I challenge you: your best alternate to materialism

[Lowpro]

Right.



In the strong form, it's an argument from incredulity (based partly on the fact that all instances of consciousness so far have been observed only in organic brains, and partly on the absence of a casual mechanism that would make an arrangement of something like light switches conscious).

In the weakest form, it's the response we always give to the theist:

You say you believe there's some arrangement of valves, water etc. that is conscious (i.e. You say you believe in God?)... where's your evidence? Where's the proof that that bunch of light switches and rheostats over there is conscious?

Also, you could keep swapping out components until you literally get to shifting sand dunes that are conscious or a guy moving rocks around on an endless plain producing a simulation of the universe (including all the conscious beings in it).

Once you start down the road of non-organic consciousness (transistors instead of neurons), it ultimately leads to a form of panpsychism.



We don't know, but I'm assuming for the sake of argument that a system, if made of parts that are functionally equivalent to things we find in the brain, and the parts interact in the same way the components of the brain do, then such a system would be conscious. There might be something to the system we're missing, but for the sake of argument, I'm saying that all the right valves are in place, the locks move in the right way, the water molecules move in the right way, etc. It's a system of parts that work in a way that is functionally equivalent to an organic brain, and therefore, should be conscious.



Why would it invalidate that? We KNOW consciousness arises from actual organic brains. The question is, how likely is it that a system of lightswtiches could become conscious? If it's viewed as unlikely, and materialism implies that such a system should be conscious, then there's a problem for materialism.

So let me sum this up:

Fudbucker: "I'm going to change the properties of a system of locks, rheostats, and light switches; giving them biophysical properties they DO NOT HAVE for the purpose of this example. They will be functionally equivalent to a brain"

Me and others: "That's retarded and unnecessary, but go ahead..."

Fucbucker: "Now then, if I pretend that this system has properties it doesn't, and behaves as it cannot actually do, then booyakasha we have panpsychism! Where is your evidence that this is not the case!!!"

Me and others: "That's retarded and unnecessary and now you have to stop"

You have to stop this Fudbucker, we're worried about you.

 

[MRC_Hans]

You say you believe there's some arrangement of valves, water etc. that is conscious (i.e. You say you believe in God?)... where's your evidence? Where's the proof that that bunch of light switches and rheostats over there is conscious?

I don't have to prove it. I admit that the erstatz brain is speculative.
That does not invalidate my claim that that the organic brain is conscious, however, I am, currently, also not able to conclusively prove that (which is really the reason there still exists religion).

Once you start down the road of non-organic consciousness (transistors instead of neurons), it ultimately leads to a form of panpsychism.

No, it doesn't. The assumption that some arrangements of logical components can attain consciouness does absolutely not imply that all can. Just like not all arrangements of wheels and metal parts form automobiles.

We don't know, but I'm assuming for the sake of argument that a system, if made of parts that are functionally equivalent to things we find in the brain, and the parts interact in the same way the components of the brain do, then such a system would be conscious. There might be something to the system we're missing, but for the sake of argument, I'm saying that all the right valves are in place, the locks move in the right way, the water molecules move in the right way, etc. It's a system of parts that work in a way that is functionally equivalent to an organic brain, and therefore, should be conscious.

Yes, that is what I said.

Why would it invalidate that? We KNOW consciousness arises from actual organic brains. The question is, how likely is it that a system of lightswtiches could become conscious?

That may be the question, but it is irrelevant to the discussion of materialism.

If it's viewed as unlikely, and materialism implies that such a system should be conscious, then there's a problem for materialism.

No. Because, while materialism assumes that, it does not imply it.

And, at the end of the day, the discussion is moot, because we still don't know if the assumption is correct.

Hans

 

[Fudbucker]

With enough front loading, your argument becomes circular.

Provided it meets all the requirements of being conscious, will X be conscious? Um... sure. Provided it meets all the conditions, a lemur could taste just like chocolate icecream.

I'm still feel I'm missing the point of the exercise. What is it that I don't understand? Are you after some missing ingredient not bound to functionality?

I don't think it's quite circular, although it appears to be. Let me try with fewer steps:

1. According to materialism, consciousness is produced if components A,B,...Z are present and interact in a specific way (e.g., neurons, serotonin, glial cells, etc.)

2. If components A1,B1...Z1 are functionally identical to components A,B,...Z and interact in the same way, then consciousness should be produced (.e.,g valves, pipes, water, etc.).

3. Consciousness should not be produced from a system with components A1, B1...Z1 interacting in any kind of way.

4. The materialist account of consciousness is wrong (or incomplete). In other words, there is more to the story than consciousness resulting from the interactions of the components of a working organic brain.

Now the whole argument hinges on 3. Is a system of valves, pipes, water, etc. the sort of thing that can be conscious? Does it make sense to say that such a system could be happy, sad, feel pain, fall in love, appreciate great poetry, etc.?

If there's any tension in the idea that a system of valves and flowing water and whatnot can be conscious and have the same kind of rich inner life that we experience, then there's a problem with the materialist account of consciousness. It's either wrong, or incomplete.

I think there is quite a bit of tension with the supposition that something like the Panama Canal (however complex you want to make it and however complex you want to make it interact with itself) can be conscious and experience mental states. I base this on three things:

1. All cases of consciousness have resulted from processes carried out by organic brains. There is no evidence that anything other than an organic brain can be conscious. It's pure speculation, at this point.

2. There is no causal mechanism or explanation for why consciousness should arise from an arrangement of valves, water, etc. Of course, we don't have much of a causal mechanism for why consciousness arises from our own brains, so this point applies to any conscious system.

3. Why should one arrangement of components A1, B1...Z1 produce, say, the conscious experience of pain, while another arrangement of those same components produces no experience at all?

In other words, let's suppose we set up all our valves and locks, turn the jets on, and begin to direct the water around in the following way: Valves 1,2,3 are open, 4 is closed, 5 and 6 are open, 7,8,9 are off... valves 80009752 and 80009753 are open, etc. And let's represent that in a binary fashion (1 being an open valve, 0 being a closed valve) so that the valve arrange of:

100110010010101100101000110 is the subjective experience of pain in the water-valve system.
What makes that arrangement so special? Why doesn't 11001110010010100001001 also produce the experience of pain? Why don't all arrangements produce the experience of pain?

If we're going to claim that a system of valves, water, locks, etc. can be conscious, it seems arbitrary to insist the valves must be arranged a certain way. If one arrangement of open and closed valves is conscious, then any arrangement of open and closed valves should be conscious. Why is there something special about a particular arrangement? The lack of explanation is a problem.

 

[punshhh]

Once you start down the road of non-organic consciousness (transistors instead of neurons), it ultimately leads to a form of panpsychism.

Some materialists are guilty of panpsychism, others are not, they use a more technical approach to the issues. Also some get around the problem of panpsychism by denying any kind of consciousness, or mind, and stating that it is just a computational process.

The problem you are presenting is focussing rather too much on consciousness* as the pertinent quality of the apparatus. The pertinent quality of the brain is cellular life, if your arrangement of dams and channels is equivalent to cellular metabolism you might have a functioning cell. You can then use a large number of these cells as building blocks to construct an equivalent of a brain.


*you may be aware that I don't hold with the definition of consciousness as presented around here. For me self-conscious is a more appropriate phrase for what is being discussed.

 

[marplots]

(snipped for space, linked for reference)

Your outline seems to boil down to some unspecified property that human brains have which cannot be duplicated.

This recalls to me the thinking about Élan vital^WP. The idea was there had to be some special ingredient which accounted for the difference between "life" and "not-life" - that it couldn't all be just chemicals in a certain arrangement.

Nowadays we no longer argue about it, not because it still couldn't be raised, but because we've lost interest. By mucking about with the roots of life, the question doesn't seem to have any merit any longer.

How closely do you think the two arguments align?

 

[pagetheoracle]

To say that the mind produces the outside world, is like saying that TV receivers are transmitters because they show pictures on them (A bad scientist mistakes cause for effect - a good one finds the cause behind an effect).

Using this analogy could the material world be just captured signals and the invisible world be potential on its way somewhere but not yet arrived? (I use a volcano to express this idea usually, with the lava as undefined energy and the cone as layers of history (solid, settled, definite, reality i.e. the past as opposed to the former as future). I call it an Accumulation / Discharge Cycle as The Tao calls it a journey, both really referring to the same thing or life as motion / e-motion and death as no motion / e-motion (cold, hard intellect or facts).

 

[LarryS]

I don't think it's quite circular, although it appears to be. Let me try with fewer steps:

1. According to materialism, consciousness is produced if components A,B,...Z are present and interact in a specific way (e.g., neurons, serotonin, glial cells, etc.)

2. If components A1,B1...Z1 are functionally identical to components A,B,...Z and interact in the same way, then consciousness should be produced (.e.,g valves, pipes, water, etc.).

3. Consciousness should not be produced from a system with components A1, B1...Z1 interacting in any kind of way.

4. The materialist account of consciousness is wrong (or incomplete). In other words, there is more to the story than consciousness resulting from the interactions of the components of a working organic brain.

Now the whole argument hinges on 3. Is a system of valves, pipes, water, etc. the sort of thing that can be conscious? Does it make sense to say that such a system could be happy, sad, feel pain, fall in love, appreciate great poetry, etc.?

If there's any tension in the idea that a system of valves and flowing water and whatnot can be conscious and have the same kind of rich inner life that we experience, then there's a problem with the materialist account of consciousness. It's either wrong, or incomplete.

I think there is quite a bit of tension with the supposition that something like the Panama Canal (however complex you want to make it and however complex you want to make it interact with itself) can be conscious and experience mental states. I base this on three things:

1. All cases of consciousness have resulted from processes carried out by organic brains. There is no evidence that anything other than an organic brain can be conscious. It's pure speculation, at this point.

2. There is no causal mechanism or explanation for why consciousness should arise from an arrangement of valves, water, etc. Of course, we don't have much of a causal mechanism for why consciousness arises from our own brains, so this point applies to any conscious system.

3. Why should one arrangement of components A1, B1...Z1 produce, say, the conscious experience of pain, while another arrangement of those same components produces no experience at all?

In other words, let's suppose we set up all our valves and locks, turn the jets on, and begin to direct the water around in the following way: Valves 1,2,3 are open, 4 is closed, 5 and 6 are open, 7,8,9 are off... valves 80009752 and 80009753 are open, etc. And let's represent that in a binary fashion (1 being an open valve, 0 being a closed valve) so that the valve arrange of:

100110010010101100101000110 is the subjective experience of pain in the water-valve system.
What makes that arrangement so special? Why doesn't 11001110010010100001001 also produce the experience of pain? Why don't all arrangements produce the experience of pain?

If we're going to claim that a system of valves, water, locks, etc. can be conscious, it seems arbitrary to insist the valves must be arranged a certain way. If one arrangement of open and closed valves is conscious, then any arrangement of open and closed valves should be conscious. Why is there something special about a particular arrangement? The lack of explanation is a problem.

How about this. According to Materialism, if we placed an individual in a Star Trek Transponder, and we COPIED their physical body and brain into an exact duplicate down to the exact elementary particle, we would have two identical human beings, with the same memories, identities, egos and etc. They would be identical because the matter is identical between the two and matter sufficiently explains consciousness. We might have a discussion regarding continuity, as, if the original is not 'broken apart' in the process, and the copy now with a fresh start - - Would these two have a different concept of continuity of identity?

 

[MRC_Hans]

3. Consciousness should not be produced from a system with components A1, B1...Z1 interacting in any kind of way.

Please explain why it should not (other than you would prefer it not to be so).

4. The materialist account of consciousness is wrong (or incomplete). In other words, there is more to the story than consciousness resulting from the interactions of the components of a working organic brain.

Even granting, for the sake of discussion, that #3 turns out to be true, #4 does not follow. There may well be functions in a biological brain that cannot practically be reproduced in anything but a brain.

Now the whole argument hinges on 3. Is a system of valves, pipes, water, etc. the sort of thing that can be conscious? Does it make sense to say that such a system could be happy, sad, feel pain, fall in love, appreciate great poetry, etc.?

Actually, none of the things you mention are necessarily properties of consciousness.

If there's any tension in the idea that a system of valves and flowing water and whatnot can be conscious and have the same kind of rich inner life that we experience, then there's a problem with the materialist account of consciousness. It's either wrong, or incomplete.

You know, no matter how many times you repeat this, it does not become true.

1. All cases of consciousness have resulted from processes carried out by organic brains. There is no evidence that anything other than an organic brain can be conscious. It's pure speculation, at this point.

Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.

2. There is no causal mechanism or explanation for why consciousness should arise from an arrangement of valves, water, etc. Of course, we don't have much of a causal mechanism for why consciousness arises from our own brains, so this point applies to any conscious system.

Come on, we are not even sure of (or agree to) the definition of consciousness.


Hans

 

[Lowpro]

How about this. According to Materialism, if we placed an individual in a Star Trek Transponder, and we COPIED their physical body and brain into an exact duplicate down to the exact elementary particle, we would have two identical human beings, with the same memories, identities, egos and etc. They would be identical because the matter is identical between the two and matter sufficiently explains consciousness. We might have a discussion regarding continuity, as, if the original is not 'broken apart' in the process, and the copy now with a fresh start - - Would these two have a different concept of continuity of identity?

Yes they will, but not as much as two different people. There's a better scenario here. We know consciousness does NOT require memory. People with memory failure are still conscious and experience however in the brain the insular structures for memory do not respond in the integration. That's all that's different but as far as conscious goes memory doesn't matter.

So lets use your scenario but absolutely no memory between them of their previous single iteration. They are not identical to the primary iteration since we have destroyed their insular functions but they will both be conscious and similarly conscious between them given the rest of the structures were accurately duplicated. But the instant afterwards their experiences will diverge.

This suggests that identity is a moving target and memory can influence identity but is not integral to identity. This seems counterintuitive however memory-deficit patients still report an identity. I want this to be mentioned because it needs to be understood: Consciousness does not require memory reference, but if it's available it can be integrated with consciousness.

 

[LarryS]

Yes they will, but not as much as two different people. There's a better scenario here. We know consciousness does NOT require memory. People with memory failure are still conscious and experience however in the brain the insular structures for memory do not respond in the integration. That's all that's different but as far as conscious goes memory doesn't matter.

So lets use your scenario but absolutely no memory between them of their previous single iteration. They are not identical to the primary iteration since we have destroyed their insular functions but they will both be conscious and similarly conscious between them given the rest of the structures were accurately duplicated. But the instant afterwards their experiences will diverge.

This suggests that identity is a moving target and memory can influence identity but is not integral to identity. This seems counterintuitive however memory-deficit patients still report an identity. I want this to be mentioned because it needs to be understood: Consciousness does not require memory reference, but if it's available it can be integrated with consciousness.

Correct, memory is not required for consciousness. Wiping their memories clean would be a different experiment. If matter totally explains c-ness, if we copy an individual to the exact elementary particle, then the two individuals should only diverge as their two physical POV's would be different, ie both in same room, but seeing the room from different angles. If we could create two exact individuals that occupied the same exact space, they would never diverge - and both their behaviors could be predicted to the minutia. This assumes that matter explains c-ness, and the universe plays by the rules.

 

[Lowpro]

Correct, memory is not required for consciousness. Wiping their memories clean would be a different experiment. If matter totally explains c-ness, if we copy an individual to the exact elementary particle, then the two individuals should only diverge as their two physical POV's would be different, ie both in same room, but seeing the room from different angles. If we could create two exact individuals that occupied the same exact space, they would never diverge - and both their behaviors could be predicted to the minutia. This assumes that matter explains c-ness, and the universe plays by the rules.

Maybe. Even with the exact makeup they'll probably diverge due to biophysics. This could influence c-ness but as I've said many times c-ness as a physiological and spatial model is stochastic which represents physiology pretty well.

 

[Fudbucker]

Please explain why it should not (other than you would prefer it not to be so).

I gave three reasons. I even numbered them.

Even granting, for the sake of discussion, that #3 turns out to be true, #4 does not follow. There may well be functions in a biological brain that cannot practically be reproduced in anything but a brain.

That would fall under "incomplete story". It would also be a strange result, under materialism, that there is something in an organic brain that doesn't have a non-organic functionally equivalent counterpart.

Actually, none of the things you mention are necessarily properties of consciousness.

What do you mean "properties of consciousness"?

You know, no matter how many times you repeat this, it does not become true.

That's why I listed three reasons in support of my premise.

Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.

It depends on the search. If we examine 99% of the galaxy, and don't find any intelligent life, then the absence of alien intelligent life in the Milky Way would indeed be very good evidence that alien intelligent life in the Milky Way doesn't exist, even though there's still that missing 1%.

In other words, the absence of white ravens is evidence that "all ravens are black".

In the case of consciousness, we have done some pretty thorough searching. Consciousness only appears to exist in organisms with pretty complex brains. the absence of consciousness in, say, rocks is evidence that rocks aren't conscious.

Come on, we are not even sure of (or agree to) the definition of consciousness.

While the definition of "consciousness" is necessarily vague, I'm assuming you would admit to being conscious, however you define the term? And that people you know are also conscious? So, in the colloquial sense, the idea that a bunch of valves and flowing water would be conscious, and capable of having a rich inner mental life is a problem for materialism, for the reasons given.

You also ignored my third reason (which I think creates the biggest problem for materialism):

If arrangement of valves 110101010001010101010101011100010 conscious, why does that particular arrangement result in consciousness? Why not any arrangement of open and closed valves? If one arrangement is conscious while the others aren't, it's special pleading.

 

[Fudbucker]

How about this. According to Materialism, if we placed an individual in a Star Trek Transponder, and we COPIED their physical body and brain into an exact duplicate down to the exact elementary particle, we would have two identical human beings, with the same memories, identities, egos and etc. They would be identical because the matter is identical between the two and matter sufficiently explains consciousness. We might have a discussion regarding continuity, as, if the original is not 'broken apart' in the process, and the copy now with a fresh start - - Would these two have a different concept of continuity of identity?

A) The two individuals would still be numerically distinct and B) the identity problem wouldn't necessarily go away, even if you ditched materialism.

 

[Myriad]

While the definition of "consciousness" is necessarily vague, I'm assuming you would admit to being conscious, however you define the term? And that people you know are also conscious? So, in the colloquial sense, the idea that a bunch of valves and flowing water would be conscious, and capable of having a rich inner mental life is a problem for materialism, for the reasons given.

My definition of consciousness is the inclusion of the self as an agent in a narrative dynamically constructed from sensory input and memory. Most people I know do that, while awake. It's not clear whether babies do that, and it's not clear whether they're conscious.

You also ignored my third reason (which I think creates the biggest problem for materialism):

If arrangement of valves 110101010001010101010101011100010 conscious, why does that particular arrangement result in consciousness? Why not any arrangement of open and closed valves? If one arrangement is conscious while the others aren't, it's special pleading.

That argument is incoherent. "1101010..." does not describe an arrangement of valves. It could describe the state of an arrangement of valves (that is, which valves are open and which closed) but without knowing how they're connected to one another, how could anyone possibly tell if the system is capable of, or actively engaged in, dynamically constructing narrative that includes the self as an agent from sensory input and memory? (If the system is static as you seem to be describing it, then we know it cannot, just as we know that a stalactite cannot play basketball; and if the system really only has 33 elements, then we know it cannot, just as we know that a hurricane cannot take place inside an eye dropper. But in general, given neither a description of how a system is configured nor a description of its behavior, we have no way to tell.)

 

[LarryS]

A) The two individuals would still be numerically distinct and B) the identity problem wouldn't necessarily go away, even if you ditched materialism.

If we ditch materialism, then matter alone is insufficient to explain consciousness . . . so, if we could exactly materially duplicate an individual, the two individuals would not necessarily be identical because there is something other than the material required. This is the point I'm trying to make with the experiment, duplicating a brain/body not with electronic switches or waterways, but with an identical configuration of elementary particles.

 

[Belz...]

If we ditch materialism, then matter alone is insufficient to explain consciousness . . .

Huh ?

 

[LarryS]

Huh ?

If we ditched Materialism (as per post 273), and assumed some form of Idealism or Dualism, then matter alone is insufficient to explain c-ness . . . this is my understanding.

 

[MRC_Hans]

My definition of consciousness is the inclusion of the self as an agent in a narrative dynamically constructed from sensory input and memory. Most people I know do that, while awake. It's not clear whether babies do that, and it's not clear whether they're conscious.

Self-awareness is the common criterion for consciousness, but I don't think it holds for close examination. -Or at least, it wants its own definition. For example, I will say that it would not be too hard to give a computer program a level of self-awarenss that would pass current tests.

OTOH, some animals, e.g. cats, while generally not capable of passing current self-awareness tests, nevertheless appear to be quite self-aware.

Hans

 

[Belz...]

If we ditched Materialism (as per post 273), and assumed some form of Idealism or Dualism, then matter alone is insufficient to explain c-ness . . . this is my understanding.

That doesn't follow.

 

[Fudbucker]

My definition of consciousness is the inclusion of the self as an agent in a narrative dynamically constructed from sensory input and memory. Most people I know do that, while awake. It's not clear whether babies do that, and it's not clear whether they're conscious.

That's a pretty fair stab at it.

That argument is incoherent. "1101010..." does not describe an arrangement of valves. It could describe the state of an arrangement of valves (that is, which valves are open and which closed) but without knowing how they're connected to one another, how could anyone possibly tell if the system is capable of, or actively engaged in, dynamically constructing narrative that includes the self as an agent from sensory input and memory? (If the system is static as you seem to be describing it, then we know it cannot, just as we know that a stalactite cannot play basketball; and if the system really only has 33 elements, then we know it cannot, just as we know that a hurricane cannot take place inside an eye dropper. But in general, given neither a description of how a system is configured nor a description of its behavior, we have no way to tell.)

You're right, the binary sequence describes a sequence of on-and-off valves, not an arrangement. But it doesn't change the point:

Arrange the valves however you want. Now start turning them off and on. Some sequence will result in consciousness and most won't. Suppose we have 100 billions valves arranged some (any) way.
1001010110101001001....1 produces consciousness while
0010001010101000111....0 doesn't produce any experience, conscious or otherwise.

Why is one particular sequence (and/or arrangement) so special?

Note, that this is not just an objection to water-valve consciousness. The same thing applies to neurons. Arrange 100 billions neurons however you want. Now "turn the system on". Some neurons firing a certain way will produce the experience of stubbing your toe while another sequence of neurons firing will produce the experience of an orgasm.

Materialism has a hard time with explaining why a particular bit of neural activity produces a particular experience, and I think the conscious water-valve thought experiment is a good way of elucidating this.

This helps idealism because the idealist can remove the problem simply by asserting that everything is consciousness, and there is some particular mastermind (God, a collections of minds, whatever), behind the scenes, coordinating all of our experiences.

Of course, the evidence for the above is....? My argument simply allows idealism to negate a very thorny problem for materialists.