A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Interesting Ian]

Ian said:
You know, if you or Titus or someone could explain what this actually means, you might make some progress with us.

I have no idea what it means to say that a property (conscious experience) is the very same thing as a physical thing (brain). No idea whatsoever. It sounds like saying that blue sky is the very same thing as air and light. An emergent property (or whatever) is not the very same thing as its underlying source.

Now, if what you mean is that conscious experience is nothing more than a result of the brain, I can understand that. Let's assume that's what you mean. Then:

Now perhaps you can explain what you mean here.

~~ Paul

Paul, I was critisising identity theory. If you think it's ludicrous then that's fine. That's both identity theory and eliminitivism you reject. So what type of materialism are you espousing? If consciousness is not the same as the brain or its functions but the result of such functions, then how come this isn't epiphenomenalism? If consciousness is still material, but is not identical to the functioning of the brain or processes within the brain, then we should be able to detect it, yes? But we can't. So it seems you're advocating epiphenomenalism.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Hey! you gave it after I asked for it!

Yes, but I gave it before I read you asking for it.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Titus
A broader question you ask is why we are at all linked to a particular brain or body. Now, that's a good question even from a dualist point of view. One of the answers suggested thus far, and the one I endorse, is that it's part of the rationale of being in this physical world, that we become largely limited to the perspective given by a particular point in space (and time). This limited perspective might teach us some valuable lessons about ourselves and others and thus form the basis for an inner development.
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Dymanic
The meanings of terms like 'ourselves' and 'others' gets a little fuzzy here, doesn't it? So you were incarnated as a shepherd, a shaman, a shoemaker, a prostitute, a priest, and a proctologist, - yet somehow, it was you all along. I don't get that.

What don't you get Dymanic?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: The same you always, anyhow and anywhere

Dymanic,

Well, I'm not surprised that you don't have an answer to that, as the idea of a trans-incarnation continuity is fundamentally irreconcilable with both identity theory, eliminative materialism and epiphenomenalism. The point is however, that I don't hold any of these positions. In my philosophy a person is first and foremost a personal soul, irreducible and substantial (which here means constituting an ontological domain of itself), regardless of whether he is incarnated or discarnate. So you don't originate in conception nor will you disappear after death. You're one of the constant building blocks of reality or atoms in the non-material sense. You remain yourself, despite all the differences in state of mind, moods, thoughts, emotions, desires, etc. you may undergo. It has been you, it is you, and it will always be you. No matter what your profession, appearance, race or even sex in a particular life time. That is what's called dualist personalism or personalist dualism. Whatever happens to you, you can't stop being yourself.

Best wishes,

Titus

Well yes precisely. How on earth could anyone have any problems with this?? I just simply don't understand the problem Dymanic is having. Could anyone be good enough to explain it for me?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Are you really an idealist, Ian?

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First of all I should say I certainly don't deny that an external world exists. It is true that my sensory perceptions do not enjoy an ontological independent existence from my self, but nevertheless they are external because they are imposed from without, and I do not have any control over their character save for that afforded by my voluntarily bodily movements.
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Oh, but that's not what I meant.

Huh??

Idealism as I understand it may allow for a certain externality, but it doesn't accept the independent reality of a physical world. Even if the physical world continues to exist if no animal or human being is experiencing it, its continuation still depends on the mind of god. That's the main difference between idealism and dualism, i.e. as I understand these positions. Dualism holds that the physical world would be real, even if there were no god around.



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what is to be gained by saying the apple is nevertheless an illusion?
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Well, I thought this kind of questions fitted the dualist more than the idealist.

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The problem here is that you're wanting to ascribe a certain ontological status to the external world in order for us to justify us as labeling it as "real". But I find it unhelpful that our everyday language should be contaminated by our particular metaphysical presuppositions in such a way
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But Ian, if I interpret you rightly, you're not really an idealist at all. You're a non-materialist alright, and your views are very similar to dualism, though you may take an agnostic position about the ultimate nature of the physical world.

I am an idealist, a subjective idealist to be specific, and I declare the physical world is ontological dependent upon mind or minds.

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

How on earth could anyone have any problems with this?? I just simply don't understand the problem Dymanic is having.

That we don't all see this the same has been duly noted. Numerous times now.

The problem I have is that I find it completely tautological. Titus says the reason we are different selves is that we are not the same self, and that this is an unanalysable fact. If you have it analysed, let's hear it.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Matter as an epiphenomenon

Your point seems like the mirror image of physicalism: the physical world may be real, but it is inefficacious. Meaning that the physical world is wholly dependent on the mind. Matter as an epiphenomenon of mind.

Do you really believe that matter has no impact whatever on the mind? As that would seem to be the implication of this view.

Intrigued,

Titus

Matter doesn't literally have an impact upon mind. Compare it to a computer game where your avatar eats a herb or whatever to restore health. Your health is restored bu it wasn't literally due to your character eating the herb though was it? It was simply because the game is programmed that way. Same for our reality.

 

[Interesting Ian]

That we don't all see this the same has been duly noted. Numerous times now.

The problem I have is that I find it completely tautological. Titus says the reason we are different selves is that we are not the same self, and that this is an unanalysable fact. If you have it analysed, let's hear it.

What do you mean? I am not you because I experience out of my body rather than yours. What is the problem?

Why am I not you rather than me not you? But this is nonsensical. No sorry, I don't understand your problem.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Titus
You remain yourself, despite all the differences in state of mind, moods, thoughts, emotions, desires, etc. you may undergo. It is has been you, it is you, and it will always be you. No matter what your profession, appearance, race or even sex in a particular life time.
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Dymanic
In fact, any such differences would have to be irrelevant, wouldn't they? The differences that count would be the ones that distinguish one meta-self from another.

What's a metaself? The self in abstraction from the brain?

So, as meta-selves, we still have subjective experience, but at the level of meta-subjects. For it to make any sense to refer to us as separate beings,

It is clear we are separate beings because I experience out of my body and you experience out of yours

our individual experiences and perspectives must still be limited at the meta-level -- just not as limited as when we are incarnate (during which time we are like actors in a kind of cosmic sit-com, but we get so into our roles that we temporarily forget it's just a sit-com).

Of course, even at the meta-level then, we might actually be just temporary sub-selves of meta-meta-selves whose actual existence is on an even higher plane of existence.

And so on.

I am completely clueless as to what you're talking about. If you have a problem with reincarnation could you please communicate your problem in English?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Identity and personality structure

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In fact, any such differences would have to be irrelevant, wouldn't they? The differences that count would be the ones that distinguish one meta-self from another. So, as meta-selves, we still have subjective experience, but at the level of meta-subjects. For it to make any sense to refer to us as separate beings, our individual experiences and perspectives must still be limited at the meta-level -- just not as limited as when we are incarnate (during which time we are like actors in a kind of cosmic sit-com, but we get so into our roles that we temporarily forget it's just a sit-com).
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No Dymanic, at least not according to my version of personalism. A self is not a structure or personality in my system, but it's an experient.

He thinks that a self is a structure or personality?? No point in assuming that Dymanic. No wonder you have problems with reincarnation

Does the stupidity of the materialist know of no limits?

So there is no need to go to an imaginary higher level. You'll always be you, as you remain the same experient, the same subject undergoing the myriad of different subjective experiences. The ontological difference between selves is not based on structural differences, or differences in personality and so on.

Well of course not. If Dymanic doesn't understand this then I see little purpose in discussing this with him.

 

[Interesting Ian]

How do the non-materialist views explain conception, gestation and birth?

At what point does the soul or consciousness or whatever you wish to call it get attached to the physical brain?

Is this a gradual or an instantaneous event?

How many brain cells are required before a brain can be called a brain?

It will be an instantaneous event. I don't know the answer to the rest of your questions.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Let's see if I have this straight so far

Titus
A self is not a structure or personality in my system, but it's an experient.
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So a self is an experient, and an experient is something experienced by a self.

No.

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The ontological difference between selves is...
...based on the fact that I'm this experient and you're that, and we can't ever be replaced by one another.
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So the reason we're different selves is that we're not the same self.

What would it mean to say that we're the same self?? It is simply a brute fact that I am not you. What is your problem??

 

[Interesting Ian]

Titus said:
This is easily explained by the fact that your philosophy appears to some of us to be nothing more than a just-so story. Really, when I ask why my subjective experience can't be a product of my brain,

But is this product itself physical or not? if it is physical it should in principle be susceptible to a scientific explanation. but it isn't.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Doggone those unanalysable facts anyway. I hate those.

It's clear that we are shouting back and forth across a vast chasm. From my perspective, interactionist dualism (though not necessarily by that name) is pretty much the default position likely to be assumed by anyone who hasn't thought much about it.

The only problem I see with interactionist dualism is that it advocates the existence of a material world. Are there any other problems?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Idealism (or dualism) won't make sense to me even if we hit a brick wall, because of the possibility that we're just too stupid to understand the complexity of the brain, despite the mind being completely material. The fact that badgers (to pick a random animal) can't understand how their eyes work doesn't mean that a badger's eyeballs have some sort of non-materialistic quality, all it means is badgers are too stupid to figure it out.

{sighs heavily}

But the point I've been making time after time after time is that consciousness cannot in principle be explained by science. It could only be "explained" by science if first of all we manage to philosophically argue for some sort of materialism.

This is the whole point. The issue of the mind/body problem is not a scientific problem, but rather a philosophical problem.

Boy this is hard work.

 

[Interesting Ian]

David, the question of the irreducibility or otherwise of conscious experience has got nothing to do with science. It seems to me that in common with so many others you do not understand what science does. It simply describes the objective world. Unless (phenomenological) consciousness can play some fruitful role in describing our behaviour, then science cannot explain consciousness. And if the world is physically closed it cannot play a fruitful role.
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I suppose that depends a little on one's approach to studying (phen) consciousness.

No not at all.

A structural treatment can be very difficult, as it turns into an attempt to dissect something that has no physical substance (again, depending on assumptions--I refer only to the historical attempt by early psychologists to introspectively study consciousness structurally). On the other hand, a functional approach--looking at the adaptive significance of the behaviors we label "consciousness" (once again, very different assumptions here, including the notion of private behavior as caused, not causal) can be very fruitful. In this approach, we are able to "dissect" functionally rather than structurally, and this difference in approach and assumptions makes all the difference.

I do not see how this would explain consciousness at all. It would only explain behaviour.

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

No point in assuming that Dymanic. No wonder you have problems with reincarnation

Does the stupidity of the materialist know of no limits?

If Dymanic doesn't understand this then I see little purpose in discussing this with him.

I looked everywhere for the substantive content of your responses, but found only personal incredulity.

Maybe you really don't understand the question:

I am not you because I experience out of my body rather than yours.

That's clear enough as long as we have bodies. My question is, if what we really are is spirits (metaselves) temporarily inhabiting bodies, how is our existence as independent beings defined independent of such a context? As inhabitants of bodies, our single-point perspective is a result of temporal qualities of phenomena like light and sound arriving at our sensory organs, no? If we have a higher existence independent of bodies, it is not subject to these limitations; it is everywhere-all-at-once (or if not, why not)? So what differentiates one from another? (Hint: unsupported assertions, whether presented as unanalyzable facts or brute facts, are still unsupported.)

 

[hammegk]

Dymanic

I'd posit that if you feel the facts most support "self = ego/memory/etc" that persists after perceived-as-biological-death, your best choice is some form of dualism; if I thought this the non-interactive flavor would be my choice.

Conversely, if you feel that "self" does not equal "ego/memory/etc" -- but rather is best characterized as "life itself" -- idealism would attract you as the "best" choice. Bergson is one of the earlier proponents, so far as I know.

 

[Interesting Ian]

II
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I am not you because I experience out of my body rather than yours.
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That's clear enough as long as we have bodies. My question is, if what we really are is spirits (metaselves) temporarily inhabiting bodies,

I don't understanding why you're describing it as a metaself. It's not the metaself but simply the self.

how is our existence as independent beings defined independent of such a context?

It's not.

As inhabitants of bodies, our single-point perspective is a result of temporal qualities of phenomena like light and sound arriving at our sensory organs, no? If we have a higher existence independent of bodies, it is not subject to these limitations; it is everywhere-all-at-once (or if not, why not)? So what differentiates one from another? (Hint: unsupported assertions, whether presented as unanalyzable facts or brute facts, are still unsupported.)

I don't understand your question. What differentiates me from you is that I am me and you are you.

If you find something unsatisfactory with this answer could you explain what it might be?

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

how is our existence as independent beings defined independent of such a context?

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It's not.

Great. We agree on that then.

What differentiates me from you is that I am me and you are you.

If you find something unsatisfactory with this answer could you explain what it might be?

What I find unsatisfactory about that answer is that as an answer, it isn't very satisfactory.