A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Titus Rivas]

Laus

Adam,

wo possible interpretations of what I mean by 'silly'

Do I hear an echo of Erasmus's Laus Stultitiae?
Some discussions in contemporary analytical ontology may seem reminiscent of the kind of late scholastics ridiculized by Erasmus. But then again, so might mathematics or theoretical physics. The more complex, the less relevant and esoterical it may seem to persons not directly involved.

Titus

 

[Mr Sensible]

Re: My first Argument against the Identity Theory

In my paper Exit Epiphenomenalism I also give a first argument against the identity theory, which I shall reformulate here:

(1) Identity theory implicitly claims that we can know that there are two perspectives towards the conscious mind. One would be the first person, subjective perspective. The other one the third person, objective perspective. The first person perspective amounts to what conscious mind appears to be (irreducible subjectivity). The third person perspective amounts to what the conscious mind really is (brain processes).

Hmmmm . . . the third person perspective is that which is required to give a scientific explanation. But just as looking at a pen from end on, and looking at a pen from side on will give 2 completely differing visual appearances of one and the same pen, but be both equally real, why cannot the first person perspective of consciousness and the third person perspective of consciousness be equally real? Why must the first person perspective merely be apparent?

(2) Identity theory is right in claiming that only real entities can have a real impact on the real world.
(3) As (according to identity theory) consciousness as seen from the first person perspective is not real, but only apparent, it cannot have a real, but exclusively an apparent impact on the real world.

No, it can have an impact on the real world. It's just that the impact can be examined scientifically ie from the third person perspective, or the impact can be thought of as the exercising of conscious intent. Is there a contradiction here?

 

[Titus Rivas]

Identity theory: materialist and other

Mr. Sensible,

No, it can have an impact on the real world. It's just that the impact can be examined scientifically ie from the third person perspective, or the impact can be thought of as the exercising of conscious intent. Is there a contradiction here?

Yes, there is, at least in the materialist type of Identity Theory.
For the materialist version of this theory, mind and matter aren't equally real or illusory. And I was talking about the materialist Identity Theory.

This would be different for another theory called neutral monism, espoused by Bertrand Russell for example. But (naturalistic) neutral monism presupposes some kind of (naturalistic) parallellism again, which I have discarded in other posts on this same thread.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[slimshady2357]

Re: Identity theory: materialist and other

This would be different for another theory called neutral monism, espoused by Bertrand Russell for example. But (naturalistic) neutral monism presupposes some kind of (naturalistic) parallellism again, which I have discarded in other posts on this same thread.

Best wishes,

Titus

That part in bold.... huh?

It's neutral monism, how does it pre-suppose some kind of parallelism (which implies a Dualistic belief) ?

Adam

 

[BillyJoe]

Re: Illusion or not?

Ian, You've responded in a similar fashion before [The brain as perceived is more of an illusion, together with the rest of the physical world, under materialism!]. I actually don't understand what you mean by it, Ian.
What I mean by illusion, is not that the illusion itself (qua illusion) does not exist. Illusions (as meant here, so not in the technical sense it is sometimes employed in perceptual psychology) are real mental phenomena. The only thing is that they don't refer to anything real outside themselves, they give the impression that there is something external, outside the mind which really isn't there.

You should ask Ian to explain the checker-board illusion to you.

regards,
BillyJoe

 

[Titus Rivas]

Parallellistic, but within monism

Adam,

It's neutral monism, how does it pre-suppose some kind of parallelism (which implies a Dualistic belief) ?

Well, as I've understood it, neutral monism states that there is one undivided and neutral reality and in that sense it is non-dualistic. But on the other hand it also accepts that the supposed one reality can have several types of aspects. As in Spinoza's system, there would be one substance (ontological domain) but with different types of adherentiae (properties). The different aspects would run completely parallel to each other without there being really separate substances.

I hope that helps.

Titus

 

[Interesting Ian]

Titus,

You know, the weidest thing just happened...I just read your anti-identity theory summary, and I think you've just convinced me that epiphenomenalism is correct!! Gasp! Win, where are you - I think I finally get what you've been trying to tell me.

I need to think about this .....

Yes it's great when suddenly something clicks like that and you gain an understanding of something. The point is that science only describes the third person perspective. Saying phenomenal conscious experience is the very same thing as physical processes in the brain is not very helpful because the fact remains that physical processes and conscious experiences are not synonymous. So the point is that this conscious aspect of physical processes cannot be derived from a scientific description of the world. Therefore materialism necessarily fails. Unless you deny the existence of phenomenal conscious experiences as eliminitivism does.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Checker-board

You should ask Ian to explain the checker-board illusion to you.

Thanks, Billy Joe!

Well, Ian, go ahead if you wish!

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Asking Ian for some clarification

Dear Ian,

So the point is that this conscious aspect of physical processes cannot be derived from a scientific description of the world. Therefore materialism necessarily fails. Unless you deny the existence of phenomenal conscious experiences as eliminitivism does.

Precisely, that's a good reflection of my own views.

By the way, Ian, I beg you to explain your views on the reality of the physical world. As an idealist I suppose you can't claim that the physical world is as independently real as the mind, can you? Because if you would do so, you might as well be called a dualist.
So, if the reality of physical world depends on the reality of the mind, and has no independent reality of its own, wouldn't you agree that in this limited, specific sense it might as well be called an illusory manifestation of the mind itself. Meaning that it only appears to be something independent whereas it wholly depends on the mind.

Curious regards,

Titus

 

[slimshady2357]

Re: Parallellistic, but within monism

Adam, Well, as I've understood it, neutral monism states that there is one undivided and neutral reality and in that sense it is non-dualistic. But on the other hand it also accepts that the supposed one reality can have several types of aspects. As in Spinoza's system, there would be one substance (ontological domain) but with different types of adherentiae (properties). The different aspects would run completely parallel to each other without there being really separate substances.

I hope that helps.

Titus

Hmmm, that sounds like what I would call non-interactive property dualism.

I'll have to re-read some stuff on neutral monism.

Adam

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Reminding Ian of his Idealism

Ian, Physical world? What physical world, Ian? Accprding to idealism, as I've understood it, the physical world would be just another manifestation of the mind. For idealism there is no real, irreducible physical world outside mental ('ideal') reality. So, the apparently closed nature of the physical world does not constitute a serious threat to the idealist world view.

Or does your idealism hold something else?

Best wishes,

Titus

My worldview is that we are spiritual beings and that all our sensory perceptions are a direct communication from God. More important than the rejection of a physical world (understood as a mind-independent reality) is the rejection of physical causality (understood as an innate generative causality within this physical realm). The only causality that exists is mental causality and this accounts for all change in the world ie the vast majority of change is a direct manifestation of God's Will with a small amount of change in the world being a manifestation of free will made by conscious agents (finite spirits). We are implicitly aware of our own causal agency at any given moment and are implicitly aware of our genuine capacity to choose from alternatives. Thus such mental causality on the part of finite spirits is a freely exercised choice and certainly would not follow some preordained algorithm.

Now if the scenario that Loki has painted came true this would mean that I am fundamentally wrong in my beliefs. If I am fundamentally wrong about such a basic issue then emotionally I would feel that, since the predictions of those who subscribe to a materialist type of metaphysic are correct in this aspect, they are likely to be correct in more or less the rest of their worldview. But I would not reject the existence of conscious experience because doing so is utterly preposterous. So either someone needs to explain to me how some form of materialism squares with subjective experiences, in which case I possibly might be disposed to accept materialism. Or possibly I would subscribe to maybe epiphenomenalism. I really don't know. Or maybe idealism still, although it would be somewhat different from my original worldview, and I might be legitimately accused of clinging onto a worldview despite the evidence demolishing a major aspect of that worldview.

But as I say, that was my emotional reaction on reading Loki's scenario. On second thoughts, maybe I would still be an idealist, but of a somewhat differing one from the one I am now. Hell I don't know. Loki has provided an utterly implausible scenario!

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

Saying phenomenal conscious experience is the very same thing as physical processes in the brain is not very helpful because the fact remains that physical processes and conscious experiences are not synonymous. So the point is that this conscious aspect of physical processes cannot be derived from a scientific description of the world.

You know, if you or Titus or someone could explain what this actually means, you might make some progress with us.

I have no idea what it means to say that a property (conscious experience) is the very same thing as a physical thing (brain). No idea whatsoever. It sounds like saying that blue sky is the very same thing as air and light. An emergent property (or whatever) is not the very same thing as its underlying source.

Now, if what you mean is that conscious experience is nothing more than a result of the brain, I can understand that. Let's assume that's what you mean. Then:

Saying phenomenal conscious experience is nothing more than a result of physical processes in the brain is not very helpful because the fact remains that physical processes and conscious experiences are not synonymous. So the point is that this conscious aspect of physical processes cannot be derived from a scientific description of the world.

Now perhaps you can explain what you mean here.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

I also hold that it's logically conceivable that there is a direct interaction between two minds, or telepathy, so that I don't have any particular reason to be unusually skeptical about the evidence for this phenomenon.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Yes, that would follow, wouldn't it? Once you allow consciousness to interact (in whatever unexplainable, non-physical way) with matter (a brain) what reason is there to suppose that this effect should be restricted to a particular brain? For that matter, why exactly does it even have to be a brain? Why not a liver, or... ...an onion?

I guess that the physical something which the self operates through needs to be able to process information.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Neutral monism and non-interactive (or parallellist) property dualism

Hmmm, that sounds like what I would call non-interactive property dualism.

Right, and applied to a concrete person it would be, as property dualism is different from substance dualism. In the sense of properties, neutral monism cannot hold one set more (or less) real than another set, as that would mean the end of its neutrality.

Titus

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: A teleological answer for a change

Dymanic,
Well, there really is evidence (by my non-skeptical dualist standards of course) for psychogenic influences upon livers and onions, etc. But you probably mean a somatogenic impact from the lever or a physicopsychical impact from the onion upon the mind. In fact, the lever (and even the onion when you smell, taste or eat it) does have influences on the mind, albeit through the brain.
More seriously, the question relates to the issue of incarnation (or more accurately of 'being incarnated in a physical system). It does seem quite handy that we experients should be directly linked to the central control unit in a human body, i.e. the brain. And apart from that, there are information processes going on in the brain that provide us with information, absent in the liver.
A broader question you ask is why we are at all linked to a particular brain or body. Now, that's a good question even from a dualist point of view. One of the answers suggested thus far, and the one I endorse, is that it's part of the rationale of being in this physical world, that we become largely limited to the perspective given by a particular point in space (and time). This limited perspective might teach us some valuable lessons about ourselves and others and thus form the basis for an inner development. So my answer is teleological in this case. I can't prove it logically, though I do believe there is evidence for the position, mainly in the form of near-death experiences and memories of a discarnate preexistence in young children, which both may point to a purpose of earthly life.

That's about as specific I can get about this I'm afraid.

Yes I absolutely agree with all of this.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: To Loki and Ian

By the way, talking about thoughts, any idea how my recent posts may relate to your paradox, Ian? I haven't sorted that out myself to tell you the truth.

Titus [/B]

Er . .no, no idea at all.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Re: Dismissing parallellism

Just to summarize my arguments:

(1). Parallellism implicitly states that we can know that there is a real, irreducible mind and a real, irreducible brain.
(2). One of the claims of parallellism is that the mind is not influenced by the brain.
(2a). If the mind is not influenced by the brain, we cannot know that there is a brain.
(2b). If we ourselves hold that we cannot know that there is a brain, we can't (even implicitly) state that we know that there is a real, irreducible brain.
(2c) Thus, parallellism is an incoherent position.
(3). The other claim of parallellism is that the brain is not influenced by the mind.
(3a). If the brain is not influenced by the mind, we cannot meaningfully express our theories about the mind by physical means, such as speech and writing.
(3b). Parallellism as shared in the intellectual debate should be meaningfully expressable by physical means, such as speech and writing.
(3c). As parallellism cannot be expressed meaningfully in the intellectual debate, it can't be a candidate within that intellectual debate, let alone win that debate.
(3d). However, parallellists implicitly claim that their position is a meaningfully expressable one, which should not only take part in the intellectual debate, but even win the battle.
(3e). Therefore, parallellism is an incoherent position.

Satisfied?

Titus

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Not really.

Everything there seems to ignore the idea that the pre-established harmony is pre-established by God. Your arguments do not work for someone who believes all this was set up by God, including all ones thoughts about the brain and about parallelism.

A detrministic parallelism, where all things physical and psychical were pre-established by God. So your knowledge of the brain (and indeed of anything physical) is through God, not through any kind of interaction.

Yes, good point Adam. I had been thinking about making that point myself when I got round to reading the appropriate response, by Titus, to my "coincidence" remark. Been so many posts today in this thread. I think I'm well behind! LOL

PS And I'm just wondering about occasionalism here too.

 

[Interesting Ian]

I was wondering about that. I mean, I was joking when I suggested parallelism, because it always seems sort of silly to me. But it certainly would be an option, even possibly an attractive one for someone who clearly sees that our perceptions themselves are not identical with brain processes.

Anyway, what do you think of Titus' refutation of parallelism above? (way above, this thread has been moving along as usual)

Adam

Er . . I've given it. Is it still below here?? LOL

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

PS And I'm just wondering about occasionalism here too.

All right, that's it! This proves my contention that philosophers have generated all possible metaphysics and named them by stealing all possible words and adding -ism.

However, on the off chance that Ian was just making up this term, I looked it up (http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/occasionalism.html):

occasionalism - A view popularized by Nicolas Malbranche whereby: (1) the mental and the material comprise two different kinds of substance; (2) neither has any direct causal effect on the other and; (3) all seeming interactions between the two are due to the continual intervention by God who brings about a change in one on the occasion of a change in the other.

Imagine my surprise! This seems to be about the most coherent description of dualism I've found.

~~ Paul

 

[slimshady2357]

Er . . I've given it. Is it still below here?? LOL

Hey! you gave it after I asked for it!

Maybe you missed my post with a cross post and then saw it later

And this thread certainly has been moving along!

Adam