A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Interesting Ian]

What differentiates me from you is that I am me and you are you.

If you find something unsatisfactory with this answer could you explain what it might be?
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What I find unsatisfactory about that answer is that as an answer, it isn't very satisfactory.


__________________

Why isn't it satisfactory? What else could conceivably distingusih me from you apart from the fact that I am not you? If we suddenly swapped bodies and I had your memories and you had mine, would that make you me and vice versa? I would say not. Of course if we did swap bodies our memories wouldn't swap as well. But just suppose they did.

BTW what problems does interactive dualism have apart from it advocating the existence of a material world?

 

[Mercutio]

I do not see how this would explain consciousness at all. It would only explain behaviour.

Absolutely true. Which is why I said it depends on perspective. As I have argued here, one may consider consciousness to be a particular subset of private behaviors, taken as a category. You, quite clearly, do not agree with that view. Others here do. I understand your perspective, but do not agree with it, due to differences in fundamental assumptions that you and I make differently.

 

[slimshady2357]

Ian,

Here's what I think Dynamic is asking. Ho can you know there is more than one self outside this physical world? You know you're you and I'm me because we don't see out of the same eyes, occupy the same space, etc...

As you said, it's quite obvious as to why we think this way.

But when you start talking about a self that exists outside this physical realm and can be re-incarnated as someone else (with no memories or any realization of being the same 'self' as before in nearly all cases), you get into some strange questions I think.

How do you know there is more than one self it the realm outside this physical one? Maybe it's one self experiencing many different physical existences.

And this all comes around to questions like ceptimus' asked earlier, how many non-physical selves are there? How are they created? Can they be destroyed?

If there was a massive catastrophe and suddenly there was only 3 billion people alive, what happens to the other 3 billion non-physical selves?

I think the answer is that you have no idea what-so-ever. And this also goes for the question 'how do you know there is more than one non-physical self?'

For instance, to make up something from scratch...

Why say that the same 'self' is re-incarnated? Maybe all the re-incarnation evidence really points to the fact that non-physical 'selves' can get tangled up in passing and rub off on each other. That's why only a few confused 'former physical life' facts make it through in the new person. Or maybe there is only one non-physical 'self' and sometimes some it's memories of earlier incarnations slips through to a new one?

Basically, what evidence what-so-ever can you have of these non-physical selves outside of your experience as being one while in this physical realm?

Adam

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ian,

Here's what I think Dynamic is asking. Ho can you know there is more than one self outside this physical world? You know you're you and I'm me because we don't see out of the same eyes, occupy the same space, etc...

No, I know I'm me as an immediately experienced reality.

As you said, it's quite obvious as to why we think this way.

But when you start talking about a self that exists outside this physical realm and can be re-incarnated as someone else (with no memories or any realization of being the same 'self' as before in nearly all cases), you get into some strange questions I think.

Sure, the memories can't be accessed. But what strange questions do you have in mind?

How do you know there is more than one self it the realm outside this physical one? Maybe it's one self experiencing many different physical existences.

But what would it mean to say that I am you as well as myself? I don't experience out of your body. I only ever experience out of one body. So other selves can't be me. It's one and the same self experiencing through differing bodies in successive incarnations. I think you and Dymanic make the mistake of identifying the self with ones memories and/or material continuity. You should understand that this is the materialists understanding of the self. You can't use the materialists understanding of the self to criticise reincarnation. Of course you can argue that this must be what the self is, but I would vehmently disagree. I find such a conception of the self patently absurd.

And this all comes around to questions like ceptimus' asked earlier, how many non-physical selves are there?

No idea.

How are they created? Can they be destroyed?

They are not created. They are not destroyed although ultimately I would say we lose our individuality as we come one with each other and God.

If there was a massive catastrophe and suddenly there was only 3 billion people alive, what happens to the other 3 billion non-physical selves?

They experience the afterlife realm.

I think the answer is that you have no idea what-so-ever. And this also goes for the question 'how do you know there is more than one non-physical self?'

I know that I exist. I feel that you do. We are not the same person.

For instance, to make up something from scratch...

Why say that the same 'self' is re-incarnated? Maybe all the re-incarnation evidence really points to the fact that non-physical 'selves' can get tangled up in passing and rub off on each other. That's why only a few confused 'former physical life' facts make it through in the new person.

Sure, that seems possible to me. There are a few interpretations of the evidence. I'll go to the library tomorrow and pick up that reincarnation book by Ian Stevenson and see if he says anything about such possibilities.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

Paul, I was critisising identity theory. If you think it's ludicrous then that's fine. That's both identity theory and eliminitivism you reject. So what type of materialism are you espousing? If consciousness is not the same as the brain or its functions but the result of such functions, then how come this isn't epiphenomenalism? If consciousness is still material, but is not identical to the functioning of the brain or processes within the brain, then we should be able to detect it, yes? But we can't. So it seems you're advocating epiphenomenalism.

I'd like to answer this question, Ian, but it's so laden with muddy definitions (not your fault). I don't know if identity theory is ludicrous, because I don't know what "consciousness is the very same thing as brain function" means. I don't know about eliminativism, because I'm not sure that all eliminativists really mean that consciousness is a simply nonexistent. I certainly don't like epiphenomenalism if they are really saying that consciousness as no effect on the brain, because that sounds patently false to me. I have no idea what you mean when you say we can't detect consciousness. If we can't then how are we having this conversation (isn't that epiphenomenalism?).

This is one of the reasons ontology is incoherent: What the heck to the words really mean? How can you talk coherently about consciousness when the subject at hand is "what is consciousness"?

I'll stick with an epistemological approach. What can we learn about consciousness?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian asked:

But is this product itself physical or not? if it is physical it should in principle be susceptible to a scientific explanation. but it isn't.

It's an emergent property or whatever the right term is. Just like computation in an emergent property of a computer. Is computation physical? I wouldn't call it physical. The computer is physical, the computation is conceptual.

And consciousness certainly is susceptible to scientific explanation, unless you dictate by fiat that it is not.

This is the whole point. The issue of the mind/body problem is not a scientific problem, but rather a philosophical problem.

And it will remain so forever, because philosophy has no route to come to any conclusion about it. Hence the length of this thread.

I don't understand your question. What differentiates me from you is that I am me and you are you.

If you find something unsatisfactory with this answer could you explain what it might be?

When not incarnate, how is you being you any different from you being me?

 

[Interesting Ian]

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But is this product itself physical or not? if it is physical it should in principle be susceptible to a scientific explanation. but it isn't.
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It's an emergent property or whatever the right term is. Just like computation in an emergent property of a computer. Is computation physical? I wouldn't call it physical. The computer is physical, the computation is conceptual.

Computation is information processing which is a physical process. So this information processing is consciousness?

And consciousness certainly is susceptible to scientific explanation, unless you dictate by fiat that it is not.

But how does science predict conscious people rather than p-zombies?

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I don't understand your question. What differentiates me from you is that I am me and you are you.

If you find something unsatisfactory with this answer could you explain what it might be?
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When not incarnate, how is you being you any different from you being me?

Well I would experience being me and you would experience being you, and we wouldn't experience being each other. We are recognisable and distinguishable to a third person through an innate apprehension (telepathy). Or even in an afterlife realm people may well still see us as having bodies. Indeed we could have bodies just as much as in our present existence.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

Computation is information processing which is a physical process. So this information processing is consciousness?

Okay, I'll give up on the distinction between physical things and their properties. It never gets us anywhere anyway. How about evil? Is that a physical thing or a concept?

Consciousness is what we call the various subjective feelings that we have as a result of brain activity. These feelings can be studied objectively, but cannot be experienced by anyone else. Exactly like a rock.

But how does science predict conscious people rather than p-zombies?

P-zombies are an incoherent concept, so it doesn't matter. If a machine is built that duplicates my brain, it will be conscious.

Well I would experience being me and you would experience being you, and we wouldn't experience being each other. We are recognisable and distinguishable to a third person through an innate apprehension (telepathy). Or even in an afterlife realm people may well still see us as having bodies. Indeed we could have bodies just as much as in our present existence.

How on Earth do you know this? Do you remember what your experiences were like before you were incarnate, in such a way that you are absolutely certain the experiences are not just a fabrication?

~~ Paul

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

I think you and Dymanic make the mistake of identifying the self with ones memories and/or material continuity. You should understand that this is the materialists understanding of the self. You can't use the materialists understanding of the self to criticise reincarnation.

It looks to me like your own ideas about 'self' are rooted in this same soil. They are conceptual extensions of what it feels like from the limited perspective of an earthly organism. You are completely unable to even approach a definition of self that is not a direct product of that. As much as anything, you define 'you' as 'over there', and 'me' as 'over here'.

Or even in an afterlife realm people may well still see us as having bodies. Indeed we could have bodies just as much as in our present existence.

This afterlife realm is looking more and more like it obeys the same rules as the earthly realm. But I thought the point of the whole exersize was that we stand to learn certain lessons (which will serve us how exactly I'm not clear on either) that we can only learn by being limited by the perspective of having a body.

 

[Dancing David]

{sighs heavily}

But the point I've been making time after time after time is that consciousness cannot in principle be explained by science. It could only be "explained" by science if first of all we manage to philosophically argue for some sort of materialism.

This is the whole point. The issue of the mind/body problem is not a scientific problem, but rather a philosophical problem.

Boy this is hard work.

Well, sigh heavily, throw arms in air, catch arms and reattach!

That I would say is an a priori argument and like tha nature/nuture argument it will be resolved in the future. I say you can't rule out the biological basis of consiousness, just as I can not disprove the immaterial POV. Draw, even up.

You are a philospher so you see it as a philosphy, a scientist sees it as a science, an animist sees it as an anima, they are all equally correct and all equally wrong.

I know that immaterialist hold this point of view

This is the whole point. The issue of the mind/body problem is not a scientific problem, but rather a philosophical problem.

Ain't life grand, a philospher, a scientist and a musician can all approach the same subject, they are all right and all wrong.

PS I agree with you about the optical illusion, while an objective measure may see the squares as disequal the brain percieves them as equal. Cool!

 

[BillyJoe]

Mercutio, Ceptimus and Dymanic,

You all understand Ian's interpretation of the Checkerboard illusion but do you actually agree with it?
And does he understand it from your point of view?

BillyJoe.

BTW, with all this talk of god, afterlife and reincarnation, are we still in the science forum?

 

[Mercutio]

Mercutio, Ceptimus and Dymanic,

You all understand Ian's interpretation of the Checkerboard illusion but do you actually agree with it?
And does he understand it from your point of view?

I do agree with it. This does not mean I do not agree with the interpretation that says the two squares are the same color. What we have here are two different standards for "same"; under one, Ian is absolutely correct in saying they are different, under the other, the two squares are the same. The neat thing is, we actually can program an artificial system with the same exitatory and inhibitory signals in visual fields that our retinas give us through the funneling of signal through bipolar and ganglion cells, and we can predict, purely mechanically, the same phenomenon as we experience, well, experientially. Ian's analysis is not incompatible with a materialistic one. (in fairness, Ian's need not be compatible with materialism to be consistent.)

I do not know if Ian understands it from my point of view. I assume that he does, as I have been impressed with his understanding of other issues. That he disagrees with me is a completely different issue than whether or not he understands me.

BTW, with all this talk of god, afterlife and reincarnation, are we still in the science forum?

Oh, that train left weeks ago...

 

[BillyJoe]

Re: Re: Checker-board

Mercutio,

Do you really agree with him?.....


I am the only person who is saying that the squares represented by A and B are different colours.

He doesn't acknowledge here that there is another possible interpretation by which it can be concluded that the sqaures (or parallelograms) are the same color (or shades of grey)

Thus to everyone apart from me, it seems that the experience of colour is not a quale, but some abstract scientific definition of what constitutes a particular colour. I suggest this demonstrates a complete lack of knowledge regarding the philosophy and psychology of perception.

He is clearly saying one interpretation is correct (his) and the other (yours/ours) is incorrect.

Most crucially the mind actively creates reality when we perceive.

When I first read this bit I interpreted it to mean that "mind actively creates reality" which is actually what he says. I assume you would not agree with that. But I gather now that he means "mind actively creates a simulation of reality". That would be fine

By labelling certain of our perceptual experiences as optical illusions you are by implication drawing a distinction between these so called "illusions" and the rest of our perceptual experiences. But the truth of the matter is that "optical illusions" are not particularly special in this regard. What we actually perceptual experience, whether you label them "optical illusions" or not, is largely a product of our minds.

Surely he is using "illusion" in two different senses here.
Everything we "see" is an illusion in the sense that it is "a simulation of reality" but optical illusions demonstrate how our brains sometimes make clear mistakes in attempting to simulate reality

Yes our perceptual experiences have their origin in an external world. But what we actually see is not just a passive assimilation of the information flowing through our senses. No, what we see is shaped and molded by the mind. Reality as we perceive it is very largely a product of the mind.

Okay now he says 'Reality as we perceive it is very largely a product of the mind" instead of "the mind actively creates reality when we perceive" so I guess he meant that all along. So we are in agreement

Reality is a construct. All our perceptual experiences implicitly incorporate low level theory, and we are deluded in supposing that we can somehow percieve the world in abstraction from any theoretical framework. Optical "illusions" illustrate this very nicely.

Not sure what he means here but presumably he is talking about how the brain processes incoming sense data to produce a simulation within the brain of reality. The optical illusions demonstrate the the brain makes errors in producing this simulation. No argument either

But what was the response of all the materialists when confronted with these optical "illusions"? Something like "Eeeeee isn't that great, we're seeing something that isn't really there!"

But we ARE in a sense aren't we? I mean there is a real world "out there" and through various means we can determine that the squares are the same color "out there". Yet we see them as being different (because our brains have made an error in simulating reality).
So, it seems to me, Ian is not accepting our alternative interpretation.

I forlornly tried to rectify people's error in this regard only to be accused of being a troll by everyone. So much for the intellectual capacity of the vast majority of people on this forum ie the materialists

So he is trying to rectify our error in failing to see his interpretation of optical illusions but, at the same time, failing to see that our interpretation is also valid

All I need to show is that colours should be defined by our actual experience of colour, rather than some abstract technical or scientific definition forever beyond anyones experience.

He is saying that his interpretation is consistent with his POV (irreducible qualia) and that the alternative interpretation is not consistent with his POV?

I show that by pointing out that if we define colours other than this, it will render a lot of our everyday conversations about colour as meaningless.

Do you agree with this? I mean, surely we can think about colours in all sorts of different ways and this increases our understanding about what colours are, not render conversations about colours meaningless

The scientist on one hand, and sensible people on the other, are utilizing differing language games. Thy are talking at cross purposes.

Again, do you agree? Ian insists on one definition of colour (what we directly perceive) but scientists accept that colour can mean many things. We accept his definition but he doesn't accept alternative interpretations.

When normal sensible people talk about colour, they are talking about what people actually experience and agree upon. The scientist, on the other hand, is abstracting from that common reality. If this is recognised, then there is no problem. It appears though that many people are not able to understand this and erroneously believe that scientific theories and measurements depict reality as it really is.

Again claiming that only legitimate interpretation of colour is that which is directly experienced and rejecting alternative, and not necessarily mutually exclusive, interpretations

But in fact the scientist deals in a world of unreality.

Scientists deal in a world of unreality? Scientist assume there is a reality out there which perhaps will never be totally assimilated into our brains but, nevertheless, strive to get as close a picture as possible to reality using all means at our disposal.


BillyJoe
(Sorry, this post got a bit out of hand )

 

[Titus Rivas]

Respect

Dymanic,

It's clear that we are shouting back and forth across a vast chasm.

Well, yes, the differences are considerable. I appreciate your tone though.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

The irrationalisation of the notion of a non-physical mind

Hi Mercutio,

Titus, I'm wondering...As a bit of an historian of psychology, could you explain why it is that we went from a position of cartesian dualism to materialism in the first place?

Well, as far as I know it had everything to do with trying to be more respectable as a 'real' (i.e. physical or physically based) science. Wilhelm Wundt who's often seen as one of the founding fathers of experimental psychology already wanted a psychology which wouldn't depend on the notion of a soul.
More generally, I think that despite Descartes and cartesianism, the notion of a non-physical mind remained associated with institutionalized religion. So that (exceptions notwithstanding) it still was a sign of secular rationalism if you denied the existence of such a mind or soul. It somehow seemed more scientific or even rational to leave the notion behind as an obscurantist remnant of a pre-rational and pre-scientific past. So in my view, it mostly had to do with prejudice and the identification of dualism with (especially Christian) theology.
In sum, the specific background within psychology will be related to its striving for scientific respectability. But the more general background is an increasing 'irrationalisation' of non-physical entities in general.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Personal and biological evolution

When you say reincarnation, that implies that a soul leaves one body, and possibly hangs around before attaching to a new body/brain. But there are more people around now than in previous times, so I assume brand new souls are being produced, to add to the recycled ones? Can the souls ever 'die'? I suppose at past times when the human population was reducing there might have been a temporary surfeit of souls? Personally, I believe in evolution (in the Darwinian sense). It seems to me that this theory is incompatible with dualism. There are perhaps three ways it could be made compatible?

1. At some point, the very first organism to which a soul attached would have been born. Its ancestors would necessarily have had no souls.

2. Souls evolved very gradually, from nothing, along with the organisms.

3. Every object, including non-living things, has a soul, and these souls are (or seem to be) more developed in animals, and especially man, than elsewhere.

All of those three seem flawed to me. Do I have to reject Darwinism to become a dualist, or is there a way out?

There is, and even more than one:

- The most obvious solution is that the notion of reincarnation does not imply that souls are continuously incarnated.
In fact, there is quite a lot of evidence (in cases of young children who seem to recall previous lives) that in most cases there is a so called intermission period in which a soul remains discarnate. There doesn't seem to be a fixed period so that it is imaginable that it generally lasts longer if there are less bodies available.

- Then, there is no reason to limit the notion of reincarnation to human beings. It's one of the prejudices we inherited from Christian theology that human souls would be the only immortal type of souls. In other words, it is to be expected that (other) animals may become humans.

- Thirdly, it is possible that some souls didn't have a previous life on this planet but on another one. Of course this is the most speculative solution.

Ian Stevenson, the main Western reincarnation researcher, explicitly links his concept of progressive personal evolution over more than one incarnation to the neutral biological concept of biological evolution. And so do I, to be honest.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Thanks David

Hi Dancing David,

Thanks a lot for your kind and respectful message. I had no intention of generally downgrading you or your posts as not worthy of any serious consideration. Though I do agree we have reached an impasse.

In that you have no real proof that the brain can not represent qualia, but you have a lot of words that you have ordered in such a way to demonstrate a belief that qualia can not be represented by the brain.

Well, Interesting Ian has already answered this point. The proof is precisely an analytical proof, not an empirical one. By the way, I was taught that in English the word proof is usually reserved for analytical argumentation, as in mathematics, logic and the kind of deductive reasoning I've shown.

I wish you all the best, thanks again for your kind words.

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Varia

Hammegk:

Titus: I was referring only to what we perceive as 'biological life'.

I see!

Dymanic,

But I thought the point of the whole exersize was that we stand to learn certain lessons (which will serve us how exactly I'm not clear on either) that we can only learn by being limited by the perspective of having a body.

The realm may appear quite similar except that some evidence suggests that it is a lot more free than the earthly realm. For instance, your thoughts would more directly lead to events or you would be freely capable of using ESP. The idea is that not everybody is ready for such freedom in order to make good use of it. For souls which aren't prepared for such a life, some limitation is desirable so that they will first learn basic lessons about topics like self-esteem, responsibility, friendship or love, quality of life and compassion.

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Adam's thoughts about reincarnation

Adam,

You asked how we know that veridical memories of previous lives are really one's own memories. Well, we don't absolutely know that, but it's a matter of parsimony to prefer the reincarnation hypothesis to other possibilities such as daemoniacal possession or the Swedenborgian hypothesis of subconscious influences from discarnate souls. If we are talking about young children ESP can be ruled out, as it doesn't explain paranormal birthmarks, skills and the emotional identification with the previous lives. See this paper of mine about theory in reincarnation research.

Then, you mention the brahman hypothesis )or noetic monism) of one (divine) soul living in all animated bodies at the same time.
My main problem with this theory is that it seems to be incoherent. If an experient is said to experience certain subjective experiences (say your subjective experiences) but not the experiences of another experient (say mine), how can the first experient really be identical to the second? It really seems to clear me that these experients aren't really one and the same.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Problems with ontology?

Loki,

And just quickly Titus, this is my main problem with your essays against identity theory and epiphenomenalism - too much ontology

But then again, materialism is an ontological theory as well. If you really dislike ontology, you might for example opt for Kantian phenomenalism, Humean skepticism, the Tibetan Buddhist theory that all rational views of reality are merely 'conventional' or even just a couple of Zen paradoxes ;-)

Best wishes,

Titus