I challenge you: your best alternate to materialism

[barehl]

Let's say we assume for the moment that an Idealistic framework is accurate. You have disembodied consciousness and all aspects of reality are nothing more than dreams or illusions of this mind. I can understand why a superficial review of this notion would seem to fit with what is observed. However, I don't understand how this would fit in depth.

If there is no physical reality then what is the origin of the characteristics of observed reality? This is an important question. If you existed as a disembodied consciousness then how did you imagine reality? If these characteristics are an innate part of your consciousness then you wouldn't have to observe them since you would already know them. And, if you didn't already know them then where did they come from? In other words, everything you know should already exist and anything you don't know could never exist. I've never seen an explanation for this for a single consciousness. So, I have to conclude that a single consciousness is impossible in an Idealistic framework.

Second try. Instead of one consciousness, we have an indeterminate number. With a trivial review of this configuration, it could be suggested that additional characteristics of observed reality could come from a separate consciousness. This would seem to get us past the problems of single consciousness. Except that it doesn't. You can view the sum total of all consciousnesses as a single set the same as you can a single consciousness. So, the problem remains. Everything known by the total consciousness either already exists or will never exist. And this doesn't match with our observations. So, multiple consciousnesses are impossible.

Eventually you get to the configuration of larger/smaller. With this idea, our consciousness is suggested to be smaller than another consciousness so that something unknown to our smaller consciousness could still be learned from the larger. Again, this seems to trivially satisfy observation. However, this explanation doesn't work with the larger consciousness which itself would also need a larger consciousness. So, we end up with an infinite sequence. That rules this one out as well.

Unless I've missed something, it seems that we've now eliminated all forms of Idealism.

 

[IanS]

Theoretical objects don't exist independent of the mind, they are a subjective construct. .

If what is in your mind is just a "thought" or an idea, why are you calling it an "object"?

I think it's misleading to call ideas "objects". Because that confuses ideas with tangible things which can be independently observed by other people.

It sounds to me like a semantic slight of hand, attempting to imply that observable objects are not actually "real". It sounds like it's just yet another way of philosophy trying to raise it's age-old canard of debating whether anything is "real".

 

[MRC_Hans]

Do you mean in the present tense? Because a great deal of the past seems to be unfalsifiable. There's a thread on the "historicity of Jesus" as an example.

"Falsifiable" is a theoretical construct.

The existence of a historical Jesus is theoretically falsifiable. The actual information may no longer be in a condition where it is practically possible to interpret it ^*), but that does not make it unfalsifiable.


Hans

*) A lot of words to avoid saying that it no longer exists, just to avoid anybody pointing out that information cannot be destroyed.

 

[MRC_Hans]

Originally Posted by annnnoid
The following just ‘happened’ to Berf Gooner:

Berf wants a small pepperoni pizza.

We could ask him.

No, change of mind,…Berf wants a large deluxe pizza.
No, change of mind,…Berf wants a medium Hawaiian pizza.
No, change of mind,…Berf wants 2 tomatoes and a piece of broccoli and then Berf wants to have sex.
Next…Berf is experiencing a variety of obtuse moodiness not unlike the feeling of a cool breeze on an overcast winter day.

We could ask him.

Explain how a single one of these events would be falsified….cause if they can’t be falsified…then they didn’t happen.

I don't even see your problem with these. We could ask him and in each case Berf could confirm or deny the case.

That we don't know where Berf is (or the fact that he is fictional) is entirely irrelevant; each of his notions or feelings are entirely falsifiable.

Hans

 

[MRC_Hans]

Perhaps in principle those claims could be falsified, but we're nowhere's near that capable of mining the brain to return prior states of mind, intent or images of experiences. If we were, we would not need the courts to establish guilt or innocence. Your claim these are falsifiable could easily be proven false . . . especially now that Carnac the Magnificent is dead.

Basic failure:

Our current ability to measure, monitor, or even experience something is basically irrelevant to its state of falsifiability. E.g. electricity did not suddenly start to create a magnet field on July 21st 1820 (When Oersted demonstrated it did), and the theory of electromagnetism was not unfalsifiable before that date.

It is true, however, that this presents a caveat: One might be tempted to base a claim of falsifiability on a future, hypothetical, observation method, but here the rule is that that must also be falsifiable ... etc.

Hans

 

[MRC_Hans]

Oh, and to the OP: IMHO, the best alternative to materialism, possibly even the only one, is Solipsism.

Hans

 

[marplots]

"Falsifiable" is a theoretical construct.

The existence of a historical Jesus is theoretically falsifiable. The actual information may no longer be in a condition where it is practically possible to interpret it ^*), but that does not make it unfalsifiable.


Hans

*) A lot of words to avoid saying that it no longer exists, just to avoid anybody pointing out that information cannot be destroyed.

I'm probably misreading this. It sounds to me like you mean something like "logically falsifiable" but not actually so. But if that's correct, then it doesn't really help the realist position much, does it?

In effect, aren't we claiming a property (falsifiability) outside of what can be shown empirically, in a pragmatic sense? That shouldn't be a real thing under the materialist schema. After all, it's a claim about reality that can neither be demonstrated nor observed. That sounds like idealism a bit.

 

[MRC_Hans]

I'm probably misreading this. It sounds to me like you mean something like "logically falsifiable" but not actually so. But if that's correct, then it doesn't really help the realist position much, does it?

In effect, aren't we claiming a property (falsifiability) outside of what can be shown empirically, in a pragmatic sense? That shouldn't be a real thing under the materialist schema. After all, it's a claim about reality that can neither be demonstrated nor observed. That sounds like idealism a bit.

I think all these distinctions are artificial, or at least properties of a non-materialistic position.

From a materialistic POW, something is either falsifiable or not, period.
What we do have to accept is that some falsifications are unlikely to be feasible in practice, at least for the time being. You may call those theoretical, but in reality they are not different.

Perhaps a better example than Jesus is electromagnetism:

The theory has always been falsifiable: If we run a strong enough current through a wire, and it does not influence a nearby compass needle, then the theory is false.

... The above has always been true, but till we were able to build a sensitive compass and a strong enough current source, it could not be carried out in practice.

In other words, some falsifications have to be left untried, till such time as we have the means to carry them out.

Hans

 

[punshhh]

If what is in your mind is just a "thought" or an idea, why are you calling it an "object"?

An object of thought, I am giving it an independent existence of some kind, because some materialists say that mind and by extension though doesn't exist in some way.

I think it's misleading to call ideas "objects". Because that confuses ideas with tangible things which can be independently observed by other people.

Yes you're right, perhaps if I used the phrase, object of thought, it would be more appropriate.

It sounds to me like a semantic slight of hand, attempting to imply that observable objects are not actually "real". It sounds like it's just yet another way of philosophy trying to raise it's age-old canard of debating whether anything is "real".

No, I am happy for everything to be real, it's more the other way round, I am debating that thoughts and their subjective content is real.

 

[marplots]

I think all these distinctions are artificial, or at least properties of a non-materialistic position.

From a materialistic POW, something is either falsifiable or not, period.
What we do have to accept is that some falsifications are unlikely to be feasible in practice, at least for the time being. You may call those theoretical, but in reality they are not different.

Perhaps a better example than Jesus is electromagnetism:

The theory has always been falsifiable: If we run a strong enough current through a wire, and it does not influence a nearby compass needle, then the theory is false.

... The above has always been true, but till we were able to build a sensitive compass and a strong enough current source, it could not be carried out in practice.

In other words, some falsifications have to be left untried, till such time as we have the means to carry them out.

Hans

I think the situation is actually much, much worse than you describe, both pragmatically and logically.

For example, how would we test the theory that physics is telling us something consistent through time about the world? If we get a spurious result in the experiment you mention, wouldn't we actually believe, not that the theory of electromagnetism is false, but that our experimental set-up has a flaw?

I remember doing many chemistry experiments that didn't work out as planned, and always, always, I first believed I had made a mistake, not that I had disproved some aspect of the body of knowledge we call chemistry.

It is one thing to say that things are falsifiable, but those falsifications also rely on other things which may or may not be false, and there seems to be no way to separate out exactly what you want from that mixture. At a minimum, we require consistency, so that we can falsify something over and over again. But consistency itself relies on repeatability, something which itself must be capable of falsification.

All of the phenomena which happen only once also escape our net. Those lost to history do as well. And statements which we cannot falsify ("I saw an alien ship hovering over my house last night") but which are capable of falsification ("You were in Boston last night - a thousand miles from your house") gain no support from the fact that they could be falsified.

So we have statements we believe to be true which cannot be falsified, and statements we believe to be false which might be falsified (but aren't). I hope this makes it plain why I don't think much of the idea.

 

[MRC_Hans]

I think the situation is actually much, much worse than you describe, both pragmatically and logically.

Worse? How do you mean, worse? That we know less than we may think? Perhaps, ...well, make that certainly, but is that bad? Personally, I think not.

For example, how would we test the theory that physics is telling us something consistent through time about the world? If we get a spurious result in the experiment you mention, wouldn't we actually believe, not that the theory of electromagnetism is false, but that our experimental set-up has a flaw?

It doesn't matter what we think, because we will keep verifying till we do get a consistent response.

I remember doing many chemistry experiments that didn't work out as planned, and always, always, I first believed I had made a mistake, not that I had disproved some aspect of the body of knowledge we call chemistry.

Obviously, since I expect you were doing those experiments in an educational context, so the results had been thoroughly verified earlier, so if your result did not conform to expectations, you most likely made some mistake.

Hans

(Will look at the rest of your post later)

 

[MRC_Hans]

It is one thing to say that things are falsifiable, but those falsifications also rely on other things which may or may not be false, and there seems to be no way to separate out exactly what you want from that mixture. At a minimum, we require consistency, so that we can falsify something over and over again. But consistency itself relies on repeatability, something which itself must be capable of falsification.

I think you misunderstand the concept. That a theory is falsifiable means that we can define what would show it to be wrong. No more, no less.

It does not mean that:

1) That falsification is currently available. Just that we can argue that it exists.

2) That the falsification has not failed. That is, the theory may have been supported, by the failure to falsify it.

3) That the theory is right.

All of the phenomena which happen only once also escape our net. Those lost to history do as well.

A phenomena that has happened only once (so far) can be falsifiable.

And statements which we cannot falsify ("I saw an alien ship hovering over my house last night") but which are capable of falsification ("You were in Boston last night - a thousand miles from your house") gain no support from the fact that they could be falsified.

Again, that a claim is falsifiable does not imply that it is true. Not at all. Just that it might be tested. Falsifiability is, so to speak, the entry ticket to science. If not falsifiable, the claim is turned away at the door. Otherwise, it still awaits verification.

So we have statements we believe to be true which cannot be falsified,

Have we? I cannot think of any that are not in the realm of religion (or superstition).

and statements we believe to be false which might be falsified (but aren't).

A falsifiable statement can be false. E.g.:

I own a white 1959 Cadillac.

Easiliy falsifiable, and (alas ) false.

Hans

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

I think you misunderstand the concept. That a theory is falsifiable means that we can define what would show it to be wrong. No more, no less.

It does not mean that:

1) That falsification is currently available. Just that we can argue that it exists.

2) That the falsification has not failed. That is, the theory may have been supported, by the failure to falsify it.

3) That the theory is right.



A phenomena that has happened only once (so far) can be falsifiable.



Again, that a claim is falsifiable does not imply that it is true. Not at all. Just that it might be tested. Falsifiability is, so to speak, the entry ticket to science. If not falsifiable, the claim is turned away at the door. Otherwise, it still awaits verification.

...

• The moon is made of green cheese.
• 2 plus 2 is 5.
• Killing is good.

Does the ability to use falsification apply to 3 above claims? Can science be applied to all 3 claims?

 

[Pixel42]

• The moon is made of green cheese.
• 2 plus 2 is 5.
• Killing is good.

Does the ability to use falsification apply to 3 above claims? Can science be applied to all 3 claims?

As long as you define your terms.

For example if you define good as anything which increases the sum total of human happiness then the killing of a nutter who is firing a gun at children by a sniper would be good, whilst the killing of the children would not.

 

[punshhh]

Oh, and to the OP: IMHO, the best alternative to materialism, possibly even the only one, is Solipsism.

Hans

I would modify solipsism to regard all life forms are one being.

I see little use of "falsifiable in principle", when discussing metaphysics.

 

[marplots]

(snipped much to try and get my thinking back on track)

Have we? I cannot think of any that are not in the realm of religion (or superstition).

That quote is out of context, but you were talking about a realm where statements are not generally falsifiable. If you don't mind, could you give me one to comment on?

My "agenda" is to show that religious statements can be falsified and strongly parallel scientific statements on the dimension of falsifiability. I'd like to use an example of what you mean by an unfalsifiable statement, since I've offered several that were found lacking.

 

[Belz...]

• The moon is made of green cheese.
• 2 plus 2 is 5.
• Killing is good.

Does the ability to use falsification apply to 3 above claims? Can science be applied to all 3 claims?

You can falsify the first two. Science can apply to the third IF you state your axioms/goals first (i.e. "what is good ?") at which point it becomes falsifiable.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

As long as you define your terms.

For example if you define good as anything which increases the sum total of human happiness then the killing of a nutter who is firing a gun at children by a sniper would be good, whilst the killing of the children would not.

So if I define the moon to be made of green cheese, it is made of green cheese and if I define you to be wrong, you are wrong. Is that it?

 

[Belz...]

So if I define the moon to be made of green cheese, it is made of green cheese and if I define you to be wrong, you are wrong. Is that it?

No.

 

[Robin]

As long as you define your terms.

For example if you define good as anything which increases the sum total of human happiness then the killing of a nutter who is firing a gun at children by a sniper would be good, whilst the killing of the children would not.

Depending of course on the current nutter to non-nutter ratio in the world.

For a sufficiently nutter saturated world, killing the children would increase the sum total of human happiness.