I challenge you: your best alternate to materialism

[Fudbucker]

Just to be perfectly clear, I'm going to present some options to replace (8) with, because much of the argument hinges on (8).

Original formulation of (8): It is impossible for an arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves to be conscious and have subjective experiences.

Strong version of (8): It is highly unlikely that any arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves can be conscious and have subjective experiences.

Moderate version of (8): It is unlikely that any arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves can be conscious and have subjective experiences.

Weak version of (8): It is possible* that some arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves can be conscious and have subjective experiences.

Negation of (8): It is likely that there is some arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves which would be conscious and have subjective experiences.

*"Possible" meaning "just as likely true as not".

My claim is that the burden of proof rests on anyone who believes in the weak version (or negation) of (8). I base this claim on the fact that all observed cases of consciousness and subjective experience have been produced by brains, and that a system of flowing water, valves, dams, etc. is about as far away from a brain as you can get.

I also think that it's a short hop from conscious vales, water, and dams, to conscious rainclouds and meteor storms, to panpsychism.

Maybe most of you are OK with the idea that something like the Panama Canal could become conscious, if we tweaked it and modified it the right way. If that's the case, the argument won't convince you.

Anyway, I think consciousness is the best tactic for the anti-materialist. It forces the materialist down a road that ultimately leads to panpsychism, and I don't think many materialists are comfortable with panpsychism, although the number seems to be growing.

 

[Lowpro]

Kinda reeks of the "Ireducible complexity" argument doesn't it? I mean all you've done is demonstrated consciousness to be a philosophical embarrassment because it wants to be a special attribute.

Consciousness is the best tactic for the anti-materialist as irreducible complexity is to the best tactic to a creationist.

 

[Fudbucker]

Kinda reeks of the "Ireducible complexity" argument doesn't it? I mean all you've done is demonstrated consciousness to be a philosophical embarrassment because it wants to be a special attribute.

Consciousness is the best tactic for the anti-materialist as irreducible complexity is to the best tactic to a creationist.

I don't think they're equivalent. I don't think complexity is nearly as problematic as the "hard problem" of consciousness is. Explaining consciousness has led some people here down some pretty strange rabbit holes.

 

[Lowpro]

I don't think they're equivalent. I don't think complexity is nearly as problematic as the "hard problem" of consciousness is. Explaining consciousness has led some people here down some pretty strange rabbit holes.

Try our rabbit hole then

The hard problem is a philosophical disappointment since it begs the question. From a physical standpoint the experiences are due to brain processes (see the other thread) so the hard question becomes inconsequential.

Yes I believe that we are seeing an equivalence between your scenario and consciousness. For one, you grossly mischaracterize brain activity because it has to have integration, localization, and spatial interaction. That's how the brain works, thus any system of rheostats, locks and canals, should have it too.

But luckily for both of us the IIT considers this. The bad news about the IIT model is that it models integration and considers "phi" to be the measure of consciousness of the system, or at least best represents consciousness. This model could determine phi of any system, even if it has low integration. This makes panpsychism practically ubiquitous (or else it wouldn't be panpsychism). That's okay for materialists and honestly is most damning to the philosophical notion of the hard problem since it completely destroys its necessity outright.

 

[MRC_Hans]

(8) doesn't follow. It's a premise. I think it's a given that a system of locks, valves and water can't be conscious. But I can change "impossible" in (8) to "highly unlikely", if you like.

I don't care what you call it, it remains an unfounded claim, and a such cannot be accepted as a premise.

Do you think that if we tweaked the Panama Canal in just the right way, it could become conscious? How would that work? Why would one arrangement of valves and flowing water produce consciousness while another arrangement is just a bunch of vales, dams, and water?

Do you think a ringworm is conscious? The assumption is that conciousness arises from a sufficiently complex and suitably arranged system. The Panama Canal is a deterministic system and I doubt it would become conscious, no matter how long you made it. Similarly, the computer in front of you is designed to be deterministic, and even though that sometimes seems to fail, I don't expect it will likely become conscious, no matter how large we build it. It is, however, possible that a suitably built software system might, even if running on a deterministic machine.

I think the default position is that locks, vales, and water aren't the sorts of things that can produce consciousness. The burden of proof is on the person asserting such a system could possibly become conscious and have subjective experience.

Nice attempt at shifting the burden of proof, but I have made no claim. YOU have made the claim that it cannot be conscious, and used that as a basis for your argument. Thus, it is your premise, and your burden of proof, sorry.

In other words, you're OK with claiming it's possible that an arrangement of valves, dams, pumps, water, etc. could be happy. That sounds rather wooish.

No. YOU are claiming that it cannot have consciousness. I say that you cannot know anything about that, and since you (and anybody else) cannot know, you cannot use it as a premise for a discussion.

Hans

 

[MRC_Hans]

Just to be perfectly clear, I'm going to present some options to replace (8) with, because much of the argument hinges on (8).

Original formulation of (8): It is impossible for an arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves to be conscious and have subjective experiences.

Strong version of (8): It is highly unlikely that any arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves can be conscious and have subjective experiences.

Moderate version of (8): It is unlikely that any arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves can be conscious and have subjective experiences.

Weak version of (8): It is possible* that some arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves can be conscious and have subjective experiences.

Negation of (8): It is likely that there is some arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves which would be conscious and have subjective experiences.

*"Possible" meaning "just as likely true as not".

My claim is that the burden of proof rests on anyone who believes in the weak version (or negation) of (8). I base this claim on the fact that all observed cases of consciousness and subjective experience have been produced by brains, and that a system of flowing water, valves, dams, etc. is about as far away from a brain as you can get.

I also think that it's a short hop from conscious vales, water, and dams, to conscious rainclouds and meteor storms, to panpsychism.

Maybe most of you are OK with the idea that something like the Panama Canal could become conscious, if we tweaked it and modified it the right way. If that's the case, the argument won't convince you.

Anyway, I think consciousness is the best tactic for the anti-materialist. It forces the materialist down a road that ultimately leads to panpsychism, and I don't think many materialists are comfortable with panpsychism, although the number seems to be growing.

No. Simply no. The materialistic claim is that a sufficiently complex BRAIN can be conscious. Not that a higly advanced water regulation system, or indeed anything else can.

It is true that it must then be assumed that a physically different, but suitably arranged system can also be conscious, but it does not follow that ANY sufficiently complex system can. In fact, since we know of extremely complex systems (e.g. global weather) that show no sign of being conscious, it is a fair assumption that complexity alone does not cut it.

Hans

 

[marplots]

Maybe most of you are OK with the idea that something like the Panama Canal could become conscious, if we tweaked it and modified it the right way. If that's the case, the argument won't convince you.

Maybe it's conscious already. How would we know? Certainly something could be conscious and unable/unwilling to interact with other conscious beings.

The problem's even worse if we suppose there might be other types of consciousness, alien to our familiar brand. Maybe the Panama Canal has one thought every couple of years or so.

"Is conscious" is much easier than "isn't."

 

[Belz...]

I don't think they're equivalent. I don't think complexity is nearly as problematic as the "hard problem" of consciousness is.

There is no hard problem of consciousness.

 

[tsig]

Just to be perfectly clear, I'm going to present some options to replace (8) with, because much of the argument hinges on (8).

Original formulation of (8): It is impossible for an arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves to be conscious and have subjective experiences.

Strong version of (8): It is highly unlikely that any arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves can be conscious and have subjective experiences.

Moderate version of (8): It is unlikely that any arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves can be conscious and have subjective experiences.

Weak version of (8): It is possible* that some arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves can be conscious and have subjective experiences.

Negation of (8): It is likely that there is some arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves which would be conscious and have subjective experiences.

*"Possible" meaning "just as likely true as not".

My claim is that the burden of proof rests on anyone who believes in the weak version (or negation) of (8). I base this claim on the fact that all observed cases of consciousness and subjective experience have been produced by brains, and that a system of flowing water, valves, dams, etc. is about as far away from a brain as you can get.

I also think that it's a short hop from conscious vales, water, and dams, to conscious rainclouds and meteor storms, to panpsychism.

Maybe most of you are OK with the idea that something like the Panama Canal could become conscious, if we tweaked it and modified it the right way. If that's the case, the argument won't convince you.

Anyway, I think consciousness is the best tactic for the anti-materialist. It forces the materialist down a road that ultimately leads to panpsychism, and I don't think many materialists are comfortable with panpsychism, although the number seems to be growing.

Human consciousness is an emergent process of electrochemical actions in a human brain.

If other forms of consciousness exist they have yet to manifest themselves.

Your whole argument is a straw man.

"If matter can be conscious in a human brain then why can't the matter in the river be conscious".

 

[Fudbucker]

No. Simply no. The materialistic claim is that a sufficiently complex BRAIN can be conscious. Not that a higly advanced water regulation system, or indeed anything else can.

It is true that it must then be assumed that a physically different, but suitably arranged system can also be conscious, but it does not follow that ANY sufficiently complex system can. In fact, since we know of extremely complex systems (e.g. global weather) that show no sign of being conscious, it is a fair assumption that complexity alone does not cut it.

Hans

Ehhhh, you might check out this thread: http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?t=282437&highlight=word+salad

You'd be surprised the kinds of things that can be conscious.

The argument is pretty simple. A brain is made of components A,B,C...X interacting in a certain way. If components A1, B1, C1...X1 are functionally equivalent to A,B,C..X, and you can get them to interact in a functionally equivalent way, then you have a brain that is functionally equivalent to an organic brain. It should be conscious. The components could literally be just about anything: moving rocks, flicking lightswitches, shifting sand dunes... so long as they're the functional equivalent of the components of an organic brain, and they interact in the "right" way, the system should be conscious. There's no reason for it not to be conscious. There's nothing special about neurons. They can be replaced by all sorts of functionally equivalent things.

Marplots, when I think of functionally equivalent, I think of a PVC pipe and copper tubing. They're made of two different things, but they do the exact same job. Or take vacuum tubes and transistors. Same thing.

 

[marplots]

Ehhhh, you might check out this thread: http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?t=282437&highlight=word+salad

You'd be surprised the kinds of things that can be conscious.

The argument is pretty simple. A brain is made of components A,B,C...X interacting in a certain way. If components A1, B1, C1...X1 are functionally equivalent to A,B,C..X, and you can get them to interact in a functionally equivalent way, then you have a brain that is functionally equivalent to an organic brain. It should be conscious. The components could literally be just about anything: moving rocks, flicking lightswitches, shifting sand dunes... so long as they're the functional equivalent of the components of an organic brain, and they interact in the "right" way, the system should be conscious. There's no reason for it not to be conscious. There's nothing special about neurons. They can be replaced by all sorts of functionally equivalent things.

Marplots, when I think of functionally equivalent, I think of a PVC pipe and copper tubing. They're made of two different things, but they do the exact same job. Or take vacuum tubes and transistors. Same thing.

Well, we have already done the experiment and it worked. One brain is very much unlike another - this is why a simple mapping of my noodle won't do much if we want to operate on your noodle with any fidelity. However, even though each of our brains is different, they are functionally equivalent.

But taking the step from neuron to something else poses a bit more of a challenge. Until we can say just exactly what the important properties of a neuron (and the rest of that brain gunk) actually are - in other words, until we understand it deeply, we don't actually know what function we are trying to duplicate.

If the functionality is bound up with the material properties of a neuron, the you'd either want a neuron or something very similar to do the job. All I'm claiming is that some functions aren't mere abstract concepts, but properties strongly bound to the material at hand. In your transistor analogy, I can't conceive of finding duplicate function in materials incapable of conducting electricity - after all, that's the point and part of the function.

For water pipes, either plastic or copper will do - unless that water is very, very hot, or unless you switch to some other thing you'd like to flow through there, like an organic solvent which destroys plastic. It's not as simple as you make it sound.

Imagine if you were thrown back into the stone age. Do you believe you could make the "functional equivalent" of most of our modern conveniences? It reminds me of the Flintstones and how they made functional equivalents of cars and dishwashers and such like. Except none of those things would actually work as shown in the cartoon.

Checkers can never be chess, simply because there's no way to distinguish all the different pieces you need to play chess. Materials and their properties do matter. Matter matters.

 

[Lowpro]

Ehhhh, you might check out this thread: http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?t=282437&highlight=word+salad

You'd be surprised the kinds of things that can be conscious.

The argument is pretty simple. A brain is made of components A,B,C...X interacting in a certain way. If components A1, B1, C1...X1 are functionally equivalent to A,B,C..X, and you can get them to interact in a functionally equivalent way, then you have a brain that is functionally equivalent to an organic brain. It should be conscious. The components could literally be just about anything: moving rocks, flicking lightswitches, shifting sand dunes... so long as they're the functional equivalent of the components of an organic brain, and they interact in the "right" way, the system should be conscious. There's no reason for it not to be conscious. There's nothing special about neurons. They can be replaced by all sorts of functionally equivalent things.
Marplots, when I think of functionally equivalent, I think of a PVC pipe and copper tubing. They're made of two different things, but they do the exact same job. Or take vacuum tubes and transistors. Same thing.

In the realm of thought experiments, sure. In physiology this replacement would be the biggest breakthrough in medicine. Do not be cavalier in these thought experiments though, as conjuring functional equivalents in an attempt to put materialists in the awkward position of saying a grouping of rocks can be conscious. That's a thought experiment and one that begs so much of the word "should" that Webster would have reconsidered his life's work.

Why invoke this childish equivalence when we have an entire discipline of physiology that investigates the mechanics of neurons?

 

[marplots]

Have we ever come up with a functional equivalent to something as well understood as insulin? Even using the same materials, it's damn hard to replace what's already in the mix.

My best guess is that if we want extra consciousnesses to play with, the best way to get them will be to grow them and mimic what nature already does.

 

[Tassman]

Just to be perfectly clear, I'm going to present some options to replace (8) with, because much of the argument hinges on (8).

Original formulation of (8): It is impossible for an arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves to be conscious and have subjective experiences.

Strong version of (8): It is highly unlikely that any arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves can be conscious and have subjective experiences.

Moderate version of (8): It is unlikely that any arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves can be conscious and have subjective experiences.

Weak version of (8): It is possible* that some arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves can be conscious and have subjective experiences.

Negation of (8): It is likely that there is some arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves which would be conscious and have subjective experiences.

*"Possible" meaning "just as likely true as not".

My claim is that the burden of proof rests on anyone who believes in the weak version (or negation) of (8). I base this claim on the fact that all observed cases of consciousness and subjective experience have been produced by brains, and that a system of flowing water, valves, dams, etc. is about as far away from a brain as you can get.

I also think that it's a short hop from conscious vales, water, and dams, to conscious rainclouds and meteor storms, to panpsychism.

Maybe most of you are OK with the idea that something like the Panama Canal could become conscious, if we tweaked it and modified it the right way. If that's the case, the argument won't convince you.

Anyway, I think consciousness is the best tactic for the anti-materialist. It forces the materialist down a road that ultimately leads to panpsychism, and I don't think many materialists are comfortable with panpsychism, although the number seems to be growing.

What a lot of palaver. What would give you the idea that consciousness in humans and the higher animals is anything more than electrical impulses in the organic brain which cease when the brain ceases to exist?

 

[MRC_Hans]

Ehhhh, you might check out this thread: http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?t=282437&highlight=word+salad

You'd be surprised the kinds of things that can be conscious.

The argument is pretty simple. A brain is made of components A,B,C...X interacting in a certain way. If components A1, B1, C1...X1 are functionally equivalent to A,B,C..X, and you can get them to interact in a functionally equivalent way, then you have a brain that is functionally equivalent to an organic brain. It should be conscious. The components could literally be just about anything: moving rocks, flicking lightswitches, shifting sand dunes... so long as they're the functional equivalent of the components of an organic brain, and they interact in the "right" way, the system should be conscious. There's no reason for it not to be conscious. There's nothing special about neurons. They can be replaced by all sorts of functionally equivalent things.

Marplots, when I think of functionally equivalent, I think of a PVC pipe and copper tubing. They're made of two different things, but they do the exact same job. Or take vacuum tubes and transistors. Same thing.

That is pretty much what I just said: An apperatus with the same functionality as a brain is assumed to work like a brain, including gaining consciousness.

Now, in your argument, you are either arguing about canals and locks (Panama Canal, right?), which can hardly be made functionally equivalent to a brain (if only due to scale), OR you are being more abstract, in which case your premise #8 is simply an argument from incredulty.

In both cases, your argument fails.

However, it also fails on another level: False equivalence. ... We are sometimes assuming that a functional equivalent of a brain will function like a brain, because this seems logical, but we don't actually know this. A Marplots mentions, we don't know exactly which of the properties of a brain are essential, so we are really making blind guesses at which mechanics might emulate it.

However, our being able or not to emulate a brain does not invalidate the theory that consciouness arises as a function of ans actual brain.

Hans

 

[tsig]

That is pretty much what I just said: An apperatus with the same functionality as a brain is assumed to work like a brain, including gaining consciousness.

Now, in your argument, you are either arguing about canals and locks (Panama Canal, right?), which can hardly be made functionally equivalent to a brain (if only due to scale), OR you are being more abstract, in which case your premise #8 is simply an argument from incredulty.

In both cases, your argument fails.

However, it also fails on another level: False equivalence. ... We are sometimes assuming that a functional equivalent of a brain will function like a brain, because this seems logical, but we don't actually know this. A Marplots mentions, we don't know exactly which of the properties of a brain are essential, so we are really making blind guesses at which mechanics might emulate it.

However, our being able or not to emulate a brain does not invalidate the theory that consciouness arises as a function of ans actual brain.

Hans

"Since you say consciousnesses is a property of matter I'll come up with the most ridiculous example I can think of to discredit what you say"

 

[Fudbucker]

That is pretty much what I just said: An apperatus with the same functionality as a brain is assumed to work like a brain, including gaining consciousness.

Right.

Now, in your argument, you are either arguing about canals and locks (Panama Canal, right?), which can hardly be made functionally equivalent to a brain (if only due to scale), OR you are being more abstract, in which case your premise #8 is simply an argument from incredulty.

In the strong form, it's an argument from incredulity (based partly on the fact that all instances of consciousness so far have been observed only in organic brains, and partly on the absence of a casual mechanism that would make an arrangement of something like light switches conscious).

In the weakest form, it's the response we always give to the theist:

You say you believe there's some arrangement of valves, water etc. that is conscious (i.e. You say you believe in God?)... where's your evidence? Where's the proof that that bunch of light switches and rheostats over there is conscious?

Also, you could keep swapping out components until you literally get to shifting sand dunes that are conscious or a guy moving rocks around on an endless plain producing a simulation of the universe (including all the conscious beings in it).

Once you start down the road of non-organic consciousness (transistors instead of neurons), it ultimately leads to a form of panpsychism.

In both cases, your argument fails.

However, it also fails on another level: False equivalence. ... We are sometimes assuming that a functional equivalent of a brain will function like a brain, because this seems logical, but we don't actually know this. A Marplots mentions, we don't know exactly which of the properties of a brain are essential, so we are really making blind guesses at which mechanics might emulate it.

We don't know, but I'm assuming for the sake of argument that a system, if made of parts that are functionally equivalent to things we find in the brain, and the parts interact in the same way the components of the brain do, then such a system would be conscious. There might be something to the system we're missing, but for the sake of argument, I'm saying that all the right valves are in place, the locks move in the right way, the water molecules move in the right way, etc. It's a system of parts that work in a way that is functionally equivalent to an organic brain, and therefore, should be conscious.

However, our being able or not to emulate a brain does not invalidate the theory that consciouness arises as a function of ans actual brain.

Hans

Why would it invalidate that? We KNOW consciousness arises from actual organic brains. The question is, how likely is it that a system of lightswtiches could become conscious? If it's viewed as unlikely, and materialism implies that such a system should be conscious, then there's a problem for materialism.

 

[Hecubas]

6. If an arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves can be functionally equivalent to an arrangement of light switches, rheostats, wires and electric current, then an arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves can be functionally equivalent to a mechanical working brain.

Seems kind of crazy, but with a large enough sandbox who knows what you could make.

This discussion gave me a strange notion that the first true AI will probably be built by a kid constructing a massive redstone device in Minecraft. Some of the things people create in that game for fun are mind-boggling, yet consistent and reproducible.

 

[marplots]

We don't know, but I'm assuming for the sake of argument that a system, if made of parts that are functionally equivalent to things we find in the brain, and the parts interact in the same way the components of the brain do, then such a system would be conscious. There might be something to the system we're missing, but for the sake of argument, I'm saying that all the right valves are in place, the locks move in the right way, the water molecules move in the right way, etc. It's a system of parts that work in a way that is functionally equivalent to an organic brain, and therefore, should be conscious.

With enough front loading, your argument becomes circular.

Provided it meets all the requirements of being conscious, will X be conscious? Um... sure. Provided it meets all the conditions, a lemur could taste just like chocolate icecream.

I'm still feel I'm missing the point of the exercise. What is it that I don't understand? Are you after some missing ingredient not bound to functionality?

 

[Belz...]

In the strong form, it's an argument from incredulity (based partly on the fact that all instances of consciousness so far have been observed only in organic brains, and partly on the absence of a casual mechanism that would make an arrangement of something like light switches conscious).

In the weakest form, it's the response we always give to the theist:

You say you believe there's some arrangement of valves, water etc. that is conscious (i.e. You say you believe in God?)... where's your evidence? Where's the proof that that bunch of light switches and rheostats over there is conscious?

You are altering the meaning of words somewhat, here. The issue is not whether gods are conscious, but whether they exist at all.