A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Titus

A broader question you ask is why we are at all linked to a particular brain or body. Now, that's a good question even from a dualist point of view. One of the answers suggested thus far, and the one I endorse, is that it's part of the rationale of being in this physical world, that we become largely limited to the perspective given by a particular point in space (and time). This limited perspective might teach us some valuable lessons about ourselves and others and thus form the basis for an inner development.

The meanings of terms like 'ourselves' and 'others' gets a little fuzzy here, doesn't it? So you were incarnated as a shepherd, a shaman, a shoemaker, a prostitute, a priest, and a proctologist, - yet somehow, it was you all along. I don't get that. Saying it was you assumes a particular perspective, but having such a perspective is possible only through incarnation (which, if I understand correctly, is its whole point). What is the basis for this trans-incarnation continuity?

 

[Titus Rivas]

The same you always, anyhow and anywhere

Dymanic,

The meanings of terms like 'ourselves' and 'others' gets a little fuzzy here, doesn't it? So you were incarnated as a shepherd, a shaman, a shoemaker, a prostitute, a priest, and a proctologist, - yet somehow, it was you all along. I don't get that. Saying it was you assumes a particular perspective, but having such a perspective is possible only through incarnation (which, if I understand correctly, is its whole point). What is the basis for this trans-incarnation continuity?

Well, I'm not surprised that you don't have an answer to that, as the idea of a trans-incarnation continuity is fundamentally irreconcilable with both identity theory, eliminative materialism and epiphenomenalism. The point is however, that I don't hold any of these positions. In my philosophy a person is first and foremost a personal soul, irreducible and substantial (which here means constituting an ontological domain of itself), regardless of whether he is incarnated or discarnate. So you don't originate in conception nor will you disappear after death. You're one of the constant building blocks of reality or atoms in the non-material sense. You remain yourself, despite all the differences in state of mind, moods, thoughts, emotions, desires, etc. you may undergo. It has been you, it is you, and it will always be you. No matter what your profession, appearance, race or even sex in a particular life time. That is what's called dualist personalism or personalist dualism. Whatever happens to you, you can't stop being yourself.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Illusion or not?

Ian,
You've responded in a similar fashion before. I actually don't understand what you mean by it, Ian.
What I mean by illusion, is not that the illusion itself (qua illusion) does not exist. Illusions (as meant here, so not in the technical sense it is sometimes employed in perceptual psychology) are real mental phenomena. The only thing is that they don't refer to anything real outside themselves, they give the impression that there is something external, outside the mind which really isn't there. Compare the term illusionism.
I really, sincerely thought that this is how most idealists picture the physical world. If not, please explain as that might be quite enlightening for me.

best wishes,

Titus

First of all I should say I certainly don't deny that an external world exists. It is true that my sensory perceptions do not enjoy an ontological independent existence from my self, but nevertheless they are external because they are imposed from without, and I do not have any control over their character save for that afforded by my voluntarily bodily movements.

If I see an apple and this visual appearance of an apple changes in such a way which we would expect a real apple to change as we shift our perspective and distance from the apple, and moreover . . . . .

wow! Just got a phone call from my local public library saying they've just got in the latest Ian Stevenson book on European cases of reincarnation which I ordered months ago! They actually had to buy a copy . . .

right where was I?

Yeah, and moreover this visual appearance of an apple changes consistent with how we would expect the visual appearance of a real apple to change, and furthermore when we make appropriate bodily movements we receive the appropriate tactile sensations of what a real apple feels like, and when we eat it we get the appropriate gustatory and olfactory sensations, and moreover it gives the appropriate nutritional value and affects ones body in an appropriate manner, just like a real apple would, then if all this happens what is to be gained by saying the apple is nevertheless an illusion?

Allow me to put it another way. We can say that absolutely everything we every perceptually perceive is an illusion if you like, but if we do this what should we call what we presently call "illusions"?? Surely if I can see, touch, taste and smell an apple, and it does everything that we normally ascribe to real apples, then we should label it a real apple!

The problem here is that you're wanting to ascribe a certain ontological status to the external world in order for us to justify us as labeling it as "real". But I find it unhelpful that our everyday language should be contaminated by our particular metaphysical presuppositions in such a way

 

[Titus Rivas]

Are you really an idealist, Ian?

Hi Ian,

I'm delighted that you agree with my theory of why there is personal life on earth...

First of all I should say I certainly don't deny that an external world exists. It is true that my sensory perceptions do not enjoy an ontological independent existence from my self, but nevertheless they are external because they are imposed from without, and I do not have any control over their character save for that afforded by my voluntarily bodily movements.

Oh, but that's not what I meant. Idealism as I understand it may allow for a certain externality, but it doesn't accept the independent reality of a physical world. Even if the physical world continues to exist if no animal or human being is experiencing it, its continuation still depends on the mind of god. That's the main difference between idealism and dualism, i.e. as I understand these positions. Dualism holds that the physical world would be real, even if there were no god around.

wow! Just got a phone call from my local public library saying they've just got in the latest Ian Stevenson book on European cases of reincarnation which I ordered months ago! They actually had to buy a copy . . .

Congratulations, I still need to get it.

what is to be gained by saying the apple is nevertheless an illusion?

Well, I thought this kind of questions fitted the dualist more than the idealist.

The problem here is that you're wanting to ascribe a certain ontological status to the external world in order for us to justify us as labeling it as "real". But I find it unhelpful that our everyday language should be contaminated by our particular metaphysical presuppositions in such a way

But Ian, if I interpret you rightly, you're not really an idealist at all. You're a non-materialist alright, and your views are very similar to dualism, though you may take an agnostic position about the ultimate nature of the physical world.

Now if that conclusion is right, it's quite surprising I'd say.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Occasionalism

Imagine my surprise! This seems to be about the most coherent description of dualism I've found.

Well, no, Paul, it's just one of the types of dualism.
It's a strange hybrid between interactionism and parallellism. It allows for apparent interaction, but only through God. Compare my own system: though the natural laws which govern interaction may well have been established by a God, it's the laws of interaction which link mind and matter, rather than only an apparent interaction. Together with the doctrine of pre-established harmony, this is a theory which can only be upheld in an explicit theistic context.

Titus

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Proponents

Adam, I see, well I don't know any official proponents either. Anyway, my argument aimed exclusively at naturalistic parallellism.

Regarding the non-naturalistic type, I'd say parallellists would first have to prove the existence of God (which might be easier than it seems) before they use the concept of a God so that it can explain knowledge about the physical world. So they first have to answer the question about the existence of God.

And that was probably what you had in mind all along.

Titus

No because if parallelism is the only reasonable metaphysical position, and naturalistic parallelism is incoherent, then one might argue that this gives substantial reason for believing in God, because God is one of the obvious choices to make parallelism coherent.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Matter as an epiphenomenon

My worldview is that we are spiritual beings and that all our sensory perceptions are a direct communication from God. More important than the rejection of a physical world (understood as a mind-independent reality) is the rejection of physical causality (understood as an innate generative causality within this physical realm).

Your point seems like the mirror image of physicalism: the physical world may be real, but it is inefficacious. Meaning that the physical world is wholly dependent on the mind. Matter as an epiphenomenon of mind.

Do you really believe that matter has no impact whatever on the mind? As that would seem to be the implication of this view.

Intrigued,

Titus

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Titus

You remain yourself, despite all the differences in state of mind, moods, thoughts, emotions, desires, etc. you may undergo. It is has been you, it is you, and it will always be you. No matter what your profession, appearance, race or even sex in a particular life time.

In fact, any such differences would have to be irrelevant, wouldn't they? The differences that count would be the ones that distinguish one meta-self from another. So, as meta-selves, we still have subjective experience, but at the level of meta-subjects. For it to make any sense to refer to us as separate beings, our individual experiences and perspectives must still be limited at the meta-level -- just not as limited as when we are incarnate (during which time we are like actors in a kind of cosmic sit-com, but we get so into our roles that we temporarily forget it's just a sit-com).

Of course, even at the meta-level then, we might actually be just temporary sub-selves of meta-meta-selves whose actual existence is on an even higher plane of existence.

And so on.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Identity and personality structure

In fact, any such differences would have to be irrelevant, wouldn't they? The differences that count would be the ones that distinguish one meta-self from another. So, as meta-selves, we still have subjective experience, but at the level of meta-subjects. For it to make any sense to refer to us as separate beings, our individual experiences and perspectives must still be limited at the meta-level -- just not as limited as when we are incarnate (during which time we are like actors in a kind of cosmic sit-com, but we get so into our roles that we temporarily forget it's just a sit-com).

No Dymanic, at least not according to my version of personalism. A self is not a structure or personality in my system, but it's an experient. So there is no need to go to an imaginary higher level. You'll always be you, as you remain the same experient, the same subject undergoing the myriad of different subjective experiences. The ontological difference between selves is not based on structural differences, or differences in personality and so on. It's based on the fact that I'm this experient and you're that, and we can't ever be replaced by one another. So my views are very different in this respect from popular impersonalist or higher-self theories among New Age adepts.

Anyway your question is inspired by a socalled empirical approach to personal identity, whereas mine is the socalled metaphysical approach. In early modern philosophy these positions were taken for example by respectively
John Locke (empirical approach) and Thomas Reid (metaphysical approach).

Titus

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

It's a strange hybrid between interactionism and parallellism. It allows for apparent interaction, but only through God. Compare my own system: though the natural laws which govern interaction may well have been established by a God, it's the laws of interaction which link mind and matter, rather than only an apparent interaction. Together with the doctrine of pre-established harmony, this is a theory which can only be upheld in an explicit theistic context.

Your laws of interaction should be discernable, because one prong of them affects the material world. Why can't we find them? How are they hiding? (I'm ignoring the question of how a law can be partly material and partly not.)

I think the god hypothesis is safer, because it is complete and total magic. We can't find the natural laws because god works in mysterious ways. Might as well call a shovel a shovel.

No Dymanic, at least not according to my version of personalism. A self is not a structure or personality in my system, but it's an experient. So there is no need to go to an imaginary higher level. You'll always be you, as you remain the same experient, the same subject undergoing the myriad of different subjective experiences.

But what is the mechanism by which an experient experiences? There must be a meta-experiecer, no? Otherwise I just cannot imagine how you can get subjective experience out of a merely objective experient.

~~ Paul

 

[Titus Rivas]

The experient is objective, but not physical

Paul said,

But what is the mechanism by which an experient experiences? There must be a meta-experiecer, no? Otherwise I just cannot imagine how you can get subjective experience out of a merely objective experient.

That's the trouble with materialism: it's confused and confuses ;-). Materialism identifies the objective with the material. Dualism identifies it with the real, regardless of whether it is material or not. So an experient can be objective and non-material. In fact, an experient has to be non-material, to have any subjective experiences. If you think of it, there is nothing in the physical that would constitute a good model for it.

The whole idea of the need for a meta-experiencer or meta-self, makes sense in a reductive or eliminative functionalism of the kind proposed by Dennett. In such a system, there is really no experient, no self, and no subjective experiences either. So what have Dennett and other functionalists done? They have given the words self and experiences completely 'new', eliminative meanings. Neither apply when we're talking about an irreducible unanalysable experient or self (rather than a composite homunculus and similar strawmen) within the context of non-materialism.

Hopefully that makes my position on personal identity and experients a bit easier to grasp.

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Laws of interaction

Your laws of interaction should be discernable, because one prong of them affects the material world. Why can't we find them? How are they hiding? (I'm ignoring the question of how a law can be partly material and partly not.)

Sigh
I guess you mean there is no interaction, because if you accepted that there is, you'd start looking for the laws in it, by studying the different types of interaction I mentioned in a former post. You can only find laws by doing research, whether you do it yourself or study what others have done. The laws of nature aren't showing themselves somewhere in the sky, are they? Or would you say so in the case of physical natural laws?

Natural laws of interaction can only be found if you take interaction seriously.

Titus

 

[ceptimus]

How do the non-materialist views explain conception, gestation and birth?

At what point does the soul or consciousness or whatever you wish to call it get attached to the physical brain?

Is this a gradual or an instantaneous event?

How many brain cells are required before a brain can be called a brain?

 

[Dymanic]

Let's see if I have this straight so far

Originally posted by Titus

A self is not a structure or personality in my system, but it's an experient.

So a self is an experient, and an experient is something experienced by a self.

The ontological difference between selves is...
...based on the fact that I'm this experient and you're that, and we can't ever be replaced by one another.

So the reason we're different selves is that we're not the same self.



Do you really think this thread needs padding through repetitive addition of content-free statements like this?:

That's the trouble with materialism: it's confused and confuses

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

So an experient can be objective and non-material. In fact, an experient has to be non-material, to have any subjective experiences.

But your objection to the possibility that the material brain can give rise to subjective experiences is precisely that it is a purely objective hunk of meat. Why don't you apply the same reasoning to your objective hunk of nonmaterial stuff? How come it can have subjective experiences?

Hopefully that makes my position on personal identity and experients a bit easier to grasp.

It seems like nothing more than begging the question by ripping of a bit of reality, tossing it in another ontological category, and assigning it all the attributes you don't want to assign to physical things. What on earth or in heaven have you gained?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

Natural laws of interaction can only be found if you take interaction seriously.

Okay, so I'm a serious interaction researcher. What am I going to find? I'll find a physical effect that appears to have no cause. It won't be that simple, though, because I'll be able to find the part of the law that pokes the physical thing, but the law "won't be connected to anything on the other end." It will be like an arm waving in the breeze, not connected to a shoulder, yet also not ending in a stump. There will be some kind of indescribable nexus between science at the one end and, and, and what at the other end? There will be a causal chain tracing back until it suddenly trails off to nowhere.

~~ Paul

 

[Titus Rivas]

Selves

Dymanic,

So a self is an experient, and an experient is something experienced by a self.

No, what are you talking about? In this context selves and experients are synonyms for me.

So the reason we're different selves is that we're not the same self.

Yes, it's an unanalysable fact, which cannot be reduced to a set of structural psychological or historical diferences.

Do you really think this thread needs padding through repetitive addition of content-free statements like this?:

That's the trouble with materialism: it's confused and confuses

If it were content-free I'd agree with you. But alas, it is not I'm still too surprised and shocked by the fact that there really are so many quite intelligent people who take materialism seriously. If you want me to continue participating I sometimes need to show my utter bewilderment. Rest assured that apart from some irony, I generally mean what I say.
But I'll try to moderate myself a bit.

Titu

 

[Titus Rivas]

Prenatal, birth, brain and incarnation

How do the non-materialist views explain conception, gestation and birth?

As physical processes which, with the exception of birth, aren't inherently related to incarnation.

At what point does the soul or consciousness or whatever you wish to call it get attached to the physical brain?
Is this a gradual or an instantaneous event?

Good questions, but I actually have no idea. These questions should be answered by naturalistic reincarnation research in young children.

How many brain cells are required before a brain can be called a brain?

That's a matter of definition. And there even may be no generally fixed natural relation between the stages of prenatal development of the brain and the moment of incarnation. Again, that should become clear from reincarnation research.

Titus

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

I'm still too surprised and shocked by the fact that there really are so many quite intelligent people who take materialism seriously.

This is easily explained by the fact that your philosophy appears to some of us to be nothing more than a just-so story. Really, when I ask why my subjective experience can't be a product of my brain, I want a brutally clear logical derivation why it can't possibly be so. To be honest, I would think that, if there were just a derivation, it would have been presented long ago and we'd all be cheering dualists.

Also, it may be unfair, but I'm suspicious that your philosophy is driven by your desires, such as the desire that our soul live on and experience future lives. Seems to me that just muddies the waters.

~~ Paul

 

[Titus Rivas]

Rising from the muddy waters

Paul,

Also, it may be unfair, but I'm suspicious that your philosophy is driven by your desires, such as the desire that our soul live on and experience future lives. Seems to me that just muddies the waters.

Let's leave the muddy waters to the blues.
But you're right, it's unfair. It had nothing to do with my desire of believing in an afterlife, as I've never been an unbeliever concerning this issue. When I used to be a Roman Catholic, even as a young child, I could doubt a lot of the Catholic doctrine, except for angels and heaven. Intuitively, dualism was always quite obvious to me. I've never believed that I'm really a body with a mind, I've always seen myself as a spirit in a body. I've doubted many things, even including the existence of other minds , but never these subjects. As a teenager I had several experiences I spontaneously interpreted as paranormal and I was always interested in such matters, even to an extent that my parents judged me superstitious (as my interests often showed no relation with Catholicism).
A materialist might even want to explain all this by a supposedly innate genetic lust for mysticism - a positive motive with possible survival value- and the paranormal rather than a fear of death - merely a negative motive.

I'm kidding of course. If you want to look for hidden motives, you can find them in the strangest places. Remember Freud for example.

To be frank, as an outsider, I've often phantasied about possible psychological reasons for being a materialist. Apart from apparent scientific respectability, and errors about the misapplication of methods suitable for one branch of science to others where they aren't, I personally think that it's a lot to do with the appeal of a secular world view. Especially since there are so many conservative and even reactionary 'spiritual' movements, materialism may seem a way to free oneself from repressive religion. A healthy motive, though not expressed in the most elegant way. But this is largely speculation as well.

Titus