Materialists......

[Ichneumonwasp]

"Mental actions" clearly meant "physical actions" because it turned out to mean "stuff the brain does."

Um, no. I happen to believe that mental actions result from stuff the brain does, but not everyone believes that.

Look, this discussion arose because you and Paul were discussing the p-zombie. You guys ended up describing several mental phenomena. You siad that the end result of Paul's conjectures was that he must accept the existence of mind. I only offered another alternative, which was based on what you guys were discussing. You discussed mental phenomena, so you should conclude that mental phenomena exist, mental action exists. I expressly mentioned, I think, that this might be the result of mind, or it might not. Whether or not I view mental phenomena as the result of brain's doing their thing has no bearing on the validity of the observation. The observation stands. There is simply more than one way to interpret the information. It may imply mind. It may not. Simple as that. No question begging.

Time to let this one go, Geoff.

It was just introduced into the argument as a conclusion.

No it wasn't. In science we do this all the time -- introduce other potential explanations for data. It was just that, plain and simple.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Geoff we can go at this all day and night and then some and probably get no closer to any closure.

Really? let's see.

First things first, I did not beg the question in my statement about what mind is because I was not trying to prove that mind is a collection of actions. The only thing that I said was that there was another way of looking at the issue that differed from yours -- so it did not follow that Paul must accept that there is a mind. That is all. I gave a counter example. Nothing more and nothing less.

You've just done it again, even in the act of denying you are doing it. Paul IS bound to accept there is a mind, because the first half of the zombie argument goes out of its way to support the definition of mind used in the zombie argument. There is a line of reasoning to support the definition of mind being used. You do NOT provide any line of reasoning to support yours. Instead, you have just done the following

1) You suggest an alternative conception of mind, which is "a collection of physical actions".

2) You then claim that this means it is legitimate for Paul to reject the definition of mind being used in the zombie thread.

Between them, this is a clear case of question-begging. (1) establishes the alternative definition of mind WITHOUT SUPPORTING IT. (2) claims that this definition of mind allows Paul to reject the one in current use WITHOUT OFFERING ANY REFUTATION OF THE LINE OF REASONING SUPPORTING IT.

That is question begging.

So to cut to the chase -- do you contend that awareness is an epiphenomenon?

No, but the zombie argument does and so do supervenience theories of materialism.

You seem to think that the p-zombie argument leaves you with consciousness as an epiphenomenon and you seem to think that awareness = consciousness.

No. The p-zombie argument attempts to refute materialism. It doesn't neccesarily leave you with epiphenomenalism.

Frankly I don't see why any materialist should think twice about the p-zombie if it amounts to an epiphenomenon within a thought experiment.

It refutes materialism, that ought to catch a materialists attention, don't you think? A bit like this thread does.

In other words, it is a thought experiment that goes nowhere and proves nothing. There may, at best, be some epiphenomenal "thing" called consciousness that cannot be detected, has no extension, has no effect, etc. In other words, it is non-existent. So why is this "proof" so important?

If anything, it's an argument against epiphenomenalism. It certainly doesn't prove it. And as a final note, epiphenomenalism does not claim that mind doesn't exist.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Because Wasp's statement wasn't supported by a previous set of arguments. The zombie argument is supported by a linguistic argument that is very hard to refute, unless you want to rewrite the dictionary.

The linguistic argument does not require that I accept that mind is the sort of thing that is separable from the physical, except perhaps conceptually at the same level of analysis that the folk mental terms bring to the table. I agree that there are folk mental terms and that they are folk conceptually different from folk physical terms. I might even agree that folk zombies are conceivable.

~~Paul

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

1) You suggest an alternative conception of mind, which is "a collection of physical actions".

Um, no. What I said was that one alternative is that there is no such thing as mind, only a collection of mental actions.

(1) establishes the alternative definition of mind WITHOUT SUPPORTING IT.

Sure it supports it. It says that mind may not exist and all we have is a collection of mental actions. This isn't difficult.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

You've just done it again, even in the act of denying you are doing it. Paul IS bound to accept there is a mind, because the first half of the zombie argument goes out of its way to support the definition of mind used in the zombie argument.

I have no idea what it is that I'm bound to accept. We have not discussed the first half of the argument, except to label a fool anyone who doesn't buy it.

The second half of the argument was worthless, because we were already required to agree that the mind is nonphysical.

~~Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Um, no. I happen to believe that mental actions result from stuff the brain does, but not everyone believes that.

Weebles wobble but they don't fall down!

You are wobbling about all over the place. First we have a clear definition of mind. Then it goes via "mental behaviours" to "mental actions" and "mental" turns out to mean "stuff the brain does". When you are caught question-begging for this redefinition of mental to physical, you retreat to claiming "mental actions RESULT from stuff the brain does", wobbling back into ersatz-dualism. What does "result" mean? Are we back to a meaningless "is"? Are you defending dualism? Do you have any idea what position you are actually defending, because I've got no idea what it is. Lastly you qualify it with "but not everyone believes that". Sure. I know what it is that I believe. I don't wobble backwards and forwards between dualism, eliminativism and supervenience positions on mind.

Look, this discussion arose because you and Paul were discussing the p-zombie. You guys ended up describing several mental phenomena. You siad that the end result of Paul's conjectures was that he must accept the existence of mind. I only offered another alternative, which was based on what you guys were discussing.

NO it wasn't. It was based on adding a new premise to the discussion which involved an assumption of a different meaning of the word "mind". Allowing that definition to stand would cause the argument to collapse, but you've done nothing to justify its inclusion. You didn't support it. Neither did you attempt to refute the argument that supports the existing definition of mind. So even though you may not have realised what you were doing, you were begging the question. You were attempting to assume a conclusion which contradicted the result of the zombie argument (which is "minds are non-physical). You then claimed this was a valid means of avoiding the conclusion "minds are non-physical". It isn't. It's question-begging, common garden variety.

You discussed mental phenomena, so you should conclude that mental phenomena exist, mental action exists.

Sure, provided "mental action" means "minds" as they are being used in the zombie argument and not "physical stuff" as you want them to mean. As soon as "mental action" means "brain action", you've begged the question. If it doesn't mean "brain action", it doesn't make any difference to the zombie argument anyway.

I expressly mentioned, I think, that this might be the result of mind, or it might not. Whether or not I view mental phenomena as the result of brain's doing their thing has no bearing on the validity of the observation. The observation stands. There is simply more than one way to interpret the information. It may imply mind. It may not. Simple as that. No question begging.

Time to let this one go, Geoff.

You think so do you? I don't. I've spent YEARS on this board being told by people who did not understand what question-begging is that I was question-begging when in truth I was doing no such thing and they blatantly WERE. Not this time. This time is different. This time Robin tried to do it and he got caught out by LW. I saw my chance to nail it once for all and that is what is going to happen.

No way am I going to let this one go. Who do you think I am, Hannibal after the Battle of Cannae?

No it wasn't. In science we do this all the time -- introduce other potential explanations for data. It was just that, plain and simple.

This is not science. It is philosophy. Either you will play by the rules of philosophy and logic or all you are doing is spamming my thread with scientism.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

The linguistic argument does not require that I accept that mind is the sort of thing that is separable from the physical, except perhaps conceptually at the same level of analysis that the folk mental terms bring to the table.

I'm not sure exactly what this means or implies. Specifically I don't know what the italicised phrase means.

I agree that there are folk mental terms and that they are folk conceptually different from folk physical terms. I might even agree that folk zombies are conceivable.

~~Paul

That's more progress. Folk zombies are good enough for me.

When Nagel argues that zombies are conceivable, he means folk zombies. Please note that the term "folk psychology" was invented by materialists, and then claimed to be "a wrong theory". Now, I don't think it is a wrong theory, but everybody knows what the words "folk psychology" refer to - it is handy shorthand for "all the mentalistic words in the dictionary". Basically, I am fairly certain I am able to defend the claim that folk pyschology is not a theory, and therefore cannot be a wrong theory, and provided I can do this then "folk zombies" are all we need to agree about. Without folk psychology, the p-zombie argument fails for exactly the same reason it can't refute eliminativism. Eliminativism eliminates folk psychology. It was labelled "folk psychology" by eliminativists who want to eliminate it.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Um, no. What I said was that one alternative is that there is no such thing as mind, only a collection of mental actions.

Wobble.

Now you are defending eliminativism. This like trying to nail jelly to a wall. What are you, wasp? An eliminativist, a supervenience physicalist or a dualist?

Sure it supports it. It says that mind may not exist and all we have is a collection of mental actions. This isn't difficult.

Yes, but it's not what you defended five minutes ago, which in turn wasn't what you defended ten minutes ago. The zombie argument cannot refute eliminativism. You did not advocate eliminativism in your original question-begging. You claimed minds were "mental actions", now you are claiming there are no such things as minds.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I have no idea what it is that I'm bound to accept. We have not discussed the first half of the argument, except to label a fool anyone who doesn't buy it.

The second half of the argument was worthless, because we were already required to agree that the mind is nonphysical.

~~Paul

At which point? Have you gone back to defending Robins accusation that the zombie argument begs the question when it defines a zombie? That claim was debunked by LW, and he did it with style.

And I don't know about you, but I have been extensively discussing the linguistic parts of the zombie argument today. See post #2934.

 

[Robin]

With respect to "assuming your conclusion", the structure was exactly the same.

I already pointed this out. The Socrates syllogism does not assume it’s conclusion, yours did. Here it is again:

(a) P-zombies are physically identical to humans but mindless.
(b) Humans have minds.

And the conclusion that we get is "minds are non-physical". Have we now committed the fallacy of assuming our conclusion? By the reasoning you used above, we have. Because if we add the sentence:

(c) Everything is physical.

(a) P-zombies are physically identical to humans but noseless.
(b) Humans have noses.

And the conclusion that we get is "noses are non-physical". Have we now committed the fallacy of assuming our conclusion? By the reasoning you used above, we have. Because if we add the sentence:

(c) Everything is physical.

Perhaps LW would like to comment.

 

[RandFan]

I'll take a discussion/debate with Geoff and Merc, Paul and others over lifegazer any day. Where oh where is stimpy?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Then it goes via "mental behaviours" to "mental actions" and "mental" turns out to mean "stuff the brain does".

You know Geoff, I really don't want to have to call you an idiot, so please pay attention this time.

What I said was that there was an alternative to the idea that Paul must accept "mind" as the result of the previous conjectures. The alternative is that there is no such thing as "mind" as an integrated phenomenon, rather that there may simply be mental behaviors. You objected to the phrase mental behaviors and had a hissy fit thinking I was trying to pull in some behaviorism behind your back. So I changed the wording to action. It doesn't matter to me what the term is, since it is just a label. Mental actions does not necessarily mean what the brain does. For the original argument it doesn't matter what the underlying cause for mental actions is, only that there may simply only be mental actions that we can see. The existence of mental actions does not necessarily imply an integrated "mind". That was the only point. The fact that I think that mental actions result from the workkings of the brain is neither here nor there as far as that discussion goes. If you cannot see the line of reasoning and want to create some strawman characterization that never existed, then go right ahead. Frankly I have better things to do with my time.

Yes, but it's not what you defended five minutes ago

Yes it is, Geoff. I cannot help what you read into my statements. Have a nice life.

You claimed minds were "mental actions", now you are claiming there are no such things as minds.

I claimed then that one option is that what we call mind may not be, but that there is simply a bundle of mental behaviors, to which you objected out of hand, etc. etc.

Now you are defending eliminativism.

Christ, Geoff, for the last time, I'm not defending anything. I'm offering another alternative to counter your claim that Paul must accept that we have minds. That is all.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I already pointed this out. The Socrates syllogism does not assume it’s conclusion, yours did. Here it is again:

Perhaps LW would like to comment.

And as I already answered you (to a deafening silence, welcome back BTW), it is a false analogy for the very simple reason that :

"(a) P-zombies are physically identical to humans but noseless."

...is false according to absolutely everybody, because noses are obviously physical.

So it's not like the socrates example and not like the zombie example. Your example involves a premise to which nobody will agree. The other two do not.

LW will tell you exactly the same thing.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I'll take a discussion/debate with Geoff and Merc, Paul and others over lifegazer any day. Where oh where is stimpy?

Hey, Randfan. Glad to know the audience appreciates the entertainment.

And I've got my name back!

 

[RandFan]

Hey, Randfan. Glad to know the audience appreciates the entertainment.

And I've got my name back!

I noticed, cool. Keep it civil and I assure you that it is really more than just entertainment. It is very much appreciated. Though I lean against you I have an open mind and will pay close attention to your arguments.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

You know Geoff, I really don't want to have to call you an idiot, so please pay attention this time.

Believe me when I tell you I am playing very close attention to what gets posted in this thread.

What I said was that there was an alternative to the idea that Paul must accept "mind" as the result of the previous conjectures. The alternative is that there is no such thing as "mind" as an integrated phenomenon, rather that there may simply be mental behaviors.

This is just gobbledegook. Which bit of the gooked sentence am I supposed to read.....? "there is no such mind" or "mind is not an integrated phenomenon" or "there may only be mental behaviours". You are now wobbling in and out of eliminativism in the space of a single sentence. I have no idea whether you are trying to say "there is no such thing as a mind" or "there are such things as minds but they are a non-integrated phenomenon" or "there are mental behaviours which are brain processes". I really don't have any idea what position you are actually trying to defend. If I attack eliminativism, you turn into a reductionist. If I attack reductionism you morph back into defending eliminativism. Then you end up saying things which try to sound like both at the same time, even though they contradict each other.

You objected to the phrase mental behaviors and had a hissy fit thinking I was trying to pull in some behaviorism behind your back. So I changed the wording to action. It doesn't matter to me what the term is, since it is just a label.

Good. Can we use "mind"? You know....the word that already means "mind"?

Mental actions does not necessarily mean what the brain does.

Wibble. Then what do they mean?

For the original argument it doesn't matter what the underlying cause for mental actions is, only that there may simply only be mental actions that we can see. The existence of mental actions does not necessarily imply an integrated "mind". That was the only point.

The fact that I think that mental actions result from the workkings of the brain is neither here nor there as far as that discussion goes. If you cannot see the line of reasoning and want to create some strawman characterization that never existed, then go right ahead. Frankly I have better things to do with my time.

I cannot follow your line of reasoning because it keeps wobbling backwards and forwards all over the place. I think you need to work out which position you are actually defending and then try to consistently defend it.

Christ, Geoff, for the last time, I'm not defending anything.

That's fairly clear, yes.

I'm offering another alternative to counter your claim that Paul must accept that we have minds.

Which, in the context of the zombie argument, was question-begging. You offered an alternative. That alternative just happened to be the negation of the conclusion of the zombie argument. So it was not a valid alternative for Paul to simply adopt that definition of mind because had he done so, he would have been question-begging.

It's no different to a creationist coming along in the middle of a debate about evolution and telling somebody already involved in the debate that he doesn't need to accept the evidence from evolution because he has another alternative to offer - intelligent design. And "If intelligent design is correct, then evolution is wrong, right?" WRONG.

 

[hammegk]

You know Geoff, I really don't want to have to call you an idiot, so please pay attention this time.

ROFL.

.... The alternative is that there is no such thing as "mind" as an integrated phenomenon, rather that there may simply be mental behaviors.

What is a "mental behavior"?

Cheer up and define it; I really don't want to call you an idiot, either.

 

[Robin]

So you are saying there is no contradiction between "Everything is mortal" and "Socrates is mortal". You are correct, there isn't. So what?

Er.. the conclusion of the Socrates argument is "Socrates is mortal" the negation of that is "Socrates is not mortal"

The premise is still perfectly consistent even after adding the negation of the conclusion.

So what? If the conclusion is a logical consequence of the premise, the name for that is "assuming your conclusion".

So you are now saying that if you assume your conclusion (minds are physical), then you get a contradiction.

No, I am saying that if the conclusion logically follows from the premise then that is called "assuming your conclusion"

And it doesn't in either the zombie or socrates examples. It only does so IF you ADD the conclusion as a premise, like you keep trying to do but LW and myself do not.

On the contrary this was precisely what LW did in his original analysis of the arguement.

In predicate calculus a formula f is a logical consequence of a set S of formulas if and only if f is true in all models of S. That is, if all premises are true, then f has to be true also. There is a nice theorem that states that f is a consequence of S if and only if the set of formulas that we get by adding the negation of f to S is inconsistent.

So, we add the negation of our desired conclusion to the set of propositions and check what happens.

Now clearly if we add the negation of the conclusion to the premise and we get an inconsistency then the conclusion is a logical consequence of the premise.

And you also add the negation of the conclusion, look, you just did it here. My conclusion was noses are not physical. But you argue that my premise is not sound be because noses are physical :

Yes, but with (a) and (b) we STILL have not assumed our conclusion!!! It is a perfectly valid argument. It just isn't sound because one of the premises is clearly wrong because if p-zombies are physically identical to humans then they clearly do have noses.

They only have noses if noses are physical.

You are assuming that noses are physical. Just as you accuse me of assuming that consciousness is physical.

Now I never assumed that consciousness was physical. I simply said that it might be.

You appear to be saying that

Similarly, you should have challenged the premise "zombies are possible", NOT accused me of assuming my conclusion.

I don't challenge the premise because I am challenging the defintion.

Does a noseless person prove that noses are non-physical? No of course not.

Does a person without consciousness prove that consciousness is non-physical? No of course not.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

At which point? Have you gone back to defending Robins accusation that the zombie argument begs the question when it defines a zombie? That claim was debunked by LW, and he did it with style.

You're right, we aren't required to accept that mind is nonphysical. We are required to accept that mind is separable from the rest of a human.

From the reading I've done in the past week, I would never have gotten the idea that this is all just a linguistic argument.

~~Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

The premise is still perfectly consistent even after adding the negation of the conclusion.

I'm not sure what you mean here. Can you show the argument?

No, I am saying that if the conclusion logically follows from the premise then that is called "assuming your conclusion"

In all logical arguments, the conclusion follows from the premises. I can't quite get a grip on when question begging occurs, but apparently only when you literally include the conclusion as a premise. The funny thing is that, in the papers I've read recently, I see things like "this is very close to begging the question." Does question begging come in shades of gray? If so, then this zombie argument is very close to begging the question.

~~Paul