A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Titus

Yes, it's an unanalysable fact, which cannot be reduced to a set of structural psychological or historical diferences.

Doggone those unanalysable facts anyway. I hate those.

I'm still too surprised and shocked by the fact that there really are so many quite intelligent people who take materialism seriously.

It's clear that we are shouting back and forth across a vast chasm. From my perspective, interactionist dualism (though not necessarily by that name) is pretty much the default position likely to be assumed by anyone who hasn't thought much about it. I never expected to encounter an intelligent, thoughtful interactionist dualist either, and I do welcome your participation (even though I must confess that this is undoubtedly due in part to the fact that I find some of your ideas attractive as targets).

Maybe we can just take it as a given that the reason we don't see things the same is that we see things differently, and that while noting this is maybe not the most interesting part of the discussion, it is nonetheless an important part -- otherwise, we'd have forty-something pages of, "Yup, yup, yup" "Boy howdy", and, "You sure said a mouthful there".

 

[Mercutio]

Titus, I'm wondering...As a bit of an historian of psychology, could you explain why it is that we went from a position of cartesian dualism to materialism in the first place? You seem to be saying that it is materialism that is being supplanted by dualism, and yet, historically, psychologists were dualists long before they were material monists. (Of course, some are still dualists, especially the humanists and cognitivists--another great Brain & Behavior article was on cognitive psych as a second spiritualism, searching for evidence of a soul)

If dualism is so obvious, why did we abandon it?

 

[ceptimus]

Re: Prenatal, birth, brain and incarnation

As physical processes which, with the exception of birth, aren't inherently related to incarnation.

Good questions, but I actually have no idea. These questions should be answered by naturalistic reincarnation research in young children.

That's a matter of definition. And there even may be no generally fixed natural relation between the stages of prenatal development of the brain and the moment of incarnation. Again, that should become clear from reincarnation research.

Titus

Titus, thanks for answering my questions. Your second answer provokes another set of questions from me (sorry). They're all really one question to do with how souls are pigeonholed.

When you say reincarnation, that implies that a soul leaves one body, and possibly hangs around before attaching to a new body/brain. But there are more people around now than in previous times, so I assume brand new souls are being produced, to add to the recycled ones? Can the souls ever 'die'? I suppose at past times when the human population was reducing there might have been a temporary surfeit of souls?

Personally, I believe in evolution (in the Darwinian sense). It seems to me that this theory is incompatible with dualism. There are perhaps three ways it could be made compatible?

1. At some point, the very first organism to which a soul attached would have been born. Its ancestors would necessarily have had no souls.

2. Souls evolved very gradually, from nothing, along with the organisms.

3. Every object, including non-living things, has a soul, and these souls are (or seem to be) more developed in animals, and especially man, than elsewhere.

All of those three seem flawed to me. Do I have to reject Darwinism to become a dualist, or is there a way out?

 

[Dancing David]

Tius,
I do have great respect for your thoughts and words, in fact as I have stated before you have elucidated many fine philosphical points that were beyond my comprehension before. Which i have found to be very useful, and I have shown great politeness in not refering to some of your ideas as incoherent and just whacky.

I am all for frankness which is what led me to say that your arguments are semantic, I did not mean that are solely word play but that they rely on philosophical logic and seem to be supported by apparent tautologies, that doea not mean that they are tautologies, they just look that way to me.

You have spent many pages merely asserting that 'qualia' can not be represented by the functions of the brain, but as of yet the only basis for those believe seems to be semantic. In that you have no real proof that the brain can not represent qualia, but you have a lot of words that you have ordered in such a way to demonstrate a belief that qualia can not be represented by the brain.

I do not mean to be purely dismissive of your arguments but they seem to lack the scientific flavor that I as a naturalist/materialist/nihilist generaly appreciate.

I feel that despite many pages of asserting that qualities can not be represented by the brain, that it comes down just to your assertion that it is so. That is why I questioned your understanding of biological neurology, why do you dismss the seeming fact that the qualities that the brain can represent are learned through exposure? And then there is a whole other series of questions that I feel are very important that you seem to dismiss a preiori with out due consideration.

I have no desire to draw your ire because you obviously have a deep grasp of the philospohical history of consiousness. I shall bow out of the discussion with you as it seems to have reached an impasse.

respectfuly
David

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

To be frank, as an outsider, I've often phantasied about possible psychological reasons for being a materialist. Apart from apparent scientific respectability, and errors about the misapplication of methods suitable for one branch of science to others where they aren't, I personally think that it's a lot to do with the appeal of a secular world view. Especially since there are so many conservative and even reactionary 'spiritual' movements, materialism may seem a way to free oneself from repressive religion. A healthy motive, though not expressed in the most elegant way. But this is largely speculation as well.

Speaking for myself, I am only a "materialist" because that's what everyone else calls me. I don't really care, because I think ontology is incoherent. There is no way we can know what stuff really is, and once we allow for two kinds of things, there is no way we can know if there are really 100 kinds of things.

You were around for at least part of the conversations with Ian where some of us claimed that he was erecting a straw materialism man and then stomping on it. In fact, many such straw men. This is partly what got me annoyed with all the metaphysical pigeonholing.

So I just look around at the world and figure that what matters is what we can understand, and I don't see any reason we can't understand the mind as simply a result of brain process. If we hit a brick wall trying to do so, or stumble on your nonmaterial arm poking my brain with nothing attached at the other end, then maybe idealism or dualism will begin to make some sense.

~~ Paul

 

[Loki]

(Don't have much time - gotta post and run...)

(Paul wrote) : Speaking for myself, I am only a "materialist" because that's what everyone else calls me. I don't really care, because I think ontology is incoherent.

I wish I'd said that!

(And just quickly Titus, this is my main problem with your essays against identity theory and epiphenomenalism - too much ontology!)

(Titus wrote) : I personally think that it's a lot to do with the appeal of a secular world view. Especially since there are so many conservative and even reactionary 'spiritual' movements, materialism may seem a way to free oneself from repressive religion.

You're close, but not quite right. This is sort of how I see it. It's not that materialism is a way to free myself from repressive religion (did that long before I wondered what all the "-isms" meant), but rather I see materialism as the only "-ism" that is happy to standalone. It's an end in itself.

As you've said Titus, your own dualism requires (well, prefers?) an immortal self and reincarnation in order to "complete the picture". Ian's Idealism needs a god to turn the crank that makes it all work. Materialism is happy to just say "it is what it is", and requires nothing more of me. Of course you and Ian are correct - if reincarnation or NDEs can in some way been proved true, then materialism (my version) must fall.

In short, I find that materialism answers theological questions, whereas the other -isms open up endless varieties of theological choice, all unverifiable.

 

[Ziggurat]

So I just look around at the world and figure that what matters is what we can understand, and I don't see any reason we can't understand the mind as simply a result of brain process. If we hit a brick wall trying to do so, or stumble on your nonmaterial arm poking my brain with nothing attached at the other end, then maybe idealism or dualism will begin to make some sense.

Idealism (or dualism) won't make sense to me even if we hit a brick wall, because of the possibility that we're just too stupid to understand the complexity of the brain, despite the mind being completely material. The fact that badgers (to pick a random animal) can't understand how their eyes work doesn't mean that a badger's eyeballs have some sort of non-materialistic quality, all it means is badgers are too stupid to figure it out.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Humility

Hi Ziggurat,

Idealism (or dualism) won't make sense to me even if we hit a brick wall, because of the possibility that we're just too stupid to understand the complexity of the brain, despite the mind being completely material. The fact that badgers (to pick a random animal) can't understand how their eyes work doesn't mean that a badger's eyeballs have some sort of non-materialistic quality, all it means is badgers are too stupid to figure it out.

Interesting position , which reminds me a bit of how my parents used to encourage me to become a little more humble when confronted by questions the Roman Catholic Church didn't seem to have an answer to
However, if you really believe we just might be too stupid to understand how our brains contain our minds, why couldn't it be the case that our whole framework is stupid as well? Including materialism I mean? Why should we link such humility (found in a more consistent way in Mahayana Buddhism for example) to materialism in other words?

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[BillyJoe]

STILL READING

Titus,

In case you missed it, Ian says that the two shades of grey ARE different.

(Not trying to lead the thread off into a tangent but you seem to be interested in gaining insight into Ian's viewpoint)

BillyJoe.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ziggurat said:

Idealism (or dualism) won't make sense to me even if we hit a brick wall, because of the possibility that we're just too stupid to understand the complexity of the brain, despite the mind being completely material.

I think we might be stumped for awhile, but in the long run we should be able to understand how the brain works. I was talking about a permanent brick wall: If we just can't get past a certain point no matter how much effort we put into it. Then I might be tempted to consider some other metaphysic.

On the other hand, what if we really aren't clever enough to understand the brain or the universe? Then we will have no way of knowing if it's our lack of cleverness or some nonmaterial influences thwarting our progress. Surely the result will be god of the gaps arguments galore, and they might even be correct!

~~ Paul

 

[hammegk]

Titus: I was referring only to what we perceive as 'biological life'.

.....dualism requires (well, prefers?) an immortal self and reincarnation in order to "complete the picture". Ian's Idealism needs a god to turn the crank that makes it all work. Materialism is happy to just say "it is what it is", and requires nothing more of me.

And what do you ascribe to what some idealists would name Atman/Brahman? Is that "god" in some way?

In short, I find that materialism answers theological questions, whereas the other -isms open up endless varieties of theological choice, all unverifiable.

And I'd say you're just happier defining "objective reality", and then worshipping it.

Surely the result will be god of the gaps arguments galore, and they might even be correct!

Certainly the situation as it stands today, huh?

BillyJoe: How did you say you would demonstrate any 2 shades of anything are the "same"?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Tius,
I do have great respect for your thoughts and words, in fact as I have stated before you have elucidated many fine philosphical points that were beyond my comprehension before. Which i have found to be very useful, and I have shown great politeness in not refering to some of your ideas as incoherent and just whacky.

I am all for frankness which is what led me to say that your arguments are semantic, I did not mean that are solely word play but that they rely on philosophical logic and seem to be supported by apparent tautologies, that doea not mean that they are tautologies, they just look that way to me.

You have spent many pages merely asserting that 'qualia' can not be represented by the functions of the brain, but as of yet the only basis for those believe seems to be semantic. In that you have no real proof that the brain can not represent qualia, but you have a lot of words that you have ordered in such a way to demonstrate a belief that qualia can not be represented by the brain.

I do not mean to be purely dismissive of your arguments but they seem to lack the scientific flavor that I as a naturalist/materialist/nihilist generaly appreciate.

I feel that despite many pages of asserting that qualities can not be represented by the brain, that it comes down just to your assertion that it is so. That is why I questioned your understanding of biological neurology, why do you dismss the seeming fact that the qualities that the brain can represent are learned through exposure? And then there is a whole other series of questions that I feel are very important that you seem to dismiss a preiori with out due consideration.

I have no desire to draw your ire because you obviously have a deep grasp of the philospohical history of consiousness. I shall bow out of the discussion with you as it seems to have reached an impasse.

respectfuly
David

David, the question of the irreducibility or otherwise of conscious experience has got nothing to do with science. It seems to me that in common with so many others you do not understand what science does. It simply describes the objective world. Unless (phenomenological) consciousness can play some fruitful role in describing our behaviour, then science cannot explain consciousness. And if the world is physically closed it cannot play a fruitful role.

 

[BillyJoe]

BillyJoe: How did you say you would demonstrate any 2 shades of anything are the "same"?

Not sure if I really want to go there again. Not sure if anyone wants to go there agian. Just thought it would give Titus an insight into Ian's POV to hear his interpretation.

But briefly......

First of all, we are talking about the picture depicting the checker-board, not the checker-board that the picture depicts.
There are various methods, the simplest being to just cover all parts of the picture except the two shades under consideration. Another way is to cut a piece out of one shade and drag it over the other shade (in Paintshop for example)
(You asked a general question above but, if it's okay, I am sticking with this specific illusion)

BillyJoe.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Checker-board

Thanks, Billy Joe!

Well, Ian, go ahead if you wish!

Titus

Well I'll just paste in a couple of posts I've made before.

{quote}

Here is the optical illusion they are referring to.

I am the only person who is saying that the squares represented by A and B are different colours. Thus to everyone apart from me, it seems that the experience of colour is not a quale, but some abstract scientific definition of what constitutes a particular colour. I suggest this demonstrates a complete lack of knowledge regarding the philosophy and psychology of perception. Most crucially the mind actively creates reality when we perceive. Here is what I wrote before on this topic:

By labelling certain of our perceptual experiences as optical illusions you are by implication drawing a distinction between these so called "illusions" and the rest of our perceptual experiences. But the truth of the matter is that "optical illusions" are not particularly special in this regard. What we actually perceptual experience, whether you label them "optical illusions" or not, is largely a product of our minds. Yes our perceptual experiences have their origin in an external world. But what we actually see is not just a passive assimilation of the information flowing through our senses. No, what we see is shaped and molded by the mind. Reality as we perceive it is very largely a product of the mind.

Reality is a construct. All our perceptual experiences implicitly incorporate low level theory, and we are deluded in supposing that we can somehow percieve the world in abstraction from any theoretical framework. Optical "illusions" illustrate this very nicely.

But what was the response of all the materialists when confronted with these optical "illusions"? Something like "Eeeeee isn't that great, we're seeing something that isn't really there!"

I forlornly tried to rectify people's error in this regard only to be accused of being a troll by everyone. So much for the intellectual capacity of the vast majority of people on this forum ie the materialists

Originally posted by csense


Most importantly, how does any of this show that squares A and B are the same colour??
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Well, that's something you're trying to show Ian.
Understand that my posts are not trying to argue for or against your premise.

Personally, I think you have some very interesting concepts.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

All I need to show is that colours should be defined by our actual experience of colour, rather than some abstract technical or scientific definition forever beyond anyones experience.

I show that by pointing out that if we define colours other than this, it will render a lot of our everyday conversations about colour as meaningless.

eg


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Person A:

Oh look at the contrast in colours on that flower! Doesn't it look lovely?

Person B

How do you know that the flower isn't actually a uniform colour??

Person A

Well I can directly see it!

Person B

But the colours might well be totally different from what you actually experience. Indeed the colours might all be the same.

Person A

But everyone with normal eyesight agrees that the flower consists of different colours!

Person B

Ah yes, but everyone might be deluded. If we actually measure . . .

Peron A (inturrupting)

Measure? measure?? measure??? Aaaaagh!


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



The scientist on one hand, and sensible people on the other, are utilizing differing language games. Thy are talking at cross purposes.

When normal sensible people talk about colour, they are talking about what people actually experience and agree upon. The scientist, on the other hand, is abstracting from that common reality. If this is recognised, then there is no problem. It appears though that many people are not able to understand this and erroneously believe that scientific theories and measurements depict reality as it really is. But in fact the scientist deals in a world of unreality.
]
{/quote}

These posts can be found on this thread.

 

[Mercutio]

David, the question of the irreducibility or otherwise of conscious experience has got nothing to do with science. It seems to me that in common with so many others you do not understand what science does. It simply describes the objective world. Unless (phenomenological) consciousness can play some fruitful role in describing our behaviour, then science cannot explain consciousness. And if the world is physically closed it cannot play a fruitful role.

I suppose that depends a little on one's approach to studying (phen) consciousness. A structural treatment can be very difficult, as it turns into an attempt to dissect something that has no physical substance (again, depending on assumptions--I refer only to the historical attempt by early psychologists to introspectively study consciousness structurally). On the other hand, a functional approach--looking at the adaptive significance of the behaviors we label "consciousness" (once again, very different assumptions here, including the notion of private behavior as caused, not causal) can be very fruitful. In this approach, we are able to "dissect" functionally rather than structurally, and this difference in approach and assumptions makes all the difference. Rather than saying "what is a quale?" (a structuralist approach), we look at the functions of the various types of perception. It's a bit like the difference between dissecting a frog (structural) or observing it in its habitat (functional). Both may be scientific; when we have consciousness instead of a frog, sheer practicality dictates that the functional approach will be easier. Perhaps some day technology will allow us to examine consciousness structurally better than we can now, but perhaps not.

 

[Mercutio]

Just for the record, Ian, I did understand your points about the checkerboard, and did think they were absolutely correct, given your approach and assumptions. I also think that your approach and assumptions are perfectly valid in some contexts. In the context of (most) perceptual science, however, the "objective" measures of the greys are more useful.

Let's face it, though, if it were not for the fact that your subjective (I really don't like that word) experience is real AND the objective measures are real, we would not be using these types of examples to study how our perceptual systems work. We must try to reconcile the two views, and arguments over which ONE of them is "real" are, in my opinion, irrelevant.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Asking Ian for some clarification

Dear Ian,

Precisely, that's a good reflection of my own views.

By the way, Ian, I beg you to explain your views on the reality of the physical world. As an idealist I suppose you can't claim that the physical world is as independently real as the mind, can you? Because if you would do so, you might as well be called a dualist.
So, if the reality of physical world depends on the reality of the mind, and has no independent reality of its own, wouldn't you agree that in this limited, specific sense it might as well be called an illusory manifestation of the mind itself. Meaning that it only appears to be something independent whereas it wholly depends on the mind.

Curious regards,

Titus

Independent reality of its own? Well if it has such an independent reality then what is it like? Is the real world similar to our qualia? Does this reality really have colours as we experience them for example?

I regard the world as being defined by our sensory perceptions of it. Just like you can't have a grin without a cat so we cannot meaningfully speak of a world in abstraction from all minds whatsoever. And even if there were such a world we could never in principle know anything about it. Obviously we couldn't know of such a world by perception because as soon as we perceive something then it is not mind-independent! And with what reason could we have to hypothesise such a mind-independent reality?

 

[hammegk]

(You asked a general question above but, if it's okay, I am sticking with this specific illusion)

BillyJoe.

Good "macro" answer to what is really a "micro" problem that imo again demonstrates Ian's 100%/50%. Saying it another way, what could actually demonstrate simultaneity within the The Way Things Are world of materialists?

Even if time is quantized is it possible to speak of such for different spacial coordinates? To me, no.

 

[Mercutio]

Re: Re: Asking Ian for some clarification

Independent reality of its own? Well if it has such an independent reality then what is it like? Is the real world similar to our qualia? Does this reality really have colours as we experience them for example?

Maybe somebody should start a thread on primary and secondary qualities...


We have officially come full circle.

 

[ceptimus]

In the chequerboard thread Ian linked to, you'll find I was one of his first and most persistent supporters. I think, in the end, most people were convinced that Ian had a valid point of view in that thread.