I challenge you: your best alternate to materialism

Can you not read???

Darat very explicitly claimed that every one of the statements I came up with can be falsified. He didn't provide a shred of evidence to support this nonsense.

Hand------waving!

I don't think you know how this works, so let me help you: falsifiability is not an evidence-based reasoning. All you need to do is to successfully argue that the claim is falsifiable.

As for your worthless claims...I can, without too much difficulty, locate a principle that legitimizes the existence of the flying spaghetti monster.

Please do so.

I think you are so enthralled by your own debating technique (incredulity) that you forget to actually, you know, debate.
 
…excuse me…it was you who made the claim that all those events could be falsified. That’s an extraordinary claim by any standard

Yet another term you do not understand. Seriously, your entire posting history on this forum only demonstrates your ignorance of all things related to skepticism. There are plenty of people here willing to help you with that, and even if you end up not agreeing with them on the conclusions, at least you could make some progress by actually using reason and logic to debate topics, if only you let them.

For instance, as far as subjective experiences are concerned, there are a number of ways that these can be falsified. Unfortunately, since you have decided that they cannot, past attempts at explaining those only result in more incredulity and snark from you. It's unfortunate, because you seem intelligent, but utterly determined to prove otherwise.
 
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I expected you to come back with this; but you said you wanted to distinguish theoretical objects from real objects. Since now you are saying they exist as mental states, then there is no distinction. You will have to make up your mind.
Theoretical objects don't exist independent of the mind, they are a subjective construct. Real objects outside the mind are very different indeed. Do you not see that these are two entirely different worlds, the subjective chitta Chatta of the mind and the world of physical objects?

Unfortunately we cannot consider, know, or understand physical objects any other way than through the subjective constructs of the mind. Because this is where our consciousness resides. So we have to represent them symbolically.

The problem is when the subjective construct is confused with the physical object it represents. This is not a problem when considering physical objects which we can interact with via our bodies, as we are hard wired to interact with them and use subjective constructs of them simultaneously. But when we try to consider physical objects which we cannot interact with externally(of the mind), then it is easy to fall into the trap of regarding them as subjective constructs alone, with no independent existence outside the mind. This is not the case, unknown physical objects do exist out there in numerous forms.

I see this all over this forum and repeatedly try to point it out with little success.

However in a philosophical discussion of ontologies it is important to be aware of the distinction.

Now I can see some relevance of falsifiability in scientific experiments, where it is easy to interact with the physical world and perform experiments. Also in the mental subjective world, it can have some relevance. But in the consideration of unknown physical(or otherwise) circumstances in existence it has little value.


Such as ?
Existence itself, whatever that is.
 
Theoretical objects don't exist independent of the mind, they are a subjective construct. Real objects outside the mind are very different indeed. Do you not see that these are two entirely different worlds, the subjective chitta Chatta of the mind and the world of physical objects?

Unfortunately we cannot consider, know, or understand physical objects any other way than through the subjective constructs of the mind. Because this is where our consciousness resides. So we have to represent them symbolically.

The problem is when the subjective construct is confused with the physical object it represents. This is not a problem when considering physical objects which we can interact with via our bodies, as we are hard wired to interact with them and use subjective constructs of them simultaneously. But when we try to consider physical objects which we cannot interact with externally(of the mind), then it is easy to fall into the trap of regarding them as subjective constructs alone, with no independent existence outside the mind. This is not the case, unknown physical objects do exist out there in numerous forms. I see this all over this forum and repeatedly try to point it out with little success.

However in a philosophical discussion of ontologies it is important to be aware of the distinction.

Now I can see some relevance of falsifiability in scientific experiments, where it is easy to interact with the physical world and perform experiments. Also in the mental subjective world, it can have some relevance. But in the consideration of unknown physical(or otherwise) circumstances in existence it has little value.


Existence itself, whatever that is.

What are these unknown physical objects?

Do you acknowledge the five senses?
 
Theoretical objects don't exist independent of the mind, they are a subjective construct. Real objects outside the mind are very different indeed. Do you not see that these are two entirely different worlds, the subjective chitta Chatta of the mind and the world of physical objects?

YOU are the one who said they existed as mental states. Here:

Theoretical objects do exist as mental states along with intellectual objects like questions, answers, assumptions, conclusions, truths etc.

So which is it ?

Let's settle this before we go any further, ok ?
 
…excuse me…it was you who made the claim that all those events could be falsified. That’s an extraordinary claim by any standard (I’m not going to assume you know why but it would be very easy to establish that this is the case). You provided not a shred of evidence to support it.

That’s called hand-waving.

If you’re going to back-track when your feet land in the fire…then don’t make the claims in the first place.

My claim was simply that Belz gospel of the omniscience of science (and, by extension, the primacy of materialism) is nothing but religion with another name. That is self-evident for any number of reasons…not least of all because science cannot even begin to explain its own existence.

You claimed the following (highlighting the sections I called "statements"):

The following just ‘happened’ to Berf Gooner:

Berf wants a small pepperoni pizza. No, change of mind,…Berf wants a large deluxe pizza. No, change of mind,…Berf wants a medium Hawaiian pizza. No, change of mind,…Berf wants 2 tomatoes and a piece of broccoli and then Berf wants to have sex. Next…Berf is experiencing a variety of obtuse moodiness not unlike the feeling of a cool breeze on an overcast winter day.
Explain how a single one of these events would be falsified….cause if they can’t be falsified…then they didn’t happen.

…according to you (any of the other disciples of the one-true-epistemology want to leap in here?).

Or could it possibly be possible…that punshhh isn’t the only ignorant one with fundamental failings?

It is your claim those statements are not falsifiable - you have not provided any evidence for your claims and your argument seems to be simply one of personal incredulity.

Again I look forward to you supporting your claims - with evidence and argument - and also addressing the question I posed in the opening post.
 
YOU are the one who said they existed as mental states. Here:

So which is it ?
I wasn't aware I had departed from the statement that theoretical constructs are mental states. I was saying that they don't exist independently of the mind, they can't, they only exist in the mind as ideas.
Let's settle this before we go any further, ok ?
Ok, I suspect there is a difference in what we consider a mental state. Do you say they don't exist?
 
I wasn't aware I had departed from the statement that theoretical constructs are mental states. I was saying that they don't exist independently of the mind, they can't, they only exist in the mind as ideas.

Ok, I suspect there is a difference in what we consider a mental state. Do you say they don't exist?

You are the one dancing between the two statements. Do they exist as mental processes, or do they not exist ? Once you've decided, we can proceed.
 
You are the one dancing between the two statements. Do they exist as mental processes, or do they not exist ? Once you've decided, we can proceed.
I haven't considered at any point that they don't exist. I was asking you that.

Simply we have to consider the world through the prism of our mind, so we should distinguish between concepts used by the mind for thinking and language and concepts used by the mind to represent external objects(matter).
 
I haven't considered at any point that they don't exist. I was asking you that.

Simply we have to consider the world through the prism of our mind, so we should distinguish between concepts used by the mind for thinking and language and concepts used by the mind to represent external objects(matter).
But why, all the evidence we have supports the idea that they are both the same. We have zero evidence to suggest that they are different in class.
 
I haven't considered at any point that they don't exist. I was asking you that.

Simply we have to consider the world through the prism of our mind, so we should distinguish between concepts used by the mind for thinking and language and concepts used by the mind to represent external objects(matter).

Model dependent realism rejects considering the world through our mind and extends model techniques to conceptualize the external world. While I'm not sure if all people understand model dependent realism, we all rely on it the moment we use math.

While Darat seems to take issue with distinguishing between concepts, I reject the entire premise of considering the "prism of the mind" to conceptualize the universe. We can investigate all we want with our minds, but only cogent mathematical models can suffice to independently describe the universe (in a strict sense; models must still undergo the scientific method always in order to determine their validity)
 
But why, all the evidence we have supports the idea that they are both the same. We have zero evidence to suggest that they are different in class.
In the mind they are the same, but some represent mental abstractions and architecture and some represent objects that exist externally out in the universe. The distinction is that the external object does not conform to the rational processes employed in the mind. It can be predicted with reference to scientific exploration etc how the object conforms to intellectual modelling etc, and how it will behave in relation to other objects in the universe. All this though is descriptive, of a situation about which we are only partly aware. We don't know or understand the basis of the physical universe, or what may or may not be going on behind the scenes(beyond our perception) and as such we cannot dictate what is out there beyond what we can detect and perceive. This includes its make up.
 
Model dependent realism rejects considering the world through our mind and extends model techniques to conceptualize the external world. While I'm not sure if all people understand model dependent realism, we all rely on it the moment we use math.

While Darat seems to take issue with distinguishing between concepts, I reject the entire premise of considering the "prism of the mind" to conceptualize the universe. We can investigate all we want with our minds, but only cogent mathematical models can suffice to independently describe the universe (in a strict sense; models must still undergo the scientific method always in order to determine their validity)
Yes, but it requires the mind to do and understand the maths. I only brought it up to point out that if one distinguishes mental objects from external objects the notion of falsifiability in principle becomes of little use, as it is a mental construction and external objects are and behave in ways independent of human thought and convention.

Math is all very well, but remember some of the clangers it has brought us, such as infinity.
 
Yes. Something must be able to be proven wrong in order to have a change to be right. Ignorance of this principle is one of your fundamental failings.
Well, it has to for a chance to be knowable. Something unfalsifiable can be true, but it is necessarily unknowable.
 
Yes, but it requires the mind to do and understand the maths. I only brought it up to point out that if one distinguishes mental objects from external objects the notion of falsifiability in principle becomes of little use, as it is a mental construction and external objects are and behave in ways independent of human thought and convention.

Math is all very well, but remember some of the clangers it has brought us, such as infinity.

Actually it doesn't require us to do and understand the math, but it would be infinitely more useful if we knew the math. No mind is necessary in model dependent realism.

Also infinities aren't clangers really. The philosophy of infinity is a clanger, but for mathematicians infinity is logical.
 
Actually it doesn't require us to do and understand the math, but it would be infinitely more useful if we knew the math. No mind is necessary in model dependent realism.

Also infinities aren't clangers really. The philosophy of infinity is a clanger, but for mathematicians infinity is logical.


Renormalization is a way of handling infinities in calculations.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Renormalization
 

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