I challenge you: your best alternate to materialism

[Tommy Jeppesen]

No.

So what is the difference between these 3 claims?

• The moon is made of green cheese.
• 2 plus 2 is 5.
• Killing is good.

 

[Belz...]

So what is the difference between these 3 claims?

• The moon is made of green cheese.
• 2 plus 2 is 5.
• Killing is good.

That is a very vague question. What kinds of differences are you looking for ?

Assuming you mean differences about defining your terms, none. You need to know what you mean by each word before you can check these claims.

If you define "green cheese" to mean "matter", then sure, the moon is made of green cheese. Since no one calls it that, however, it would be an inefficient way to talk about our natural sattelite.

Personally I think "good" is the only term here that requires further defining.

 

[tsig]

So what is the difference between these 3 claims?

• The moon is made of green cheese.
• 2 plus 2 is 5.
• Killing is good.

The first refers to what the moon is made of the second is a wrong math equation and the third is a value judgement.

Are you having a hard time distinguishing between the moon, math and murder?

 

[MRC_Hans]

• The moon is made of green cheese.
• 2 plus 2 is 5.
• Killing is good.

Does the ability to use falsification apply to 3 above claims? Can science be applied to all 3 claims?

For the first two, no problem.

For the last, not as the claim is stated.

Hans

 

[MRC_Hans]

I would modify solipsism to regard all life forms are one being.

I see little use of "falsifiable in principle", when discussing metaphysics.

That could be a definition of solipsism, if you are the one being.

Basically, metaphysics do boil down to science, but that is not its first concern.

Hans

 

[MRC_Hans]

That quote is out of context, but you were talking about a realm where statements are not generally falsifiable. If you don't mind, could you give me one to comment on?

My "agenda" is to show that religious statements can be falsified and strongly parallel scientific statements on the dimension of falsifiability. I'd like to use an example of what you mean by an unfalsifiable statement, since I've offered several that were found lacking.

"God talked to me yesterday. He told me he loves all people."

Hans

 

[MRC_Hans]

So what is the difference between these 3 claims?

• The moon is made of green cheese.
• 2 plus 2 is 5.
• Killing is good.

The first two are quite consise, the third is not. Killing what? Good for what?

Killing cockroaches is certainly good for kitchen hygiene. That is falsifiable.

Hans

 

[Fudbucker]

I'll play Devil's Advocate and present an argument for non-materialism:

1. If materialism is true, then consciousness and subjective experience are the result of a working brain.

2. All the components of a working brain can be replaced with mechanical functionally equivalent components.

3. From (2), a mechanical working brain that is conscious and capable of feeling subjective experience is possible.

4. A system of light switches, rheostats, wires and electric current can be arranged and manipulated in such a way as to be functionally equivalent to a mechanical working brain.

5. It is possible that the switches, rheostats, wires, and electric current from (4) can be successfully replaced with flowing water, locks, canals, and valves such that the system of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves is functionally equivalent to the system of light switches, rheostats, wires and electric current described in (4).

6. If an arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves can be functionally equivalent to an arrangement of light switches, rheostats, wires and electric current, then an arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves can be functionally equivalent to a mechanical working brain.

7. From (3) it's possible that an arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves can be conscious and have subjective experiences.

8. It is impossible* for an arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves to be conscious and have subjective experiences.

9. Materialism results in a logical contradiction (between (7) and (8)).

10. Therefore non-materialism must be true* (either dualism or idealism).

ETA: *For a weaker version of the argument, remove (9), replace "impossible" in (8) to "highly unlikely", and "must be true" in (10) to "very likely true".

 

[Apathia]

I'll play Devil's Advocate and present an argument for non-materialism:

1. If materialism is true, then consciousness and subjective experience are the result of a working brain.

2. All the components of a working brain can be replaced with mechanical functionally equivalent components.

3. From (2), a mechanical working brain that is conscious and capable of feeling subjective experience is possible.

4. A system of light switches, rheostats, wires and electric current can be arranged and manipulated in such a way as to be functionally equivalent to a mechanical working brain.

5. It is possible that the switches, rheostats, wires, and electric current from (4) can be successfully replaced with flowing water, locks, canals, and valves such that the system of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves is functionally equivalent to the system of light switches, rheostats, wires and electric current described in (4).

6. If an arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves can be functionally equivalent to an arrangement of light switches, rheostats, wires and electric current, then an arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves can be functionally equivalent to a mechanical working brain.

7. From (3) it's possible that an arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves can be conscious and have subjective experiences.

8. It is impossible* for an arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves to be conscious and have subjective experiences.

9. Materialism results in a logical contradiction (between (7) and (8)).

10. Therefore non-materialism must be true* (either dualism or idealism).

ETA: *For a weaker version of the argument, remove (9), replace "impossible" in (8) to "highly unlikely", and "must be true" in (10) to "very likely true".

The Devil needs a better lawyer! I'm sure you see the flaws in this yourself.
Even the Idealists are going to have a field day with them.

 

[Fudbucker]

The Devil needs a better lawyer! I'm sure you see the flaws in this yourself.
Even the Idealists are going to have a field day with them.

Which premise do you disagree with?

 

[marplots]

4. A system of light switches, rheostats, wires and electric current can be arranged and manipulated in such a way as to be functionally equivalent to a mechanical working brain.

I don't think this step can be assumed, since there might be particulars which differ between biological organisms and things you have on your list. It's not just a matter of arrangement, but might involve differences in time and distance that prevent the outcome we are looking for.

For example, is there some arrangement of locks and valves that would be functionally equivalent to a modern television set, or are there inherent differences in the materials used which prevent this?

 

[Lowpro]

Which premise do you disagree with?

I disagree with the equivalence between switches, locks in canals, to the physiology of the brain. The brain integrates and has feedback, localization and specialization, and memory.

Do I mean to say that mechanical analogs cannot produce consciousness? No but I do want to remind you that if we intend to discuss the brain being the source of consciousness we have to consider the feedback. Hell I could see a good argument against the brain producing consciousness because so much of that feedback occurs due to peripheral feedback, as if the body's nervous system is a separate conscious entity from the brain's.

And to preempt an attempt to imbue those locks and canals with a robust feedback, consciousness requires that the system be spatial (because they're chemical interactions) and to imbue those characteristics into the locks and canals, they were an extension of switches and rheostats remember? They have to be spatial too, and I don't believe you can keep that equivalence then.

 

[Fudbucker]

I don't think this step can be assumed, since there might be particulars which differ between biological organisms and things you have on your list. It's not just a matter of arrangement, but might involve differences in time and distance that prevent the outcome we are looking for.

For example, is there some arrangement of locks and valves that would be functionally equivalent to a modern television set, or are there inherent differences in the materials used which prevent this?

There are materialists here who do indeed believe consciousness and experience can arise from a network of light switches (if you arrange them the right way). They even believe moving rocks around can produce consciousness.

As to your other point, no, locks and vales won't ever be the functional equivalent of a TV set, but then neither is a brain. Brains produce the feeling of consciousness and subjective experience. If you have a system that is functionally equivalent to a working brain, then it shouldn't matter what that system is made of- transistors, neurons, ropes and pulleys, light switches, dams and vales... all that matters is that it is functionally equivalent.

Abacuses and calculators do the same thing, but one is made of beads and wood while the other is made of transistors and electricity.

If a valve can be the functional equivalent to a transistor, and flowing water can be functionally equivalent to moving electrons, then the systems of vales, dams, water, and locks should be conscious. What's so special about neurons and electrons? To assert that the presence of neurons and/or electrons is a necessary condition for consciousness and experience is special pleading.

 

[Lowpro]

There are materialists here who do indeed believe consciousness and experience can arise from a network of light switches (if you arrange them the right way). They even believe moving rocks around can produce consciousness.

As to your other point, no, locks and vales won't ever be the functional equivalent of a TV set, but then neither is a brain. Brains produce the feeling of consciousness and subjective experience. If you have a system that is functionally equivalent to a working brain, then it shouldn't matter what that system is made of- transistors, neurons, ropes and pulleys, light switches, dams and vales... all that matters is that it is functionally equivalent.

Abacuses and calculators do the same thing, but one is made of beads and wood while the other is made of transistors and electricity.

If a valve can be the functional equivalent to a transistor, and flowing water can be functionally equivalent to moving electrons, then the systems of vales, dams, water, and locks should be conscious. What's so special about neurons and electrons? To assert that the presence of neurons and/or electrons is a necessary condition for consciousness and experience is special pleading.

I think I ran across another similar argument with a person discussing whether a register machine would be conscious if the functionally equivalent process was being registered. However the brain doesn't integrate as some kind of forward processing, it's in a continual spatial process; the brain never stops (well it does, but if it does then you got problems) so consciousness isn't an output, it's the process as it goes. This echoes from the Integrated Information Theory which to me is a sensible model since it's very useful for studying any physiological system. It also makes consciousness quite banal in that it's not a yes/no, but a "how robust is that system's consciousness"?

 

[marplots]

There are materialists here who do indeed believe consciousness and experience can arise from a network of light switches (if you arrange them the right way). They even believe moving rocks around can produce consciousness.

As to your other point, no, locks and vales won't ever be the functional equivalent of a TV set, but then neither is a brain. Brains produce the feeling of consciousness and subjective experience. If you have a system that is functionally equivalent to a working brain, then it shouldn't matter what that system is made of- transistors, neurons, ropes and pulleys, light switches, dams and vales... all that matters is that it is functionally equivalent.

Abacuses and calculators do the same thing, but one is made of beads and wood while the other is made of transistors and electricity.

If a valve can be the functional equivalent to a transistor, and flowing water can be functionally equivalent to moving electrons, then the systems of vales, dams, water, and locks should be conscious. What's so special about neurons and electrons? To assert that the presence of neurons and/or electrons is a necessary condition for consciousness and experience is special pleading.

Maybe I don't understand what "functionally equivalent" is supposed to mean.

It appears to ignore the special properties that certain types and arrangements of matter have - including limitations. I wouldn't expect to be able to make the functional equivalent of sol if all I had to work with was iron. Why? Because there are physical laws governing how nuclear fusion works.

So too, I don't know how we could make a "functional equivalent" of a transistor with water and valves. That doesn't mean we couldn't make something analogous, but I don't see how it could be equivalent across all the properties we might test. For example, would our replacement be subject to magnetism? Would it be small enough to fit in an actual circuit?

If consciousness, like fusion, depends on certain properties inherent in a certain arrangement of matter, then I'm not troubled that it couldn't be mimicked by water and pipes. That doesn't make consciousness anything unique by itself, nor does it necessitate an immaterial basis - there are plenty of emergent phenomena which depend on some underlying material fact about the constituents.

 

[Belz...]

There are materialists here who do indeed believe consciousness and experience can arise from a network of light switches (if you arrange them the right way). They even believe moving rocks around can produce consciousness.

This again ?

That you don't understand the thought experiment is no argument against it.

 

[MRC_Hans]

I'll play Devil's Advocate and present an argument for non-materialism:

1. If materialism is true, then consciousness and subjective experience are the result of a working brain.

2. All the components of a working brain can be replaced with mechanical functionally equivalent components.

3. From (2), a mechanical working brain that is conscious and capable of feeling subjective experience is possible.

4. A system of light switches, rheostats, wires and electric current can be arranged and manipulated in such a way as to be functionally equivalent to a mechanical working brain.

5. It is possible that the switches, rheostats, wires, and electric current from (4) can be successfully replaced with flowing water, locks, canals, and valves such that the system of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves is functionally equivalent to the system of light switches, rheostats, wires and electric current described in (4).

6. If an arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves can be functionally equivalent to an arrangement of light switches, rheostats, wires and electric current, then an arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves can be functionally equivalent to a mechanical working brain.

7. From (3) it's possible that an arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves can be conscious and have subjective experiences.

OK, albeit a hugely complex such system. If you scale it to a primate brain, it would take up a whole planet.

8. It is impossible* for an arrangement of flowing water, locks, canals, and valves to be conscious and have subjective experiences.

Is it? How does that follow?

9. Materialism results in a logical contradiction (between (7) and (8)).

10. Therefore non-materialism must be true* (either dualism or idealism).

Premises #1-#7 are rather hypothetical and may not be true. For example, we don't know what role time plays in consciousness, and a mechanical system as mentioned would be extremely slow.

#8 Is, nevertheless, unsupported.

Thus #9 fails, and hence #10 is false.

Also, IMHO, the entire argument is weak. You might as well say that since it seems impossible to build an automobile from, say, mud and rocks, automobiles are impossible.

Hans

 

[Apathia]

Which premise do you disagree with?

Sorry for the late reply, but as I expected others would take up the slack.
See MRC_Hans, especially.

 

[dlorde]

8. It is impossible for billions of interconnected bags of interacting chemicals to be conscious and have subjective experiences.*

*substitute any suitable argument from incredulity here.

 

[Fudbucker]

OK, albeit a hugely complex such system. If you scale it to a primate brain, it would take up a whole planet.



Is it? How does that follow?



Premises #1-#7 are rather hypothetical and may not be true. For example, we don't know what role time plays in consciousness, and a mechanical system as mentioned would be extremely slow.

#8 Is, nevertheless, unsupported.

Thus #9 fails, and hence #10 is false.

Also, IMHO, the entire argument is weak. You might as well say that since it seems impossible to build an automobile from, say, mud and rocks, automobiles are impossible.

Hans

(8) doesn't follow. It's a premise. I think it's a given that a system of locks, valves and water can't be conscious. But I can change "impossible" in (8) to "highly unlikely", if you like.

Do you think that if we tweaked the Panama Canal in just the right way, it could become conscious? How would that work? Why would one arrangement of valves and flowing water produce consciousness while another arrangement is just a bunch of vales, dams, and water?

I think the default position is that locks, vales, and water aren't the sorts of things that can produce consciousness. The burden of proof is on the person asserting such a system could possibly become conscious and have subjective experience.

In other words, you're OK with claiming it's possible that an arrangement of valves, dams, pumps, water, etc. could be happy. That sounds rather wooish. Kind of like believing the Flying Spaghetti Monster exists on some planet.