is particularly annoying is his tendency to invent his own terminology for things I have no referents for - like "the phenom", "heterophenomenology", "the brain minds", the list is endless. I have just completed a course in the philosophical foundations of cognitive science and I think it is fair to say that of all the philosophers we studied during that time, it was Dennett whose position was the most obscure. "Is Dennett a Realist about mental states?" was one of the questions on the exam paper. The answer is that after twelve months of studying him (among others), I don't have a clue. His position is so opaque as to be close to meaningless, and it is probably fair to say that most of the other people in the class felt the same way. What does Dennett mean by "intentional"? I have no idea. Is he a realist about mental states? No idea. Not because I haven't tried, but because he is a bad writer and half the time I'm not even sure that Dennett himself really understands what he is trying to say half of the time. I strongly suspect the same is true of "Zimboes", but do go ahead, I'm listening.

 

[LordoftheLeftHand]

To be honest, Dennett drives me up the wall - and I'm not the only one. What is particularly annoying is his tendency to invent his own terminology for things I have no referents for - like "the phenom", "heterophenomenology", "the brain minds", the list is endless.

Isn't that the job of a philosopher? Or is it to just think deep thoughts about being unemployed?
LLH

 

[nescafe]

I don't agree. Perhaps you'd like to explain it. To be honest, Dennett drives me up the wall - and I'm not the only one. What is particularly annoying is his tendency to invent his own terminology for things I have no referents for - like "the phenom", "heterophenomenology", "the brain minds", the list is endless. I have just completed a course in the philosophical foundations of cognitive science and I think it is fair to say that of all the philosophers we studied during that time, it was Dennett whose position was the most obscure. "Is Dennett a Realist about mental states?" was one of the questions on the exam paper. The answer is that after twelve months of studying him (among others), I don't have a clue. His position is so opaque as to be close to meaningless, and it is probably fair to say that most of the other people in the class felt the same way. What does Dennett mean by "intentional"? I have no idea. Is he a realist about mental states? No idea. Not because I haven't tried, but because he is a bad writer and half the time I'm not even sure that Dennett himself really understands what he is trying to say half of the time. I strongly suspect the same is true of "Zimboes", but do go ahead, I'm listening.

Wish I had time right now, but this thread has eaten too much of my productive time at work today. This website, though has a neat (if idiosyncratic) summary of Dennett's views (it does not explain the intentional stance well, though).

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Wish I had time right now, but this thread has eaten too much of my productive time at work today. This website, though has a neat (if idiosyncratic) summary of Dennett's views (it does not explain the intentional stance well, though).

Yeah, clear as mud. As one of the people contributing to that page summarises brilliantly:

Disciple: Dan, I've absorbed and internalised your theory and at last I really understand and believe it fully. But recently I've been having a difficulty.

Dennett: What's that?

Disciple: Well, I can't seem to adopt the intentional stance any more.

Dennett: Wow. It's really very simple. Deep breaths now. Look at the target (use me if you like). Now just attribute to me some plausible conscious states and intentions.

Disciple: But... What would that be like? What are conscious states? For you to have conscious states just means I can usefully deal with you as if you had ... conscious states. I seem to be caught in a kind of vicious circle unless I just somehow know what conscious states are...

Dennett: Steady now. Just think, what would I be likely to do if I had the kind of real, original intentions which people talk about? How would things with intentions behave?

Disciple: I have no idea. There are no things with real intentions. I'm not even sure any more what 'real intentions' means...

The response to this little piece of comedy was "yes, you have to give up some cherished notions to understand Dennett". The trouble is, the "cherished notions" he is asking me to give up actually make sense, and Dennett doesn't.

If you cannot explain something clearly, you probably do not understand it. I do not believe Dennett understands consciousness, and what he has explained is, to me, clear as mud.