But, Fiona, you're contradicting yourself. Now you say that there are two moral principles in oposition (I assume they are the fetus' right to life, however measured, and the mother's right to control her body). But, earlier you ruled one of those out as a moral consideration:
If personhood begins at birth, there is no weighing to be done. The mother's rights win because she has rights and the fetus doesn't.
I have never, ever said that the personhood of the fetus was reason to deny an abortion. I have consistently said that personhood may not confer an automatic right to life, or that the right to life may not automatically trump all other rights.
Are you now willing to say that the fetus has some rights - perhaps changing as it changes? Or are you willing to say that the concepts of morality and rights don't sufficiently address the abortion problem?
It's not a trick. I am 100% pro-choice. The only time I ever marched on Washington was in support of choice. But if we grant that "personhood begins at birth" is a cheap shortcut, maybe we can have a real conversation about intersecting rights that will, in fact, answer the OP: How could any consistent moral system disallow abortion except when it allows it?
The problem with that is that competing moral principles are not supposed to exist, and it may be that there is a meta-principle which would help us to resolve the apparent problem.
No, I do not think I am contradicting myself. I am tring to tease out where the difference lies and why we cannot have the kind of consensus that seems to reasonable to Prof Yaffle.
So far as I can tell, the "pro lifers" say that the foetus is a person. Some say that it is a person from the moment of conception because that is when it gets a soul: some say at 14 or 40 days (IIRC) because there is a delay before it gets a soul: some say at 20 or 22 or 24 or 28 weeks, because that is when it is "viable" (those ones don't define personhood in terms of a soul: they define it in terms of when the very earliest miscarried foetus can survive in an incubator etc: or sometimes can survive with good intensive care without an incubator). So already we have different views within that general position and it gets confused because we are not talking about the same notion of personhood at all.
Whichever notion of personhood they adopt, they make the assumption that if they can get that accepted then they win: that is, they make the assumption that a person has the right to life and that special right, which only applies to foetuses and not to the rest of us, imposes a duty on the woman who is pregnant to stay that way.
I have already said why I do not think that flies. I will add in this, though, because I have not seen it discussed. There is much talk from those who found on "viability" about where the cut off point might be. With increasing technology it reduces: and they have manged to get it accepted that that is a relevant consideration on the question of abortion. It seems to me your own points about the definition of personhood are relevant here. There are two things to consider and one is obvious: a woman who does not want to be pregnant does not want that foetus dead: she wants it out. If it is viable there is nothing at all to prevent it being removed from her body and being brought to term somewhere else: not in principle. That is opposed because the foetus may not survive in these less than ideal conditions: and once again we see those foetuses getting "rights" the rest of us don't have. Young children die for lack of clean water and food all the time: where is their right to ideal conditions? Or the right to ideal conditions for adults who live in hunger and squalor which is likely to lead to early death? They don't exist or at best they are not recognised.
The second point is raised by Ziggurat's notion that once personhood is accepted it follows that one opposes abortion because some magic thing happens which gives the foetus all the extra special rights that people don't have. Then those who helped to create that foetus thereby magically acquire the responsiblity to meet those extra rights. It is interesting that those who insist on those extra rights have no problem with the idea that those rights disappear at birth. Yet those same people argue there is nothing special about the moment of birth. I find that inherently contradictory.
For example: this right to use the body of your parent does not carry with it the right to use your father's non essential organs after birth, should you need them. Why doesn't it? What difference does birth make? Similarly it does not apparently confer the right to emotional and financial support from anyone: it did at one time. But some, at least, agree that shotgun weddings were a bad idea:If that responsibility for the foetus comes from the role in creating it I do not see much logic in that position either. (and for the avoidance of doubt, I think shotgun weddings are a thoroughly bad idea: but that is logical for my position: it is not logical for those who argue as Ziggurat does)
In short, those who argue that the moment of birth makes no difference do not seem to act as if that were true in many ways. Curiously, those special rights which people do not have, vanish at the point when someone other than the woman could meet them: coincidence? I think not.
Of course children do have some needs which adults do not have and which normally parents meet: and there are laws about that too. But we allow parents to place children for adoption: it seems to me that should be outlawed if this position is to be consistent: and that we should ensure that fathers are always identified, so they can assume the burden of the choices they made. Not just child support: but physical protection and hands on care for the child throughout its childhood. As technology advances this becomes perfectly possible: we just need a universal dna database and the will to do it. There is evidence to suggest that children do better in two person households with an adequate income: so that father (and mother) should be forced to create that "ideal environment" and if they cannot get a job etc then we should force them to labour for the money the state has to supply. Course that is not always the ideal environment: many kids would be better off in adoptive homes, it may be argued. But unless actual abuse is demonstrated the default position is that children have a right to their own parents: a right to live with people who do not want to live with them. And that is another "special" right which somehow we are not willing to enforce by draconian means: why not? For some adopted people the very fact of adoption causes them great pain. Their parents should not be allowed to take the chance that child will be one of them: they assumed that responsibility when they created them, surely?
I find the idea that a foetus is a person silly: I can perfectly well understand the position that says it becomes a person at some point in gestation, though I do not agree with it. But even that position becomes untenable if it founds on the viability of a foetus, and then forces continued pregnancy on the grounds that it cannot vie. The very assertion that it is viable means that there can be no justification for taking control of the woman's body: what is the problem? Get it out and take it away and look after it if you like: no different from adoption. Fact is it is not really viable at all, is it not? It is just rhetoric in defence of a position. So I am happy if the law is changed to mean that the form of abortion is changed so the foetus is removed intact at the point it is said to be viable: not comfy for the woman, perhaps: but then late abortion is not comfy however you do it. Fortunately it is quite rare.
For those who insist it is a person from the moment of conception there is a problem, however: finding it is the problem in early abortion: but we will manage. Won't vie though. So we should do what? Outlaw early abortion and insist the right to abortion only arises when it is viable? Seems to follow: absurd but logical, I would say. But if those who found on personhood don't like that idea we are back to punishment: because all of their objections founded on the right to life are now met.
For me a foetus is not a person so I don't have these problems: I don't think an acorn is an oak tree either.
But the point is that if we do accept that a foetus is a person none of the consequences which are claimed follow at all. Give that foetus exactly the rights which follow from personhood and they still have no right whatsover to use another's body for their own purposes. That is the meta principle which unifies the two apparently different moral stances, so far as I can tell. It is not a question of competing rights: because the opposition is not about right to life as against bodily autonomy at all. Nor is it ever about an opposition between the foetus's rights and the woman's rights: that is a false and emotive rhetorical trick: it is about the right of other adults to take control of a woman's body for
their purposes. The foetus only comes into it tangentially. That is the real moral dilemma: at what point do you have the right to take control of another's body for
your purposes?