Well I would assume that they are worried about the debt levels.
The fiscal end has been loose for a long time to build up so much debt.
Government outlays have exceeded revenues by a large amount for a long time.
Maybe if they had done it right in the first place, like back in the 1990s or early 2000s, they wouldn't be in such a fix now.
Japan's NET debt falls between Portugal & Greece - bad but not off the charts as the public debt figures imply.
I don't understand that - why would a bad policy implemented earlier do anything but hasten the current status ?
There are other issues too, like the demographics and, since 2011, the lack of output from nuclear power. (It has become very unpopular politically, despite the fact that it would help reduce energy imports.)
+1, and nuclear was a big part (~30%) of their national elec supply. I understand they are restarting a few plants.
Sure, but when the government tightens its fiscal stance (when AD is already lackluster), what results is not necessarily a smaller deficit. It may grow larger as private consumption decreases even further.
Agreed, but Abenomics seemed like a poor idea to start with. They are now running the ~2% avg (or better) inflation rate they wanted, their currency dropped as expected. This effectively robs savers (most of Japanese individual investment is in Jbonds) and consumers . The 2% per annum loss in LT savings is certain to have a negative wealth effect, but perhaps not enough to cause a dramatic decline in Jbond holding behavior/tradition/market-inefficiency. You can't improve
real GDP by accounting tricks, but the tricks have secondary effects.
Yes tax increases add the the negative wealth effect, and is likely a major driver of the big negative GDP changes, but so are their slowing exports. It's a brilliant way to hollow-out retail consumption.
I agree with the timing thou: I guess they would have needed some kind of private sector debt write-down in the 1990s; followed by a larger share of government spending touching households rather than the financial sector.
We can speculate about counterfactuals all day - none of this represents a convincing argument.
Keynes was a brilliant guy, and IMO accurately assessed that the consumer fears, or the 'negative wealth effect' can lead to reduced retail consumption, therefore forcing a decline in production and ... a vicious circle (tho' at some point a self-limiting one). His proposed solution, to have government make up the shortfall in consumption, on a short term basis seems to be quite problematic in practice. Government can stimulate either by additional deficit spending or by tax reductions. Tax reductions on a short term basis seem likely to be ineffective in overcoming the consumer reluctance to spend. It would require a long term reliable reduction to convince someone to buy a house or car. Added deficit spending by government is likely inefficient with a low multiplier, but also it stimulates different market sectors - the government buys tanks, roads and bridges, not iphones and pay-per-view events. So the wrong sectors are stimulated/over-stimulated. Of course Keynes allowed for the government stimulating by reducing interest rates - TO BORROWERS - but that doesn't effectively happen in the US where Government crowds-out private borrowing, and sets very high bars for bank lending I don't know the internals of Japan lending, but the GDP figures include negative investment growth, implying a comparable problem. Maybe government taking up the slack isn't the right solution.
Japan has a different problem tho' - they had a working population inversion before we did, and their only export (manufacturing value add) has heavy competition. A stagnant or declining GDP is not unforeseeable.