Can ID be disproven?

That and the fact that one is scientific and the other is not. If I may expand on your statements a bit.

Natural Evolution: Natural laws should be adequate to explain evolution, even though we don't know them all yet.

Miraculous Evolution: No they are not, and we are confident that no further investigation into natural laws will ever yield answers to the unexplained parts about evolution.

Your rewriting is accurate. In each case, your rewriting changes the meaning to note that neither side can prove its case. In the case of Natural Evolution, we don't know all of them, but we assume that when we do, we will have enough information to explain evolution. In the case of Miraculous evolution, we don't know then all, but we assume that when we know more, we will be able to show that they cannot explain evolution.

So what makes one scientific, and one not?

I'll answer that question for you. The only thing that separates the two is the assumption of materialism. If you disqualify nonmaterial explanations, then, by definition, nonmaterial explanations are unscientific.

But it's not a definition I can find in my dictionary.
 
I don't think so. Does it make sense to treat a watch as a DCO? Did it fall together from a pile of gears, springs, and screws? No.

So how complex is a watch? According to complexity theory, that isn't some subjective question. There's a number attached to it. And how is that number computed? It's computed by treating the watch as a discrete combinatorial object.

Back in physics class, I had homework assignments that asked me how complex certain poker hands were. To give the answer, I treated the poker hands as discrete combinatorial objects, applied the formulas, and got the answers. I didn't have to ask whether the poker hands were selected deliberately, or were dealt out as normal poker hands, or were before or after the draw phase of the hand, which would correspond to a selection phase.

Let's explore that further. We will play draw poker, but instead of a single draw, we are going to allow N draws. What's the probability of getting a royal flush? To answer that, we need to know the value of N. What is the complexity of a royal flush? To answer that, I don't need to know the value of N. The complexity of a royal flush isn't related to how that hand was produced.

Look it up. Try "complexity" and "poker" in google. I haven't tried it myself, but I'll guarantee you you will find the answer.

Of course, the problem is that it's a lot harder to define the appropriate space to use for the combinatorics with watches or flagella. However, the method is correct.
 
So how complex is a watch? According to complexity theory, that isn't some subjective question. There's a number attached to it. And how is that number computed? It's computed by treating the watch as a discrete combinatorial object.
Really? Really? How does the information-theoretic definition of complexity do this? Please elaborate; give the formula, calculate it out, and explain how combinatorics are involved.
 
I tried the google experiment. I had to add "entropy" before I liked the results.

I haven't read the following site, but I think you will find it interesting. It's an anti-creationist site.

http://www.ldolphin.org/entropy.html

I just snipped out the part related to poker and information theory, and its relationship to combinatorics. Also note the last sentence, which talks about just how difficult the subject can be, and how easy it is to get wrong.

Now, I'll go back and read the rest of the stuff.

David Cavanaugh: For the sake of the audience (many of the audience according to the biographies will know this already), I would like to make a few comments on Information and Coding theory, which was developed in large part due to the work of Claude E. Shannon. Shannon used the concept of Entropy to treat problems in communication, especially in the face of noisy communication channels. In the theoretical framework of Shannon, Entropy is a measure of order at the message source, instead of disorder as in the Statistical Thermodynamical sense, and uncertainty at the message receiver. In both cases, the definition of Entropy flows from the size/number of distinct states of a system canonical ensemble. In the case of Thermodynamics after Boltzmann, S = k ln W. In the Shannon sense,
Entropy = - H = Sum over i, P(i) * Log 2 P(i),
where P(i) is related to and/or proportional to 1 / W. P(i) or W can be illustrated easily from combinatorial probability calculations of the Entropy of poker hands. The Shannon entropy is measured in bits, not in Thermodynamical units, and one can think of it as the number of nodes assigned to a binary decision tree, where the log of base two is the number of levels in the tree. So for Shannon, the more possible messages or symbols a source can send, the higher the level of uncertainty for the receiver, hence the higher the informational content of the message. Also, the Entropy of Shannon has the formal canonical form of the statistical expected variable, or more commonly termed an average.
When properly understood, these are complimentary definitions. I would like to also extend a caution for using Information theory from "An Introduction to Information Theory: Symbols, Signals and Noise," by John R. Pierce, revised edition 1980:
"If we want to understand this Entropy of communication theory, it is best first to clear our minds of any ideas associated with the Entropy of physics. Once we understand Entropy as it is used in communication theory thoroughly, there is no harm in trying to relate it to the entropy of physics, but the literature indicates that some workers have never recovered from the confusion engendered by an early admixture of ideas concerning the Entropies of physics and communication theory. "
 
Your rewriting is accurate. In each case, your rewriting changes the meaning to note that neither side can prove its case. In the case of Natural Evolution, we don't know all of them, but we assume that when we do, we will have enough information to explain evolution. In the case of Miraculous evolution, we don't know then all, but we assume that when we know more, we will be able to show that they cannot explain evolution.


So what makes one scientific, and one not?

I'll answer that question for you. The only thing that separates the two is the assumption of materialism.

... and the falsifiability question.

It's a parallel situation to discussing whether fire-breathing dragons exist somewhere in the cosmos. Although we haven't looked everywhere, I assume that when we have,looked everywhere, we will not find any fire-breathing dragons. Point to a fire-breathing dragon, and I've been falsified.

You acknowledge that we haven't looked everywhere, and you assume that when we have, we will eventually find one. To what can I point to falsify you?

In particular, let me examine your rewriting a little more closely.

We assume that when we know more, we will be able to show that [natural laws]cannot explain evolution.

This is where your interpretation of ID differs slightly, but significantly, from the writings of the various ID theorists as presented in the Pandas trial and elsewhere. You state that "when we know more, we will be able to show." Behe and Dembski -- Behe on the stand, in fact -- state that we are now able to show that natural laws cannot explain evolution. Unfortunately, this statement is in point of fact, inaccurate.

Neither Behe, nor Dembski, nor anyone else, has been able to come up with a single demonstration that evolution cannot be explained by natural law. They have shown a number of phenomena that are currently unexplained by current theory, but this is simply an argument from ignorance. (And, in point of fact, a number of the 1996-era phenomena Behe cited in Darwin's Black Box have been explained in the intervening decade. This is always a risk with an argument from ignorance -- people don't stay ignorant forever.) "God of the Gaps" is always unfalsifiable, and therefore unscientific.

Behe and Dembski have also claimed to have proven from first principles that evolution of certain things is impossible, regardless of future discoveries. This would indeed be a scientific claim if it were pursued via the scientific method (hypothesis, experiment, revision, peer review) and if it were true. (Even if it were false, it would remain scientific until science got around to rejecting it....) Unfortunately, the "proofs" they have cited have all been demonstrated to be deeply and fatally flawed. Their claims are simply untrue -- and rather than perform further experiment and revision, they're just moving their claims into the courtroom and out of the journals.

If I claimed that my sheepskin rug were really a Bigfoot pelt, self-published a book on it, went on Letterman to sell the book, and ignored the DNA evidence that said it was from a sheep, would my claim be "scientific"? Hardly.

So, basically, the claims of ID can be divided into two types. The unfalsifiable (and therefore unscientific), and the methodologically unsound (and therefore unscientific).
 
I just snipped out the part related to poker and information theory, and its relationship to combinatorics. Also note the last sentence, which talks about just how difficult the subject can be, and how easy it is to get wrong.

Physician, heal thyself....

He (Cavanaugh) is missing the central aspect of Shannon's entropy, in that it's not about the number of states, but about their distribution. A poker deck in the hands of an expert card-sharp has zero entropy, not because the cards have no combinatorial probability, but because there is no uncertainty in the distribution.

I might be inclined to give Cavanaugh the doubt, because he's talking about poker not as an explanation, but as an illustrative example. But his statement that "In the Shannon sense, Entropy = - H = Sum over i, P(i) * Log 2 P(i),where P(i) is related to and/or proportional to 1 / W," in particular, is wrong in a couple of rather serious ways.

First, Entropy does not equal -H, but H itself. More significantly, P(i) is not at all related to 1/W, except in the rather loose sense that W is the number of values that i [and therefore P(i)] can take. In physics (which appears to be where his background is) this is not necessarily a fatal flaw, but if you are trying to understand entropy in the information-theoretical sense, it's absolutely fatal, and likely argues for a fundamental misunderstanding about the nature of information.

But more significantly, Shannon entropy is not appropriate as a definition of "complexity"! It refers to the prior probability of repeated events happening, not to post-hoc analysis of any given event (or event set). There's a reason that almost no one refers to "Shannon complexity," the way that they would refer to "Lempel-Ziv complexity" or "Kolmogorov complexity" or "Chaitin complexity" or "Algorithmic complexity." The reason is, simply, Shannon's definition is not a definition of complexity. And this mistake is inexcusable if he's supposed to be putting together a tight argument.

As discussed later in that page : "Entropy is a statistical concept, and has no meaning outside the context of a probability distribution. A probability measures our uncertainty of the occurrence of a single event. Conversely, entropy measures our uncertainty of the occurrence of a collection of events. ... David Cavanaugh: I would agree that Entropy can be considered to be uncertainty in data, or noise as I've described it above." Once something has occurred (like, for example, the evolution of the bacterial flagellum), it is no longer uncertain.

Coming back to Cavanaugh's writings:

The principle of Entropy; a fundamental property of energy and matter. Entropy represents the number of statistical degrees of freedom available to any given thermodynamical ensemble or system..

This statement is only true (and under rather restrictive circumstances at that) when we're talking about thermodynamic entropy. When talking about information-theoretic entropy, it's simply false.

I would strongly urge you to find a better source on information-theoretic entropy.
 
... and the falsifiability question.

It's a parallel situation to discussing whether fire-breathing dragons exist somewhere in the cosmos. Although we haven't looked everywhere, I assume that when we have,looked everywhere, we will not find any fire-breathing dragons. Point to a fire-breathing dragon, and I've been falsified.

You acknowledge that we haven't looked everywhere, and you assume that when we have, we will eventually find one. To what can I point to falsify you?

So, basically, the claims of ID can be divided into two types. The unfalsifiable (and therefore unscientific), and the methodologically unsound (and therefore unscientific).

A parallel can also be drawn using "a naturally evolved intermediate between species x and species x+1" for "fire-breathing dragon".

In which case the roles of IDer and evolutionist are reversed - does this make evolution unfalsifiable?

I guess not, but it does show the importance of not misrepresenting what someone is actually claiming [or trying to]. It is quite easy to represent a claim in such a way as to make it unfalsifiable. It might to more constructive to rephrase the claim in an alternative manner which is falsifiable, rather than to simply denounce it.
 
Perhaps I was unclear in my title, because the question can be taken two ways. One way is "Is ID falsifiable?" The answer to that is yes.

I diagree, for the reason I (and others) have put forth. To summarize: there is no way to detect the intelligent agent designing these things, not is there a way to prove its absence. Reason's rules include the trivially true statement: "you cannot prove a negative".

ID will never be "disproven".

Ever.

It will forever be "unproven", wandering amongst the shades of other, similar conjectures. It may wander for a time with the "uproven, but politically popular" ghosts, but that is not even in the same plane as the "scientfic" ideas, even the ones subsequently disproven or discarded.

The second way, which is what I meant is, "Can ID be falsified today, with our current limitations on the knowledge of evolution?" The answer to that appears to be "no".

No matter how much we come to understand evolution, or any related area, ID can never be falsified; it is not falsifiable. My new mantra.

Until our resident Devil's Advoctae addresses this, all other discussion is premature.

Cheers,

Hank
 
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Your rewriting is accurate. In each case, your rewriting changes the meaning to note that neither side can prove its case. In the case of Natural Evolution, we don't know all of them, but we assume that when we do, we will have enough information to explain evolution. In the case of Miraculous evolution, we don't know then all, but we assume that when we know more, we will be able to show that they cannot explain evolution.

So what makes one scientific, and one not?
One is still trying to find out how it works but hasn't yet. That is scientific. One has either given up or is preparing to give up. That is non-scientific.

I'll answer that question for you. The only thing that separates the two is the assumption of materialism. If you disqualify nonmaterial explanations, then, by definition, nonmaterial explanations are unscientific.
Non-material explanations, by definition, can have no evidence. So yes, they are alway unscientific.

However, if you can give me an example of non-material evidence, I will reconsider my position.
 
Can any of these be disproven?

1. Life was designed by a 47-dimensional spirograph,

2. Life was designed by an invisible and untraceable supercomputer

3. Life was designed by winged trolls from another plane of existence

4. Life was an accidental discharge from Harvey, the six-foot white rabbit.


No? They are, therefore, equal with the TOEvolution. Q.E.D.!!!
 
A parallel can also be drawn using "a naturally evolved intermediate between species x and species x+1" for "fire-breathing dragon".

In which case the roles of IDer and evolutionist are reversed - does this make evolution unfalsifiable?

No, because evolution makes other, falsifiable, predictions.

You are right to point this parallel, because it illustrates one of the key ways that "science" handles this kind of issue. Part of the problem with many of these observational sciences (biology is only one among many) is that you can rarely if ever make useful predictions about what can and cannot be found. There's simply too many reasons that an animal might not fossilize to make it practical or useful to draw much inference from what hasn't been found.

And that, in turn, is part of why so much work has been doing in evolutionary biology (in particular) in finding ways to test hypotheses that don't rely on the vagaries of unfalsifiable predictions about what might be found in the rocks. Some of these ways include genetic sampling, comparative anatomy, comparative embryology, and so forth. Ambulocetus was a wonderful finding -- but we didn't need it to figure out that whales and hippos were related, becaus we can figure that out by looking at the gene sequences.

It is quite easy to represent a claim in such a way as to make it unfalsifiable. It might to more constructive to rephrase the claim in an alternative manner which is falsifiable, rather than to simply denounce it.

I would love to. This gets back to a question that has been posed to Meadmaker over and over again, and posed to ID proponents more generally? What predictions has ID made? Where's its track record? What has ID actually contributed to our understanding of the world?

That's what BillHoyt has been politely requesting in his oh-so-subtle way:

SHOW ME THE ID RESEARCH THAT SUGGESTS ID IS REALLY SCIENTIFIC. SHOW ME THE ARTICLES DEMONSTRATING ANTI-ID NULL HYPOTHESES THAT COULD NOT BE REFUTED.

I will happily believe that ID makes falsifiable claims when somone actually comes along and makes one -- describes a state of the world that would falsify ID. I have yet to see one from Behe. I have yet to see one from Meyer. I have yet to see one from Dembski. I have yet to see one from any participant on this thread.

Of course, even at that point, I will still probably be unwilling to believe that ID is "scientific" until the proponents actually do some science, dammit. Propose to me a state of the world that would falsify ID -- and then, once you've done that, dig up something I didn't already know about the world that shows me that the world isn't in that state.
 
However, if you can give me an example of non-material evidence, I will reconsider my position.

Hmmmm. I wonder if there's a way of dividing my 13 sweaters equally among my six children without tearing them.

Why, no, there isn't. Because 13 is a prime number.
 
Please elaborate; give the formula, calculate it out, and explain how combinatorics are involved.

"Many." Because the answer is obviously larger than 1 or 2. By process of elimination, the only other number must be the correct one.
 
Hmmmm. I wonder if there's a way of dividing my 13 sweaters equally among my six children without tearing them.

Why, no, there isn't. Because 13 is a prime number.
Well, you've lost me here, Doctor. Perhaps its a joke. Do you have to tear the sweaters or the children?

Or perhaps you are saying mathematics is evidence, and it's not material. Well, you did specify numbers of things. Children are material. Sweaters are most definately material. Probably wool.

(and the solution to your problem is to specify that one sweater rotates ownership on a regular basis.)
 
Or perhaps you are saying mathematics is evidence, and it's not material. Well, you did specify numbers of things. Children are material. Sweaters are most definately material. Probably wool.

The children are material, the sweaters are material -- but the evidence that the problem I want to solve cannot be solved is most definitely not material. There are lots of things for which the evidence for (or for that matter, against), is purely mathematical, and is nevertheless taken seriously.

Perhaps a more realistic example would be the bridges of Konigsburg problem, where Euler wanted to walk across every bridge in Konignsburg once and only once during his afternoon excercise, but was able to prove mathematically that such could not be done. Today I might be asked to design a shortest possible delivery route for a truck -- and use Euler's theorem not only to prove the optimality of the route, but to find the route in the first place. I believe that many brokerage firms use variations on Hall's Marriage Theorem to link buyers and sellers of goods in such a way to maximize profits, and of course, most of the software on your computer today has been designed using relatively pure mathematics (algorithmic notation is hardly "material") to get good performance out of it.

Even the very notion of "evidence" presupposes an idea of logic and reasoning, which are not material.

The problem isn't with non-material evidence, it's with non-material causation. Basically, it's the old dualism problem again. It's easy to prove that God as literally described in the Bible does not exist, because He is self-contradictory. I could also easily go through and cherry-pick a couple of attributes of God that are probably consonant. Non-material evidence simply means that you thought hard, and came up with the correct conclusion inside the privacy of your own head.

What Meadmaker is asking for is not non-material evidence, but non-material causation; stuff that actually exists, and has a real effect on the world, and can be relied upon to explain material effects, but that is not itself material. Math isn't causative in this sense -- Euler may have learned something about the Bridges of Konigsberg, but he sure didn't have any effect about them when he proved his theorems. If God's only role in the universe were to describe it, but not to cause anything, He wouldn't be a problem for science at all.... but at the same time, that would also rule out any miraculous effects that could be explained only with reference to God. (And in particular, theistic ID would be clearly false.) The problem is that as soon as you permit causal intervention by traceless, immaterial objects -- how you you describe those interventions? How do you predict them? How do you determine the properties of either the interventions or the intervenors?

Materialism isn't an ontological assumption, but a methodological one. (See Dr. Forrest's testimony in Pandas for more details.) There may indeed be such traceless objects. But -- and this is mostly a question for Meadmaker -- how do you work them into your theory while preserving anything useful, or indeed meaningful? Scientists don't reject God or the immaterial. They simply find Him impossible to work with.
 
My apologies.

I just read the rest of the link I posted earlier. It was not an anti-creationist site. I skimmed it very quickly, looking for poker references, and noted that at one point it said the author of the Jack Chick pamphlet didn't understand entropy, and jumped to a conclusion. At this time, I also haven't read any of the intervening posts to see if anyone jumped all over me for the mistake, but if they did, I must admit it was my fault alone. (It's still an interesting site, but not for the reasons I mentioned.)
 
Non-material explanations, by definition, can have no evidence. So yes, they are alway unscientific.

However, if you can give me an example of non-material evidence, I will reconsider my position.

The theory of Kashrut. I'll repost if this was something you skipped over.

I claim that that the theory of Kashrut is perfectly scientific, although it includes a nonmaterial claim (i.e. that God kills people because he doesn't like them eating shrimp.)

In this case, and in ever such case, the evidence is material, but the explanation of the cause is non-material.
 
No matter how much we come to understand evolution, or any related area, ID can never be falsified; it is not falsifiable. My new mantra.

Until our resident Devil's Advoctae addresses this, all other discussion is premature.

There are two aspects of ID theory.

1. The theory of Natural Evolution is wrong.
2. Godidit.

Number 2 can't be falsified. Number 1 can be. If you disagree that number 1 can be falsified, could you please explain to me how "Natural Evolution is right" can be falsified.
 
The theory of Kashrut. I'll repost if this was something you skipped over.

I claim that that the theory of Kashrut is perfectly scientific, although it includes a nonmaterial claim (i.e. that God kills people because he doesn't like them eating shrimp.)

In this case, and in ever such case, the evidence is material, but the explanation of the cause is non-material.
So it's perfectly scientific except where its not? Okay.

Then I have no problem accepting that the Theory of Intelligent Design is scientific, except for the parts where it mentions Intelligent Design, including the parts where it says evolution is too complex to have happened naturally.
 

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