A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Titus Rivas]

Close cousins

Loki, my arguments against the Identity Theory and against Epiphenomenalism are even so close, that accepting the first implies you should also accept the second and vice versa. Similarly, if you discard one argument, it implies you also have to discard the other one.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Loki]

Titus,

1. All information about consciousness (even about its existence or presence at any moment in time) gained from introspection must be false.

Your rewording seems a little...tainted...towards a certain conclusion. We're close, but not yet in agreement. Would you accept :

"1. All information about consciousness gained from introspection that leads us to conclude that consciousness is more than simply a noun relating to a group of behaviours must be false."

Eliminative Materialism which amounts to nothing less than an insult for people who believe in rational thought. EM is a charicature of rationalism.

Saying it forcefully doesn't increase it's truth value.

my arguments against the Identity Theory and against Epiphenomenalism are even so close, that accepting the first implies you should also accept the second and vice versa. Similarly, if you discard one argument, it implies you also have to discard the other one.

Yes, that's the conclusion I've come to. Identity theory I'm comforatable with, it's epipehnomenalism I've struggled with. Your attempt to disprove them has, in fact, given me the insight into seeing how much they are alike, and has allowed me to see epiphenomenalism in a much more favourable light! Weird, huh! Exactly the opposite of what you were trying to say.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Reformulation and weird confession

Hi Loki

You said:

"Would you accept :
1. All information about consciousness gained from introspection that leads us to conclude that consciousness is more than simply a noun relating to a group of behaviours must be false."

No objection. That's exactly what Eliminative Materialism claims.

Saying it forcefully doesn't increase it's truth value.

Of course not. I sighed as I did because in my view I had already shown its truth.

Yes, that's the conclusion I've come to. Identity theory I'm comforatable with, it's epipehnomenalism I've struggled with. Your attempt to disprove them has, in fact, given me the insight into seeing how much they are alike, and has allowed me to see epiphenomenalism in a much more favourable light! Weird, huh! Exactly the opposite of what you were trying to say.

Certainly, very weird! Especially if you don't share with us what your reasons for discarding the validity of my argument in both cases would amount to!

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Titus

I also hold that it's logically conceivable that there is a direct interaction between two minds, or telepathy, so that I don't have any particular reason to be unusually skeptical about the evidence for this phenomenon.

Yes, that would follow, wouldn't it? Once you allow consciousness to interact (in whatever unexplainable, non-physical way) with matter (a brain) what reason is there to suppose that this effect should be restricted to a particular brain? For that matter, why exactly does it even have to be a brain? Why not a liver, or... ...an onion?

 

[Titus Rivas]

A teleological answer for a change

Dymanic,

Once you allow consciousness to interact (in whatever unexplainable, non-physical way) with matter (a brain) what reason is there to suppose that this effect should be restricted to a particular brain? For that matter, why exactly does it even have to be a brain? Why not a liver, or... ...an onion?

Well, there really is evidence (by my non-skeptical dualist standards of course) for psychogenic influences upon livers and onions, etc. But you probably mean a somatogenic impact from the lever or a physicopsychical impact from the onion upon the mind. In fact, the lever (and even the onion when you smell, taste or eat it) does have influences on the mind, albeit through the brain.
More seriously, the question relates to the issue of incarnation (or more accurately of 'being incarnated in a physical system). It does seem quite handy that we experients should be directly linked to the central control unit in a human body, i.e. the brain. And apart from that, there are information processes going on in the brain that provide us with information, absent in the liver.
A broader question you ask is why we are at all linked to a particular brain or body. Now, that's a good question even from a dualist point of view. One of the answers suggested thus far, and the one I endorse, is that it's part of the rationale of being in this physical world, that we become largely limited to the perspective given by a particular point in space (and time). This limited perspective might teach us some valuable lessons about ourselves and others and thus form the basis for an inner development. So my answer is teleological in this case. I can't prove it logically, though I do believe there is evidence for the position, mainly in the form of near-death experiences and memories of a discarnate preexistence in young children, which both may point to a purpose of earthly life.

That's about as specific I can get about this I'm afraid.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Loki]

Titus,

Especially if you don't share with us what your reasons for discarding the validity of my argument in both cases would amount to!

Just making sure I can sort my own thoughts before posting...

 

[Titus Rivas]

To Loki and Ian

Loki,

Just making sure I can sort my own thoughts before posting...

That's acceptable for me.

By the way, talking about thoughts, any idea how my recent posts may relate to your paradox, Ian? I haven't sorted that out myself to tell you the truth.

Titus

 

[Interesting Ian]

Yes this scenario would seem to prove the world is physically closed. This is quite definitely contrary to my beliefs and I would most probably adopt some sort of materialist based metaphysic.
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How about non-interactive parallelism?

Adam

Emmm . . .I was thinking last night that I would probably go for epiphenomenalism rather than materialism if the physical world is closed. Never thought of non-interactive parallelism. Yes, might well be my preferred choice.

 

[slimshady2357]

Re: Dismissing parallellism

Hi Adam,


Just to summarize my arguments:

(1). Parallellism implicitly states that we can know that there is a real, irreducible mind and a real, irreducible brain.
(2). One of the claims of parallellism is that the mind is not influenced by the brain.
(2a). If the mind is not influenced by the brain, we cannot know that there is a brain.
(2b). If we ourselves hold that we cannot know that there is a brain, we can't (even implicitly) state that we know that there is a real, irreducible brain.
(2c) Thus, parallellism is an incoherent position.
(3). The other claim of parallellism is that the brain is not influenced by the mind.
(3a). If the brain is not influenced by the mind, we cannot meaningfully express our theories about the mind by physical means, such as speech and writing.
(3b). Parallellism as shared in the intellectual debate should be meaningfully expressable by physical means, such as speech and writing.
(3c). As parallellism cannot be expressed meaningfully in the intellectual debate, it can't be a candidate within that intellectual debate, let alone win that debate.
(3d). However, parallellists implicitly claim that their position is a meaningfully expressable one, which should not only take part in the intellectual debate, but even win the battle.
(3e). Therefore, parallellism is an incoherent position.

Satisfied?

Titus

Not really.

Everything there seems to ignore the idea that the pre-established harmony is pre-established by God. Your arguments do not work for someone who believes all this was set up by God, including all ones thoughts about the brain and about parallelism.

A detrministic parallelism, where all things physical and psychical were pre-established by God. So your knowledge of the brain (and indeed of anything physical) is through God, not through any kind of interaction.

Adam

 

[slimshady2357]

Emmm . . .I was thinking last night that I would probably go for epiphenomenalism rather than materialism if the physical world is closed. Never thought of non-interactive parallelism. Yes, might well be my preferred choice.

I was wondering about that. I mean, I was joking when I suggested parallelism, because it always seems sort of silly to me. But it certainly would be an option, even possibly an attractive one for someone who clearly sees that our perceptions themselves are not identical with brain processes.

Anyway, what do you think of Titus' refutation of parallelism above? (way above, this thread has been moving along as usual)

Adam

 

[Titus Rivas]

Neutral, naturalistic parallellism

Adam,

Not really.
Everything there seems to ignore the idea that the pre-established harmony is pre-established by God. Your arguments do not work for someone who believes all this was set up by God, including all ones thoughts about the brain and about parallelism.

Maybe not, but then you should know I actually was not talking about this original 17th or 18th Century type of parallellism, but about a neutral contemporary type which would not even presuppose the existence of a God. I guess that if you can justify your knowledge because you trust God to have placed it in you, parallellism could be upheld. However, that would be a type of parallellism which has an entirely theological theory of knowledge rather than an empirical one.

A detrministic parallelism, where all things physical and psychical were pre-established by God. So your knowledge of the brain (and indeed of anything physical) is through God, not through any kind of interaction.

That's what I meant, yes. And obviously, my presupposition is that non-axiological knowledge (of how things are rather than how they should be) is valid because it is based on (logic and) experience, rather than divine revelation.

Again, my argument aims at a naturalistic parallellism which is combined with a usual theory of knowledge rather than with a theological epistemology.

Besides, I guess most contemporary philosophers who would try to cling as much as possible to a type of partial (intraphysical) physicalism, would not want to have to insert the concept of a theistic God as a prerequisite.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Idealism would be the only rational choice

Adam said:
Such a way out is more than just an imaginary answer without followers. In fact, I covered it in my papers Exit Epiphenomenalism and
Why the efficacy of consciousness cannot be limited to the mind.

I've conclusively shown that parallellism is not an option.

Some months since I read that paper of yours. I'lll have to read it again.

If brain processes would show no interaction, I would definitely opt for idealism.

I'm really not happy with the notion that the self's actions is described by the same laws as the patterns exhibited by ones sensory perceptions. But there again all other choices are equally implausible. It's Loki's fault for providing an utterly implausible scenario!

If the world is physically closed I might instinctively feel materialist functionalism is correct. But we do have a subjective perspective, so how can functionalism be correct? So maybe not. But it depends. If someone could explain to me how we could have phenomenal consciousness under any sort of materialism, and I were convinced by their argument, I would go for that. But maybe I would provisionally go for epiphenomenalism

I can't knowingly believe in what does not correspond with logic, in this case materialism. So the brain etc. would simply have to be an illusion,

The brain is not an illusion under idealism! The brain as perceived is more of an illusion, together with the rest of the physical world, under materialism!

 

[Titus Rivas]

Illusion or not?

Ian,

The brain is not an illusion under idealism! The brain as perceived is more of an illusion, together with the rest of the physical world, under materialism!

You've responded in a similar fashion before. I actually don't understand what you mean by it, Ian.
What I mean by illusion, is not that the illusion itself (qua illusion) does not exist. Illusions (as meant here, so not in the technical sense it is sometimes employed in perceptual psychology) are real mental phenomena. The only thing is that they don't refer to anything real outside themselves, they give the impression that there is something external, outside the mind which really isn't there. Compare the term illusionism.
I really, sincerely thought that this is how most idealists picture the physical world. If not, please explain as that might be quite enlightening for me.

best wishes,

Titus

 

[slimshady2357]

Re: Neutral parallellism

Adam,
Maybe not, but then you should know I actually was not talking about this original 17th or 18th Century type of parallellism, but about a neutral contemporary type which would not even presuppose the existence of a God. I guess that if you can justify your knowledge because you trust God to have placed it in you, parallellism could be upheld. However, that would be a type of parallellism which has an entirely theological theory of knowledge rather than an empirical one.

I must admit that I had no idea such a philosophy existed as you describe. I find is difficult to believe someone could try to hold a position like parallelism and still try to claim it had empirical foundations!

And of course, because I lacked knowledge of such a philosophy, I was definitely assuming a theological basis for parallelism.

That's what I meant, yes. And obviously, my presupposition is that non-axiological knowledge (of how things are rather than how they should be) is valid because it is based on (logic and) experience, rather than divine revelation.

Besides, I guess most contemporary philosophers who would try to cling as much as possible to a type of partial (intraphysical) physicalism, would not want to have to insert the concept of a theistic God as a prerequisite.

Best wishes,

Titus

Two possible interpretations of what I mean by 'silly'

Adam

 

[a_unique_person]

I hereby officialy declare this thread a greater waste of time than the the thread that will never die.

 

[slimshady2357]

I hereby officialy declare this thread a greater waste of time than the the thread that will never die.

HOORAY!

Oh, and screw you.

Adam

 

[Titus Rivas]

Proponents

Adam,

And of course, because I lacked knowledge of such a philosophy, I was definitely assuming a theological basis for parallelism.

I see, well I don't know any official proponents either. Anyway, my argument aimed exclusively at naturalistic parallellism.

Regarding the non-naturalistic type, I'd say parallellists would first have to prove the existence of God (which might be easier than it seems) before they use the concept of a God so that it can explain knowledge about the physical world. So they first have to answer the question about the existence of God.

And that was probably what you had in mind all along.

Titus

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Dismissing parallellism

Hi Adam,


Just to summarize my arguments:

(1). Parallellism implicitly states that we can know that there is a real, irreducible mind and a real, irreducible brain.

It proposes there is a real irreducible brain. I don't see how it can say that it knows this.

(2). One of the claims of parallellism is that the mind is not influenced by the brain.
(2a). If the mind is not influenced by the brain, we cannot know that there is a brain.
(2b). If we ourselves hold that we cannot know that there is a brain, we can't (even implicitly) state that we know that there is a real, irreducible brain.
(2c) Thus, parallellism is an incoherent position.

Yes but I have challenged premise 1

(3). The other claim of parallellism is that the brain is not influenced by the mind.
(3a). If the brain is not influenced by the mind, we cannot meaningfully express our theories about the mind by physical means, such as speech and writing.

Again it might seem we can dispute 3a. Even though all our ideas about the mind are purely caused by physical processes occurring in our brains and local environment, it could be that "coincidentally" we arrive at correct ideas about the mind.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Saving my argument

Hi Ian,

It proposes there is a real irreducible brain. I don't see how it can say that it knows this.

But how can it propose that there is a real brain, if that does not imply truth of that proposition and therefore knowledge of its truth?

The logical options are:

- A proposition is just a wild guess or speculation, which obviously is not the case for parallellism.

- A proposition is based on logic, which obviously is not the case either.

- A proposition is based on intuition, which could only hold for the theistic type, non-naturalistic type of parallellism I was not addressing.

- A proposition is based on evidence, which is what would have to apply for naturalistic parallellism.

So, my point is saved.

Again it might seem we can dispute 3a. Even though all our ideas about the mind are purely caused by physical processes occurring in our brains and local environment, it could be that "coincidentally" we arrive at correct ideas about the mind.

The problem is that we could only claim that there is such a coincidence of the expression of such ideas (rather than the ideas themselves, which is another matter) and our intention to express the very same ideas. But such a coincidence is not the same as a real expression. And that's obviously not what naturalistic parallellists would implicitly claim. They would implicitly claim that their words reflect their thoughts because they want them to, not by a freaky type of coincidence. Again, we're talking about naturalistic parallellism here.

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

How I understood naturalistic parallellism

This is how I understood naturalistic parallellism:

the processes in our conscious (and perhaps subconscious) minds run completely parallel to certain processes in the brain.

the brain processes aren't affected by the conscious processes.

the conscious processes aren't affected by the brain processes.

both types of processes would have to be deterministic and predictable from naturalistic laws, of the mind and the brain respectively.

Now in such a system no problem shows up until the two types of processes claim to refer to each other.

To clarify this it bit more, consider the following:

No similar natural process could take place in the brain when the mind starts thinking about the brain as something outside itself. This is because the brain would have no natural motive (within its own causal chain) to think about itself as something outside itself.
The brain is not something external to itself. A mirror image is no option, meaning that the brain would be thinking about the mind as something outside itself. Since brain and mind aren't the same thing in parallellism the (cerebral and mental) 'thought' processes can't go the same way.

Compare: my good old paper .

Don't forget I'm exclusively talking about naturalistic parallellism.

Titus