Is vegetarianism arbitrary?

Perhaps "harm" is a more precise term to use, as suffering obviously conjures up images of prolonged torture. Feel free to replace any previous use of the word "suffering" by me with "harm" if it will clear up the crossed-purposes we appear to have been talking at.

Harm is interference with current or future interests. This brief summary of the principle of Nonmaleficence might be useful, although it acknowledges that harm is tricky to define.

I happen to think that being killed can be termed to be undergoing harm, even if the process of death is painless.

I said this in response to another poster, but I think it's relevent here. How is it a harm to deprive an organism of something they have no concept of? A cow has no understanding of future life, its existence is merely subsistent. A humane slaughter is no different from that animal going to sleep and not waking up. Humans understand death and potential events in a way no other animal can. Prematurely killing a human deprives them of something they know exists, prematurely killing a cow just means one less day of eating and crapping. Only suffering should be avoided with respect to animals.
 
1) Not at all - because, as I said, the methane production of a cow is similar no matter how it is raised, and the CO2 levels used are always higher than well-planned methods of raising the same number of calories in vegetables.

It's not a problem for me at all. Fewer cows means fewer greenhouse gases. It's a trivially simple sum.




2) I read the abstracts. Now, the key point here is that if a cow is able to sense and express fear, it means it has a sense of future time. It is capable of understanding that a future existence without pain is better than one in pain, and by extrapolation that an existence alive is preferable than one dead. This suggests to me, and to those who have studied this issue (like Peter Singer, for example) that cows and other livestock have a stake in their own future existence, and thus your propositions that "they don't care" or "they don't know any different" don't add up. If cows were as incapable of expressing future interests as you claim, they wouldn't show fear - which, by definition, is an expression of future interests.



No, I'm not. You, on the other hand, are engaging in some rather deft use of things like special pleading.

Hilarious that you would accuse me of special pleading...ironic.

1) All animals excrete some level of methane. Does that mean we should kill all animals and only let vegitation exist? Or are there a certain number of animals that are actually healthy for the environment? Would methane excretion be an issue if there were no feed-lots?

You are making a somewhat silly argument holding that because too much of something causes a problem we shouldn't have any of it. A proper amount of grazing animals and free-range meat production are healthier for the environment, even though those animals produce methane, than none at all. Again, all you've done is offer studies that show certain practices are suspect and used that to condemn all instances of meat production. This is just a pathetic argument. What would take the place of free-range ranching to keep the plains healthy?

2) You are deriving a hell of a lot from very little. A cow can sense IMMEDIATE pain. Over time they can become trained to a schedule, so they will exhibit a fearful response each day at the time a careless farmer comes to milk them painfully. This is not evidence that they understand the future, it is simply Pavlovian rutinization. Cows do not have any sense of impending death while eating grass on an open prairie. If you've branded them with an iron, they may become fearful if they see fellow cows in pain or the offending item is brandished in front of them, but the are incapable of more complicated thought processes.

"...if a cow is able to sense and express fear, it means it has a sense of future time. It is capable of understanding that a future existence without pain is better than one in pain, and by extrapolation that an existence alive is preferable than one dead." This is an awe-inspiring leap of judgment. An organism that avoids pain doesn't necessarily have a concept of life and death. You're simply describing an evolved harm-avoidance faculty. That requires no understanding in the same way that you immediately pull your hand from a fire. You don't need to understand much about fire to pull your hand away, it is simply eons of evolution that caused flame-avoiding organisms to pass on their genetics.
 
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Hilarious that you would accuse me of special pleading...ironic.

1) All animals excrete some level of methane. Does that mean we should kill all animals and only let vegitation exist? Or are there a certain number of animals that are actually healthy for the environment? Would methane excretion be an issue if there were no feed-lots?

You are making a somewhat silly argument holding that because too much of something causes a problem we shouldn't have any of it. A proper amount of grazing animals and free-range meat production are healthier for the environment, even though those animals produce methane, than none at all. Again, all you've done is offer studies that show certain practices are suspect and used that to condemn all instances of meat production. This is just a pathetic argument. What would take the place of free-range ranching to keep the plains healthy?

If we take it as a moral precept that we should take steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, we should switch from meat to vegetable diets wherever feasible. Our dietary choices have the most immediate impact on our environmental "footprints", and they are the most simple to change. Where is the moral case for continuing a destructive behaviour? You've yet to make one.

Everything else you've said here is a ludicrous strawman - where have I suggested that we should "kill all animals"?!


2) You are deriving a hell of a lot from very little.
Not at all.

Your entire argument that killing is not harm is, as you yourself admit, predicated an a presupposition that cows do not have future interests. That they can, and do, exhibit fear shows that they have future interests, and thus depriving them of life is harmful and therefore unethical.

Hoist by your own petard, I'm afraid.

Cows do not have any sense of impending death while eating grass on an open prairie. If you've branded them with an iron, they may become fearful if they see fellow cows in pain or the offending item is brandished in front of them, but the are incapable of more complicated thought processes.
It is not about the "complexity" of the thought processes, it is simply about understanding that you cannot simultaneously argue both that cows suffer from cruel behaviour and that killing them is not harmful, as the two propositions rely on radically oppositional ethological frameworks.

If hurting a cow is cruel, it is cruel because the cow is aware, on some level, of pain - that is, it has an interest in carrying on existing into the future with no pain. If your suggestion is that cows have no future interests, then you cannot simultaneously argue that inflicting suffering on them is wrong. The two positions are logically incompatible.

This is an awe-inspiring leap of judgment. An organism that avoids pain doesn't necessarily have a concept of life and death. You're simply describing an evolved harm-avoidance faculty. That requires no understanding in the same way that you immediately pull your hand from a fire. You don't need to understand much about fire to pull your hand away, it is simply eons of evolution that caused flame-avoiding organisms to pass on their genetics.
Yes, I do not dispute that, so much. What I do dispute is that fear and pain indicate (indeed, prove) that the cow is self-interested (consciously or not, "evolved" or not) in it's own preservation and continuation of life, and therefore killing it is harmful in the same way (moreso, perhaps) than simply injuring it. The cow doesn't need a concept of life or death, it just needs a sense that it has future interests - because it is interference in interests which, I would argue, defines harm.

We agree that harming animals unnecessarily is bad, correct. We just disagree on two key points. The first is that eating meat is necessary - that is trivially easy to refute, given that I am not dead. The second is that, by your definition, killing does not constitute a harm.

By what measure can you argue that inflicting pain is harmful, but killing is not? I have argued (with a number of ethicists) that harm is, by definition, the interference in current and future interests. Both pain infliction and killing fit this definition. How would you definite "harm" such as to include pain infliction but exclude killing?

It is your contention that killing does not constitute a harm. The ethologic framework you yourself are working within says that it is.
 
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I'm more hardline. I don't eat anything with a face.

I used to be that pure, but now I only rule out faces my mother would love. I ate some shrimp recently. My mother would have not loved their faces.
So,

no bunnies for me, for sure. other predators can have them, including Bill.
 
1) If we take it as a moral precept that we should take steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, we should switch fro meat to vegetable diets wherever feasible. Our dietary choices have the most immediate impact on our evironmental "footprints", and they are the most simple to change. Where is the moral case for continuing a destructive behaviour? You've yet to make one.

Everything else you've said here is a ludicrous strawman - where have I suggested that we should "kill all animals"?!


2)Your entire argument that killing is not harm is, as you yourself admit, predicated an a presupposition that cows do not have future interests. That they can, and do, exhibit fear shows that they have future interests, and thus depriving them of life is harmful and therefore unethical.

Hoist by your own petard, I'm afraid.

It is not about the "compexity" of the thought processes, it is simply about understanding that you cannot simultaneously argue both that cows suffer from cruel behaviour and that killing them is not harmful, as the two propostions rely on radically oppositional ethlogical frameworks.

If hurting a cow is cruel, it is cruel because the cow is aware, on some level, of pain - that is, it has an interest in carrying on exisiting. If your suggestion is that cows have no future interests, then you cannot simultaneously argue that inflicting suffering on them is wrong. The two positions are logically incompatible.

Yes, I do not dispute that, so much. What I do dispute is that fear and pain indicate (indeed, prove) that the cow is self-interested (consciously or not, "evolved" or not) in it's own preservation and continuation of life, and therefore killing it is harmful in the same way (moreso, perhaps) than simply injuring it. The cow doesn't need a concept of life or death, it just needs a sense that it has future interests - because it is interference in interests which, I would argue, defines harm.

It is your contention that killing does not constitute a harm. The ethlogic framework you yourself are working within says that it is.


1) I never said YOU wanted to kill all animals. I was taking the logic of your argument at pushing it to the extreme. You argued that vegetariansim is preferable to eating meat because cows excrete methane. So do all animals. According to you lowering greenhouse gases is always good, therefore we should kill all animals. It would reduce greenhouse gases.

And here's my argument for ending destructive behavior, as you put it: meat originating from free-range ranching does not harm the environment. In fact, it is good for the environment, therefore when I support that institution I am acting morally with respect to the environment. The fact that other meat comes from environmentally destuctive means has no bearing on free-range alternatives.

2) First, I did not say that cows do not have future interests. In a strict sense, of course they have future interests. If they need to eat now, they will need to eat in the future. The question is whether cows understand the concept of future life such that depriving them of a few years causes them pain.

Exhibiting fear shows nothing more than pain avoidance/the need to survive at the given instant. In fact the complete lack of fear they show while impending death hangs over their head is solid evidence that they lack the concept in question. If I wave fire in a cow's face, they experience fear. If I beat a cow consistently it will be afraid of my presence. If I tend to its needs, feeding and healing the animal, it shows NO consciousness of a coming slaughter. I would love for you to show me that a cow has knowledge of a coming slaughter more than a fraction of a second before it happens. Even when it's happening, they don't really realize it.

A cow hates pain for pain's sake. It's desire to continue living is a genetic urge to pass on genes. A single celled organism feels pain and the need to survive in the sense you are describing. Put a lethal agent near an amoeba and it will recoil. Are you going to extend the same ethical demands to the trillions of single-celled organisms you unwittingly butcher each day?

Only humans have an understanding of what a shortened life means. We are the only animals conscious of our ultimate deaths. Here's an experiment: If you have a kid, grab it, if not run down to the local playground. Go up to the kid, hit it with a stick and say, "I'm going to hit you again in a week." Now go to a cow, hit it with a stick and try to explain that the beating will be repeated in a week. Only humans will be able to understand what's coming and be scared for the week. The cow will be momentarily pained, then go back to eating.
 
Here's a question for the meat eaters here:

Can you make a positive claim for eating meat? For what reasons is a meat based diet better than a plant based one? All the discussion so far has been quibbling as to the things we veg[etari]ans see as problematic with meat eating. I'm interested in hearing the positive case for meat eating - in what way can meat eating for the average Western consumer be justified?
 
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Its what they serve in the restaurants. Its what's advertized. Its kind of gay and un-patriotic to not be in on it. If you eat tofu, I will kick your ass, right after I finish my moose steak, you homo.

Tofu has become such a laughing stock of a word, I won't admit to eating it anymore.
 
1) I never said YOU wanted to kill all animals. I was taking the logic of your argument at pushing it to the extreme. You argued that vegetariansim is preferable to eating meat because cows excrete methane. So do all animals. According to you lowering greenhouse gases is always good, therefore we should kill all animals. It would reduce greenhouse gases.

I'm not sure if you're actually serious here.

We have to eat. We have two choices - one is demonstrably more environmentally destructive than the other. What possible moral case can be made for picking the more destructive one?

Let's not hear any strawmen about "killing all animals", because that is manifestly not my argument, nor even a version of it, at all.

And here's my argument for ending destructive behavior, as you put it: meat originating from free-range ranching does not harm the environment. In fact, it is good for the environment,
That is manifestly, demonstrably false, as the links I already provided suggested.


2) First, I did not say that cows do not have future interests.
Yes, you did. I'm typing without a mouse, so excuse me if I don't copy|paste, but you certainly did handwave objections that killing constituted harm because cows did not care what happened in their future, a fact that is easily disproven. I am glad you are now distancing yourself from it.


In a strict sense, of course they have future interests. If they need to eat now, they will need to eat in the future. The question is whether cows understand the concept of future life such that depriving them of a few years causes them pain.
They can understand the concept of the future - the exhibition of fear demonstrates that. An organism cannot express fear if it does not have a sense of its future interests. Cows exhibit fear, thus is has future interests. It doesn't have to "know", in a rational sense, that they are being "deprived of a few years" - they just have to have a concept that the future exists, and that they would prefer (if "prefer" is the correct word for the type unconscious behaviour at play here) to continue into that future unharmed.

Exhibiting fear shows nothing more than pain avoidance/the need to survive at the given instant.
It's not the "given instant", is it? Fear is a concept that demonstrates a sense of time, future time. It is anticipation of a future event - and thus any defence that you wish to mount that killing is not harmful because "the cows don't have a sense of the future" is demonstrably, empirically wrong.


A cow hates pain for pain's sake. It's desire to continue living is a genetic urge to pass on genes.
I would, of course, not argue with this. But a cow does not just flinch from pain. It actively suffers.

Why is inflicting pain bad, by your understanding? The cow doesn't understand what's going on, lives in a perpetual present with no sense of the future, and has no self-awareness of its predicament.

A single celled organism feels pain and the need to survive in the sense you are describing. Put a lethal agent near an amoeba and it will recoil. Are you going to extend the same ethical demands to the trillions of single-celled organisms you unwittingly butcher each day?
No, because amoebas are clearly less aware than cows. And their recoil is not properly called "pain" anyway, because pain requires a nervous system. And ameobas do not have future interests.

If it is your argument, however, that the pain reaction is analagous between cows and ameobas, shouldn't you be going to the same ethical demands as you do for cows? After all, you think factory farming is bad because it causes suffering, and that bovine and ameobal suffering are the same!

You're demolishing your own argument, in other words.

Only humans have an understanding of what a shortened life means. We are the only animals conscious of our ultimate deaths.
Cow's do not need to be "conscious of their ultimate deaths" for killing them to be harmful. They just need to have a sense of self in time, and a preference for future existence.

Your initial argument was was that killing is not harmful because cows do not have a sense of the future. The impliction, of course, was that if they did have a sense of the future, it would be harmful - because most ethical systems acknowledge that future interests are key considerations when considering levels of harm.

Cows have a sense of future time, so your initial argument that killing is not harmful because cows don't care about the future is thus invalidated. Would you care to present another argument as to why killing is not harmful that is not empirically wrong? Please define "harm" (and explain why it is bad) in a way that includes pain infliction but excludes death.
 
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See, what'd I say earlier about carrots? Always with the carrots.

Are you really that dumb or are you involved in some kind of Andy Kauffman bit? Paris Hilton purchased an animal that was domesticated thousands of years ago. She didn't save it from nature...

OK, so Paris Hilton did not save her dog from nature. Taking that explicit position can you now explain your original offending remark, which I reproduce here:

I, as a farmer/rancher, have exerted my unique human gifts to remove animals from the unmitigated horror of nature and tend to their needs.

How are your self-described noble efforts different than Hilton's?

the first group of nomadic hunter-gatherers to take in the more docile wolves that eventually became Chihuahuas did. Yes, they rescued those animals from what otherwise would have been a dangerous existence in nature.

Ah, so nomadic hunter-gatherers saved Chihuahuas from the "dangerous existence of nature." Do you think about these things before you say them because it's rare to find such a bad case of foot-mouth disease, even on these forums. Chihuahuas would not exist if not for the intervention of human beings. Please, if you're going to attempt to condescend at least have the dignity of not being spectacularly wrong.

On why nature works as a moral baseline:
Because that is the state animals would exist in without human intervention... Maybe you're arguing they never would have existed. This is true with respect to any given instance of a contemporary domesticated animal, but without domestication SOME animal would live.

So here we have three sentences. The first is your original claim, the second is my counter and the third is your new counter-counter and I'm afraid I cannot characterize it in favorable terms. Here's the thing: even with domestication there are still animals in the wild, suffering. You need to somehow demonstrate that animals are somehow transported from the ravages of the wild onto your utopian free-range farm; that free-range farming serves as, well, a welfare program. What you're saying is just too obtuse for words.

And I would love to hear your explanation of this mystical third way that isn't domestication and isn't life in the wild.

It's already been mentioned a couple of times. Do you recall where Volatile said you could raise animals as pets? If domestication is so good for the environment and sustainability, then we could form a cooperative pact. Of course, that sounds ridiculous because it is: the real reason animals are domesticated is not to provide them a refuge, not to maintain the balance of ecosystems, but to slaughter and consume them.


Some of what follows is in Volatile's above reply, but I'll make a few comments, ask a couple of questions.

Jones is a human, therefore what he is being deprived of is human life. A cow's life is much different in the same way that a cow's life is of a different value than a carrot's. The actual act of killing, though, caused Jones no suffering. I would like to see you explain how and why depriving Jones of his life caused him suffering. It is equally likely that Jones was about to have his bone cancer diagnosed and the murderer saved him 20 years of tortorous pain. Understanding death in those terms is just silly. The value of human life is not gauged in a suffering/happiness distinction because we are capable of higher thought. Unlike any other animal we can view suffering as a means to an end, or simply an aspect of life that must be endured. For an animal pain and suffering are ends of themselves, they have no faculty of higher thought. A caretaker's only standard of care with respect to an animal is to limit pain and suffering. There is no need to attend to the higher faculties imposed on those animals by rediculous people like you.

I did not say killing Jones causes "suffering"; I said it "constitutes a harm." I don't see how the bone cancer scenario helps your case, or what case you're trying to make. I would like to know how and what "higher faculties" are morally necessary for what I'll call a right-to-life. This standard of yours introduces problems you probably did not anticipate: the status of mentally disabled humans, children, fetuses. I'm not sure how you can so glibly privilege the "higher faculties" you seem to resent, but let's imagine two scenarios for Jones and his immediate interests. One involves presenting a lecture on justice-as-impartiality and the other involves ****ing a Brazilian supermodel's brains out. After doing each which do you think Jones is more likely to remark, "I could die happy"?

Now, now, don't get a big dick, I'll agree a life of deep meaning is -- for lack of a better word -- more meaningful than one based on, um, base pleasures. The film Groundhog Day makes a convincing enough case. But what you're saying is that the pleasures experienced and anticipated by non-humans are trivial, which somehow empowers you to kill them to satisfy more exalted ends, such as enjoying a hamburger. That's hubris. It's also arbitrary because for some reason you lend significant weight to animal suffering. Interests are a two-way street. Why should I give a crap about cow's pain?

Unless you're honestly arguing that the relationship between Jones and his murderer is no different from a cow and its farmer (which seems to be your level, so I shouldn't be surprised), the analogy is useless. A cow does not look forward, does not have plans that a murderer thwarts, does not have any emotion but the base need to eat and crap. It isn't wrong to deprive an organism of something of which they have no concept.

What kind of plans are necessary? I'm pretty sure babies (and most toddlers?) don't have plans, so are they fair game?
 
Volatile, you should try the "more hunting opportunities" for cretins approach to your veganism. You should get some points for not competing for the meat. You have nothing to defend.

But can you fast?
The ability to fast is one of the big pluses of a good diet.

You can feel good without food, for many days. Weeks, even. That is a real edge, at least psychologicly.
 
Cue "humans are different" and "don't you dare compare humans and cows", whilst at the same time accusing the vegetarian of requiring irrational, moralistic, metaphysical or even quasi-religious premises to support his arguments.
 
For what its worth, technology might answer this dilemma.
Meanwhile, those inclined away from killing animals will find themselves on the defense, which is bizarre.

Its difficult to endure what seems like primitive behavior in your friends and country-men/women.

I wish you the best in circumventing all this, while you enjoy a sane diet.
 
The Atheist

It's really just so silly and boring and adolescent.

You seem to be having enough fun with Trane Wreck that I'll just leave you to it.

When you find the box marked "clue", get back to me.

Here's a question for the meat eaters here:

Can you make a positive claim for eating meat? For what reasons is a meat based diet better than a plant based one? All the discussion so far has been quibbling as to the things we veg[etari]ans see as problematic with meat eating. I'm interested in hearing the positive case for meat eating - in what way can meat eating for the average Western consumer be justified?

Iron. If you're a meat eater, it's very unlikely you'll need to even bother considering iron intake, while vegans must do in some way or other.

Bowel cancer. Think of all the millions of pension dollars saved by all the meat eaters who burn the bejesus out of their barbecues.

Taste. Sorry, but there is no taste in the world which matches a perfect blue fillet steak. (All taste being personal, of course)

Cue "humans are different" and "don't you dare compare humans and cows", whilst at the same time accusing the vegetarian of requiring irrational, moralistic, metaphysical or even quasi-religious premises to support his arguments.

It must be time to introduce the old standby for all vegan threads:

A Modest Proposal
 
There is no who. That doesn't mean we can't reason about the effects of various decisions.
No, but it does make it clear that we cause no real harm by failing to bring people into existence. At worst, we fail to bring about the best possible world, with the greatest number of mostly happy people (or animals) in it. But that's not a moral good that many of us are prepared to consider binding upon us, and I've yet to see a satisfactory treatment of this problem, which is one of the most difficult challenges facing modern moral philosophers (see Derek Parfit's repugnant conclusion, for example), so it raises my eyebrows a little to see it described as 'simple'.

To bring it back to meat, I've posted that if given the choice between living and becoming food at 35 (and I'm 42 now), or never existing, I'd choose the former
To apply this line of reasoning to contemporary decisions about the future is to beg the question by granting concrete existence to hypothetical entities that do not yet exist, resolving the very issue at hand in favor of virtual people. Of course you'd advocate for your continued existence, because you already exist, and presumably would like to keep it that way. But as someone in the here and now looking forward, rather than someone in the future looking back, I can't settle the matter by assuming that the person (or pseudo-person, or whatever) I'm thinking about creating already exists, and that they therefore ought to have some say in the matter. I'll deal with any pushy time travelers when the problem presents itself. (Hopefully I won't have to entertain simultaneous visitors from alternate futures. "You have to get on that plane to Paris, otherwise you'll never meet my mother and I'll never have been born!" "No, you have to stay home! Otherwise you'll never meet my mother, and I'll never have been born!")

I extrapolate from that and feel that a happy cow destined for eventual slaughter is not a bad thing.
Setting aside the problems involved in lending real interests to imaginary people, this creates a yet more convoluted chimera: the cow who isn't capable of understanding itself in these terms thinking about how beastly it would be for the person it isn't never to have not existed. I don't think it's worth taking seriously.

Besides, what about Davis' small animals killed in crop production? Presumably there's a reason they hang out around cultivated land. Do they have generally decent lives prior to being killed by a thresher? Would there be fewer of them if we emphasized pastures instead? Funny how they're forgotten as soon as they're no longer rhetorically useful.

Much of the reasoning on this question seems decidedly goal-oriented. "You mean I'm already doing the best possible thing? Great, awesome." As Cain points out, these arguments work against morality in general, and are only brought to bear where we don't like the results on offer from application of well-worn principles.
 
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No, but it does make it clear that we cause no real harm by failing to bring people into existence.
I made no such claim. My claim is that it is a net good to bring a cow into the world.

But that's not a moral good that many of us are prepared to consider binding upon us,
I'm not sure of your point. I am not arguing that we are morally obligated to bring cows into existance, just that if we do, it's a net good.

so it raises my eyebrows a little to see it described as 'simple'.
I redact 'simple'.


Setting aside the problems involved in lending real interests to imaginary people, this creates a yet more convoluted chimera: the cow who isn't capable of understanding itself in these terms thinking about how beastly it would be for the person it isn't never to have not existed. I don't think it's worth taking seriously.
The question we (I) am trying to answer is, "is it good to live, even if we end up as food". My answer, for myself, is yes. Getting tangled up over time travel, can you kill your mother, etc., misses the point. Is it good to live, even if we end up as food. I say yes. I'm willing to extrapolate that to a less conscious creature, such as a cow. Arguing that we can't time travel makes me go :confused:

Besides, what about Davis' small animals killed in crop production? Presumably there's a reason they hang out around cultivated land. Do they have generally decent lives prior to being killed by a thresher? Would there be fewer of them if we emphasized pastures instead? Funny how they're forgotten as soon as they're no longer rhetorically useful.
Please, argue fairly. This is an internet forum. I cannot address every last point ever brought up in every post - that requires a book. Failing to do so is not evasion. Besides, isn't that rhetorically useful for my point? More rodents, more life, unfortunately cut short for food reasons. Net plus, based on my reasoning. Am I misunderstanding you? Maybe you weren't addressing that to me.

Besides, people have argued that 1) rodents lives aren't equal to cows; 2) meat eating means more cultivation, not less.


Much of the reasoning on this question seems decidedly goal-oriented. "You mean I'm already doing the best possible thing? Great, awesome." As Cain points out, these arguments work against morality in general, and are only brought to bear where we don't like the results on offer from application of well-worn principles.
I honestly don't think it is clear what the best possible thing is. I entered into this argument because of a claim that a microsecond of thought makes it clear that veganism is the moral choice. There are so many factors - industrial vs organic farming, effects of things like methane production, manure runoff, availability of things like hide glue (nothing else has it's properties), food, leather, pet companionship (feed a cat a vegan diet, you've got a dead cat), etc., etc., etc. It's very clear there are negative factors to a omnivorous diet, and I've brought them up unprompted. For me, so far, I come up with that it's a net good. The strongest counter-argument to that that I can think of is, if I am not sure, 100%, wouldn't it be better not to kill and eat the animals until I am sure? I find that counter argument modestly compelling.
 
I happen to think that being killed can be termed to be undergoing harm, even if the process of death is painless.
I agree, both with terminology and the conclusion.

I'm not sure where you are trying to get with this. I don't hold Trane's position, that eating cows incurs no harm. It clearly does. My calculus is that it is a net good for the cows. You strongly disagree. I don't see how we will ever have a meeting of minds on that point. I really do understand it is not optimal for the cow, compared to being allowed to live until old age, as a pet, which of course will never happen except in a very few cases (there was a story on This American Life where a family kept a steer as a pet because it exhibited dog like behavior, unlike the rest of the herd, which they raised for food).
 
1)I'm not sure if you're actually serious here.

We have to eat. We have two choices - one is demonstrably more environmentally destructive than the other. What possible moral case can be made for picking the more destructive one?

Let's not hear any strawmen about "killing all animals", because that is manifestly not my argument, nor even a version of it, at all.

That is manifestly, demonstrably false, as the links I already provided suggested.


2) Yes, you did. I'm typing without a mouse, so excuse me if I don't copy|paste, but you certainly did handwave objections that killing constituted harm because cows did not care what happened in their future, a fact that is easily disproven. I am glad you are now distancing yourself from it.


3) They can understand the concept of the future - the exhibition of fear demonstrates that. An organism cannot express fear if it does not have a sense of its future interests. Cows exhibit fear, thus is has future interests. It doesn't have to "know", in a rational sense, that they are being "deprived of a few years" - they just have to have a concept that the future exists, and that they would prefer (if "prefer" is the correct word for the type unconscious behaviour at play here) to continue into that future unharmed.

It's not the "given instant", is it? Fear is a concept that demonstrates a sense of time, future time. It is anticipation of a future event - and thus any defence that you wish to mount that killing is not harmful because "the cows don't have a sense of the future" is demonstrably, empirically wrong.


4) I would, of course, not argue with this. But a cow does not just flinch from pain. It actively suffers.

Why is inflicting pain bad, by your understanding? The cow doesn't understand what's going on, lives in a perpetual present with no sense of the future, and has no self-awareness of its predicament.

5) No, because amoebas are clearly less aware than cows. And their recoil is not properly called "pain" anyway, because pain requires a nervous system. And ameobas do not have future interests.

If it is your argument, however, that the pain reaction is analagous between cows and ameobas, shouldn't you be going to the same ethical demands as you do for cows? After all, you think factory farming is bad because it causes suffering, and that bovine and ameobal suffering are the same!

You're demolishing your own argument, in other words.

6) Cow's do not need to be "conscious of their ultimate deaths" for killing them to be harmful. They just need to have a sense of self in time, and a preference for future existence.

Your initial argument was was that killing is not harmful because cows do not have a sense of the future. The impliction, of course, was that if they did have a sense of the future, it would be harmful - because most ethical systems acknowledge that future interests are key considerations when considering levels of harm.

Cows have a sense of future time, so your initial argument that killing is not harmful because cows don't care about the future is thus invalidated. Would you care to present another argument as to why killing is not harmful that is not empirically wrong? Please define "harm" (and explain why it is bad) in a way that includes pain infliction but excludes death.


Wow, just wow.

1) Look, veganism may produce less greenhouse gases than free-range farming, but the question is whether or not free-range farming in and of itself is dangerous to the environment. From the perspective of the prairie it is BETTER to have grazing animals than not. From the perspective of those grazing animals it is BETTER to be domesticated than not. In order to keep that domesticated herd healthy, numbers must be controlled and resources raised. Ergo, by supporting free-range ranching I am contributing to something that BENEFITS the environment.

"We have to eat. We have two choices - one is demonstrably more environmentally destructive than the other." You haven't even bothered to establish this, you completely ignore free-range farming. Find me one bit of data showing how it is harmful to the environment.


2) You either don't understand my argument or are being intentionally dense. Cows having INTEREST in the future does not mean that they can conceptualize what that future holds. Look, if my uncle has written in my will that I will inheret a million dollars I have a future interest in that money. If, however, no one informs me of that interest and the will is somehow destroyed without me ever learning of its existence, I have only suffered on a very conceptual level. I never feel any pain or loss, so I haven't been directly harmed, I can live out my life in complete bliss. From an omnipotent perspective, however, I lost a million dollars. Somehow you think cows are emotionally tied to that omnipotence. I am arguing that they are content in their ignorant bliss, and to deprive them of years of life causes them no suffering or pain.

3) "An organism cannot express fear if it does not have a sense of its future interests." This is just scientifically incorrect. I would challenge you to find me a single scientist of any subject that thinks an organism needs a cognative understanding of its future interests to feel fear. Fear is an evolutionarily developed mechanism that causes an animal to recoil in the face of danger. I would guess 99.999999% of all organsisms that have ever lived have no idea WHY they recoil, they simply do. This isn't understanding.

It is laughable to claim that fear implies understanding. Evolution seeks to pass on genes. Anything without fear of fire, say, died long ago. Thus organisms with a nerve arc causing them to recoil from fire survived. They don't even need a central nervous system to exhibit the rudimentary chemical reaction of fear.

4) Really? You're honestly asking me after all of this exchange why I think pain is bad? It is simple: pain, discomfort, and other negative emotions, for animals, are bad in and of themselves. Only humans are able to understand that pain can have benefits. No animal save a human would, for example, willingly get a shot. We have to force our pets to get shots because we know the brief pain will ultimately be good for them. Animals have evolved to feel nervous, fearful, and generally unhappy in the presence of pain. It is our duty as our caretakers to save them from this pain to the best of our ability.

5) You're the one incapable of distinguishing fear in a cow from an amoeba, not me. I have no difficulty separating the two based on brain functioning. You, however, used mere evidence of fear, pain, and discomfort to establish a cognative understanding of the future in cows. Toads exhibit the same characteristics, so do insects. I am not advancing that hogwash, so I am not tied by my argument to thinking a gnat and a dog must be treated the same. Please explain how your definition of a sense of the future is not present in a beetle.

6) Perhaps I was not precise enough with my language. For the sake of congeniality I will hold myself responsible for the misunderstanding. My response to point 2 should explain something of my stance.

I am arguing that a cow needs something stronger that a "sense of the future." Certainly a cow has a vague understanding that it would be best to keep eating. But cows sleep. Slaughtering a cow is no different to the cow than simply putting it to sleep. You can argue that they've been deprived of something, but it is something they have no idea exists. Just like I go on with my life after my uncle died no worse for wear. Only from an omnipotent perspective can you say something was lost. There was no suffering from the perspective of the animal, so there was no harm done--from the perspective of the animal.
 
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1) OK, so Paris Hilton did not save her dog from nature. Taking that explicit position can you now explain your original offending remark, which I reproduce here:

I, as a farmer/rancher, have exerted my unique human gifts to remove animals from the unmitigated horror of nature and tend to their needs.

How are your self-described noble efforts different than Hilton's?



2) Ah, so nomadic hunter-gatherers saved Chihuahuas from the "dangerous existence of nature." Do you think about these things before you say them because it's rare to find such a bad case of foot-mouth disease, even on these forums. Chihuahuas would not exist if not for the intervention of human beings. Please, if you're going to attempt to condescend at least have the dignity of not being spectacularly wrong.

On why nature works as a moral baseline:


3) So here we have three sentences. The first is your original claim, the second is my counter and the third is your new counter-counter and I'm afraid I cannot characterize it in favorable terms. Here's the thing: even with domestication there are still animals in the wild, suffering. You need to somehow demonstrate that animals are somehow transported from the ravages of the wild onto your utopian free-range farm; that free-range farming serves as, well, a welfare program. What you're saying is just too obtuse for words.



4) It's already been mentioned a couple of times. Do you recall where Volatile said you could raise animals as pets? If domestication is so good for the environment and sustainability, then we could form a cooperative pact. Of course, that sounds ridiculous because it is: the real reason animals are domesticated is not to provide them a refuge, not to maintain the balance of ecosystems, but to slaughter and consume them.


Some of what follows is in Volatile's above reply, but I'll make a few comments, ask a couple of questions.



5) I did not say killing Jones causes "suffering"; I said it "constitutes a harm." I don't see how the bone cancer scenario helps your case, or what case you're trying to make. I would like to know how and what "higher faculties" are morally necessary for what I'll call a right-to-life. This standard of yours introduces problems you probably did not anticipate: the status of mentally disabled humans, children, fetuses. I'm not sure how you can so glibly privilege the "higher faculties" you seem to resent, but let's imagine two scenarios for Jones and his immediate interests. One involves presenting a lecture on justice-as-impartiality and the other involves ****ing a Brazilian supermodel's brains out. After doing each which do you think Jones is more likely to remark, "I could die happy"?

Now, now, don't get a big dick, I'll agree a life of deep meaning is -- for lack of a better word -- more meaningful than one based on, um, base pleasures. The film Groundhog Day makes a convincing enough case. But what you're saying is that the pleasures experienced and anticipated by non-humans are trivial, which somehow empowers you to kill them to satisfy more exalted ends, such as enjoying a hamburger. That's hubris. It's also arbitrary because for some reason you lend significant weight to animal suffering. Interests are a two-way street. Why should I give a crap about cow's pain?



What kind of plans are necessary? I'm pretty sure babies (and most toddlers?) don't have plans, so are they fair game?

Haha, funny stuff indeed.

1) I didn't realize I was dealing with a literalist, I apologize for taking artistic liberty, I thought I was speaking with reasonably well educated adults. I will not make that mistake again.

You may be shocked to learn that I am not actually a rancher, gasp.

I was speaking in a figurative sense. The concept of ranching, tending to animals puts humans in the place of caretaker over their flock. That flock came to be what it is over thousands of years. Without human intervention those animals that became domesticated would have continued to have off-spring, and those decendents would have been wild. Any domesticated animal (forgot you were a literalist--any domesticated animal treated humanely) is therefore better off because humans chose, long ago, to use their higher faculties to give those beasts a better life.

The other option to domestication is to simply never interfere. This would mean that ALL animals are wild. Observe two hypothetical worlds, one where animals are domesticated, one where they aren't. In the world of domestication animals will, in general, fair better than the world with no domestication. Yes, we humans, as arrogant as it may sound, have rescued a good many beasts from cruel, arbitrary nature. The fact that a specific animal, say Paris Hilton's dog, would not exist in the hypothetical world without domestication, whatever genetic lineage that led to the domesticated chihuahua would have led to a wild animal suffering in the wild.

2) This point reveals your simple, literal mind. The bluster with which you vomit out this childish tripe, however, is quite amusing. This point was answered in 1.

3) A rancher has no duty to care for animals in the wild, save to try and do as little harm as possible to the habitat. That wild animals should suffer says nothing about how we should treat animals we have chosen to care for. Ranchers have no control over birds of prey, they have control over their herd. That caretaker position bestows the responsibility.

Again your literal mind has you fluttering. If you only understand the domestication process in terms of the present, it may not make sense. But those animals were domesticated over thousands of years. If they hadn't been domesticate, that entire genetic line would have existed in the wild. Instead, it was cared for by humans.

Your point isn't even relevent, but you did prove to everyone that you can count to three, so I guess we'll count that as a victory for you.

4) Never did I say animals were domesticated BECAUSE we wanted to take care of them. I'm arguing simply that their domestication was immensely beneficial when compared with a world similar in all ways save a lack of domestication. We do make a pact with animals. We improve their lives, keep them fed, cure their diseases, and in turn, we eat them. The animals have no concept of the coming slaughter, so they don't suffer at all. It is only from an omnipotent perspective that it even makes sense to say they've been harmed, but no cow or any animal save a human can understand that perspective. They eat, crap, eat, crap, then the lights go out.

5) Hmm, I'm not as dumb as you, so I did actually anticipate that charge. I just guessed, "what would a third grader or Carlos Mencia argue here," and sure enough it was you bringing up your fellow tards.

Infants have the potential to become humans. Human life is more valuable than a cow's life for the same reason a cow's life is more valuable than a carrot's. Killing a helpless infant does deprive them of a future. Killing a cow means they have one year less of eating, crapping, eating, crapping. The difference is simply brain function.

Ah, now you're excited. I could practically see you spill your bowl of fiber sticks in soy milk. Why don't we kill mentally disabled people then? First of all, most special needs people haver higher functioning brains than cattle, but that's not the interesting case. What about seriously disabled people that can't function at all? This is simply a societal norm that needs no justification. We have decided that they share enough genetic material with humans that we should care for them. If, on the other hand, we decided to euthanize completely non-functioning humans, I wouldn't really have a problem with that. Of course I would leave it up to that person's caretaker to decide what to do.

So you've played a semantic game, falling back on a concept of "harm" that doesn't include suffering. Please explain why I should care that a creature has been deprived of something it has no concept for.
 
Haha, funny stuff indeed.

1) I didn't realize I was dealing with a literalist, I apologize for taking artistic liberty, I thought I was speaking with reasonably well educated adults. I will not make that mistake again.

You may be shocked to learn that I am not actually a rancher, gasp.

I was speaking in a figurative sense. The concept of ranching, tending to animals puts humans in the place of caretaker over their flock. That flock came to be what it is over thousands of years.

My goodness you're quick on the up take. What from my first, second, or third posts indicated otherwise, allowing you more than ample time and opportunity to clarify. I am so sorry for demanding precision with language, like any other non-educated adult. :rolleyes:

Without human intervention those animals that became domesticated would have continued to have off-spring, and those decendents would have been wild. Any domesticated animal (forgot you were a literalist--any domesticated animal treated humanely) is therefore better off because humans chose, long ago, to use their higher faculties to give those beasts a better life.

And yet you still cling to this bad argument. One could argue that killing any animal in the wild has spared the world from generations of future misery. Indeed, a utilitarian argument could be made that killing an animal, even painfully, has on the balance done much, much more good than harm.

The other option to domestication is to simply never interfere. This would mean that ALL animals are wild. Observe two hypothetical worlds, one where animals are domesticated, one where they aren't. In the world of domestication animals will, in general, fair better than the world with no domestication. Yes, we humans, as arrogant as it may sound, have rescued a good many beasts from cruel, arbitrary nature. The fact that a specific animal, say Paris Hilton's dog, would not exist in the hypothetical world without domestication, whatever genetic lineage that led to the domesticated chihuahua would have led to a wild animal suffering in the wild.

Perhaps the only way I could explain this to you is if I borrowed a piece of paper and your box of crayons. The domesticated animals alive today would not exist if not for human intervention. Had we never "rescued" cows, pigs, sheep, nature would not have produced nearly as many of these animals. The same goes for Hilton's dog except instead of numbers, the TYPE of dog, let alone the individual animal, never would have existed at all. This should be obvious to even you.

Thankfully, later on you are explicit in your error:

Again your literal mind has you fluttering. If you only understand the domestication process in terms of the present, it may not make sense. But those animals were domesticated over thousands of years. If they hadn't been domesticate, that entire genetic line would have existed in the wild. Instead, it was cared for by humans.

This is fallacy of uninterrupted trends, and it's amusingly ironic because it's a type of mathematical literalism in that it assumes a 1:1 to transfer. This also betrays a paper thin understanding of genes.

3) A rancher has no duty to care for animals in the wild, save to try and do as little harm as possible to the habitat.

No, you're missing the point. You might wanna try some of them there literalist readings. I'll repeat the crucial line for your convenience: "You need to somehow demonstrate that animals are somehow transported from the ravages of the wild onto your utopian free-range farm."

Your point isn't even relevent, but you did prove to everyone that you can count to three, so I guess we'll count that as a victory for you.

Thank you. It would also like kudos for being able to spell "relevant." Don't worry, I'll make sure you get an award for participation. Everyone is special.

4) Never did I say animals were domesticated BECAUSE we wanted to take care of them.

And I did not say you did.

I'm arguing simply that their domestication was immensely beneficial when compared with a world similar in all ways save a lack of domestication.... It is only from an omnipotent perspective that it even makes sense to say they've been harmed, but no cow or any animal save a human can understand that perspective.

And you're failing to support that assertion. Also, the word "omnipotent" does not mean what you apparently think it means, which I only mention to segue here:

5) Hmm, I'm not as dumb as you, so I did actually anticipate that charge. I just guessed, "what would a third grader or Carlos Mencia argue here," and sure enough it was you bringing up your fellow tards.

Infants have the potential to become humans.

Um, infants are humans. Dee Dee Dee

Human life is more valuable than a cow's life for the same reason a cow's life is more valuable than a carrot's. Killing a helpless infant does deprive them of a future. Killing a cow means they have one year less of eating, crapping, eating, crapping. The difference is simply brain function.

This does not explain the continuum of value, or how an infant has any interest in its future. Worse still, you fail to consistently apply your own standard: "Please explain why I should care that a creature has been deprived of something it has no concept for."

Ah, now you're excited. I could practically see you spill your bowl of fiber sticks in soy milk. Why don't we kill mentally disabled people then? First of all, most special needs people haver higher functioning brains than cattle, but that's not the interesting case. What about seriously disabled people that can't function at all? This is simply a societal norm that needs no justification. We have decided that they share enough genetic material with humans that we should care for them.

Here you go magic-ing new rules and exceptions, making it up as you go along. What sort of moral principle do you derive from shared genes, and how on earth is that anything but an arbitrary threshold? Also, so what if most special needs people have higher brain functioning than cattle; what we're really looking for here is a difference of kind rather than degree. No, you have not thought through your answer. Suppose us vegans somehow convince the world that nobody should consume animals, and this eventually becomes a societal norm. Does that mean it needs no longer requires justification? So maybe you do want to eat meat in such a society, but we stop you, and you ask why. "Societal norm."
 
Still thou are blest, compared wi' me! The present only toucheth thee:
But och! I backward cast my e'e,
On prospects drear!
An' forward, tho' I canna see,
I guess an' fear!

​
Interesting (and apposite) choice of poem to quote.

Burns often gets slagged off, partly for sentimentality, but also often because English speakers find Scots amusing. But that poem is a striking piece of animal empathy, dated 17-what?
I'm truly sorry Man's dominion
Has broken Nature's social union,
And justifies that ill opinion
Which makes thee startle
At me, thy poor Earth-born companion
And fellow mortal.
​
And all in English, too, that verse.

Rolfe.
 

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